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Introduction
1 This development is also called “the intellectual property age”. See Koulu 2003, 2. ICT has
been considered to play the most important role in reaching the objectives for further
development at the EU level, for example. See COM (2004) 757 final, 3. The effective
evolution of information and communication technologies is one of the key issues in the
“Lisbon strategy”; two other key issues are to improve investments in knowledge and
networks and to promote active ageing. See COM (2004) 29 final, 2.
2 The importance of being able to create and invent and the ability to communicate
creations and inventions to others have been included among the most important factors
in the emerging Information Society. Supporting these factors has also been considered a
worthwhile development area. See Bangemann et al. 1994, 11.
3 The concept of business idea is used in this study to refer to the kernel of a business. A
business idea is also termed a business mission and a business concept, which are descriptions
of the same object. These are essentially Anglo-American concepts; in Scandinavia the
kernel of a business is generally described as a business idea. See Karlöf 1986, 29.
4 Information is the essence of what has become known as the Information Society. In general
terms, the Information Society is a society where information builds up, and acts in, the
most important societal structures. In sum, the Information Society is a society where
information is bound to all human activity. See Tilastokeskus 1997, 5.
1
CHAPTER ONE. INTERESTS OF THE STATE,
THE MARKET AND SOCIETY
0 INTRODUCTION
Much of business today is communication, making communication one of the essential
factors in the new economy. Other crucial considerations in that economy are the
importance of information and communication technology (ICT), continuing economic expansion,
the increased risks to enterprises, uncertainty in the course of development, networking,
and the globalization of the economy.1 These essential components are connected to both
the operations of enterprises and their operational framework.2 When these factors
materialize, they will bring about profound changes in both business itself  and the business
environment. There exist, however, risks, of which the most serious is the inability to get
sufficiently effective protection for innovations. The changes occasioned by economic
structures will further prompt a search for new and more suitable forms of protection for
the increasing number of operations.
The main purpose of this study is to analyze the divergent interests of the state,
business, and society in the evolving environment. To this end, business is examined in
terms of the business idea, which is considered the very core of business overall.3 The
business idea can even by definition be seen as constituted mainly of other innovative
ideas. In this perspective, information and ideas are the most important structural elements
of the new economy.4 Information and ideas are both also the core elements of the
network economy, which is usually also described as the digital economy. The evolving
prerequisites of operations are manifested through the digital economy as well. This is the
Interests of the state, the market and society
5 The new economy is also described as based on rapid innovations, a globalizing world
economy, and information and communication technology. See Kuusiholma - Pöyhönen
2002, 279. The new economy may also be called an intellectualized economy, in which
scientific discovery, technological change, and innovation are integral in creating growth.
See Petrusson 2004, 2 - 3.
6 Data is called the raw material of information; it consists of signs or combinations of signs
and can be stored, saved, transferred, or transmitted using computers or the digital
communication infrastructure. See Niiniluoto 1997, 236.
7 The developing digital economy does not mean only new discoveries. Just as often, it
consists of old discoveries in a new environment. For example, the first benefits of the
Industrial Revolution were realized in agriculture. Similarly, the productive benefits of the
second industrial revolution derived from the transition from mechanics to electricity. It
is too early to say yet whether the effects of information and communication technology
will be as profound. See Koski - Rouvinen - Ylä-Anttila 2002, 15 - 16.
8 This development has also been described as a two-stage one. The first stage comprises
technological introduction, in which the computer technology is developed and refined.
The second stage is then the one of technological permeation, in which the technology
becomes integrated in everyday human activities and social institutions. At this level,
computer technology changes the fundamental meanings of basic concepts such as
money, education, work, and fair elections. See Bynum 1998, 280.
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outcome of two factors: the digitization of traditional physical products, and the dynamics
brought by this development. Accordingly, information and ideas increase in significance
as the core of the new economy and as the most important aspect of value.5
The kernel of the digital economy is compact and tightly structured around ideas.
At the very core of this economy, information and ideas have close mutual connections.
Information is organized data, data being the most foundational of the three units of
information in the theory of knowledge.6 Information simply becomes the connecting link
in the foundation of the digital economy in that it connects both core assets of the
economy - ideas and knowledge - to each other. Both are founded on information and,
further, both are derived from data as well. Information acts as a form in which ideas are
expressed, a characteristic of information that has even increased in importance recently
with the digital economy.  Data, on the other hand, is the basis of information generally,
whereby ideas are often expressed in the form of data: in fact, it is impossible to separate
ideas from data. Thus, it is essentially impossible to separate data and information from
each other and as such a captive bond they form the very foundations of this study.
The digital economy is not, however, only the abstract communication of
information and ideas; it has serious practical implications. Indeed, the emergence of the
digital economy has brought a set of new products and new ways to operate.7 These new
products and operations are mixes of products and services and differ considerably from
traditional products.8 An illustrative example is the trade in and delivery of information
products. Music may be uploaded from a database and transmitted to the client’s computer.
Is this considered a service, like delivering music to the client and letting him or her upload
it, or as a product, like selling and buying music? This is only one example of the mass of
novelties. The blurred borderlines between products and services have made it impossible
Introduction
9 New property may be described also as new forms of property, with those forms including all
new applications of property. The new forms of property are, for example, the right to
the environment and its values and rights to social benefits such as a pension or health
care. See Kartio 1991, 159.
10 In the digital environment it is almost impossible to get access to digital content without
making several copies of it. See Vaidhyanathan 2001, 152.
11 Public information resources are also considered a common public resource. These informa-
tion resources are free for everyone to use by saving or searching for information. See
Kuronen 2000, 91.
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to draw any clear line of demarcation between the contextual and functional elements of
a given asset. These assets constitute a category termed new property.9 Characteristic of this
new property is that it is derived from the dynamic new economy, this economy being
exactly the framework in which the new property is used. New property thus includes
commercialized information on the availability of some product and a price that depends
on availability. To go even further, new products are not even constructed of single elements,
which used to be the cornerstones of intellectual property. This is often referred to as mixed
property, which contains some attributes of personal property, like intellectual property, and
some attributes of real property.
This development results in the object to be protected having an exceptional
character. This divergent nature sets some further requirements for the overall protection
of property rights. Protection needs to be targeted more and more on operations. This is
due to the dynamics of digital economy, which are at least partly bound to the interplay of
three formerly distinct processes: gaining access to traditionally protected content, to its
usability and employment, and the possibility to copy the content, whatever that may be.10
These dynamics are the development that has caused business to take on an important role
in communication. They relate to operativity, with operativity further fundamentally
connected to the divergent interests that in practice constitute the overall business idea. A
business idea is thus communication. Communicativeness is then further brought into the
business idea through the different interests linked to its operational nature and the
different stakeholders who are active in this communication. A business idea as such
includes a number of contradictory interests and pursuits that are driven by several
stakeholders. On the other hand, the ability or inability to protect a business idea clearly
illustrates the overall change from strictly defined object-oriented protection towards a
more dynamic one. Accordingly, an examination of the business idea and the prerequisites
for its protection require a review of intellectual property rights, which are foundational.
The point of departure for such an examination is to draw a line between free and
controlled. This distinction is important, indeed integral, in the law of intellectual property.
It is derived from the character of resources, which are either free or controlled. Free
resources are those available for everyone to take, like air to breathe or sunshine to enjoy.11
They are free in the sense that everyone can take advantage of them without permission
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12 Totally free resources are rather rare, however. The most common approach has been
control of some degree. Controlled resources may also be available to others, who need
permission to use them. See Lessig 2002a, 12.
13 See Vaidhyanathan 2001, 152 - 153.
14 In the discussions concerning the American information infrastructure, these three stake-
holders have always been considered a communicative wholeness. In other words, ven-
ture capital, innovativeness, and commercialization constitute an interactive system in
which none can exist without the other two. See Steinbock 1998, 4.
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from others.12 The control of resources is based on the requirement of permission for their
use; that is, one person is allowed to establish limits affecting use by others and to control
others’ access to certain resources. When use is allowed, it takes place based on the
permission of the possessor and in accordance with his or her rules. This distinction
between free and controlled is found in the foundation of intellectual property rights, one
of the main focuses of intellectual property law. However, recent developments in the
digital environment and its operational framework have brought about pressure for change
in intellectual property rights. The rise of the digital economy has influenced intellectual
property law in that distinctions between different types of intellectual property have been
eroded.13 The main factor here is the collapse of the object of protection as a tangible
physical asset. This is a direct consequence of the mixing of the characters of products and
services. Protecting merely the object is no longer a tenable approach. The basic
explanation for the collapse of the protected object lies in two main developments:
digitization and networking. The two have collapsed some important distinctions in
intellectual property rights. This also has implications for the collapse of the traditionally
very distinct elements of producers and consumers of information and culture.
The business idea as a reflection of several overlapping interests is continuously
dynamic. Its dynamics clearly illustrate the communication of the stakeholders in those
interests, these stakeholders being the major actors in society at large. Specifically,
communication is carried out among three different interests: the state, the market, and
society.14 These are the stakeholders that make up the modern scope of intellectual
property rights. This threefold communicative pattern is also the basis of the operativity
underlying the concept of business. In this study, business is examined precisely as the
communication and cooperation of these three overlapping elements and the stakeholders
behind them. A study of this communication is well founded, given the need to sufficiently
illustrate the functionality and the communicativeness of business. These communicative
relations are illustrated in the form of a triangle below:
Introduction
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The arguments regarding the communicativeness and functionality of the concept of
business are examined through some practical operations, which are to be interpreted as
operational frameworks. It is essential to frame those operations in order to be able to
capture the internal communication of the divergent interests represented by the three
stakeholders concerned. Indeed, examining these interests and stakeholders separately
seems to be the major failure of traditional intellectual property rights. The separation of
stakeholders and the strict adherence to this distinction in interests has apparently led to
at least a certain inability to discern and anticipate the bases on which different stakeholders
operate and the need to reconcile them. In other words, these needs have always existed,
but they have remained rather inconspicuous. Accordingly, the present study undertakes
to reveal at least some of those interests and the stakeholders behind them.
Crucial developments in the economy overall and thus also in intellectual property
rights have nevertheless one rather fundamental implication: the change in the balance
between statics and dynamics as the core of the interests that constitute business in general,
i.e., the interests of the state, the market, and society. It is, however, the interest of the state
that has been emphasized most in traditional intellectual property rights, the other two
stakeholders being comparatively overlooked in this respect. On the other hand, all of
these interests have been emphasized differently depending on the operational framework
concerned and the activity of the stakeholders in it. The state-oriented view has led to
statics. The static nature of the state orientation is best illustrated in examining the interests
of the market, for the aim is to make the market as dynamic as possible. Dynamic operation
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is the essence of the overall functionality of the market. The alteration of statics and
dynamics is in fact best seen when the interests of the market are solidly fixed on dynamics.
However, both the state and the market need to be cooperative and mutually
communicative. In the traditional economy, this was accomplished by building up
contractual mechanisms to provide for dynamics, i.e., licensing. Licensing made it possible
to transfer rights and thereby it was considered dynamic. However, the digital economy has
changed the content of these interests and the stakeholders have become more dynamic, even in
terms of content. It is no longer sufficient to be able to create dynamics that are
fundamentally based on statics, nor is it possible to create statics that have only a tenuous
connection to dynamics.
The alteration of statics and dynamics is hence the problematic point in reconciling
the interests of the state and the market. One additional consideration here is the scope of
commons, which  illustrates the interests of society as a third stakeholder. Commons may
be used as a safety valve when pursuing collaborative communication between all the
stakeholders and their interests. There then remains at least one major problem: How to
construct a complete illustration of the communicative pattern of all these stakeholders and
their respective interests? Outlining this pattern and presenting its most important
implications is the central aim of the present study.
The State. Static governance
15 On the other hand, the state consists of continuous communication among its citizens.
This communicativeness constitutes a unity. See Simmel 1999, 20.
16 The means of control may be generally classified using the categories of physical, mate-
rial, and symbolic control. Physical control is founded on the use of powers that affect
the body, such as a gun, a whip, or a lock. Control based on the application of physical
means is also described as coercive power. See Etzioni 1964, 59. One of the most effective
forms of control is to connect it to the information streams in society. This may be done
by the mass media. See Bagdikian 2000, 3.
17 See Longman Dictionary of English Language and Culture 1993, 67.
18 Laws are also described as rules of behavior for certain societies, with societal
organization is created by the people living in a society. See Tolonen, J. 1989, 1.
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1 THE STATE. STATIC GOVERNANCE
1.1 Implications of state governance
State governance is characteristically static, mainly due to the nature of state governance itself
and how it is implemented. The state as a governing body is generally considered a sovereign
exerciser of the highest executive power.15 This is one basic function of the state as the
holder of centralized power. This sovereignty is clearly seen for example in the state
governing people by registering them using state-issued identity numbers. State governance
clearly has its source in the centralization of power, which also explains its static nature. On
these grounds, the state has been granted the authority to command and control behavior in
society. The control of the state is thus basically the power to act, command, and restrain,
and these actions are often carried out by the state. This control is also called state
regulation or state governance.16
State governance has thus some core elements that are additional to its sovereignty
and the reasons for its static nature. One such element is the governance of behavior.
Functionally, state governance is aimed at ruling behavior, with this control aimed at the
behavior of a group of people, or even the whole country. Governance of this kind is
carried out by making and amending laws.17 As such, the governing power of the state is
exercised through its legislative power, as embodied in laws.18 The main purpose here is
to set constraints on unwanted behavior. Legislation is thus used for making the governed
people “unfree” by directing the legislative power at them. On the other hand, the governable
unfree may be anything whatsoever, as long as it may be placed under the power of the state.
This implies that legislation is used for dominating unfree nature.
State governance is, further, essentially based on the operations of government,
which derives directly from the sovereignty of the state. This makes the character of
government likewise one of the core elements of state governance. Government is a tool
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19 State governance is also a means to define the functions and tasks of the government
generally. For example, the state of the 19th century, described as ”a night watchman“,
derived from the general nature of the state as an organizer of general state governance,
public order and security, national defense, taxation and some essential aspects of
citizenship. See Kivivuori 1997, 683.
20 State governance is thus centralized governmental organization due to its institutionalized
character. It is also hierarchical, bureaucratic, and subject to legal rules. See Tuori 1990,
269.
21 See Longman Dictionary of English Language and Culture 1993, 567. See also Collins
Cobuild English Language Dictionary 1987, 630.
22 See The Oxford Reference Dictionary 1986, 352.
23 In the Habermasian sense, the institutionalized state is here compared with an archaistic
kinship system, where the systemic mechanisms remain tightly intermeshed with
mechanisms of social integration only so long as they attach to pre-given social
structures. In the institutionalized state the formation of genuinely political power no
longer derives its authority from the prestige of leading descent groups. See Habermas
1989, 165.
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used by the state to organize its own operations and the behavior of its citizens.19 Hence,
state governance is itself bound to governmental authority, which imposes some further
requirements on the governmental structure. State regulation is centralized, which means that
it is based on some centralized power that maintains control.20 Governance is thus often
linked to the control carried out by a country, which controls the public services. This
controlling force is, for its part, often bound to the exercise of political power.21
The authority of state governance is also one of its basic elements. Governance is
usually carried out by an authority that controls policy or affairs.22 This is one further
explanation for the sovereignty of state governance; i.e., governance is carried out by the
sovereign state. The governing power here is precisely that power which is exercised by a
sovereign. Governance is hence often used as means to define the rules and behavioral
patterns of the dominating power, which complements the power with some measure of
politics and political power. On the theoretical level, this in fact corresponds rather closely
to the formation of genuinely political power as described by Jürgen Habermas. According
to Habermas, political power derives its authority from disposition over juridical means of
sanction. Furthermore, the organizational complex that is created at the level of political
control becomes the core of the institutional state.23 This is the very kernel of the
mechanism of state organization, whose interests are embedded directly in legal
institutions.
The governance structure may further be brought down to a slightly lower level, on
which it can be examined from a somewhat functional viewpoint. A functional approach
makes it possible to implement the governance structure in operations in society at large,
not only in traditional governmental ones. This possibility is associated with certain
circumstances or operations, where the governance structures have some essential potential
to be implemented in individual operations. This kind of governance structure may be
described as functional governance. The forms of functional governance are characteristically
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24 This governance is called operational governance. See Collins Cobuild English Language
Dictionary 1987, 630.
25 Verticality is a direct consequence of the significance of human and civil rights as the ker-
nel of state governance. See Karhu 2004, 73.
26 Copyright in Anglo-American countries and author’s right (droit d’auhor) in France are slightly
different in content. Copyright focuses traditionally on the societal role of protection: a work
is considered a commercial good. The author’s right tradition, on the other hand, has
emphasized the individual aspect of protection, with moral rights constituted one of the most
significant elements. A societal aspect has thus been introduced by protecting the author. See
Koivumaa 1995, 75. In the present study, these two different traditions are not differentiated;
“copyright” is used as a general term referring to both.
27 Section 15 in its entirety reads as follows.”Protection of property. The property of everyone
is protected. Provisions on the expropriation of property, for public needs and against full
compensation, are laid down by an Act.” See the Constitution of Finland at
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf
See also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C364/01), article 17.
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somewhat more specific than the forms of state governance. Functional governance is
aimed at governing particular events or occurrences. It may be effected using traditional
governmental instruments in a certain network of those events or situations. In these cases,
the overall governance structure is a practical means for creating some order in temporary
functions. The reason is clear: the natural course of events may become total chaos if left
uncontrolled. Governance is used for controlling functions or influencing them.24
The applicability of governance structures in both state governance overall and more
specific instances makes it a practical tool in operational frameworks. It may be applied
somewhat  further provided that its limitations are taken into consideration. Governance
is static and rather fixed, and while it is precisely this static nature that makes state
governance characteristically vertical, it is nevertheless used as an instrument for controlling
operations.25
1.1.1 State governance as a tool
The control that is carried out in the form of state governance is bound to fundamental values
that must be preserved and protected. Generally these values are simply built into people’s
ordinary daily activities. An illustrative example is copyright legislation. The author of a
work has an exclusive right to dispose of the copyrighted content. This ensures the author’s
right to decide about his or her property.26 This is closely connected to the constitutional
protection of property (In Finland: Constitution of Finland 15§.)27 At the same time, a
copyright ensures freedom of action for the author in that the copyright may well be
considered a right ensuring two fundamental values.
The governing structure of values is thus generally established in a framework which
then further sets out the operational environment. The framework may change in the
course of time and this variation affects the values and their mutual relationship
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28 The interconnected entity of values and their realization corresponds rather closely to the
constellation approach elaborated by Satu Paasilehto. Paasilehto sees the constellation
approach as an attempt to understand the structural forces which generate the order and
regularity that are characteristic of a certain legal culture. This occurs without assuming
that the order is natural or built into cultural space. See Paasilehto 2002, 132.
29 Radical change in the most fundamental frames of society is naturally based on
digitization and informatization. Information is no longer stored and modified in physical
form but is transmitted and passed on in digital form. When dependency on information
technology rises, the transmission of information and information itself become more
vulnerable. See Saarenpää et al. 1997, 21 - 22.
30 See Lessig 1999, 6.
31 Structural values are closely bound to the constitutive role of law. Law has a dual role as a
constitutive factor and as a regulative tool. In its constitutive role, law creates and pre-
serves social institutions through norms. On the other hand, law is regulative and gives
guidance and incentives for certain behavior. See Pöyhönen 1999, 49.
32 Lessig writes here about the constitution of the United States Federal Government where
the purpose of structural values is pursued by designing certain checks on governmental
power and limits on its reach over states. See Lessig 1999, 7. The structural values are,
however, rather similar and quite incompatible when structuring the values of cyberspace.
33 DRM is an acronym of digital rights management. A digital rights management system is an
application of technical tools which are used to protect digitally expressed copyrighted
content. Protection is implemented by technical applications that restrict access to the
content of any information products requiring protection. In the digital environment,
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accordingly.28 For example, the digital economy has changed the conditions for the
economy at large. This development necessarily affects fundamental values. Naturally, one
of the most likely developments is that these values do not simply occur, but need to be built
into new structures. This occurs when the traditional structure of values is revised to reflect
the changed digital framework - exactly what we do when we re-examine the structure of
data protection or data security in the revised digital framework.29 In the digital framework
this also implies that the values may be built directly into the code of cyberspace. Indeed,
in the artificial digital framework, fundamental values are usually realized artificially as
well.30 These values may well be those of the biggest or the most powerful party.
Values are divided into two classes, which are rather closely connected to the
structure of the  framework concerned. Values are either substantive or structural. Structural
values are concentrated in the structure of government or other governing body.31 In the
digital framework the governing body is usually the one that decides on the construction
of computer code. The  purpose of structural values is to ensure that the power of the
governing body does not become too strong.32 Accordingly, structural values become
embedded in the constitution and cannot be removed without changing the entire
instrument. This is due to the essence of human rights, which constitute the overall scope
of structural values. A good example of structural values in the digital framework is the
incompatibility of digital constraints (DRM) and free access to information, where technological
measures may restrict or diminish the realization of access to information as a fundamental
value.33 In Finland, free access to information is set down in the law even at the level of
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these restrictions can be carried out effectively almost only by technical measures.
See Davis 2001, http://www.copyright.com/PDFs/ComputerLibraries.pdf.pdf
34 Section 12 in its entirety reads as follows: “Everyone has the freedom of expression.
Freedom of expression entails the right to express, disseminate and receive information,
opinions and other communications without prior prevention by anyone. More detailed
provisions on the exercise of the freedom of expression are laid down by an Act. Provi-
sions on restrictions relating to pictorial programs that are necessary for the protection of
children may be laid down by an Act. Documents and recordings in the possession of the
authorities are public, unless their publication has for compelling reasons been specifi-
cally restricted by an Act. Everyone has the right of access to public documents and re-
cordings.” See the Constitution of Finland at
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf See also the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C364/01), article 11.
35 See Lessig 1999, 7.
36 In addition to traditional civil rights, these civil rights include such economic fundamental
rights that influence all the market actors by protecting them. One of the most important
of these is protection of property, which includes freedom of contracts and their validity.
Likewise, freedom of trade, the right to work and freedom to engage in commercial
activity are crucial civil rights in this sense. These civil rights actually have their impact on
the functionality of the overall market. See Karhu 2004, 73.
37 Section 10 in its entirety reads as follows: “Everyone's private life, honor and the sanctity
of the home are guaranteed. More detailed provisions on the protection of personal data
are laid down by an Act. The secrecy of correspondence, telephony and other confiden-
tial communications is inviolable. Measures encroaching on the sanctity of the home, and
which are necessary for the purpose of guaranteeing basic rights and liberties or for the
investigation of crime, may be laid down by an Act. In addition, provisions concerning
limitations of the secrecy of communications which are necessary in the investigation of
crimes that jeopardise the security of the individual or society or the sanctity of the home,
at trials and security checks, as well as during the deprivation of liberty may be laid down
by an Act.” See the Constitution of Finland at
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf See also at the level of
EU: the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C364/01), article  7.
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civil rights. (The Constitution of Finland 12 §: Freedom of expression and right of access to
information.)34
Substantive values support the checks and limits of governmental power. These values
are fundamental ones and thus cannot be totally removed. In other words, a certain
protection of these values must always be preserved, whereby a commitment to them
persists.35 These substantive values thus resemble human rights or traditional civil rights.
As such they come rather close to the central role of human and civil rights as the most
important restrictive instrument of the power of state. Preserving these substantive values
is actually the traditional task of civil rights. Indeed, it is their most fundamental task.36  In
other words, there always exists some value that is further realized through a relevant civil
right; e.g., privacy corresponds to the right to personal freedom. (The Constitution of Finland
10 §: The right to privacy.)37 Another good example of substantive values is free speech,
which is partly included in the overall freedom of human beings. This freedom has to be
preserved in order to prevent anarchy in the state. (The Constitution of Finland 7 § : The right
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38 Section 7 in its entirety reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to life, personal liberty,
integrity and security. No one shall be sentenced to death, tortured or otherwise treated
in a manner violating human dignity. The personal integrity of the individual shall not be
violated, nor shall anyone be deprived of liberty arbitrarily or without a reason prescribed
by an Act. A penalty involving deprivation of liberty may be imposed only by a court of
law. The lawfulness of other cases of deprivation of liberty may be submitted for review
by a court of law. The rights of individuals deprived of their liberty shall be guaranteed by
an Act.”See the Constitution of Finland at
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf
The right to the integrity of person is set out the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union (2000/C364/01), article 3.
39 The borderline has also been drawn at the level of free speech. Mass communication  has to
be carried out in a neutral way. Neutrality ought to apply to both media and content. See
Niiranen - Sotamaa 2003, 11 - 12.
40 Copyright is even more clearly defined and formulated in section 12 of the Constitution
of Finland. See n. 34 footnote.
41 See Lessig 1999, 7.
42 On the other hand, public law and order are strictly derived from the decision-making of
the governing body and their manifestation varies. See Schmitt 1997, 54.
43 These values linked to fundamental rights are generally vertical; i.e., they are realized in the
relationship of the individual and the state. See Ferrajoli 2001, 14 - 15.
44 See Lessig 1999, 95.
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to life, personal liberty and integrity.)38 On the other hand, personal liberty and integrity
both constitute an essential part of copyright, which draws a borderline between private
(included) and public (excluded).39 Here copyright may be seen as an instrument for
defining the scope of privacy.40
There is also some internal logic in the system of substantive and structural values; i.e.,
the  implementation of both structural and substantive values ought to be ensured. This
is also why the implementation of both should be carried out in an interrelated manner.
Interrelated implementation is reasonable for several reasons. On the one hand,
implementing one category without implementing the other would be meaningless. On the
other hand, if left unchecked the structure could easily undermine substantive protection;
i.e., the governing structure may become too strong or too weak. This in turn might cause
some distortions in the overall structure of governance or even in the category of
substantive values. Without any substantive protection fundamental values may be violated
by even reflective and balanced government.41
Both sets of values also have some influence in society itself. Namely, it is through
these values that the governing power essentially aims to affect people’s behavior.42 This
kind of influence is either direct or indirect.43 The law functions in different ways
depending on the case. Direct legislation is designed to directly regulate the behavior itself.
In other words, the law tells individuals how to behave, and then threatens them with
punishment if they deviate from that behavior.44 An illustrative example of this is a
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45 See Article 2 of the Copyright Act in footnote n. 231.
46 Law is the most general of the regulative forms; legislation is aimed directly at setting lim-
its on  behavior. See Lessig 1999, 87.
47 For example, the behavior of smokers is only seldom regulated by law. Regulation by
norms can be seen in the pattern of behavior whereby one asks permission to smoke in a
car. See Lessig 1999, 87.
48 The price of a cigarette is a constraint on one’s ability to smoke. Changing the price
changes this constraint accordingly. The same applies to quality. If the market supplies a
variety of cigarettes of widely varying quality and price, one’s ability to select the kind of
cigarette one wants increases. Increasing choice here reduces constraints. See Lessig 1999,
87.
49 For example, unfiltered cigarettes represent a greater constraint on smoking than filtered
ones, if one is worried about one’s health. “Architecture” here means the way the ciga-
rette is designed, how it is built, and what it is like. See Lessig 1999, 87.
50 This is especially carried out by Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright And
Related Rights in the Information Society: Article 6: Obligations as to technological measures.
See similarly in the USA in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) H.R. 2281: Sec-
tion 1201: Technical amendments.
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copyright, which grants the creator of a work an exclusive right to dispose of the work.
(The Copyright Act of Finland 2 §.)45
Indirect legislation, for its part, aims at modifying one of the other structures of
constraint. Indirect legislation may be more powerful when the punishment enacted in law
is not effective enough to prevent people from violating the law. These structures of
constraint may arise from either direct or indirect regulation and the forms of regulation
may be divided into four categories.46 Law is naturally the starting point inasmuch as it is
an instrument of direct regulation. Law may nevertheless be used a tool of indirect
regulation. Alongside the law, there are norms, which are also rules of behavior. Norms
differ from laws in that they are usually agreed upon in a certain society or group of people.
Accordingly, compliance with norms is often based on group pressure.47
Law and norms are further complemented by the market, which is also an effective
regulative instrument. Market regulation is carried out by setting market prices, for
example.48 The most fundamental regulative tool of these four, however, is the technical
architecture. Architecture means that the technology of a product set limits on behavior, for
example, by limiting the use of the product. Architectural regulation also refers to
technology that directly affects the supply or the supply channels of products.49 In the
copyright example above, architecture takes the form of different physical restrictive means
that seek to prevent infringements of copyright, e.g., a high price and poor quality of
copies. These physical means now tend to be strengthened by constructing instruments for
digital rights management and incorporating these into copyrighted works.50 Making these
technical measures part of the copyright clearly alters the architectural construction of the
system of copyright. Both direct and the indirect regulation are closely bound to the
implementing values in the society, which makes them part of the foundation of state
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51 Verticality is basically expressed in the medieval view that the societal structure ought to
be hierarchical. In other words, a hierarchically organized society was a harmonious
whole: at the top was the church, and below it were then the secular might and the other
positions. In this whole everything had its own meaning and function. See Tolonen, J.
1989, 9.
52 This clearly corresponds to the structure of a legal order as described by Carl Schmitt.
Schmitt concludes that law and order are based on decision-making, exactly like other
social orders. See Schmitt 1997, 54.
53 On the one hand, human beings are a part of nature and likewise a part of the ecosystem;
on the other, they are considered responsible actors utilizing nature. See Heinonen 2000,
55.
54 The causal principle is based on the presupposition that all events are derived from certain
characteristic causes as an unexceptional rule. The future is hence causal in that it is al-
ways determined by the past. See Makkonen 1998, 13. See also Niiniluoto 1983, 238 -
241.
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governance. The verticality of state governance is also readily found in the implementation
of these forms of regulation. Verticality is the foundation of an additional vertical structure
in the human being’s dominance over nature.
1.1.2 The human being’s dominance over nature
State governance is basically founded on influencing the way people behave. The governance
of human behavior is hence one tool of state governance. In this sense state governance is
based on putting the state above the people. This is one of the cornerstones of the
verticality and static nature of state governance: placing the state above the people makes
the governance structure and thus the overall governance architecture vertical.51 Verticality
is incorporated in the forms of regulation used by the state, e.g., law and norms. These
forms of regulation are based on a certain superiority of legislative power. This superiority,
and verticality as a fixed part of it, then further constitute the state’s monopoly on
legislation.52 On the other hand, state governance is based directly on building up the
architecture of governance inasmuch as structural values are implemented in this manner
in any case.
The overall interests of the state are thus also basically embodied in the vertical
structure. Verticality is based on a certain distinctiveness in the internal order of nature.
The current view on the mutual relationship of humankind and nature is based on this
dualistic distinctiveness.53 In nature there simply exist no intentions and in this sense nature is
totally unintentional. Natural phenomena simply occur without anyone having any intent
to make them or want them to occur. Nature thus includes that part of reality in which
causal natural laws are predominant.54 In nature one certain occurrence plainly causes some
other one. In this sense, nature is precisely unintentional and thus unfree. In practice, this
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55 Natural beings develop on their own as they progress in the direction determined by their
own norms. As such they also reproduce themselves. Technical creations, in contrast, get
their form and their functioning rules from human beings. Thereby, it is up to humans to
decide about this development and its pace. See Heinonen 2000, 58.
56 According to the words of Lord Bacon from the year 1597 “Nam et ipsa scientia potestas est”,
meaning “knowledge is power”. This power is considered to be the human being’s power
over nature. See von Wright 1983, 7 - 8.
57 Here it is clear that the behavior of a human being is based on his or her intention, i.e.,
that he or she pursues a certain goal and has a certain epistemic outlook, which means
that he or she considers an act as a necessary step reaching this goal.  Further, the inten-
tion and epistemic outlook constitute a sufficient justification for committing the act. See
Makkonen 1998, 110 - 111. The intentions and beliefs that influence a given human act
are never employed alone; rather the act becomes understandable in terms of several be-
liefs and intentions. This makes it rather complicated to predict societal behavior. See
Rosenberg A. 1988, 33 - 34.
58 On the other hand, the laws of nature and the rules of law are analogically connected.
The former control the relations among natural objects, the latter the relations among
people. See Renner 1949, 45.
59 In the Middle Ages it was generally thought that God and the real world together formed
an organized whole in a reasonable way. No clear borderlines were drawn between nature
and its ethos and God and his creations. God’s will and ability were brought out in the
visible world, mainly in nature in the form of natural laws. See Tolonen, J. 1989, 8 - 9.
15
means that natural beings develop on their own.55 As thinking creatures, human beings
distinguish themselves from nature. A human being is capable of having intentions and the
ability to make rational decisions is his or her most distinctive attribute. In this sense
humans are free, or at least they always have the chance to be free.56 On the other hand,
in being bound to causality, nature is crucially unfree. This verticality embodied in the
imbalance in the relationship between human beings and nature then sets up the
empowerment of human beings over nature.57
Society differs from nature precisely in the sense that nature is unfree, whereas society
is bound to a certain order. The causality of natural laws means that a certain order exists in
nature that is directly derived from that causality itself. In other words, nature functions
on its own. In society the setting is slightly different. Society tends to turn towards chaos
and anarchy if there is no sovereign to keep law and order. Maintaining law and order is
the task of the state.58 The resulting control is then extended over all other actors and this
domination is the source of verticality in state governance. It also imparts the static nature
to the overall state governance system.
The verticality of state governance is thus transferred directly to the relationship
between people and nature.59 In this relationship verticality means that human beings ought
to control nature in general. The vertical relationship of people and nature is precisely
manifested in how nature is exploited. People have the ability to take advantage of natural
resources and to utilize those resources. This is often also described as “discovering”
nature, where discovering actually means getting information about nature and then
exploiting this to one’s own advantage. On the other hand, discovering nature creates the
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60 Contractual freedom is an illustration of a free market that is based on free competition.
Free competition then further stabilizes the market and supports contractual freedom.
See Wilhelmsson 1995, 5.
61 Freedom is manifested in the very foundations of contract law. In contract law, freedom
to act is based on the possibility granted to the contracting parties to arrange their mutual
relationships as they wish. See Wilhelmsson 1995, 2.
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crucial basis for inventions, which may then become excluded from the common base of
natural resources. Here an illuminating example is a patent, which is actually a state-granted
monopoly to exploit some discovery of nature.
Nature is thus, in more general terms, exploited by employing the information
gathered about it. In other words, discovering nature and gathering information about it
yields some more sophisticated knowledge about nature and its functions. On the basis of
this knowledge it becomes possible to use nature and its resources for humankind's own
good. Thus,  the human ability to collect and compile knowledge and information creates
an important element in humankind’s dominance over nature. This is also exactly the
meeting point of human knowledge and information technology as a manifestation of
nature.
1.1.3 The human being’s dominance over any free actor
The basis of human beings’ dominance over nature is found in the de facto freedom of the
human being. This is freedom gives an individual the liberty to enter into obligations, i.e.,
to oblige him- or herself, and thereby to become unfree. Therefore, the other rather essential
implication of the superiority of humankind, alongside its domination over nature, is
manifested in the relationship between free actors, i.e., human being versus human being. People
are free to enter into obligations and use  their privileged position for their own good. This
takes place through contracts, for example.60 In the relationship between two free actors,
contracts incorporate a dominance rather similar to the human being’s  domination over
nature; the difference is in the freedom or unfreedom of the object.
An individual’s domination over nature is governed. This occurs precisely through
the vertical construction of state governance, which is needed for governing the activities
of free actors as well. Thus, exactly as in the case of domination over unfree nature, even
the rights of free actors may be governed. This is where contracts are to be used. Contracts
are precisely the tool to govern these rights among free human beings. Contractual freedom,
i.e., the freedom of a free actor to obligate him- or herself,  is in fact considered the very
basis of exchange. It is precisely the freedom to make arrangements for future activity that
sets the foundation for cooperation in society at large. Freedom is then manifested in the
form of autonomy, which allows each party to define his or her individual sphere of life
in order to achieve his or her individual aims.61
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62 These intentional acts may be explained on various grounds. Some focuses here are moti-
vation to do something, social pressure, goal orientation, and intentionality. Other essen-
tial factors are the interplay of intentions and beliefs in certain acts and their relation to
the ultimate goal. See von Wright 1976, 116.
63 See Wilhelmsson 1995, 2.
64 This was also the case when the powers of state and society were clearly different from
each other. This is an explicit difference from the strict engagement of state and society
in the era of feudalism, when the feudal lord determined both private law and public law.
The rights and duties of a bondman were hence totally subject to the power of the lord
superior. See Ylikangas 1983, 77.
65 This is carried out through both the validity of contracts as one of the main presumptions of
the whole contractual system and contractual freedom as a legal principle. See Pöyhönen
1988, 88. On the other hand, contractual freedom has been shaken (Or, has it in fact
been strengthened?, added here) by including in the concept of a contract some prerequi-
sites that are valid right after entering into a contract. These prerequisites contribute to
the concept itself. See Grönfors 1993, 27 - 31.
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In more general terms, contractual freedom involves the libertarian idea of free
activity. The basis of this free activity is that a contracting party is free to decide on his or
her own acts according to his or her individual aims and responsibilities. Free activity is
thus rather extensively based on the intentionality of the human being.62 Accordingly,
freedom is also part of economic activity. The state has no power to interfere in the free
activity of contracting parties. Legislation concerning contracts is assumed to be
discretionary and thus also to yield to the will of the contracting parties regarding the
context of the contract.63 Further, as a manifestation of the freedom of contract, the
normative framework of contract law is assumed to be equal for everyone.64 It is thus
precisely contractual freedom that binds individuals to the contractual relationship. This
freedom is exercised in entering into a contract of one’s individual free will.65
Moreover,  this obligation is free and voluntary and is thus fundamentally derived
directly from the individual him- or herself. This is the greatest distinction between
dominating the free and the unfree. It is precisely individuality that draws the most
significant line of demarcation here. In other words, both freedom as free will and
commitment as a manifestation of individuality are essential factors in incorporating some
privacy into the contractual relationship. Internal privacy is actually a rather robust
manifestation of individuality in the contractual relationship. Yet, contractual freedom by
no means implies an unlimited freedom of choice. At least public interests and justified claims
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66 The market is often based on monopolies or oligopolies, where the market is cooperation
among a few  powerful market actors. These are then free to decide market prices or the
terms for entering into contracts. In these cases contractual freedom will be reduced or
become even a total fiction. These contracts are often mass ones and the terms are de-
cided almost exclusively by one contracting party or its branch organization. Actually in
these cases interfering in contractual terms also implies interference in the content of
contracts.  Restriction of contractual freedom actually entails interference to some degree
also in the contextual freedom of contracts. Contextual distortions have emerged when
the stronger contracting party has the intention of getting a better legal position or limit-
ing its liability. See Wilhelmsson 1995,  6 - 8.
67 The argumentation behind legal fictions may be explained through an examination of the
work of Alf Ross. Ross examined the notion of tû-tû by comparing it to the concept of
subjective right. Originally tû-tû referred to an ancient rite of the Noït-Kif people, who were
very primitive and based their life on several different beliefs. Tû-tû was one of these
beliefs and it was connected to violating the taboos of the Noït-Kif. Tû-tû was hence
realized when a taboo of the Noït-Kif was violated. For example, one violation was eat-
ing the food intended for the chief. One who committed this kind of violation was driv-
en under a harmful or even injurious force of tû-tû. This was a dangerous magic power or
threat of bad luck under which the guilty member of Noït-Kif or even the whole people
might come. In order to neutralize tû-tû, a guilty person had to go through a special puri-
fication ceremony. Ross aimed his criticism at the chain of inferences which was drawn
from the violation of a taboo via tû-tû to the purification ceremony. Ross argued that the
conclusion could be drawn from eating the food intended for the chief straight to the
purification ceremony and tû-tû therefore seemed to be a completely needless concept
and thus a fiction. See Ross 1951, 468 - 470.
68 The norms set by the courts of justice are also single norms. See Zitting 1987, 491.
69 Legal norms are assumed to be stable so that they will create some essential stability and
predictability for the market as well. In addition, legal norms are assumed to be general
and abstract to impart some predictability to social behavior. General legal norms con-
cern everyone equally. See Häyhä 1993, 170 - 172.
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of others delimit the scope within which the contractual parties are allowed to act.66
Nevertheless, contractual liability does add a certain verticality to contractual relationships.
A contract actually consists of different kinds of relationships. These relationships
are commands aimed at the contracting parties to act in a certain, desired way. In other
words, the requirements of certain types of behavior are actually seen as originating in the
concept of a contract, which is further described as a gathering together of those relations.
A contract may be considered only a legal fiction having a certain internal normative system.67
This system is composed of different kinds of norms, some of which are set individually
and others generally. Contractual norm-setting may thus be carried out for only one single
contractual act or for a more general course of action. Norms concerning an individual
contractual relationship are usually set individually and are thus single norms. As such they
regulate only a single contractual relationship.68 On the other hand, general norms are
enacted by the legislator and are made concrete through enforcement.69 A corresponding
interpretative problem occurs in intellectual property rights and concerns the expansion of
the scope of contract through licensing. Licensing acts as a means of expansion when it allows
the licensee to enlarge the scope of the licensing agreement by excluding third parties from
a domain to which they would otherwise have free access. This gives the licensee a
The State. Static governance
70 The argument against the concept of subjective right was similarly the idea that a subjec-
tive right has no counterpart in reality even though it was used as a descriptive concept. On
these grounds the subjective rights were considered not to exist either. Rather than exam-
ining the prerequisites for the existence of this kind of rights it had to be considered what
a concept of subjective right means and what was being referred to when the concept
was used. It was possible to structure the concepts more accurately by giving up the re-
quirement of a concrete entity and concentrating on what the concepts referred to. See
Helin 1978, 645 - 646.
71 The prototype of a contract consists of two equal parties, with the contractual commit-
ment bound to the intent of both of those parties. See Zitting 1987, 491.
72 The view of contracts has altered. A contract is no longer considered an instrument for
realizing the divergent interests of the contracting parties. Rather, it is increasingly con-
sidered a means to balance the common interests and aims of both parties. In other
words, a contract is an instrument to realize the common interests of the parties. See
Häyhä 1996, 16 - 19.
73 The intention does not concern only a single issue but consists of several discretionary
intents given together or separately. See Zitting 1987, 492.
74 This means that  individually set rules implement contractual regulation. In this case, it is
only this precise contractual relationship that can then be regulated. Contractual norms
are thus set individually for each contractual relationship in turn, and this individual regu-
lation then becomes the  foundation of contractual regulation overall. See Zitting 1987,
492.
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possibility to protect his or her  privilege much more forcefully than he or she would be
allowed to according to the agreement itself. A third party has to adapt its behavior to this
in order not to violate the right being set out in the licensing agreement.
A contract is thus constituted of behavioral patterns. It is always a constellation of
different relationships.70 The freedom to act constitutes the basis of all inter partes
relationships, of which the contractual relationship is the core.71 A contractual relationship
is also based on intentionality as the manifestation of the free will of free actors. The intent
of the parties actually makes up the normative system in its functional sense; i.e.,
intentionality is the key to realizing one’s free will as a manifestation of the freedom to act.
This is carried out by setting a single norm for a single contractual relationship.72 This
norm is based on the intention of both of the parties.73  On balance, a contract  is an
individual regulative instrument whose core  is a certain amount of essential privacy.
Privacy as the core of the contractual relationship actually imparts some degree of
privatization to contracting overall. The most crucial elements of privatization are brought
in through individual contract regulation, this regulation being a matter of only certain
committed parties. Here, the instrumentality of contract is evident. In this norm setting, the
main element of intent is to set out a formal pattern of behavior. This creates at the same
time some regulative force for the contract, which thereby becomes based on the intention
of the contracting parties. This then shifts the regulative force from the state towards
individually decided relationships, whereby a contract may be considered a regulative tool.74
On the other hand, there exists a clear interference by the state in the freedom of
contract. This is actually an exception to the main rule according to which contract law is
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75 Contractual principles are used for optimizing cooperation and thereby they need to be
weighed against each other. See Pöyhönen 1988, 25 - 26.
76 An illustrative example of standard-form contracts in the present day are the IT 2000
Terms and Conditions for IT Procurement. This document includes the general terms and con-
ditions for information technology contracts. In Finland, IT terms and conditions are
prepared as a cooperative effort of the Central Chamber of Commerce of Finland, the
Finnish Association of Logistics, the Finnish Information Processing Association, and
the IT Services Association (TIPAL). The starting point for the IT terms and conditions
is to draft contract clauses that can be used in contracts between suppliers and customers
for domestic deliveries. For more details, see IT 2000 Terms and Conditions for IT Procure-
ment.
77 In the digital network framework, standard-form contacts are often introduced as point-
and-click contracts. Here a consumer accepts conditions by only pressing a button, but there
is no guarantee that he or she has read them. See Lindberg - Westman 2000, 58 - 59.
78 Adjustment of an unreasonable condition actually maintains contractual freedom by
endeavoring to ensure the equality of both parties in the contractual relationship. Con-
tractual terms used by the stronger contracting party should not be used as tools to sup-
press the weaker party. See Pöyhönen 1988, 263.
79 For example, credit agreements and piece-work contracts are typically standard-form
contracts. See Halila - Hemmo 1996, 41.
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based on certain contractual principles directing the contractual behavior of the parties
rather than on strict state regulation. Those principles then further govern contract law in
general, in which the cooperation of parties is rather free.75 In order to ensure the proper
functionality of the system of contracts and to sustain the principle of contractual freedom,
there exists a class of standard-form contracts. Standard-form contracts are often also described
as mass contracts and their fundamental purpose is to establish exact standard forms in all
contracts.76 Standard-form contracts constitute one effective tool for governing the
expanding market, where governance is realized precisely by creating general standards for
mass contracting.
Standard-form contracts have been used for incorporating static verticality into
contracts as privatized instruments of regulation. Examples in intellectual property rights
are click-wrap and shrink-wrap contracts, which are actually only one way to strengthen the
regulatory force of the content provider. Shrink-wraps and click-wraps differ from the
average standard-form consumer contracts in that the terms of the contract are not
revealed to the consumer until he or she opens the package. This is precisely when the
consumer becomes liable as well.77 Generally, standard forms are provisions that
characteristically already include some provisions for consumer protection. On the other
hand, the level of consumer protection in standard-form contracts in the Nordic countries
is due to the overall strength of consumer protection.78 The scope of standard-form
contracts is thus one way to include state regulation directly in a given contractual form.79
State regulation becomes a central element of a contract by becoming part of the context
of a discretionary relationship.
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80 The relation of nature and technology may also be described as a separation of natural being
and technical being. There exists a distinction between nature and art, with technical coun-
terparts being natural, but in a slightly different way. See Heinonen 2000, 57. On the
other hand, the emerging form of market capitalism is considered to be technocapitalism,
which relies greatly on intangible assets such as knowledge and creativity. See Suarez-Villa
2001, 4.
81 This is stated for example at the European level in e-Europe 2005: An information society for
all. Rapid progress in digital technologies has been considered one of the driving forces in
economical development as well. See COM (2002) 263 final, 6. On the other hand, tech-
nology is closely related to cultural and political aspects of society. For example, patent
law as a reflection of technological development is closely related to the social culture.
See Lee 2000, 16 - 17.
82 This means that information is in continuous circulation. At the same time, human com-
munication affects the development of culture and humankind overall. However, techno-
logical development has altered the means of communication, the prerequisites for ob-
taining information, and even communication itself. See Martin 1978, 5.
83 The increase in the amount of electronics, technology, and telecommunication links has
changed the structural components of society.  The change has been so rapid and dra-
matic that it has sometimes been called an information revolution. The change from an
Industrial Society towards an Information Society may be described as parallel to the dis-
covering of agriculture 1000 years ago or the beginning of the industrial age 200 years
ago. See Niiniluoto 1996, 67. This development is often described in terms of technologi-
cal development and is  defined as linear. See Bell 1974, 359. It may also be described as
waves, with the current wave depicted as a mixture of the previous ones. See Toffler
1981, 14 - 16.
84 See Thomas 1999, 37.
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1.1.4 Technological determinism as a manifestation of nature
Nature is diverse in form and its manifestations are divergent indeed. Today one of the
most essential of these is technology.80 The significance of technology is so fundamental
that it may often be considered as a compelling force in society at large. Accordingly,
technological development has been considered one of the most important transitional forces
of today.81 Technological development is also rather extensively based on close
communication regarding the means of retrieving, transmitting and distributing
information.82 On the other hand, information technology and its development are rather
essential for the telecommunication links that are the central means of communication.
Development thus affects the mutual relationship of communication and the further
development and convergence of telecommunication links.83
Technology may be described as the application of science and engineering to the
development of machines and procedures. The fundamental purpose of applying a
technological contribution is thus to enhance or improve the human condition or at least to
improve human efficiency in some respect.84 Technology may well be considered the most
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85 In this sense, technology may be divided in two aspects: a technological artifact is an identifiable
and a durable entity that is physically, economically, socially, and politically organized object
in space-time. Technology-in-practice is, on the other hand, a specific technology structure that
is a repeatedly experienced, personally ordered and edited version of the technological
artifact. See Orlikowski 1999, 7 - 8.
86 It may even be said that the effect of a new medium and new technologies is more im-
portant than the messages transmitted by them. This means that the World Wide Web as
a transmission channel is more important than the content that is transmitted over it. See
Lehtonen, M. 2000, 104 - 105.
87 A good example of this is the interplay and mutual development of technologies and in-
tellectual property rights. Several interconnecting classes of intellectual property rights
have been created along with technological development. These are, for example, the
utility patent, which was to fill the gap between a patent and a design copyright, and cir-
cuit design. See Petrusson 1999, 100.
88 Technologies are not actually causes but consequences. Technological development is in
fact a common result of societal, economic, and political circumstances and structures.
See Lehtonen, M. 2000, 90. On the other hand, technologies are often understood
through a technological frame when it is easier to identify the technological development
overall. Technological frame includes assumptions, expectations, and knowledge used for
understanding technology in organizations. See Orlikowski - Gash 1994, 178.
89 A good example of the close interaction of new technology and society overall is the
ever-blurring line between idea and expression. This line is actually questioned by each
new technological invention, for example, photography, motion pictures, sound record-
ings, radio, televison, photocopying, and telecommunication. The latest such invention is
the Internet. See Bobko 2001, 55.
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essential factor of change in social cooperation.85 At the same time, change affects societal
life.86 Technologies are not significant alone but always interact with society at large. This
is exactly the communicative element in the interaction between technological development
and society.87 Technology does not exist separate from societal or cultural institutions, but
interacts intensively with them. Further, societal and cultural institutions are the producers
and consumers of technology.88 This is precisely where business methods enter the picture.
Business methods are not pure technological productions but, rather, are constructed of
not only technology but also a highly interactive link between the market and certain
common interests.89 Business methods are nevertheless essentially  technological
constructions in that they take the form of applications used on networks.
Business methods have close connections to life in society and the smooth operation
of the market. Technology as such is one of the most significant indicators in social life.
This is exactly why development and change in society might derive from technological
development itself. Indeed, this trend can be seen clearly in the recent societal development
that may be readily attributed to information and communication technology (ICT). For
example, ICT has been considered the key component of recent development policy in the
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90 Information and communication technology has even been considered as accelerating the
pace of technological progress, modernization and structural adjustment of our econo-
mies. See COM (2004) 757 final, 4. IT often refers to the communication of coexisting
computers and telecommunication links. See SOU 1995:68, 4.
91 See Webster 2002, 120.
92 This is not really the case, for the microprocessor industry is not driven solely by its own
technical advances. The growth in the number and development of processors may be
related to the increased requirements of the operating systems and office applications
used with Intel processors. It may also be related to increased consumer interest in multi-
media and audio applications.
See Tuomi 2002, http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_11/tuomi/index.html
93 Human interaction with technologies is, however, often recurrent. Even when users
constitute a technology-in-practice through their present use of a technology, their actions
are at the same time shaped by the technologies-in-practice they have implemented in the
past. See Orlikowski 1999, 11. This is often also referred as human-computer interaction (HCI).
See Isomäki 2002, 17.
94 In other words, computing power increases at a high rate and at the same time the price
at a certain level of computing power decreases at the same rate. The value of a network
is equivalent to the square of the number of nodes. See Grewlich 1999, 31- 32.
95 For example, technologies-in-practice are changed through human action. Another way to
change these practices is improvisation, where situated innovations respond to an
unexpected opportunity or challenge. See Orlikowski 1999, 12 - 13.
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European Union.90 This development is often referred to as technological determinism,
which implies that a change in the amount of technology also changes society at large.91
Technological determinism also has its manifestations in technological or
commercial laws, which in turn have an impact on cyberspace. Moore’s law is based on the
assumption that the maximum processing power of a microchip doubles roughly every
eighteen months.92 Technology is here raised up to become the most powerful guiding
force in development. Technology in a way feeds itself and thereby acts as the principal
motor of overall development. Other development has to follow the technological.93
Further, Metcalfe’s law describes the technological and economic forces that drive the
growth of cyberspace and the Internet. Metcalfe’s law is based on the manifestation of the
network effect, whereby as the network grows, the utility of being connected to that network
grows even more. The value of a network increases exponentially with the number of
connections and users. Here, one sees technological determinism manifested from a slightly
different point of view. Technological development still dictates the pace of change. On
the other hand, the technological and economic dynamism of the Internet are based on the
simultaneous manifestation of these two laws.94
Technological determinism has one more implication in its being a manifestation of
nature. This is the crucial question of the relative priority of the human being and nature and it
derives precisely from the “unfreedom” of nature and the freedom of the human being.95
The forces of nature are traditionally considered rather strong and thus as affecting society
in quite a profound way. People are also influenced by these forces and are often
considered merely as objects, not subjects. The rationality of the human being, however,
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96 See Tolonen, J. 1989, 10.
97 Dommering sees the development of new technologies as an important driving force
behind the improvement of new legal specifications. In this view, mechanical technology
led to specializations like building law, and the combustion engine encouraged the devel-
opment of traffic law. Mass media and information would, following this reasoning, lead
to media law and computer law. See Dommering 1991, 2.
98 According to this view, societal transformation would derive from technological develop-
ment itself. This view is often called technological determinism and it says that change in
the amount of technology will change the status of social actors and society itself. See
Webster 2002, 271 - 272. Technological determinism may be complemented through par-
allel descriptions of the interplay of technology and society. The technological imperative says
that everything that can be realized will be. Further, the technocratic view focuses on the
power of technology and says that it is possible for specialists to predict technological
development and accordingly adjust the rest of the society to the change. The free market
economy, for its part, is founded on the view that the law of supply and demand also di-
rects the technological development. Finally, the indeterministic view says that even techno-
logical change is dependent on the circumstances and on coincidences. See Niiniluoto
2000, 29 - 30.
99 See Lundblad 2000, 12. One interesting approach is to concentrate on communication
and examine the Internet as a means enabling different communications models. The
Internet can be seen as either a mass medium or a communication channel. Governments
tend to see the Internet as a mass medium, whereas individuals consider it a communica-
tion channel. For more on this, see Slevin 2000, 219.
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makes him or her distinct from nature. The human being has the power to achieve a
dominating role in the coexistence of humankind and nature: human beings and nature can
never be equals. The difference between human beings and nature lies in the deterministic
character of both, however. Nature is rather strictly bound to natural laws, making its
behavior very predictable. In other words, natural laws govern natural forces. In this sense,
the human being is totally different; his or her behavior is not so certain. This is also why
humankind needs some social order to reconcile the general behavior of people with the
needs of society at large. In this task, the state has the legislative power that is used for
governing societal behavior patterns. the state is needed for keeping the forces of society
in order.96 Here again one sees the verticality of state governance clearly and most
characteristically manifested in the construction of that governance.
Verticality derives from legislation as a governing tool. Legislation is a rather useful
tool for controlling society, which justifies its use to control the new developing
technology.97 As a means of governing society, legislation may be utilized for controlling
technology. In this context, legislation is used for regulating technological development and,
through this, societal development as well. The interplay of technology and society can thus be
seen as the very kernel of technological determinism. Technology in itself is also a
significant indicator in social life and societal development.98 In other words, regulation not
only pertains to the regulation of new developing technology but setting requirements for
the society that is created by that technology.99
Regulation does not, however, concern technological determinism as non-definable
forward strides or a larger whole. Rather, regulation is more likely to be defined as opening
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100 The regulatory aspects can be divided in four categories, which are the meaning of tech-
nology in the society, the possession of technology, the use of technology, and the design
of  technology. See Lundblad 2000, 12 - 13.
101 The three main phases of this development are concentration, dissemination, and unifica-
tion. See Committee Report KM 1988:23, 7 - 9.
102 In the societal use of technology it is, however, significant that those technologies are to be
applied to use. People interact with technology, and in order to understand people’s
interpretations of technology it is critical to understand their interaction with it. ti interact
with technology, people have to make sense of it. See Orlikowski - Gash 1994, 175. (Italics
added.)
103 See Lyon 1988, 30 - 31.
104 Where information is concerned, it is networking and the evolution of information net-
works that have the greatest significance in the network effect. For example, the Infor-
mation Society as a concept is largely based on the existence of different classes of infor-
mation and the effective utilization, dissemination, and management of information. See
Pöysti 2000, 92.
105 The most effective driving force for the network effect is the dynamically evolving infor-
mation technology that makes it possible to develop novel and innovative operation
models. The network society may accordingly be described as a society where the central
functions and operations are based on networks that, further, are interconnected. See
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some possibilities from the societal perspective to see technology as several different
aspects of regulation.100 One of these viewpoints is the lowering of the costs of production.
Low prices and productivity are closely connected in that low prices are directly associated
with the quantity of production. What is more, telecommunication links are among the best
financed and thus most popular products. This development has caused the whole sphere
of communication and information to coalesce, however.  Indeed, we generally speak
about information and communication technology. This part of technology and
communication that have converged then becomes the core of society.101 Convergence is
clear: information technology and societal communication have been welded together,
inasmuch as joining communication lines makes it possible to link more and more
computers together. In this development, it is absolutely certain that technology sets the
pace of development.102
Technological determinism as divergent viewpoints may be examined also in slightly
different perspective: technological determinism makes possible a reorganization of the
economy. This reorganization is nothing less than one more expression of technological
determinism. This is particularly the case when the concept of technology no longer refers
exclusively to “hard” technology, e.g., equipment; it may well embrace increasing
possibilities to construct networks with other producers, clients, and information
producers.103 This is actually one more manifestation of Metcalfe’s law concerning the
network effect.104 The network effect actually has a dualistic role in the communication of
and search for information. The effect has a clear advantage in increasing the possibilities
to retrieve information but, at the same time, it threatens the secure transmission of
information.105 Technological development is nevertheless one of the crucial engines of
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Castells 2000, 77 - 78.
106 Technology is not meaningful or consequential by itself; it only becomes so when people
engage with it in practice. In this respect, technological structures are situationally specific,
emerging from practice, rather than embodied in given technological artifacts. See Orlikowski
1999, 27.
107 See Saarenpää 2000, 4 - 5.
108 This may be described in terms of illustrative patterns of differently structured societies.
Different eras have produced different kinds of societal orders: primordial/ancient societies
were patriarchal, with men dominating women and children; feudalism produced the struc-
ture of lord over land and vassals. The  centralized state is constructed on an order where a
king dominates over taxes, whereas imperialism places the major powers over colonies and
slaves. In industrial capitalism, capitalists have power over labor and surplus value, while in
finance capitalism bankers and investors control securities and, bonds, derivatives, and in-
terests. In this course, information feudalism would be the next stage and be fundamentally
based on the power of infogopolies and biogopolies over abstract objects. See Drahos -
Braithwaite 2003, 199.
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societal change as it accounts for a substantial number of the constitutive elements of
networking and aspects of networks.
The overall perspective on technological determinism cannot be focused solely on
technology or society. In other words, it is not technological determinism alone that causes
change. The other rather crucial part of the development is naturally the use and usability of
the technologies. This usability further arises from the acceptance of discoveries in society:
it is always a human being who accepts the technology and uses it.106 In this respect,
technological determinism and the societal acceptance of technologies are always
communicative. This is also why the development is never static but continuous. Progress
is manifested in how we exploit communicative tools and it therefore cannot be considered
a static course of development. What is more, this development is the overall basis of the
network society, where societal life as a whole is founded on using information networks
and telecommunication links.107 On the other hand, the high priority of information in
societal communication contributes to the vertical structure of the state. Verticality is a
direct consequence of according information a position in which it creates power.108
Technological development and societal acceptance of technological inventions are
based on continuousness. The governance of both of these elements is crucially based on
certain fundamental elements. One is the need for dominance as the kernel of any governing
structure. Dominance is needed in order to set the pattern for controlling the causality of
nature or the behavior of human beings. Both of these chains of events are further based
on setting some kinds of limits: in nature the limits are defined by causal laws; in society
they are introduced by legislation. In both cases, governance is based on verticality. On the
other hand, dominance as a key element of governance makes state governance static overall.
This static nature is caused by verticality being the very essence of governing  these chains
of events, i.e., the causality of nature and the behavior of human beings. This is why
governance is carried out by the state. There exist, however, some more fundamental
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reasons for the necessary verticality and static nature of state governance. These can be
illuminated by examining the divergent but overlapping interests of the state.
1.2 Interests embodied in state governance
1.2.1 Ensuring inventiveness
State governance consists of a layered construction made up of free resources and
controlled ones. In this dichotomy the resources are classified as private or public property.109
Public property has its advantages, especially from the viewpoint of consumers, but
keeping property public may cause some problems. These problems generally have to do
with the allocation of resources in society. For example, numerous problems arise from the
possibilities to exclude someone from the use of property. Sometimes the possibility to
exclude seems to be almost the most crucial consideration in the production and use of
property. This constitutes a clear dissimilarity between public and private property.
The difference between private and public property is one of the most fundamental
elements in intellectual property rights. Intellectual property rights have been traditionally
considered private property. This is mainly based on the view that an invention belongs to
its inventor, who then further receives ownership of it.110 Intellectual property rights
include, however, many elements that distinguish them from traditional ownership. One
is their common character. This is based on the public, or common, part of all intellectual
property rights, whereby any right that is granted by the state implies at the same time that
the crucial background information of an invention becomes public.111
Defining intellectual property rights as private ones has benefits, however. If the use
of a resource is free and no one can be excluded from that use, overuse is almost certain.
The resource is used by everyone, with each user pursuing his or her own good, but
payment for use is not so common. This is actually the crucial difference between public
and private property; the control of private commodities is often carried out privately and
problems of common utilization do not occur. This distortion is generally called the free-
rider problem. The free-rider problem is caused precisely by an unwillingness to pay for
goods. A free rider is thus someone who gets to consume a good without paying for it. Yet
the production of a good is often rather costly and therefore it is crucial to collect
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113 Protection through these forms of regulation actually gives the first person to invent
some lead time. The lack of sufficient lead time is one further problem in rewarding the
inventors of new inventions. See Reichman 1994, 2504 - 2505. This is also referred to as
a dynamic benefit of property. See Landes - Posner 1987, 266.
114 On the other hand, the patent system may not be considered separate from society over-
all, i.e., industrial and economic life. The patent system has at least economic effects and
effects on the competitiveness of enterprises. See COM (99)42 final, 8. Systems providing
at least some protection, e.g., intellectual property rights, and overall industrial develop-
ment are interconnected and as such have a reciprocal influence. See Petrusson 1999, 4.
115 The traditional justification of the system of intellectual property rights is that it exists to
promote innovation through its awarding of exclusive rights to inventors in return for
disseminating their inventions more widely. See Webster - Packer 1996, 1 - 2. Certain
regulation concerning patents is based on joint Nordic draft working carried out in paral-
lel in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. See Bruun 1990, 164 - 165.
116 This is the case especially in computer science and biotechnology. Incremental innova-
tion manifesting knowhow has become the most characteristic sign of the present tech-
nological development. See Reichman 1994, 2443.
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payments for its production. The free-rider problem applies particularly to public goods
that are not sold by anyone but also where the resource is available to anyone to consume.
The free-rider problem is the crucial explanation for not producing most public goods on
the private market, for it makes it difficult to ensure the production of those resources or
a proper quantity of them.112  The free-rider problem is usually invoked to avoid charging
for production despite concrete use. This is basically also the reason for keeping some
resources public and under public ownership.
The free-rider problem emerges in intellectual property law as well, where
intellectual property rights are normally used to refresh innovativeness. Patents have been
used to increase the enthusiasm of inventors to invent, and copyright is an instrument to
inspire creators to create; if inventors cannot get their inventions patented, or authors their
writing copyrighted, they will have less incentive to invent or create.113 In this way, patents
and copyright are both used as instruments of governmental regulation.114 They both
regulate the willingness to invent and provide one with sufficient reward for one’s
inventions.115 Nevertheless, without proper protection the ideas of an inventor could
simply be taken and others would benefit from his or her invention at no cost. This is the
most serious problem with the new information-based technologies, where industrial
applications are costly to develop but vulnerable to rapid duplication.116 Progressive
advances in technological knowhow originating in non-traditional inventions or
innovations fit in poorly with traditional patent or copyright paradigms. It is often even
impossible to hide the knowhow in these inventions.
Protection through intellectual property rights has even more advantages. For
example, it seeks to ensure that the costs put into research and development may be
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recovered and the results protected.117 In this way, protection accelerates technological
development at the same time. Acceleration also occurs through the patent system itself.
A competitor cannot use an invention that is patented but must aim at more developed and
newer applications.118 This actually summarizes the aims of the reward system, in which the
reward takes the form of a monopoly that is granted to the inventor. The rationale for and
the very basis of the reward system appear on two different fronts. On the one hand,
protection is considered as part of the profit of the inventor received for his or her efforts and
investments in the invention. The monopoly to exploit the invention is then granted to the
inventor as a pure reward.119 On the other hand, protection may be defined as a stimulus
whose  purpose is to inspire and stimulate creativity and investments in inventiveness.120
Here the opportunity to take free advantage of someone else’s invention would
mean fewer inventors. Similarly, progress in science and applied arts would slow.
Intellectual property is not only an input in the creative process but also an output. In other
words, increasing the costs of intellectual property increases both the cost of production,
i.e., input, and of the incentives to produce it again, i.e., output. The influences that bear
on the system therefore come from both inside and outside of it. The balance and change
in the system of intellectual property rights directly affects the exploitation and production
of intellectual property.121
1.2.2 Increasing empowerment
Inventions are privileged by the state through the granting of intellectual property rights.
These privileges may be defined as empowered rights over nature. Nature becomes harnessed
by having limits imposed on it in the form of property rights. On the other hand, filtering
technological determinism through intellectual property rights gives the state the power to
direct technological, and thus societal, development. Empowerment vis-à-vis nature
institutionalizes technological determinism. For example, a patent is institutionalized when it is
considered as a functional whole. Functionality is realized between the context and
Interests of the state, the market and society
122 Tension is also created by the communication of internal elements and external ones.
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function of the patent. A patent, when institutionalized, thus creates some tension between
the patent system and its framework.122
Increased empowerment is also well illustrated in any consideration of protected
intellectual property as individuals’ rights to their thoughts and ideas. These ideas cannot be freely
utilized but must be protected by the state.123 Intellectual property rights are defined as
property rights. A patent as a monopoly has been clearly distinguished from a patent as
ownership. A patent as property and as part of ownership has been considered a natural
part of a person’s right to live by his or her work.124 Ownership is nevertheless a strong
right, mainly due to its absoluteness. Where property is concerned, absoluteness means that
property is protected against interference by all outsiders. Protection is thus completely
exclusive. In other words, protection of property is strong and stable and increases the
empowered position of the right-holder. Ownership is thus easy to consider as an
excludable privilege.
Empowerment through a patent is carried out in a slightly different manner
associated with what are known as second-degree inventions. The justification for this lies in
rewarding and hence renewing inventiveness through proper protection, which is mainly
realized through property rights. At the same time, the enthusiasm to invent has to be
increased. Rewarding is not, however, completely imperative; there in fact exist some
inventions that are rewarding as such even without any protection. This applies in particular
to second-degree inventions that are essentially market-bound; i.e., those inventions are to
be utilized and exploited in the market. These second-degree inventions are ones that teach
people to use new technological developments.125 They are thus a kind of ”instructions for
use” for the overall system comprising the market and inventions together. Second-degree
inventions are applications that bring together pure technological ideas and further process
them to become new second-degree inventions.
The rewarding of second-degree inventions is thus carried out already when they are
approved by the market. Additional protection through property rights increases the
empowering by the state. This is also why the need to reward inventions in fact divides
inventions into two categories. There are two kinds of inventions on two different levels.
The idea of these inventions is to inspire people to learn how to exploit new
developments.126 On the first level are routine inventions or routine business applications,
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which are needed to provide new technology and opportunities for those who have learned
to use the new technology. Exploiting this knowledge is also fruitful for the economy at
large. Patent and copyright may be used for ensuring this development.
Second-degree inventions are rewarded through market acceptance. They acquire
value in the market and this is a rather great reward for an invention. These inventions are
nevertheless patentable as well. A patent is thus not only necessary in society for motivating
technological advantage; it also motivates the restructuring of businesses that is required
to take full advantage of new developments.127 Patenting in these cases actually gives the
inventor a dual advantage. A successful invention is greatly accepted by the market and
thereafter is patented and protected. Business inventions, like business methods, are rewarded
twice.
1.2.3 Privileging positions
State governance may create positions for right-holders. These positions are generally based
on privileging some of them.128 State governance in its traditional sense is mainly founded
on privilege systems in intellectual property rights.129 The state grants privileges to
inventors in the form of intellectual property rights. This actually creates a rather strong
position for the privilege-holder in which he or she acquires something closely akin to a
monopoly. Therefore, it is sometimes even thought that intellectual property rights are
constituted like monopolies. This is actually one manifestation of verticality in state
governance. These privileges are then further employed as instruments of governance, with
the  governance architecture mainly based on the requirements for granting access to some,
and, on the other hand, for controlling the access and behavior of others.
These strong privileges are used for rewarding inventiveness. This is the core
purpose of intellectual property rights. A patent is a good example of intellectual property
rights acting as a monopoly. A patent is a fixed-term monopoly that grants the right to
manufacture goods based on a certain invention. This invention and the right to utilize it
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are the core of the patent. As such a patent is considered a monopoly, where the controlled
resources are the ones that are used under the patent and the free resources are all the
others falling outside of its scope. Here, a patent may also be considered a means to
convert tacit knowledge into a visible and thus utilizable form.130
This is the way in which the  state governs the overall utilization of societal resources,
this governance being necessarily vertical. A patent may be granted for a computer
program, for example, but this requires that the invention be technical. 131No abstract
invention may be included in the sphere of patentability.132 Abstract ideas constitute a part
of natural laws, like mathematical algorithms, that are expected to remain freely accessible
to everyone. In this way, the division into technical and abstract entails a distinction
between open and closed, with technical applications being closed and abstract ideas
remaining free. This explains the essence of the coexistence of free and controlled; it is
through a patent that the state grants the patent holder a right to forbid others to utilize the
protected invention.133
The monopolistic nature of a patent is, however, slightly illusory, for a patent is not
a monopoly in the strict sense of the word. The explanation for this lies in the verticality
of controlled and free resources. The fundamental definition of a patent is predicated on
exclusivity, with all others but the patentee excluded. The reverse side of a patent is to
reveal information and thereby make it public. Patented information as such does not
belong to the scope of exclusion provided it is not used in novel inventions. Exclusivity
as a monopoly to utilize an invention is thus not the entire content of a patent; rather, a
patent becomes complete through opening access to information. The strictly monopolistic
exclusivity and limited access constitute dual, opposite poles that reflect the verticality of state
governance.
The state can be considered an actor that ensures that inventors get their inventions
rewarded. As a stakeholder, however, the state also has its own interests in producing
inventions and rewarding them. It is most profitable for the state to create strong
monopolies when the state itself is the most important producer of monopolistic products.
This has a parallel in innovations and information. It is reasonable to protect inventions
and innovations when the innovation model is linear or vertical. Innovations are based on
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linear series of small steps each of which is based on the previous one.134 The process is
primarily vertical and mainly controlled by the state, with the control generally carried out
by granting exclusive rights to the inventor. In this respect, the state acts as a “gate” for
inventions; i.e., it has a monopoly to approve or prohibit the information included in
inventions or innovations. Here, the state holds a powerful position in managing the
production of information, inventions, and innovations.
The strength of this position is enhanced due to the significance of state-approved
information. State-approved information is used in the linear invention chain and is the
basis for additional inventions.135 All in all, the state holds a strong monopoly on inventions. The
state is the only institution that has the power to grant privileges regarding intellectual
property rights. It therefore holds a monopoly on rewarding inventions by approving some
and rejecting others. In other words, as a holder of the patenting power, the state directs
inventiveness. This makes state governance characteristically rather vertical and at the same
time static.
1.3 State governance as a static force
1.3.1 Verticality as a manifestation of state governance
Verticality is found in several varied elements of state governance. The fundamental basis
of verticality rests upon the distinction between controlled and free resources. For example,
intellectual property rights are an expression of the dichotomy of free and controlled in
precisely this fashion. A patent, for example, is a fixed-term monopoly that grants a right
to manufacture goods based on a certain invention. At the same time, a patent nevertheless
draws clear lines of demarcation between free information, to be accessed freely, and
closed information, to be accessed with the permission of the patentee. In this context,
state governance determines precisely the way in which controlled resources and free ones
are to be separated. The vertical structure is formed by the interplay of controlled resources
and free ones. The layered structure of controlled and free resources in state governance
is a reflection of verticality.
Exclusivity as a monopoly to utilize an invention is, however, not the whole content
of a patent. As a patent is made complete by opening access to information, strictly
monopolistic exclusivity and restrictedly opened access constitute opposite poles for the
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state governance. These dualistic poles reflect the verticality of state governance. This is
part of the overall dualistic pattern that is the foundation of vertical governance structure
of state. The verticality of state governance as the core of a patent may be found in the
notion of information as both an excluded and an included resource. In this sense
information has a dual role that is found in the inner scope of a patent.
Information seems to be one of the most common resources in the world. Just how
common information is can be clearly seen in a patent when it comprises information as
an included and an excluded element. A patent is not a natural way to draw boundaries. In
nature, for example, where there would be no state, there would be no such thing as a
patent. As such a patent is always an artificial construction. Accordingly, in pure nature,
information would be the freest of all resources.136 On the other hand, this means that
there would be no legal institution such as a patent without governmental interference. Law
itself has created the concept of patent and its scope. In this sense, copyright closely
resembles a patent: a patent may be granted only for a novel invention; a work has to be
original to be copyrighted. This is one further manifestation of verticality in state
regulation, with the verticality even written into the requirements for obtaining a patent or
copyright.
Society is based on relations, and state governance is often structured vertically in
these relations. In this arrangement the state is generally the superior power that has a
monopoly to organize rights and circumstances on lower levels. An illustrative example of
this is land ownership in the era of feudalism.137 Property  essentially consisted of land and there
did not even exist any private ownership in the modern sense. The social order and the
governmental power relations were also directly derived from land ownership
arrangements. Land ownership was thus the foundation of societal power positions. Land
ownership was further arranged as divided ownership, and there were no restrictions on
classifying ownership as a combination of different overlapping ownerships. The
conceptual framework illustrated a hierarchical system of divided rights where the
dominium - the most fundamental part - could not be shown to be a valid concept of
private law. 138
The hierarchical classification of concepts and the close connection between land
ownership and social relations make divided ownership an illustrative example of verticality
in state governance. Indeed, divided ownership in this form strongly implies the fundamental
verticality of state governance. In these circumstances, divided ownership was arranged such
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that there was no real owner in the present-day sense.139 Ownership was complete when
all the rights belonged to the same holder of the ownership. Divided ownership was just
that. One of two joint owners had most of the ownership proper where the other was only
entitled to stable possession and usufruct of landed property. Usufruct was bound to
continuous services to the other joint owner. One of the joint owners was the direct lord
(dominus directus), who possessed the ownership proper and had control of the ownership
on the grounds of his part of the divided ownership (dominium directum). The other joint
owner was called the suppressed owner (dominus utilus) and only had the right to use
(dominium utile).140 This dualistic existence was also a vertical division of power.141
Another good example of the divided character of ownership may be found in
immovable property. Real estate is fundamentally constructed on absoluteness and exclusivity
as the essence of property. In this sense, ownership is unrestricted in favor of the owner;
i.e., it is absolute and exclusive control over an object.142 It is generally impossible for there
to be several different rights, or any multiple variation of rights, founded on one and the
same object.143 The absoluteness and exclusivity of ownership, however, appears in a
slightly different light if one looks at the utilization of real estate. Utilization is not limited
to the excluded right of the owner and there often exist several forms of utilization that are
all based on different rights of different owners. In addition to the rights of the owner,
there often exist rights of the owner of the neighboring estate. Likewise, everyman's rights
give everyone to utilize immovable property.144
Divided ownership acts as a good example of vertical state governance if it is
juxtaposed with intellectual property rights. Verticality in ownership may be structured as
an exclusive position of the state. This is easily compared to intellectual property rights as an
exclusive position. Intellectual property rights are granted by the state and the state
monopoly is the only way to get any protection for an invention through intellectual
property rights. No other institution is allowed to grant similar protection. In this sense,
the state has a monopoly to accept or dismiss inventions. An illustrative example of this
is the coexistence of a patent and information where state has the right to open access to
information by granting patents. At the same time, the state uses its power to approve or
reject inventions. When a patent is granted, the invention is approved and the necessary
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information is revealed to the public. This creates a strong and stable controlling function
for the state, including the monopoly to direct inventiveness. Monopoly and exclusivity in
this sense both reflect verticality in state governance.
The ownership of money can also be  divided. Money cannot be destroyed even if
it is part of someone’s property. Money is thus essentially vertically structured. It belongs
partly to the assets of the one who has acquired it, but at the same time it is property of the
state.145 This is well stated in the law concerning coins.(In Finland: Laki metallirahasta 3§.) One
may not use money that is damaged nor does a creditor have to accept damaged money as
a payment. The vertical structure of money and the state is reflected in the historical
character of money. Money was not considered a valuable object but only an instrument
for measuring the value of other things.146
1.3.2 Public versus private
Verticality in state governance is derived from the layered construction in governing
resources. Those layers consist of free resources and controlled ones. Controlled rights are
often called property, either private or public property. According to this dichotomy
property may further be divided in two classes, explicitly exclusive property rights and
collective property rights.147 Exclusive property rights constitute the sphere of private property,
or private goods, where exclusive property belongs to only one possessor at a time. This
is the main difference between private property rights and collective ones, which are also
called public goods, res publicae.148 Private property rights are controlled by only one owner
at a time, whereas collective property rights belong to a community. This is the fundamental
difference between private property and collective property. Collective property rights
allow for several consumers at the same time. Collective property, or public property,
nevertheless has its implications for commerce when it opens access to communication
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through transmission channels. For example, it increases communicativeness, acting at the
same time as an instrument for creating a network effect and, thereby, for creating societal
synergy.149
Private property is characteristically the more strictly controlled form of property.
Exclusive property is usually rivalrous and exhaustible. It cannot be consumed by many at the
same time because it may easily be overused. This is why several consumers often compete
for use, which makes rivalry precisely the reason to make some classes of property
excludable. Making it possible to exclude produced goods is for this reason a sound
instrument for governing rights. On the other hand, exclusivity may be examined from a
slightly different angle when the focus is on the costs put into property. Pure private property
belongs only to the one who is responsible for the costs put into it. This entails buying
things. When one buys a certain single item, for example, a book, one acquires ownership
by paying the price. Buying a book is a typical consumer purchase.150 Public property
differs from private property in carrying the costs put into preserving the property.
Another principal difference lies in defining who is responsible for the property. Public
property makes it wholly impossible to define only one person who is responsible for the
costs put into the property.151
In this sense public property may also be defined as common property. The costs are
often borne together and everyone in society may then use the property or resource.
Usually use by one person or even several people at the same time does not affect the
possibility of others to use the property.152 In this way, common property slightly changes
the view on exclusivity and monopolies as the basis of property rights. What is known as
new property is one more interesting example of the difficulties that arise from the
fundamental character of exclusivity and monopolies as the core of intellectual property
rights.153 Characteristic of new property is that it is derived from the dynamics of the
economy itself; that is, new property is fundamentally dynamic and hence cannot be
constructed on the basis of excludability or monopolies.154 The objects of new property are
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included in property. See Wennberg 2001, 137.
155 See Kuronen 2000, 90 - 91.
156 The dualistic nature of information is paralleled in the way in which quantum mechanics
studies elementary particles. When analyzed mathematically these particles clearly illus-
trate wave motion. On the other hand, they also have an essence as particles that may be
examined physically. See Kuronen  2000, 92.
157 This is actually a rather strong incentive for consumers to use property without paying
anything for its production. In the background lies the well-known dilemma of producing
resources for the private market, where consumers may possibly hide their preferences.
Property could be used or consumed by anyone at all despite the money that a person
has invested in it. On the other hand, no one can be excluded, because of the public -
and thus common - nature of property. See Begg - Fischer - Dornbusch 2000, 47.
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not constructed of the elements that are used as the cornerstones of traditional intellectual
property.
One divergent factor where the sphere of control is concerned is the possibility to
utilize property. Using private property excludes this possibility from others, whereas public
property may often be used by several users at the same time. Consuming public property
does not generally affect the possibility of others to use it.155 One good example of the
divergent characteristics of property is information. Information is usually considered
public property but may become private when it is copied for purposes of private use. This
actually modifies the nature of information in that there is some subjective factor involved.
At the same time, the whole view of information changes, however, as the altered context
changes the overall status of the information. This recalls the dualistic nature of information,
which further underscores its special nature. The use of information may be dualistic,
which in practice means that information is both a private and public commodity at the same
time.156 Privacy and publicity hence constitute the differing types of resources. State
governance is likewise often based on the dichotomy between private and public. This
correlates with the differences between the two classes of properties, i.e., public and
private. Public property is usually controlled entirely by the government, meaning that the
control is generally exercised by the state.157
On the other hand, the state has often operated as the main producer of productive
resources, whereby it has owned productive power as well. This is the case with public
property such as parks, streets, and the other parts of the public infrastructure. The tension
between publicity and privacy as the core of state governance is thus grounded on the
powerful status of state. The state has a powerful position in producing and allocating
information. This creates a certain ownership monopoly for the state, one applying mainly to
commodities that have typically been included in the sphere of public property. An
illustrative example of this kind of state monopoly  is the public infrastructure. The public
infrastructure is a technical structure that makes it possible to deliver goods and
commodities. It is mostly constructed of technical channels or passages that are mainly
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158 See Westman 1998, 33.
159 See Reichman 1994, 2434.
160 Petrusson writes about knowledge (kunskap). See Petrusson 1999, 5. The terms “informa-
tion” and “knowledge” are nevertheless often used synonymously.  See Karvonen 2000,
82 - 83.
161 Petrusson’s view is based on the distinction made by Jürgen Habermas. Petrusson also
connects his ideas to legal realism. See Petrusson 1999, 6.
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maintained by the state.158 The interest of the state here is to preserve a controlling position
in order to see to it that public infrastructures are created in the future and maintained.
1.3.3 Control versus access
The very basis of intellectual property rights lies in the positions of the privilege-holder and
outsiders. These positions involve free access by the privilege-holder and the privilege-
holder’s right to control access by all others. In other words, the privilege-holder is free to
access and to control access to information. The control thus affects the free as well as the
privileged access of the privilege-holder and the access of the others that is arranged as a
right to permit access by outside parties. This interplay of free access and the right to control
access constitutes the kernel of the static nature of control-versus-access combinations.
The contrast between control and access may also be examined from a slightly
different viewpoint -  the divergence between the general domain of ordinary products, on
the one hand, and classes of privileged intellectual goods, on the other. The general domain
of ordinary goods remains part of the process that is subject to free competition, whereas
privileged intellectual goods are subject to the legal monopolies of intellectual property
systems.159 The right to control the access of outside parties to the information constitutes
the core of the overall invention. This is the scope of the dynamics that inheres in the
communication of access and control. In this sense, defining the rights to control and to
access, or the right to control over access, are not carried out in a void; control and access
are always communicational rights.
This communication, like the dynamics, is carried out as a combination of the right
to information and control over it. Ulf Petrusson writes that law actually acts as two
overlapping systems, namely a system of knowledge and a system of action.160 Petrusson
compares law, patents and the overall patent system, and concludes that there always exists
some degree of dynamics inside these systems. A patent ought to be examined as a dynamic
communicative system of ideas and actions. Law, and patent law, are best described as ideologies
that, in interaction with other ideologies, have a significant influence on the impressions
and behavior of individuals.161 Being this kind of communicative dynamics, the
interconnection of control and access is continuous communication that mediates the
societal rules of behavior and the protected scope of an invention.
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162 See Petrusson 1999, 6 - 7.
163 The control here is actually different from a monopoly. A monopoly is employed for ex-
cluding all others from utilization. This is  generally realized by keeping information a
trade secret. Trade secrecy easily leads to inefficient monopoly, whereas publicity would
promote further innovation. See Bone 2001, 100.
164 See Petrusson 1999, 7.
165 See Petrusson 1999, 7.
40
This communicative character is actually the kernel of a patent as a controlling
instrument. The communicative pattern is exactly how a patent operates, as it is used for
controlling the information included in an invention. Control is hence firmly connected to
constructing positions and including the right to control certain sets of information in these
positions. Control of information or knowledge is necessary in order to exploit it
commercially.162 On the other hand, these positions are constructed by state legislation, as
they closely resemble institutionalized ways to behave and essentially support the interests
of the state. On the basis of this controlling position, the privilege-holder becomes capable of
accessing information and exploiting it.163 He or she also becomes capable of controlling
access by others and even of excluding it. This is the very essence of the privileged
position. This position is to be defined slightly differently when it is examined as a behavioral
concept. This changes the overall view in that we can no longer discuss creating positions but
influencing the behavior of people. The behavioral view may be essentially described as the
management of knowledge or governance of knowledge.164
The behavioral view is best illustrated by examining it as being parallel to creating
positions. The differences and similarities between the behavioral view and the position
view may be examined by comparing them contextually. Here privilege as a control/access
position is further examined as two diverging, restrictive lines - monopoly and exclusivity.
Monopoly and exclusivity do not completely correspond to each other; they have at least
one fundamental difference. Monopoly refers to the case where there is only one producer
of a particular good, the monopoly-holder, and there is thus no competition. The
monopoly-holder is the only one producing a certain commodity or service. Exclusivity
may prevail even if there are additional producers. It is enough for exclusivity that a certain
position is defined as exclusive at the level of rights. Unlike in the case of monopoly, in the
case of exclusivity there does not necessarily have to be any competition to complete the
position.165
A monopoly is essentially achieved through a certain market and market dominance.
Therefore, where the position-creating is focused on defining statically those who have
access, the behavioral view concentrates more on governing behavior. In this way,
protection of intellectual property rights is often bound to the control of competition.
Privileged positions are one creator of strong competitive forces. Through their privileges
the knowledge producers and users endeavor to secure and control the ideas, technologies,
knowhow and expertise on which their competitiveness depends. The central concern
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166 The relationship between the research and knowledge bases and wealth creation is the
central concern of science and technology policies of today. The shortening of the prod-
uct life cycle and development times places an emphasis on being technologically com-
petitive. See Webster - Packer 1996, 1 - 2.
167 See Petrusson 1999, 7. The variety of intellectual property in different positions may also
be described through certain normative keys. The first is the understanding of intellectual
property as communicative actions; the second is the understanding it as regulative
norms; and the third is seeing it as value visions. See Petrusson 2004, 13.
168 This may even be described as a command hierarchy where scarce goods are allocated by
one central authority and backed up by force. In command hierarchies, social status is
primarily determined by access to coercive power. See Raymond 2001, 80.
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becomes the long-term security of intellectual property.166 A monopoly as an instrument
to govern behavior or to control behavior is closely connected to the value of an invention.
Control of information or knowledge is also defined as a value where the value is derived
from the ability to control access to information. This value view resembles rather closely
the position view. Control as a position may be compared with control as a value, the value-
oriented view being more complete. The value of information is actually a rather idealistic
view of governance.167
1.4 Some anomalies in the statics of state governance
1.4.1 Requirements for horizontality
State governance has preserved its superiority as an instrument to govern the stagnated and
bureaucratized state organization. As fixed institutions, vertical and static state governance
have clearly been sufficient for governing resources when they were mostly static in nature.
The adequacy of static governance was basically due to two reasons. First, the overall
schematic frame was static: it was more important to be able to govern the resources
themselves than to be able to create dynamic systems of transference. In other words,
utilization was more important than trade. This is still characteristic of the governance of non-
traded resources or commodities.
There exists another approach to the schematic frame, according to which the static
nature of the overall governance structure is by no means unnecessary, but rather essential
to that structure. Within the scope of state governance, verticality is needed to illustrate the
schematic pattern of dominance and control.168 In the changing economic environment, however,
the static nature of governance should be complemented through some additional features.
The most important source of pressure here is the changing framework.
The framework will change in several ways. One significant way is the changing
pressure placed on the characteristic verticality of state governance. Verticality as the core
of state governance is directly derived from the significance of human and civil rights.
These constitute the very kernel of state governance. Human and civil rights here include
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169 See Karhu 2004, 73.
170 See Karhu 2004, 73.
171 Human and civil rights also operate as instruments in the interconnected relationships of
the members of society. The priority of human and civil rights and their fundamental
focus is thus in horizontal relationships, not in the vertical relationships of citizens and
public authority. See Tuori 2000, 100.
172 See Bynum 1998, 284.
173 However, it seems that it is precisely the trade secret that constitutes the strongest posi-
tion. Trade secrecy may include any kind of information with no categorical subject mat-
ter limitations. See Bone 2001, 100.
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the traditional civil rights, such as protection of property, freedom of contracts and legal
validity of contracts, freedom of occupation and freedom of trade. All these ensure for
their part the functionality of the market.169 On the other hand, the market is not founded
merely on vertical communication or verticality in the communicative pattern. This is
exactly where the human and civil rights involved change the static character of state
governance.
The static nature of state governance is also questioned through the rebalancing of
human and civil rights. Human and civil rights have some tasks that are employed as a
driving force when the overall vertical structure of state governance is questioned. Human
and civil rights also influence relations between individual actors; i.e., they operate
horizontally. Their direction of influence is thus not exclusively vertical - this referring only
to relations between the state and individuals170 - inasmuch as the influence is also mutual,
occurring between all the human beings living in the same community. Society thus
operates on the mutual recognition of rights. All the members of society need to recognize these
rights and accept the recognition of others’ rights to be able to live according to societal
laws. Subjective rights are thus no longer fixed to atomistic individuals but are only the
operating instruments of the actors in social relationships.171
1.4.2 Protection of the strongest position
Intellectual property rights are often considered as ownership. Ownership may be defined
as falling into at least three different categories: copyright, patent, and trade secret.172 All
of these categories are different but are nevertheless based on rather similar foundations.
All three give the right-holder a strong excludable and protected position. On the other
hand, each of these excludable rights constitutes a slightly different position.173 These
positions are not monopolies. The strongest position in intellectual property rights is not
founded on creating and protecting the strongest and the most powerful position in the
market. In reality, a patent, for example, is not a monopoly, or even a limited monopoly.
Granting a patent to an inventor does not imply that there is a market for the patented
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174 See Quinn 2002, 150.
175 See Quinn 2002, 150.
176 When considered as a project, property need not be viewed any longer as a goal-oriented
entity.  See Pöyhönen 2000, 140.
177 Case C-241-91P and C-242/91 Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publica-
tions, Ltd. (ITP) v. European Commission.
178 The abuse of the dominating market position occurred when the television company re-
stricted the emergence of the potential market for weekly magazines by refusing to grant
licenses without a good reason for doing so. It thereby reserved the secondary market for
itself by restricting access to the information used as the raw material for the magazine.
See Still 2000, 71 - 72.
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product. On the other hand, without a market there would be no monopoly.174 Thus the
strongest position does not actually communicate with the market or the society but it is
only a static position. The strongest position is thus not connected with the communicative
character of an invention.
The protection of the strongest position has a slightly different basis. It is provided
through exclusivity, which is the core of a patent. A patent only gives the patent-owner the
right to exclude others from making, using, selling and importing the patented invention.175
A patent does not guarantee any success on the market. This is why a patent is more likely
to be considered as a possibility to make monopoly profits. Having exclusivity as the kernel
makes the protection rather vertical, with verticality closely connected to the right-holder’s
privilege to exclude. This privileged position implies protection of the strongest position.
Protection of the strongest position is also questioned by considering the project
instead of trade as a cooperative prototype of property.176 The principal criticism lies in the
relative nature of the legal relationship as the core of a project. A project is based on a
comprehensive view of the cooperating stakeholders as the active or passive actors in the
project. The project view is thus characteristically rather horizontal than vertical. Horizontality
is realized by the interconnected stakeholders and the cooperation between them. This is
precisely the difference vis-à-vis protecting the strongest position, for it is horizontality and
the mutual communicativeness of a project that is to be protected rather than the strongest
position.
The strict protection of the strongest position is highlighted in the paradigmatic
Magill case.177 The focus of the case was the right of a television company to utilize its
dominating market position. The television company abstained from licensing the televison
program for the following week and thereby restricted healthy competition among the
weekly magazines that published television programs. The abuse of the dominating
position thus did not occur by abstaining from licensing the television program but by
restricting the possibility of other companies to publish the information about forthcoming
programs.178
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179 Technological development is actually a combined result of societal, economic, and polit-
ical circumstances and structures. See Lehtonen, M. 2000, 90.
180 This may still be constituted of new, developing technology. See Lundblad 2000, 12.
181 See Petrusson 1999, 165.
182 See Petrusson 1999, 166.
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1.4.3 The imperative priority of technology
Technology has been considered the driving force of overall development and as such it
is one of the most essential factors of change in social cooperation. At the same time,
change  also affects societal life. Technologies are not significant in their own right but
always exist in cooperation with society at large. Societal cooperation is one of the
emphases in the crucial priority of technology in overall societal development. The
development of technology and society take place in close concert. Technology does not
exist separate from societal or cultural institutions but interacts closely with them.179 The
communication between technology and society is actually an essential element in
technological development. Technology is still a crucial identification element in social life
and societal development, but it is not necessarily the one that drives change. Technology
is thus not necessarily considered a driving force in society. Accordingly,  regulation does not
pertain solely to the regulation of new developing technology but sets out the  prerequisites
for society at large.180
The priority given to technology is rather strongly challenged by the communicative
character of the complex of technology and society. This communication is one of the
most important factors in looking at technology as one of the cooperating elements in
societal life. The priority of technology is examined and redefined through two different
aspects of patenting. First, communicativeness as the core of technological development
affects the definition of technological invention. Technological development establishes its scope
on the basis of the continuous search for patentable inventions. In this way, each
individual  invention may be defined as the result of a communicative process.181 Likewise,
technological development cannot be considered as imperative as technological
determinism in its purest sense would claim. Rather, technological development is more
like a search for a sufficient interface. The interface is not, however, static, as in the pure
definition of inventiveness, but functional and in continuous evolution.
The imperative character of technological development is also examined through
the prerequisites of patentability. This is clearly seen in the patentability of new areas of
technology.182 An illustrative example is the patenting of business methods, which enlarges
the scope of patentability considerably. In business method patents it is precisely the
requirement of sufficient technological application that is the basic requirement for
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patentability.183 Here again, the fundamental prerequisites of patentability and the scope of
patentability are in continuous, reciprocal communication. The imperative character of
technology is also changed slightly with the modification of the requirements. It is precisely
through communicativeness that this change affects the deterministic character of
technology. The change in requirements always communicates with the external forces of
change and thus it is no longer technology that sets the pace of development.
1.5 Summary: A change in the balance of static processes
State governance clearly tends towards the static when the governing instrument of the
state is based on power. The power to use power constitutes the sovereignty of the state,
whilst this power constitutes the core of state governance in its entirety. Power acts as a
connecting link between the state and the different values embedded in state governance.
On the other hand, the value orientation of state governance, together with its connection to
the utilization of power, makes the governance structure vertical. Verticality is based
precisely on structure in the form of certain levels in governance. At the same time,
verticality makes state governance static. Staticness and verticality are characteristics of state
governance in organizing the governed rights at certain levels.
The verticality and staticness of state governance is clearly manifested in human
beings’ dominance over both nature and other free human beings. The coexistence of
nature and human beings is illustrated in technological development as a transitional force
of society. This coexistence can also be described as an interplay of technology and society, where
the change in the amount of technology and the pace set by technological development are
concurrently considered the most powerful driving force. This technological development
connects people and nature, however, and establishes their relative  priority. In other
words, this may also be described as the coexistence and cooperation of technology and
society. This is where the first of the pressures for change arises. Technological
determinism is never a static development but always dynamic societal acceptance.
Technology needs to be accepted by society until it may theoretically become a driving
force. Introducing new technology is rather more like the horizontal spreading of technology
and dynamic governance of this. This is where static state governance may prove unsuccessful.
State governance includes some interests that the state maintains or preserves as a
stakeholder. First, state interests derive from the distinctions between controlled and free
resources. Both control and free access partly preserve the interest of the state. Control is
often based on monopolies that are granted by the state inasmuch as the state governs the
overall utilization of societal resources. This makes governance necessarily vertical with the
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balance tilted towards a static state. On the other hand, strictly monopolistic exclusivity and
restrictedly open access constitute opposite poles that are part of the verticality of state
governance. Control is defined as certain positions or roles given to the right-holder. Control
may thus be described as a strong position that grants the right to control the access to
information. This position may in fact be described as the strongest one, because it grants
the position-holder a privilege to access the information freely him- or herself. It is then the
divergence between the right to access and the right to control access that constitutes the
further definitions that are connected to control of and access to information. The
privilege-holder acquires the right to govern the overall behavior with respect to the
information. These two rights then further create the value of the information or invention,
i.e., the privilege as a control position and ability to govern the behavior. None of these
positions is significant alone, but they are all essentially communicative. They are always used
in any communication.
The communicative character of control and access is where the most serious
problems or pressures for change emerge in state governance. State governance is basically
founded on a certain fixed structure. The foundation of this governance structure is a
verticality that is not very communicative, or at least not communicative in as versatile a
way as the architectural communication of rights would require. If state governance includes any
mutual communication, this communication is likewise static and hence vertical. As it
stands the governance structure is not sufficient to fulfil the needs of the communicative network
economy. In the network economy there is a crucial need for dynamics as well. Statics are
not, however, completely useless. They are needed for consolidating the kernel of the
governance structure but must be complemented by some other elements.
State governance is necessary for governing what is a stagnant and bureaucratized
state organization. Vertical and static state governance are thus connected and have clearly
been sufficient for governing resources when they were mostly static in nature. This has
been especially the case when utilization has been more important than trade. In the area
of state governance, verticality is needed for illustrating the characteristically vertical pattern
of dominance and control. The communicative architecture, however, ought to be
developed to become more functional. The pure vertical pattern is no longer sufficient to fulfil
the requirements of continuous functionality but needs to be complemented by an interplay
of actors. This indicates that the vertical structure ought to be made part of the horizontal
one.
Technology and society are developed in mutual interaction, with communication
between technology and society essential to this development. Technology is still a
significant feature of societal life and societal development but it is not necessarily a driving
force in society. The communicativeness of technology and society has made this
relationship slightly equivocal. The questioned priority of technology has been redefined
through both the altered view on defining technological inventions and the continuously
changing requirements for patentability. Both of the fundamental elements of patentability
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bring some functionality to an otherwise static system. Functionality is thus the most
important factor when constructing and refining the architecture for governing functional
rights. That architecture is mainly based on plausible cooperation between static and
dynamic forces. This cooperation is carried out by combining the vertical elements of state
governance and the dynamic elements of markets. Rebalancing is then carried out by
making the protected positions more relative to one another. This is possible only by
complementing the privileged position of the vertical governance structure by dynamic
elements. Lastly, the rebalancing needs to be carried out in a dynamic interchange. This is
exactly what is done when the elements of protectability are reexamined and redefined.
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184 This is mainly based on the dualistic usability of objects. Every object has a dualistic
foundation in its use. For example, a shoe may be used by wearing it when walking; this
is considered to be the natural use of a shoe. On the other hand, a shoe may be used in ex-
change, whereupon it takes on an exchange value. See Karapuu 1983, 49.
185 See Karapuu 1983, 49.
186 The similarity of state governance and market governance is clearly revealed if one notes
that market governance is also based fundamentally on sovereignty. One difference lies in
sovereignty’s role as the core of private property, where it is based on the relations be-
tween persons in respect of an object rather than the relations between a person and an
object. See Drahos 1996, 147.
48
2 THE MARKET. MANAGEMENT, GOVERNANCE, OR BOTH?
2.1 The basis of the functionality of the market
A market is communication. Communication in the market is carried out through exchanging
goods and services on the market and receiving money for those goods and services. This
forms the core of the functionality of the market. The market is a mix of statics and dynamics
consisting of the interplay of both these elements. Statics are reflected in the exchange of
goods through the stability of property. Property is transferred to other actors, i.e.,
exchanged, but the property itself remains essentially unchanged. On the other hand,
dynamics come to the fore in the act of exchange itself, which is characteristically
dynamic.184 On these grounds objects get both utility value and exchange value. A market
may be examined as object-oriented when the focus is on the exchangeable goods, or as
subject-oriented when the fundamental focus is on the cooperation among stakeholders. Such
an economy is considered static, with rights generally defined and enforced in terms of
tangible property.
An object’s utility value is basically derived from its ability to fulfil needs, whereas
its exchange value is fixed to its ability to create an opportunity to earn money.185 Exchange
as dynamics and the use of property in an exchange together form the core of the rights
governance and rights management systems. Governance is adaptable to the needs of both
the state and the market. How governance is implemented differs slightly, however,
depending on the circumstances. The fundamental difference lies in the degree of authority
in organizing the governance. Market governance is fundamentally organized without state
authority beyond the organizational structure. If there does exist some authority, it is
different in kind and rests on different bases than the governmentally authorized body of
state governance. State governance is generally carried out by the sovereign, the sovereign
often being the state itself.186
 The lack of governmental authority is the fundamental difference between the
governing mechanism of the market and that of the state. The most profound difference
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187 In relation to the market, management denotes a tool to control someone or something.
See Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary 1987, 882.
188 This is a rather fundamental issue. Sovereignty has usually been considered a concept of
public law, while property usually features as an aspect of private property. See Drahos
1996, 147.
189 Likewise, the urban culture creates a certain mentality. See Noro 1991, 14.
190 See Karhu 2004, 77.
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is based on the implementation of market governance by business organizations rather than
state organizations. Market governance is also often called market management. The
difference between the terms “governance “ and “management” lies in the forms of
governance. Management usually concerns business and business activities and is focused
on effectiveness in allocating profits and resources. It is hence often connected to allocating
wealth or income. The term “governance” is more likely to be used for describing only the
governmental activities that need to be organized in a sustainable way. Management is thus
usually associated with business or money; governance, on the other hand, is more likely
to be described as organizing the rights and duties of citizens.187
There exist, however, similarities in these two parallel forms of allocating advantages
and rights. Governance and management are rather similar with respect to their formative
elements. One fundamental component of both is sovereignty. State governance is crucially
based on sovereignty, the sovereign being the one in whom authoritative power is vested.
Market management, too, is based on sovereignty.188 The functionality of the market has
communicativeness as its very foundation, communicativeness being needed to connect
both governance governing the rights and duties of actors as stakeholders and management
sustainable system.
2.1.1 The market as communication
The market is communicative interaction. As a communicative structure, the market
fundamentally consists of societal cooperation. Put more generally, the market and the
monetary economy may be seen as acting as creators of a certain lifestyle in the sense
described by Georg Simmel. Money produces certain behavior and this behavior is then
produced and ensured for everyone who is operating through it.189 As such societal life is
founded on the economy and social relations are communicated through economic ones.
This communication needs to be governed to become a functional and well-organized
society, and governance requires an effective governance tool. For the market this tool is
money.190 As a tool of governance it is used as an internal system to reconcile the different
interests of market actors. This internal allocation is based on the overall functionality of
the market itself.
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191 Traditionally, the market was described as a certain physical place for trading. The modern
market is, however, independent of place, and the concept of market thus sooner
describes trade as market operations. See Virtanen 2001, 132.
192 This requires that commodities are produced, or at least that they are placed on the mar-
ket. Additionally, there must be consumers for those commodities. The supply and the
demand frame thus rather essentially defines the market. See Begg - Fischer - Dornbusch
2000, 9.
193 This is generally avoided by excluding external parties from the utilization of property.
This is  often referred to as a static benefit of property. If the owner cannot exclude others
from using his or her property (e.g., a pasture), there will be overgrazing because users of
the pasture will ignore the costs of grazing. See Landes - Posner 1987, 266.
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Communication within the market greatly illuminates the cooperation and
coexistence of governance and management structures. This is especially due to the fixed
connection between society and the economy and is derived from the needs of both the
governance of behavior and the management of wealth. Wealth is obviously managed
through money by allocating income to the relevant people. Wealth management actually
constitutes, at least partly, the governance of behavior by money. Money is further used for
governing the interplay of divergent interests of market operators. This governance may
likewise be described as the communication of stakeholders in the market framework.
The market is composed of certain market operations that further constitute the
market framework.191 Market operations are based on three definitive prerequisites. A market
will be formed wherever there is some supply and demand. Both are necessities in creating any
communication at all. Further, supply and demand are connected through exchange. Only
exchange makes a market functional. The third prerequisite for a functional market is that
commodities have a price. This means that the mere static structure of supply and demand
is not sufficient for a market. It is only exchange as a functional aspect and a market price
as a contextual aspect that  together create a market as a dynamic entity. Dynamics are
utterly crucial for the market as a functional whole. In other words, dynamics are the market.192
It is precisely the dynamics in the market that give rise to the requirement of some degree
of governance.
2.1.2 The tragedy of commons
The superiority of private ownership over public is based on better economic efficiency
or the necessity to govern scarce resources by private instead of common ownership. If a
resource is really scarce, and if there are a number of people who have a free right to use
this resource, these users will exhaust the resource by their overuse. Overuse is caused by free
access to resources that are often produced publicly and offered freely for consumption.193
People often overuse resources that they own in common because they have no incentive
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maximizing one’s gain in a free and uncontrolled environment. The tragedy of the com-
mons is examined among herders and it has a positive and a negative component. The
positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herders receive all
the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is near +1. The
negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal.
Since the effects of overgrazing are shared by all herders, the negative utility for any par-
ticular decision-making herder is only a fraction of -1. See Hardin 1968, 1243 -1244.
195 This is, for example, using nature as a common good. On the other hand, it has sometimes
been thought that nature would be better preserved and its diversity better maintained
through private ownership. See Wallius 2001, 9.
196 In other words, private benefit has not usually been a sustainable justification for any
rights. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss questions the rationale of business method patents. These
patents do not serve any public benefit, as they do not suffer from the free-rider problem
nor is there any need for disclosure. See Dreyfuss 2000, 274 - 275.
197 See Dreyfuss 2000, 274.
198 On public goods, see Begg - Fischer - Dornbusch 2000, 47.
199 Constructing intellectual property rights has actually been considered as only one more
solution to the free-rider problem. See Dreyfuss 2000, 274 - 275.
200 See Reichman 1994, 2443.
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to conserve them. This problem is often referred to as the tragedy of commons.194 The tragedy
of commons is closely bound to individual incentives. Every individual with the right to
use common property will have an incentive to be as effective as possible in getting the
resource. Put simply, everyone wants to use the resource before others do.195 Every
individual maximizes his or her use in order to maximize his or her share of the property.
These tendencies, so the argument goes, will inevitably lead to an unwanted outcome, the
exhaustion of the resource. Therefore, and especially in the world of tangibles, rights are
generally recognized only when there is a public benefit to be gained.196
Restriction on recognizing rights are thus imposed in order to preserve scarce or
diminishing resources. The fundamental aim of recognizing private rights only minimally
is to prevent the exhaustion of resources, for example, by overgrazing or overfishing. This
does not, however, mean that privatization will occur whenever there appears some value
that could be acquired.197 The tragedy of commons is thus closely bound to the free-rider
problem, which pertains precisely to publicly owned goods that are not produced for trade.
Public goods are available to anyone to consume and for this reason they may easily
become overused and exhausted.198 In this respect, public goods and commons resemble
each other closely in scope. Both involve the same dilemma of ensuring the production of
public or common resources and the right quantities of them.
The free-rider problem emerges in intellectual property law as well, where
intellectual property rights are normally used to simulate innovativeness.199 Without proper
protection, ideas could simply be taken and exploited without any cost put on them by any
other actor than the inventor.200 The free circulation of ideas is an essential element in the
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201 See Lessig 2002a, 23. This kind of innovation commons is well described in the problem
of open code software, which is based on the view that every problem is transparent to
somebody. Thus, the person who understands and fixes a problem is not necessarily or
even usually the one who first describes it. This is in fact one of the huge advantages of
open code software. See Raymond 2001, 30.
202 See Lessig 2002a, 47.
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innovative framework of the digital economy and is often referred to as innovation
commons.201 It entails threats as well, however, one being the tragedy of commons. In the
case innovations, however, the tragedy of commons may easily be avoided by considering
innovations and ideas as non-rivalrous resources: as non-rivalrous resources, they are
naturally non-exhaustible and therefore no tragedy of commons arises. One sustainable
solution to the tragedy of commons would be to reorganize the mutual relation of resources
and society. The scarcity of resources may best be addressed by removing scarcity, the
usual reaction having been to impose strong control that has made the resource even more
scarce.202 This would be very feasible in the case of innovations, provided there is no
continuous effort being made to privatize information and knowledge.
On the other hand, the aim is to encourage management of resources and especially
the governance of them. The tragedy of commons actually presumes that it is possible to
organize the governance of rights on only two different kinds of foundations, i.e., private
law or public law. Governance models for any resource thus have only two general options:
regulation by public law or the private law market framework. The public law alternative
has high transaction costs and may lead to ineffective modes of action. The self-regulation
of the markets entails high risks of social injustice and a constant danger of monopolies
compromising the freedom of competition. If, instead, a resource is given to someone as
private property, that owner will price the resource and therefore have an incentive to keep
the resource functioning for all possible users. Other individuals in need of the resource
will price their requirements in accordance with how much they value that resource. Such
incentives for behavior are economically efficient. Therefore, private property as a means
of governance will benefit everyone in the end.
The problem of the tragedy of commons may be examined through its opposite, i.e.,
the tragedy of anticommons. In the tragedy of commons a resource is prone to overuse when
too many owners each have the privilege of using the resource and no one has a right to
exclude another. Use of the resource is therefore completely free, and thus uncontrolled.
In contrast, in the tragedy of anticommons, a resource is prone to underutilization when
multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has
an effective privilege of use. As such the tragedy of anticommons partly even complements
the concept of the tragedy of commons as it explains the underutilization of resources. The
problem of underutilization may easily emerge when governments give too many people
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203 Privatization can thus solve one tragedy but cause another. See Hellner - Eisenberg 1998,
698 - 699.
204 See Grewlich 1999, 20.
205 See Drahos 1996, 147.
206 On the other hand, private ownership is based on certain overlapping principles that set the
foundation for the functionality of ownership in society. The first is a combination of effectiveness
and utility as a reasonable way to organize the use, possession and transference of objects. The
second consists of justice and equality as, on the one hand, a “floor thesis” whereby everyone
must possess a minimum ownership and, on the other, a “gap thesis” placing the limits on the
necessary inequality. The third principle is profit for labor. Labor is considered a merit that
justifies ownership. See Paasto 2004a, 51 - 52.
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rights to exclude others.203 In this perspective, the threats from the present system of
intellectual property rights are clear.
2.1.3 Private property in wealth management
Wealth management is mainly based on the decisions of the sovereign. Sovereignty is
generally considered to be characteristic of state organizations as holders of the supreme
authoritative power in society. The state as a governing body is likewise usually considered
as the sovereign executive of the supreme directive force in the state.204 As a state-based force,
the sovereign is entitled to govern the overall behavior in society. State governance strives
for dominance and domination may be focused on the behavior of a large group of people,
or even the whole country. The sovereignty in state governance is fundamentally based on
the vertical relation of the state and the individual. This obscures the foundation of private
property.
Private property may nevertheless be described as a sovereign position as well, albeit
not completely equivalent to sovereignty in state governance. Private property as
sovereignty no longer concerns the behavior of a large group or a mass of people, but is
carried out more in terms of relationships. Namely, the sovereignty that is the core of private
property is based on the relations between persons rather than on the vertical relation of
the superior and the suppressed. This relationship is a mutual relationship between
individuals rather than a pure relation between a person and an object.205 The relations of
the individuals are further shaped in respect of an object. That an object is the focus the
relations makes this consortium characteristically a manifestation of property law.
The private nature of this complex relationship as one of property is further
represented by its stable connection to the rights of individuals. This connection to
individual relations makes private property a tool of sovereignty.206 Sovereignty is therefore
derived precisely from the legal relationship that makes up the basis of ownership itself. A
legal relationship as the basis of ownership contains the correlative positions of right and
duty. Sovereignty is thus constituted of the position of the sovereign in the relations of
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207 See Drahos 1996, 148.
208 The free-rider problem causes problems in ensuring the production of resources or the
correct amount of them. See Begg - Fischer - Dornbusch 2000, 47.
209 The right to capital is one of the fundamental elements of private property. The others
include the terms of protection, extension, restriction, or elaboration of the right to capi-
tal. See Becker 1977, 20.
210 In other words, this means that the other elements of ownership may even be lacking, if
only the right to capital remains. In this sense, the right to capital may be considered the
most fundamental element of ownership. See Becker 1977, 20 - 21.
211 See Becker 1977, 20.
212 Property rights generally have two significant elements: the value of property rights may
be defined in monetary terms, and property rights are exchangeable. In this sense even
traditional civil rights may be defined as property, although we do not usually value them
in monetary terms. This is exactly the influence of the societal and cultural circumstances.
See Wennberg 2001, 137.
213 See Wilhelmsson 1983, 139.
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right and duty. In his or her position as a sovereign the property owner has some capacity
to control others. This capacity is explicitly manifested in the owner’s right (claim-right) as
against other individuals, who have a correlative duty.207 Private property largely prevents
the free-rider problem that may easily apply in the scope of public property and common
goods. The free-rider problem is the crucial explanation for not producing public goods
in the private market; in other words, public production is precisely the result of an
unwillingness to pay for goods. A free-rider consumes goods without paying for his or her
consumption. This is also why the free-rider problem tends to be applied particularly to
public goods: their consumption is different from consumption in the case of private
property. Public goods are not sold to anyone, but are available for anyone to consume.208
Private property is an effective tool for managing wealth when it is crucial to prevent the
free-rider problem.
The right to capital is one of the defining characteristics of private ownership. The
right includes the owner’s right to destroy, consume, and alienate the object of
ownership.209 It has even been asserted that whoever has the right to capital is considered
the owner of the object.210 The right to capital has some additional characteristics that have
been constituted to secure it: security in possession, security in use, security in
management, and security in income have each been considered varieties of ownership.211
In this sense capital may be variable. Property does not necessarily include traditional
capital or property in its traditional sense but is more dependent on society and cultural
circumstances.212
The role of private property in wealth management can further be explained on
grounds that are fundamentally based on the interests of society. Wealth management is
based not only on private individualistic interests but more generally on societal interests
as well.213 This is exactly why private property is considered a useful instrument in wealth
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214 See Zitting 1951, 120 -121.
215 See Renner 1949, 84 - 85.
216 The present framework of the market is fundamentally based on three overlapping and
changing elements: marketization, commodification, and extensive exploitation of tech-
nology.  The most widely employed technologies are electronics, computer software, and
biotechnology. See Tepora 2004, 181.
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management. The arguments may be roughly differentiated into two categories on the basis
of their implementation. First, private property is justifiable when it is based on activity. One
who has been active in producing wealth has his or her labor rewarded. The reasoning is
rather parallel to rewarding creativeness and inventiveness by granting intellectual property
rights. Activity thus strives to increase the entrepreneurial spirit and labor. Second, private
property is justifiable on the grounds of rationality.214 Rationality in wealth management
through private property is based on increasing flexibility and practicality in exchange. This
is carried out for example by making the utilization of time and labor more effective.215
2.2 Interests in the market
2.2.1 Commodification as creating property
The market is communication. As a communicative framework the market is essentially
based on the coexistence of certain functional elements. It is the union of supply and demand. In
the market framework, the connection between supply and demand has some further
implications. One of the fundamental prerequisites is the existence of exchangeable goods. A
market typically requires that there exist some goods to be exchanged. Static resources are
not enough for a healthily functional market. Resources as such are essential for a market
as well, but their principal problem is that they are not yet necessarily in the form of
commodities; i.e., they have not (yet) been commodified. Exchange that is based on such
resources is relatively uncertain. Therefore, for the sake of the market and smooth
exchange, there exists a crucial requirement that some resources be converted  into
commodities. The commodification of resources thus derives from the fundamental needs
of the market.216
The commodification of resources has some other advantages from the viewpoint
of the market. The most crucial of these is the functionality of the market and the price of goods
in it. The proper pricing of goods further ensures that goods may be brought onto the
market and exchanged. This is one of the principal advantages of the commodification of
resources. Since commodified resources can be properly priced, they may likewise be
properly exchanged. As such they may further be defined as property when
commodification is carried out by converting resources into property. Commodified
property has some further qualities that make it fairly stable, and thus usable in market
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217 Absoluteness and exclusivity constitute the core of private property. See Tolonen, H.
2004, 205 - 206. The owner thus possesses all rights that are not excluded. See Zitting
1984, 649.
218 However, pure commodification has its counterforce, branding. In the market, branding
ensures that commodities do not have to remain mere commodities but are increasingly sold
under heavily advertised brand names. See Kotler 2003, 425. The capitalization of material
values is more and more complemented by a focus on capitalizing the intellectual values
related to the use of products. In this way, a car understood as a material phenomenon will
be distinguished from a car understood as intellectual property. See Petrusson 2004, 24 - 25.
219 On these grounds, the main task and starting point of intellectual property rights are of-
ten considered to be converting ideas and intellectual creations into means of production
and exchangeable goods. See Bruun 1983, 161. On the other hand, the fundamental pre-
requisite for reproducing knowledge is the ability to convert it into a commodity.
Commodifying knowledge is thus a vital prerequisite for knowledge to gain exchange
value. Under technocapitalism, knowledge takes on the properties of a private commod-
ity. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 5.
220 Niklas Bruun provides an illustrative example: when Gutenberg invented the art of printing,
he produced a new invention as well - the book. See Bruun 1983, 161.
221 See Rose 2003, 95. Sometimes things that are part of res nullius may also be considered
res omnium (property of everyone). The appropriation would be carried out in a certain
community possessing a piece of land. See Paasto 2000, 349.
222 For example, converting knowledge into a commodity is the core of its reproduction.
The very act of reproducing knowledge turns it into a commodity, whereby it also ac-
quires some exchange value in addition to its utility value. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 14.
223 One good example of this is patenting. The growth in the number of patents and the
growing importance of patenting during the twentieth century reflected the rising value
of technological knowledge as a commodity. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 7.
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exchange. One is that such property is absolute and exclusive, which means that the owner
is free to decide how it is utilized.217
To be utilizable, property often needs to be in a tangible form. Accordingly,
commodities are often characteristically associated with tangibility, and commodified resources
are often treated as physical objects.218 Tangibility is also often considered the core of
intellectual property rights. Ideas and creations are rather impossible for society to exploit
as such and  therefore they need to be converted into tangible goods to be utilizable for the
needs of society; i.e., they have to be commodified.219 Therefore, when commodified, even
intellectual objects are made to look like and to serve as physical tangible goods.220 Their
commodified character makes them exchangeable and marketable. Without a commodified
character, intellectual creations would easily be left out of exchange. Commodification is
effected by creating control through intellectual property rights themselves. On the other
hand, things that are by their nature incapable of ownership, i.e., res communes, must be
turned into res nullius, i.e., things that are not yet owned but are capable of appropriation.221
Commodification is thus a means of converting resources into goods and commodities,
forms in which the resources are better suited to the needs of markets and exchange.222
Thus the most significant advantage of commodification is that it makes it possible to view
intangible resources as tangible, and thus as transferrable ones.223 Commodification is closely
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224 Public-sector information has several qualities that make it suitable for commercial ser-
vices. It is usually comprehensive; it has been collected over a long period of time; it
serves essential purposes of the infrastructure; and it is usually collected by a neutral
body. See Burkert 1993, 12.
225 Copyright law has always had exceptions that are based on the limited controlling power
of the right-holder. See Elkin-Koren 2002, 83. An example of these limits is private use, in
Finland set out in Copyright Act 12§. These limits are also realized through free speech,
which is included directly in the copyright system. See Oesch 2005, 364.
226 See Elkin-Koren 2002, 83 - 84.
227 It is illustrative here that knowledge and creativity have been considered the scarcest re-
sources today. They are scarce because they can only be acquired over long periods of
time and through great effort and persistence. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 5.
228 The fundamental difference between gift cultures and exchange cultures lies precisely in
their different view on scarcity. Gift cultures differ from exchange cultures in that the
exchange cultures are characterized by scarcity whereas the gift cultures are more likely to
be based on abundance. In gift cultures, social status is determined by what one gives
away, not by what one controls. See Bergquist - Ljungberg 2001, 305.
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connected to ensuring that goods are exchangeable. Commodification has, however, one
more implication that is even more salient than converting intangibles into a tangible form.
Namely, commodification has a direct connection to the control of access. Commodified
resources are often easy to control. This is evident, for example, in the commercialization
of public-sector information.224
Information also provides a counterexample. The change in the balance of
commercialization and commodification is totally invisible in the interpretation of copyright in the
digital framework. Culture has been commercialized by enabling right-holders to circulate
copies of their work for a certain fee. Information, however, was never turned into a
perfect commodity, because of the limited controlling power of the right-holders.225 The
character of copyright has nevertheless changed towards maximizing the profits of the
right-holders. This implies that all the economic potential of the information is to be
utilized. Indeed, it is now customary to speak of the information market, meaning that
information has become a complete commodity that brings with it a set of rights to control
all access to and utilization of information.226
2.2.2 Scarcity as increasing value
The amount of resources in society is variable.227 In this variation, commodification is
usually used for drawing boundaries with regard to resources. Boundaries are drawn
despite the quantity of a resource, i.e., regardless of whether it is plentiful or insufficient.228
In all these cases the boundaries to be drawn always create some restrictions on the use of the
resource. In other words, the use of a resource or a commodity is made controllable.
Commodification thus clearly correlates with scarcity in that resources that are
commodified are at the same time made scarce, with scarcity then increased by controlling
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229 This is based on the pattern of supply and demand, which is further based on the interplay of
utility and scarcity. Utility is the first requirement for an economic object to exist, with
scarcity added as a second determinant factor if the object is to acquire a specific value.
Supply would thereby correspond to scarcity and demand to utility. See Simmel 1978, 90
- 91.
230 Scarcificaton of a language is often complicated. According to the Copyright Council of
Finland the words of a language are not considered copyrightable. See Copyright Council of
Finland TN 1995:16, 1. The Copyright Council of Finland consists of the principal copyright-
holders and  users of copyrighted works. Everyone is free to ask for an opinion of the
Council. The opinions are, however, not binding but only recommendations. The status and
task of the Copyright Council are based on the Copyright Act (442/1984), article 55: “The
Council of State shall appoint a Copyright Council, the function of which shall be to assist
the Ministry of Education in the handling of matters pertaining to copyright and to issue
statements regarding the application of this Act.“
231 Article 2, subsection 1 of the Copyright Act of Finland reads as follows: “Subject to the
limitations stated hereinafter, copyright includes the exclusive right to dispose of the work
by making copies of it and by making it available to the public, in either the original or an
altered form, in translation or adaptation, in another literary or artistic form or by other
technical means.”
232 This applies to physical goods, where there is a direct correlation between scarcity and
value. For example, gold is more valuable than wheat. The case is, however, often pre-
cisely the reverse. Most intellectual goods increase in value as they become more com-
mon. This is precisely due to the importance of familiarity in the area of intellectual
goods.
See Barlow 1994, http://wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas_pr.html
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the use of the resource. Control and restrictions in the utilization of resources play the
main role in this scarcification.
The ability to control the utilization of resources correlates with the  market value
of the resource. The more valuable it is, the more exchange of it there will be.229
Scarcification is especially fundamental when the resource is originally plentiful. This means
that in nature the resource in question would not be insufficient even if everyone were
consuming it. Among the plentiful resources of the world, sunshine is seldom scarcified,
whereas language more often is. For example, copyrighting language truly makes it
scarce.230 It is possible to copyright even the words of a language, although they have to
be in the form of a list. According to Supreme Court of Finland in case KKO:2005:43
(S2003/594) a list of words making up part of a textbook was protected through copyright.
KKO:2005:43. A textbook used for studying a foreign language included separate reading
and vocabulary sections. Company X had, without permission of the copyright-holders of
the textbook, copied the vocabulary on a computer-readable diskette and begun to market
it, whereby the company, according to Copyright Act 2 §, infringed the copyright of the
author of the textbook.231
Scarcification is thus employed as a tool to create value for commodities.232 It is property
especially that is expressly made scarce. The value of a scarce resource is best illustrated
when scarcity is contrasted with plentifulness: the two have a fixed mutual relationship.
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233 Separation is carried out in practice through fencing. The distinction of included and ex-
cluded is one of the most crucial means when creating property. See Mackaay 2002, 137.
234 The capability of defining an object precisely is also considered one of the main prerequi-
sites for private property. See Tolonen, H. 2004, 205.
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Plentifulness is often converted into scarcity in order to create some value for the resource,
whereas scarcifying resources that are already scarce strengthens the proprietary character
of a commodity. Thus scarcification does not concern only plentiful resources but may
concern scarce ones as well. Occasionally, different degrees of scarcification may be
distinguished. Scarcification occurs more readily when the resource is already
characteristically scarce. The gradational difference in scarcifying scarce versus plentiful
resources is further connected to another fact: scarcifying is often artificial. This means that
the boundaries are drawn artificially, with scarcification often carried out by law. When a
resource is scarce by nature it is often valuable as such. A good example is pure nature, which
contains some value for everyone of us. An even more relevant example is gold and other
precious metals. Scarcifying takes place when creating value for those resources that are
already scarce by their nature.
Making resources scarce is crucial for creating property given the value-creating
character of scarcification where resources are concerned. Scarcity directly represents the
value of a commodity: only scarce resources may be valuable and this places scarcification
at the core of the overall value-creating process. Property rights make it possible to allocate
scarce resources. This is one of the most fundamental explanations of the fixed correlation
between scarcity and property. Scarcity is created by imposing restrictions on the utilization
of resources. Creating scarcity entails an increase in the controlling power of the possessor
of the scarce resource. In this respect, scarcifying resources increases the exclusive power
over the resource. Exclusivity is also used as a tool to create value and thereby correlates
rather closely with scarcity.
Scarcification does not, however, work alone, but must be complemented through
some additional mechanism. In order to become useful for market purposes resources
need to be modified. For market purposes modification is carried out first by classifying
resources. Classification is thus a basis for creating scarcity in resources; it is carried out by
separating scarcifiable resources from resources in general.233 Separation is carried out
though exclusion, which then acts as an instrument to create scarcity in the excluded
resources. Exclusion has another close connection to classification; namely it makes the
resource definable and specifiable. Further, an excluded and thus defined resource may again
be considered a commodity and as such a single object. Definability thus makes it possible
to construct property rights attached to a commodity and to own it.234 Accordingly, making
a product scarce means making it suitable for possessing.
Suitability for possession and the governance of resources are often bound together.
Often there is a tendency to govern the amount of resources by converting plentifulness
into scarcity. This is the essence of creating property rights, of which possession is the very
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235 The plentifulness of information is often referred to as the information overload, which has
caused inflation in information. There exists a lot of information, whereby its value and sig-
nificance have decreased. See Vakkari 2000, 12 - 13.
236 Property rights have often been considered an answer to scarcity, because they are gener-
ally established for scarce goods. There is no need to establish a property right to some-
thing that is abundant. See Mackaay 2002, 134.
237 See Korpijaakko 1989, 75 - 76. This is the case also in the area of intellectual property,
where there have been efforts to analyze traditional knowledge and cultural expression in
conventional intellectual property terms. Indeed, this kind of property is not considered
as being owned at all but rather as based on certain responsibilities to show respect and
maintain a reciprocal relationship with the people, animals, plants and places. See
Blakeney 2000, 253 - 254.
238 Another crucial factor in constructing the paradigm of ownership is how it is justified.
One possible reason lies in the fundamental character of labor in receiving ownership.
Labor has great significance in converting free nature into capital and hence into prop-
erty. See Korpijaakko 1989, 75 - 76.
239 See Tolonen, H. 2004, 207.
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kernel. On the other hand, property rights are a useful instrument for governing scarce
resources. Some of these resources are plentiful as such, but scarcification is still used as
an instrument to govern them. These resources might also be governed, however, by
keeping them plentiful and uncontrolled, whereby access to certain resources would be
preserved for all people. One illuminating example of such resources is information, which
is certainly a plentiful resource.235 Information governance is nevertheless increasingly
based on making the information involved scarce and inaccessible.
2.2.3 Rivalry as exclusivity
Private property is often founded on the characteristic rivalrousness of resources. Rivalrousness
as the core of private property may also be considered a means of governance.236
Rivalrousness implies an effective controlling system, exactly like scarcification. The
control of  rivalrous resources is needed for assuring that the resources will not become
depleted. In other words, resources need to be properly produced  but at the same time not
overused. Both of these threats pertain precisely to rivalrous resources. Rivalrous resources
are often traditional tangibles, such as land or pieces of movable property, whereby
governing them is also often carried out through traditional property rights. Conversely,
it may be said that there is no need for ownership without rivalry for the scarce resource.237
Scarcity as such is not, however, a sufficient reason for creating ownership; it needs to be
properly justified.238
Governance that is based on rivalrous resources is squarely based on private
property. Property in this sense is founded on two main prerequisites, the principal
requirements of individual property rights overall. The first is absoluteness.239 Absoluteness is the
core of property inasmuch as it entails that resources are treated as individual property and
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240 The justification of the single owner has varied. The most significant arguments are based
on occupation (or appropriation), labor, and agreement. See Paasto 2000, 343.
241 The priority of private property and private ownership is inscribed in their very definition.
On these grounds, persons are classified as owners and non-owners. See Paasto 2000, 339.
242 The controlling power of the owner is absolute, which implies that the owner is princi-
pally entitled to absolute and complete power over the object. The owner thus holds all
the rights that are not expressly excluded. When restricted in favor of a third party, own-
ership will be restored to its original extent. In this sense, ownership is elastic.  See Paasto
2004b, 1295.
243 Absoluteness is considered the kernel of the owner’s right to use. This right is made cer-
tain by excluding third parties, which means that the right is protected in a static sense. In
this way, the concept of private property actually binds together absoluteness and exclu-
sivity. See Zitting 1951, 27.
244 See Tolonen, H. 2004, 205.
245 The state operates as the basic institution when creating ownership. The state protects
private ownership and is thus significant for it. See Paasto 2004a, 43.
246 Exclusivity serves as a tool for establishing and protecting various personal goods, among
them autonomy, personality, self-respect, self-esteem, liberty, control, privacy, and indi-
viduality. See Munzer 1990, 90.
247 See Tolonen, H. 2004, 205.
248 In the modern research on ownership, it has become more reasonable to construct and
represent ownership as different factors. This does not render the basic definition of
ownership obsolete. Ownership can still be defined as essentially absolute and excluded
power over an object. This pertains to ownership in its static sense. See Zitting - Rautiala
1982, 208.
249 See Tolonen, H. 2004, 207.
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nothing else. Absoluteness has further implications. It requires that ownership may
generally belong to only one subject at a time.240 Absoluteness may thus well be considered the
kernel of governing rivalrousness.241 The crucial nature of absoluteness is even better
explained by the power that it grants the owner.242 Namely, it implies undivided power over
an object, i.e., property.243 Absoluteness also implies that the owner of an object is
privileged to use the property freely according to his or her wishes.244
Absoluteness seems to lend some fundamental strength to the core of ownership.
Absoluteness is, however, strengthened through another crucial foundation of ownership,
exclusivity. As the determinative elements of ownership, absoluteness and exclusivity
intersect; the two complement each other.245 Absoluteness always requires some degree of
exclusivity, perhaps even by definition. Absoluteness and exclusivity together constitute the
basis for controlling the system of private property.246 Exclusivity ensures absoluteness by
prescribing that there may excludably be only one right concerning one particular object.247
In this way, property rights may not in fact be divided. These two property functions, i.e.,
absoluteness and exclusivity, are thus rather essential in creating individual property rights.
In this respect, they have often been considered even impossible to separate.248 In other
words, absoluteness defines exclusivity and exclusivity describes absoluteness.249
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250 Absoluteness and exclusivity are therefore significant precisely from the viewpoint of
exchange. In practice, both of these elements are blended by not describing the use of
property as a monolithic whole: it is completely possible that there exist two ownerships in
the same object as long as they are not identical. See Määttä 2000, 23.
251 Ownership thus has different functions in different societal systems. The ownership that
we have in the market economy makes it possible to constitute a market and thereby sup-
ports the optimal development of market forces. Contrasting with this is traditional peas-
ant society, where ownership was not constituted for exchange, but for utilization. Pre-
serving utilization value was the most important aim of ownership. See Numhauser-
Henning 1988, 30.
252 The definition includes absoluteness, exclusiveness, and completeness. The focus in on
the shift from a society based on utilization towards a society based on exchange. See
Määttä 1999, 208 - 210.
253 The system of control that we create for rivalrous resources (tangibles, land, pieces of
movable property) is not necessarily appropriate for non-rivalrous resources (ideas, mu-
sic, expression). Having the same system for both kinds of resources may do real harm.
See Lessig 2002a, 95.
254 See Koepsell 2000, 94.
255 See Boyle 2003, 42.
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Absoluteness and exclusivity as the kernel of ownership have significance in the exchange
of property as increasing predictability.250 On the other hand, ownership is adapted to the
societal circumstances and it is thereby variable and flexible.251 Exchange proceeds more
smoothly when the object of exchange is clearly defined. This is in fact the task of the strict
definition of ownership.252 Absoluteness, complemented by exclusivity, is thus the kernel
of rivalrousness as one means of governance.
Absoluteness and exclusivity are the main elements of individual property and
thereby the very basis of intellectual property rights. Intellectual property rights are based
on two divergent purposes that at the same time constitute the rules of governance and the
collaboration of rights. First, the purpose of intellectual property rights is to protect the
results of intellectual labor. This is basically founded on rewarding inventors; if there did
not exist an effective and sufficient reward system, inventions would compete with each
other. Sometimes inventions are non-rivalrous, e.g., when they cannot be depleted. In these
cases, exclusivity is used to ensure that the resource is created.253 Second, the purpose of
intellectual property rights is to encourage the development and dissemination of new
ideas.254 Information goods are, however, considered non-exclusive and without the ability
to exclude others, the creators of information would be unable to charge for their
creations. Accordingly, there would be inadequate incentives to create.255
The uncontrolled spread of ideas also leads to rivalrousness when the collaboration
of rights is left ungoverned. Both of the purposes of intellectual property rights are based
on absoluteness and exclusivity. Rivalrousness of resources is generally based on the
coexistence of collaborative rights; it is rivalrousness that indicates the need for governance and,
further, that the rivalrous resources could principally be used by several users at the same
time. In practice, this means that there are several persons pursuing different uses for the
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256 The right to utilize and decide what is to be done with an object may be granted to a sin-
gle person or a larger group of persons. Property rights are in this way complemented by
the exclusion of all others, preferably with the right to transfer that power to someone
else. See Mackaay 2002, 134 - 135.
257 See Lessig 1999, 131.
258 Analog and digital are contradictions of sorts. Information is analog when it is defined as
a continuous quantity. Digital information, for its part, consists of discrete values, either 0
or 1. See Järvinen 2001, 156. See also Negroponte 1995, 14 - 15.
259 This may be examined through the different kinds of commons, with the tangible
(earthy) commons usually rivalrous but the commons of the mind generally non-
rivalrous. Many uses of land are for example mutually exclusive. See Boyle 2003, 41.
260 The problem of overuse is therefore more likely to be threatening in the realm of tangi-
bles and rivalrous resources (fields and fisheries) than in the case of informational or
innovational commons. See Boyle 2003, 41.
261 Actually compactness appears in a slightly different way in the background of virtuality.
The other consequence of virtuality is the essential need for technical devices, which then
creates greater dependence on user interface systems.  See Samuelson 1990, 336.
262 The generality of information is best revealed when comparing printed works with intel-
lectual ones. See Samuelson 1990, 335 - 336.
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same object. The resulting conflict of rights is the basis for rivalrousness as the foundation
of exclusivity. Exclusivity is thus created by property rights in their reserving to the owner
the power to decide what is to be done with an object.256 On the other hand, the rivalrous
character of a resource may be used as a supporting medium. This is carried out in practice
by granting a person an exclusive right over his or her personal and real property.257
Rivalrousness thus entails competing interests. The counterargument to
rivalrousness is found directly from these competing interests. Namely, one force
countering rivalrousness is the digitization of information and the ease of replicating works
in the digital framework. The ease of replication is directly linked to the nature of ideas and
information. Despite the free nature of digitized information, it is costly to produce but
cheap to reproduce.258 In this respect, information is definitely non-rivalrous.259 The
contradiction of rivalrousness may be illustrated through examples. When someone reads
a book, no one else can read that book at the same time. This is where the digitization of
books comes in and has clear implications for the threat of overuse.260 Namely, a book may
be read on a network by several readers at the same time, with this use not being rivalrous
in practice. The other factor revealing the rivalrousness of traditional tangible objects is
virtuality, which is one more essential implication of the compactness of digital
information.261 As related to rivalrousness, the implication of virtuality is closely connected
to the generality of information. Virtual information may be represented in compact form and
may therefore almost never be revealed all at the same time. The difference compared to
information represented in physical form is enormous.262 The generality of information
consequently affects the rivalrousness of intellectual objects.
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263 The essence of the new economy, i.e. a new entrepreneurial agenda,  is often described as the
privatization of knowledge or, conversely, as the collectivization of property concepts. See
Petrusson 2004, 3.
264 The controlling position is solidly based on the owner’s rights over the object. The owner
holds all the rights over the object if they are not excluded on the grounds of law, orders
of the authorities, or a legal act. Limited rights in rem, on the other hand, may be used as
another definitive element if these include only the rights that are directed to the holder
of the limited right in rem. See Paasto 2004b, 1298.
265 See Ghosh 2002, 466.
266 This change has been sometimes called deregulation. See Begg - Fischer - Dornbusch 2000,
312.
267 See Dreyfuss 2000, 274.
268 See Drahos 1996, 147.
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2.2.4 Privatization as sovereignty
Property rights are based on exclusivity and absoluteness, which are the core elements of
ownership and possession.263 These fundamental elements characteristically imply that
property rights create a control position for the right-holder.264 In the market this control
position is founded on the ability to manage exchange and it is generally also
characteristically private. Privatization of rights is thus rather an essential element when
considering ownership as an illustration of market interests. Further, privatization may be
examined as a classification of resources into controlled and free. In this classification, free
resources are defined as belonging to the sphere of commons, whereas privatized ones
form the sphere of controlled resources.265
The major role of privatization is played at the borderline of private property, i.e.,
private property and the freely usable commons. Privatization is even generally defined as
a return of state enterprises to private ownership and control.266 Privatized resources are
generally used for disciplining markets, which implies economic power for the right-holder.
Associated with this is a tendency that whenever there appears some value that could be
acquired, it is gained through privatization.267 Privatization grants the right-holder a strong
dominance, which is realized through sovereignty, the kernel of privatization. Privatization
creates a sovereign position for the right-holder, i.e., the owner. Sovereignty, in other
words, is created by granting the owner an absolute and exclusive right over the privatized
resource or commodity. Sovereignty thus has a close and fixed connection to the core of
private property, which then has further implications. Namely, sovereignty over private
property is founded on the relations between persons in respect of an object.268 These
relations then appear as the essence of sovereignty.
Absoluteness and exclusivity as the core of an owner’s sovereignty have additional
implications that can be readily seen for example in the privatization of information. The
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269 This is at least partly paralleled by informatization. It was no longer tangible commodities
and the ownership of tangible goods that were used as the measurement of market power
but information. Furthermore, the potentially decentralized nature of online information
markets affected the market players’ attempts to acquire legal rights for exercising control
over information markets and protecting market domination. See Elkin-Koren 2002, 79 -
80.
270 This is the basis of strong positions that are created through privatizing information. A
good example is knowledge cartels. See Drahos - Braithwaite 2003, 55.
271 Privatization of distribution may be carried out at least in terms of the timing, format,
and context in which the works are made available to the public. See Elkin-Koren 2002,
86 - 87.
272 See Ghosh 2002, 466.
273 See Kerr 2002, 55.
274 This is clearly seen in the institutional protection of private property. The Constitution
generally protects ownership and maintains that it is to be preserved as an institution of
private law. See Zitting 1984, 656.
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ability to discipline markets is applicable in the case of information, which is considered
to have become increasingly central to the human experience.269 Information has often
been considered to be privatized by being converted into knowledge. The rationale of
privatizing information is not to be able to share knowledge, but to achieve the power to
discipline markets.270 The owner of privatized information may achieve a dominant position
in the market, which clearly correlates with sovereignty in market relationships.
All intellectual creations may be only partly privatized. Privatization may apply to the
context as well as the form of presentation or the distribution channel. Privatization thus
does not have to be carried out completely, i.e., with respect to the whole object. Even a
partial right is generally enough for granting the right-holder a completely privatized right
to utilize the object. One example is parallel privatization at several different levels, in
which privatizing distribution only may lead to control of the overall context.271 It is often
completely sufficient to privatize only a small portion of an object to give the owner the
possibility to use his or her rights over the whole thing.272 This entails risks, however, one
of the most serious being the risk of privatizing ideas by granting excessively broad patent
protection. Patenting mathematical algorithms is a case in point. Algorithms are sets of
logical instructions that are not as such connected to the physical world. They do not
embody any ideas, theories, or insights into the physical world, but are instead mere ideas
that are programmed into a computer. These ideas are then privatized by creating property
rights in their use.273
The priority of privatization affects the whole sphere of ownership by affecting
private property. This is well illustrated by examining the instrumentality of private
property. Private property always has certain functions that are to be carried out. The
functionality of privatization entails the existence of some ends to be reached through
ownership.274 Granting ownership, or a fragment of ownership, to an object is a device to
the end of using that object, or taking advantage of it. In the mutual construction of
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275 See Ghosh 2002, 466.
276 See Lessig 2002a, 21.
277 See Mackaay 2002, 135.
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different spheres, of property the purpose of privatizing might mainly be considered as
weakening the sphere of commons in favor of private property.275
2.2.5 Exhaustibility as controlling utilization
Interests in the market are often collaborative, which is one reason why the realization of
these interests is mainly based on managing different kinds of resources. Rights management
takes the form of allocating resources in order to keep them non-exhaustible. Rights
management is best realized by basing the management system on a clear systematic
framework for equal distribution. In this respect, the grounds of distribution are clearly
derived from the amount and significance of the resources in society. Resources have
different relations to the society in which they are used and it is precisely the interrelated
communication of resources and society that affects how resources are treated.
The exhaustible character of certain resources is based on the classification of
resources. Resources may be distinguished on the basis of the prerequisites for producing them,
i.e., whether they are exhaustible or non-exhaustible. Exhaustible resources are
characteristically ones that may well be overused or depleted, whereas non-exhaustible ones
may be consumed freely without any fear of their running out. In this sense exhaustibility
is closely related to the rivalrousness of resources in that exhaustibility and rivalrousness
often correlate with each other. Further, a resource that is rivalrous is often exhaustible.
In this way, the possibility to compete for and thereby exhaust a certain resource affects
the justification of exclusivity. On the other hand, a non-rivalrous resource cannot be
exhausted: once it has been produced, it cannot be undone. If a resource is rivalrous, then
we have to worry both about there being sufficient incentive to create it and about whether
consumption by some will leave enough for others.276
The collaborative character of market interests is generally based on the varying
quantity of resources. Exhaustible resources are often also scarce, whereas non-exhaustible
resources are plentiful or even cumulative. Cumulativeness well illustrates non-
exhaustibility, information being a good example of a cumulative, non-exhaustible resource.
In the case of information, cumulativeness means that information that is embodied in the
creation of one person or invention is often used by someone else in developing another
creation or invention.277 Thus cumulativeness often reinforces non-exhaustibility. Non-
exhaustible resources are often collective goods. This implies that such resources are produced
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278 Inventiveness as a collective process has been the focus of patent law, especially in the
justifications for rewarding inventiveness. The criticism has rested on two different bases:
Is there really need of rewarding inventiveness, or is the patent itself a sufficient reward?
Both of these arguments are fundamentally based on the collectiveness of inventions. See
Petrusson 1999, 115.
279 See Drahos - Braithwaite 2003, 58 - 59.
280 See Mackaay 2002, 134.
281 Lessig challenges the view that ideas are excludable because they can be kept secret. See
Lessig 1999, 132.
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jointly and that the production process is fundamentally collective.278 One good example
of collective goods is intellectual property rights, whose collectiveness derives from their
special nature as a manifestation of information. In the area of intellectual property rights,
it is precisely information that so closely links exhaustibility and collectiveness.
Exhaustibility is manifested in the costly production of information, which may make
information exhaustible. As information is nevertheless cheap to reproduce, it remains in
the sphere of non-exhaustible resources.
The close connection between the collectiveness and non-exhaustibility of
information is further based on the generality of information. Namely, it is often rather difficult
to exclude people from using information once it has become available, for information
characteristically becomes collective and non-exhaustible. Moreover, use by one person
does not preclude use by another. In this respect, information has become a new
commodity that is mainly based on its non-exhaustible character and as such also changes
the commodity markets and the very logic of those markets. In other words, a consumer
can never actually own information; he or she can only pay for its use. In addition, every
information transaction may attract a fee and transactions may be repeated innumerable
times.279
The non-rivalrousness of ideas implies their other essential feature of belonging
naturally to everyone. Ideas are a naturally common resource. This characteristic of ideas allows
for the possibility to exclude someone from access to an idea. If one person takes another’s
idea, the first person still has it. Similarly, if one reveals one’s idea to someone else, one still
has it. In this way, an idea is imperfectly excludable, which means that it is often difficult to
exclude people from using information once it has become available.280 Something can be
kept secret and people can be excluded from it, but once a secret is revealed it cannot be
taken back. Information is therefore non-exhaustible; it can be shared without giving it
away. Ideas can also be kept secret. Keeping an idea secret is the only way to prevent others
from using it.281
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282 The public domain is defined functionally. Yochai Benkler defines the public and enclosed
domains as follows: The public domain is the range of uses of information that any person
is privileged to make, absent individualized facts that make a particular use by a particular
person unprivileged. On the contrary, the enclosed domain is the range of uses of informa-
tion as to which someone has an exclusive right, and that no other person may make ab-
sent individualized facts that indicate permission from the right-holder, or otherwise priv-
ilege the specific use under the stated facts. See Benkler 1999, 362.
283 See Lessig 1999, 131- 132.
284 See Mackaay 2002, 135.
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The exhaustibility of resources may be excluded from the public domain.282 This
applies particularly to ideas and information which have a mutual association in that
domain. Namely, the more implications of information are to be defined as ideas, the more
they will be part of the public domain. Conversely, the generality of ideas may cause their
exclusion from the sphere of private property. This is the essence of the non-exhaustibility
of ideas. Ideas are functional in a different way than concretely defined objects. Non-
exhaustibility is clearly illustrated in the consumption of ideas in their being non-rivalrous.
This implies further that ideas can be shared with no reduction in the amount consumption
by the owner. This applies to ideas at least. Another’s consumption of an idea does not
lessen my consumption of it. Accordingly, my knowing something does not lessen
another’s knowing of the same thing. No technology could make it possible to share ideas
without harm to someone else. The non-exhaustibility of ideas lies exactly in the
intellectuality and intangibility of ideas. Unlike physical entities, ideas are something that
cannot be taken from a person without diminishing what he or she has.283
This non-rivalrous aspect of ideas  is one of their most essential attributes as a non-
exhaustible resource. The nature of ideas as non-excludable and non-rivalrous resources
tends to guarantee that ideas spread freely from one person to another. This is how and
why information and ideas acquire their value also as public goods. The value is realized
in the cumulative character of information. Information that is embodied in the creation
or invention of one person is often used by someone else in developing another creation
or invention.284 Cumulativeness is in fact rather essential for innovativeness and the free
spreading of information given that cumulative value is characteristic of information. The
interests that are implied as part of the market are at the same time the essence of smooth
exchange and functionality in the exchange-based society. Therefore, these interests are
further used in constituting the market governance. Market governance is based on the
exchangeability of goods and on the smooth operation of that exchange. This is the focus
of the study of the market in the following section.
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285 See Munzer 1990, 89.
286 This functionality is based, according to ownership, on freedom of contract. The other
two freedom-based principles that are closely bound to the reorganization of ownership
are the freedom of trade and the freedom of competition. See Numhauser-Henning
1988, 46.
287 In this sense, private property contrasts with common property that is created by the
guarantee to each individual that he or she will not be excluded from the use or benefit
of something. See Macpherson 1978, 5.
288 According to Stephen R. Munzer, all private property economies are private property sys-
tems, but not vice versa. See Munzer 1990, 89.
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2.3 The core of market governance - smooth exchange
2.3.1 Resources in the market
A market is communication that needs to be governed. Market governance is founded on
the allocation of wealth, which is generally based on private property. Private property is
then predominantly built on individual ownership, which is defined as the right-holder’s, i.e.,
the owner’s, absolute, excluded, and complete right over the owned object. The
categorization of private ownership underpins further the larger private property system that
is based on property and ownership. Private property is owned by individuals, partnerships
consisting of individuals, or juridical entities, such as corporations.285
The system of private property is further linked to the economy as a whole, where
private property constitutes the main focus. Ownership is not only used to govern societal
resources but also acts as a fundamental requirement for a properly functional market.286
The fundamental core of private property is to ensure that an individual can exclude others
from the use of a benefit of something.287 Therefore, excludability constitutes the essence
of private property. The possibility to produce or possess property privately further
constitutes a complete system that is also based on the significance of private property. The
system is thus a whole in which the means of production are mostly privately owned and
the market performs distributive functions. In this system, income and wealth are mainly
assigned to individuals.288 Private property is thus the core of the management of incomes
and the governance of  wealth; it also always ensures some controlling power for individuals.
The controlling power of private property is based on the possibility to confine the
use of property to a single person in the form of ownership. The individuality of ownership
is hence one direct implication of the market interests examined in the previous section.
All of those interests, i.e., commodification, scarcification, rivalrousness, privatization, and
exhaustibility, support the individuality of ownership, each in its own way. The
fundamental characteristic of private property as a bearer of market interests derives from
the nature of traditional tangible objects. This may actually be considered as the prototype
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289 See Mackaay 2002, 136. Exclusivity is not the same as exclusion, because owners might
not use the power to exclude. They have free choice to exclude others or not. Exclusivity
is not the same as exclusiveness either. Often several persons have a legal interest in the
same thing, meaning that exclusive power is not necessarily absolute. See Munzer 1990,
89.
290 Ownership is crucially based on certain defined and restricted objects. For example, own-
ership of land is differentiated by drawing clear boundaries. This is in fact the conceptual
premise of ownership. Drawing boundaries and declaring one’s right in this way are actu-
ally one form of communication. By drawing boundaries, the owner endeavors to pre-
vent unjustified use by others. See Korpijaakko 1989, 406 - 407.
291 In this sense, intellectual properties are “fuzzier” than physical properties; i.e., intellectual
property has no existence in itself. The concepts of intellectual property only exist because
of the common belief of society that they exist and because of common loyalty to these
beliefs. See Petrusson 2004, 53.
292 See Ellicksen 1991, 26 - 28.
293 In other words, the physical boundaries of, and thus also the restrictions on, the utiliza-
tion of products have been erased. With this development, the protection of intellectual
property has become more complicated than when its protection was based on the physi-
cal attributes of products.
See Barlow 1994, http://wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas_pr.html
294 See Mackaay 2002, 137.
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of property. The objects of ownership are essentially individually specified tangible objects.
Further, an owner can legally exclude others from using his or her property. This is the
most integral element of the right to use, the privilege to exclude being the core of
ownership overall.289 Exclusion is one of the most essential elements of private property;
it is carried out by defining who is included and who is excluded, which requires at least
some degree of fencing. Fencing is thus an essential element in defining the borderlines of
ownership.290
In the field of intellectual property rights, fencing has natural restrictions that require
some legally effective means. Intellectual property is generally based on communicatively
shared beliefs concerning the existence of intellectual property.291 The natural tool for
preventing misuse of content - and thus a tool for fencing - has traditionally been the
physical nature of the product.292 Products were usually tangible goods and fencing consisted
of only defining those goods as legal objects.293 The break with physicality changed all this,
however: the digitization of products made physical fencing impossible and prompted an
acute need for an effective and stable rights management system. On the other hand,
fencing may not be assumed. Without fencing the right-holder may not have any claim-
right, which means that he or she has no means to defend his or her right. This is the
reason why drawing the borderlines of that right is essential. In this respect, fencing can
be seen as part of the foundation of property.
Fencing can be stronger or weaker and it is never completely free; the freedom to
fence is limited. The limit is set by forbidding interference with the existing rights of others;
i.e., previously existing rights limit fencing.294 Fencing and creating new objects ought to
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295 Encryption in the sense of rights management falls under technological measures and
rights management information in Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright
And Related Rights in the Information Society: Article 6: Obligations as to technological mea-
sures. This is also included in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act H. R. 2281: Section 1201.
296 See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/e/encryption.html. At the systemic
level, access may be denied through conditional access. See COM (2003) 198 final, 5 - 6.
297 Encryption or cryptography involves the translation of data into a secret code and is the
most effective way to achieve data security. Cryptography has been widely used in society
in intelligence, diplomacy and warfare. Today, cryptography may be used likewise to au-
thenticate computer users, ensure the integrity and confidentiality of electronic communi-
cations, and keep sensitive information safely stored. Thus cryptography has emerged
from the earlier secret military technology to become a key technology for all participants
in the Information Society. See Koops 2001, 33.
298 Digital signatures are used to authenticate that a particular file has been sent by the proper
sender and that it has not been altered. This kind of security is naturally very essential for
electronic transactions on open networks. The technology is derived from encryption and
is called public key cryptography. Digital signature technology is integral also for electronic
commerce when securing the information being transmitted. See Koops 2001, 55 - 56.
A closely related system is digital watermarking, which incorporates into a file identifying
information that cannot easily be dissociated from it. This is what is known as copyright
management information, i.e., information about authorship, copyright ownership, date of
creation and terms and conditions of authorized uses. See Samuels 2000, 113.
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respect objects that have already been invented, i.e., excluded from common use. A good
example of fencing in the digital age is encrypting, which is becoming a part of copyright and
an instrument for excluding rights.295 Encrypting is an extremely strong fencing technology.
By definition, encryption implies translating data into a secret code in order to keep it
concealed. Further, to read an encrypted file, one must have access to a secret key or
password that enables one to decrypt it.296 Encryption as a means of rights management
is not only an instrument of the digital age, however. Some representative examples can be
found in daily life. For example, a simple padlock is a means of rights management and,
roughly speaking, an example of encryption. A padlock is easy for the owner to use and
requires special tools for opening unless one has a key. Another classical and simple rights
management system is barbed wire, which is used as a fencing tool for real estate.
The significance of encryption technologies has been emphasized recently, also for
the purposes of fencing and excluding. Encrypting is an instrument of digital rights
management today and accordingly has become a tool for fencing.297 These techniques are
often used for controlling access to copyrighted content as a part of digital rights
management systems.298 This is the fundamental reason for narrowing the scope of free
resources in favor of controlled ones. Encryption increases the tendency to create
restrictions on free circulation of information. In the digital environment, the free
circulation of information, as well as all of resources, may easily be governed through
digital rights management. In this respect digital rights management is an extension of the
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299 In the digital environment these restrictions can only really be effectively implemented by
technical measures.  The main purpose of rights management systems is not, however, a
simple request for protection or simple distribution of content. Digital rights manage-
ment is often reduced to a description of  merely these elements or, alternatively, docu-
ment security and data protection. See Davis 2001,
http://www.copyright.com/PDFs/ComputerLibraries.pdf.pdf
300 These means include, for example, physical fences or ditches (land, goods, other physical ob-
jects), encryption and watermarking (digital products), legal restrictions (circumventing rules),
marketing techniques (regular updates, on-line assistance), or contracts. See Mackaay 2002,
136.
301 Protection in the intellectual environment is likewise implemented by technical applica-
tions. Those applications are used to restrict access to the content of any kind of infor-
mation products that require protection. There exist several technologies capable of pro-
tecting works on open networks and in the other digital environments. Especially on
open or semi-open networks digital rights management systems are said to have become
very important for future business life. See Välimäki - Pitkänen 2001,
http://www.hiit.fi/de/mobileipr/wiapp_paper.pdf
302 See Helin 1978, 650 - 651.
303 Copying was both laborious and expensive. Printing presses were expensive and massive
machines and they required considerable skill and expense to operate, while hand-copy-
ing was a time-consuming activity and useful in general only for making single copies of
the work. The use of a printing press was economical only when multiple copies were
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technical tools used to protect digitally expressed copyrighted content, with encryption
playing an essential role in that process.299
Fencing is highly dependent on the character of the protected object. Fencing may be
either physical or legal.300 Traditionally, physical fences are the most common because of
the essential physicality of fencing. This is an implication of carrying out fencing through
physical barriers, for example, by surrounding a yard with a wall. Fencing here is realized
explicitly. Physical fencing is also seen in the pure manufacture of goods. Manufacturing actually
draws physical boundaries for objects. This applies to all property that is in physical form,
for example, a book. The fencing and the physical restrictions are created along with the
object itself.
Intellectual property differs where fencing is concerned. In intellectual property
there never exist any physical fences; boundaries are created by law. Intangible property is
always created at the level of rights.301 There is no intangible property that is not first
defined through legislation, or at the level of rights. This is also manifested in the view  that
rights are not at all a relation between the right-holder and an object but rather relations
between two or more persons. In other words, rights may be ascribed to persons only, not
to objects. The task of intellectual property as a system is also to act as a tool for assigning
rights and duties.302 Physicality is one distinguishing factor between intangibles and
tangibles in fencing.
Fencing may also be examined from a slightly different viewpoint. Physical fencing
imposes some restrictions on the different uses of objects and is thereby one of the most
effective means to prevent the copying or reproduction of things.303 This is best seen in
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made and could be sold. The copies made by hand were often of poor quality and not
even close to the originals. See Samuelson 1990, 325.
304 Declining quality in copies thus does not prevent reproducing at all. Each digital copy is
exactly like the original one. Digital recordings are high in quality and very durable. The
quality of saved information is high: in other words, the copies are as good as originals.
See Samuelson - Davis 2000, 7 - 8.
305 See Munzer 1990,  91.
306 See Zitting 1951, 26.
307 This is one illustration of the abstractness and universality of the traditional system of
property rights. The group of potential legal subjects was always the same: natural and legal
persons; the legal objects are likewise always the same: persons and objects; and legal
relationships are described according their type as obligatory relationships, property rights,
intellectual property rights, and so on. See Pöyhönen 1997b, 540.
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intellectual digital objects. At the time of analog copying, copies were not even close in
quality to the original and the quality of the copies decreased each time a copy was made.
Copying itself was therefore an uncertain undertaking and not profitable. As a result of
digitization the copying of information has become easier and cheaper.304 In sum, the two
most important changes brought by digitization - the ease of copying and the difficulties
in restricting copying - directly affect the ability to fence and exclude.
2.3.2 Possession as the core of exchange
Fencing and the exclusivity of objects constitute the basis for the trade and transferability of
objects. In market governance, the focus is on the control function of private property,
where control is expressly the controlling power of the owner. Control is further realized
through exclusivity; i.e., since the owner has the right to exclude others, he or she has
substantial control over what he or she does with the property in question.305 This actually
entails a rather strong freedom on the part of the right-holder. For example, landowners are free
to enter their piece of land and use it as they wish. Similarly, patent-holders are free to
exploit their invention and use it according to their preferences. In sum, freedom of use is the
core of ownership in its static sense. This right may further be defined as legally protected,
and thus an ensured right to use, i.e., freedom with respect to the object.306
Freedom of use is further defined in terms of two parallel aspects, namely the way
of using and certainty of using. In this classification these aspects have slightly divergent
reciprocal functions. The way of using defines the context of a right and is thus essentially
a relationship between the right-holder and an object, i.e., the user and the object of use.307
The way of using is thus referred to, for example, when the copyright-holder utilizes his
or her right to manufacture copies. Thus, in the distinction between way of using and
certainty of using, it is precisely the way of using that describes the internal context of
rights, whereas the certainty of using describes the legal protection of utilization. The
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308 See Zitting 1951, 26.
309 This implies that the owner has a right to control others. The right to control is derived
directly from the owner’s right to decide how he or she uses his or her property or who is
allowed to access it. In this way, the owner’s exclusive control also affects the behavior of
others and those whom he or she allows to make use of his or her exclusive possession.
See Munzer 1990, 91 - 92.
310 Static protection may vary in strength but there always exists some degree of protection.
On the other hand, an unprotected possibility to use is only a de facto possibility, not a
right. See Zitting 1951, 26.
311 It is in fact fencing or the drawing of boundaries for resources that ultimately establishes
possession. See Mackaay 2002, 137.
312 All rights must have an object. Traditionally the object of intellectual property rights has
been intellectual and abstract. This has been the main difference between intellectual
property rights and general property rights. See Helin 1978, 647.
313 See Pöyhönen 2000, 36.
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certainty of using, for its part, is defined as against third parties and is in this way
protection against their interference in the right-holder’s right to use. This protection is
called static protection.308
Static protection in this sense describes essentially the owner’s undisturbed right to
use. Static protection is an essential element of the context of rights, as is the right to use.
Both elements, i.e., the way of using and the certainty of using, constitute an undivided entity.
They may be separated only as abstract factors. The way of using and the certainty of using
form the context of the right-holder’s right in the static sense. The owner’s right would not
be undisturbed without both of these elements.309 Further, it is only legal protection that
creates a  protected possibility to use a legally protected right to use.310 This combination
as the context of rights further establishes the legal position of the right-holder in its static
sense. This combination of rights in its static sense constitutes the possession of the owner.
Possession describes actual control of property, which further is combined with the
owner’s intention to use the property as his or her own. Possession hence means an
exclusive and thus statically protected freedom to utilize an object. Possession is further
a rather central element in the legal status of the owner inasmuch as objects are generally
nearly always possessed by someone.311 Moreover, possession as the core element of
ownership is supported by the view that rights always have an object.312
An object is thus a fundamental prerequisite for constructing any ownership at all.
This requirement that there be an object is the explanation for the physicality which is
considered the core of the prototype of property. Possession as the kernel of ownership
is based also on the relationship between human beings and nature. Objects of nature are
considered unfree, whereas human being as a free actors may receive domination over any
unfree object. This is exactly where the concept of object is needed; i.e., the concept of
legal object was created precisely to illustrate and explain the relationships between the
human being as a free actor and  unfree physical nature.313 Further, this is the very
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314 Possession of the right to a claim and intellectual property rights are very different in
how they are linked to the context of rights. Intellectual property rights always have a
certain object, even if this object is abstract, as it always is. The right to a claim does not
entail this kind of object but is only a demand that someone else behave in a certain way.
See Helin 1978, 651.
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foundation of the owner’s right of possession. It also makes possession the very kernel of
ownership. This right of possession is transferred when an object is exchanged.
Possession has a close relation to rights governance. Sometimes possession itself
resembles rights governance. One typical example of this is possession by someone other
than the owner. In certain legal acts related to movable objects there are some essential
legal effects which are attached to the transference of an object. The main rule is that legal
protection against an assignor’s creditors, e.g., protection against loss of title, is bound to
possession. This requires that normally the object ought to be removed from the control
of the assignor and transferred to the possession of the assignee. Further, this separation
should be carried out in such a way that the assignor cannot factually dispose of the object
anymore. This may be considered  the normal realization of the rights governance of
tangibles. However, this transfer may also be carried out by means of transfer of possession
subject to declaration (traditio longa manu) or by what is known as short-hand assignment
(traditio brevi manu). In these cases, the assignee already has possession of the object on
some grounds, and when assignment is carried out all that he or she receives is a notice of
assignment.
This example reveals the difference between transferring rights of intellectual
property and transferring physical property. In other words, physical property has to be
physically and concretely received by the assignee: i.e., the assignee must get the property
him- or herself in order to get legal possession of it. Often it is even crucial to possess the
thing to be able to take advantage of the rights attached to it. These relationships are rather
well illustrated in another example that concerns possession of a blank bond and its transfer.
In the case of a blank bond the right to a claim is always based only on a mere relationship,
whereby it is intellectual property. The right to a claim is then simply a demand for the
debtor to behave in certain way, i.e., to pay back his or her debt.314 Possession as the essence
of ownership can thus also be considered the foundation of rights governance in the
market and as such as the governance of certain behavior.
2.3.3 Exchangeability
Exchangeability is a key element in the functional market. In the conventional liberal market
economies, commodities by definition have no value if they cannot be brought within the
scope of exchange. Pure exclusivity in its static sense is thus not highly interesting from the
viewpoint of the market, nor is it crucial for the overall construction of functional market
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315 For example, possession of real estate is based on registration and the public trustworthi-
ness of the system of land title registration. See Kartio 2001, 706.
316 This legal position is always transferred as a whole. This position includes the owner’s
right to use as a legally protected right. See Zitting 1951, 28 - 29.
317 See Zitting 1951, 30 - 31.
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governance given that the focus is on the dynamics of the market. This does not, however,
mean that exclusivity is completely irrelevant. Exclusivity has its own significance within
the dynamics of rights. It operates as the anchor for rights and is further realized through
possession. In sum, exclusivity is essential in creating market dynamics despite the focus on the
dynamics of exchange.
Possession, however, constitutes the essence of dynamics. This is based on the
necessary statics of the traditional dynamics. In other words, as dynamic as dynamics may be, they
are always at least partly based on statics. The statics of the traditional dynamics are
predicated on the fact that it is still always contextual rights that are to be transferred and
exchanged. It is, in other words, the context that the owner sells and transfers and that the
buyer buys and receives. Another aspect of the context consists of the owner’s possession.
The basis of dynamics lies in the owner’s possession. Possession is further constructed of
the factual relationship based on the owner’s right to use. Possession does not, however,
require any concrete de facto possession. The owner does not have to concretely possess the
object; concrete possession would sometimes even be quite complicated.315
Possession and exchange are nonetheless closely bound together. In exchange,
factual possession has one crucial task. Namely, possession entails, as a rule, a the
presupposition that the possessor of an object is also its owner. This is clearly manifested when
examining assignment, where the assignee is to be legally protected and the protection is
bound to his or her good faith. This is actually one essential prerequisite for protection
against loss of title. Protection requires that the assignee is still acting in good faith at the
time when he or she receives possession. This is precisely the factor that makes possession
very significant, inasmuch as possession and good faith are closely connected. Good faith
may only be well-founded if the assignor still has possession when the assignment is
fulfilled. Possession provides the basis for the owner’s right to transfer his or her ownership.
The transfer concerns the whole complement of rights; i.e., it is the entire statically
protected legal position that is to be transferred.316 The right to transfer an object, and thus
the right to transfer ownership in its entirety, is one of the most crucial elements of
ownership overall. It is fundamentally based on the owner’s power to bring about a change
in the legal relationships.317 In other words, the owner holds the power to affect the
behavior of others by transferring the object.
The right to transfer constitutes the core of exchange. This right is called competence.
Competence represents the authorization to legally dispose over ownership. In this respect
competence clearly differs from mere possession, which is defined as a legally protected
right to use. Competence explicitly manifests some more dynamic aspects, such as capability,
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318 See Zitting 1951, 30 - 31.
319 See Mackaay 2002, 137.
320 See Zitting 1951, 26 - 27.
321 See Mackaay 2002, 137.
322 See Zitting 1951, 43.
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authority, or the power to effect the transference of an object from one owner to
another.318 These features make competence the core element of dynamics. Competence
is, accordingly, the essence of exchange. In the market economy it is essential that objects
can be transferred and that subjects have the ability to transfer them. Ownership without
any possibility to use the object openly is not functional for business purposes. In order to
ensure free and undisturbed exchange, it is thus crucial to ensure that objects can be used
freely and that they may be made available to other persons. This ought to be carried out
without the owner permanently losing control over his or her property.319 This is the
simplest system of rights management and is based first on drawing the borderlines of
assignment and, second, on creating the conditions for assured transfer.
2.3.4 Dynamics as governance
Possession is thus founded on the owner’s legally protected privilege to utilize an object,
which is the basic element of the right to use it in its static sense. This is defined as the
static element of ownership.320 The pure static right does not, however, operate as a tool
of exchange, despite the crucial nature of possession as the basis of the owner’s ability to
assign. In other words, ownership without any concrete opportunity to use one’s property freely
and openly in exchange relationships is not useful for business.321
Ownership may be defined as a tool of governance. As such ownership is rather
strong. Its strength is based on the stability of ownership as a legally protected position. This
relatively strong legal protection is a consequence of the third element of ownership in
addition to possession and competence. This third element in fact binds together both the
stability of ownership and its legal protection and is called dynamic protection. Dynamic
protection refers to legal protection that is manifested when two or more legal rights are in
collision and neither or none can be realized. Dynamic protection is directly bound to
personal relationships and does not depend in any way on the content of rights.322
Dynamic protection is based on the dynamics of rights and is directly linked to the
legal protection that is realized in dynamics. The protection is called dynamic protection.
Structurally, the legal protection of the dynamic aspect closely resembles that of the static
aspect, the difference between them lying in their applicability. Static protection illustrates
legal protection that is absolutely valid, whereas dynamic protection is closely bound to
exchange. Contextually, dynamic protection concerns the validity of the legal basis when
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323 See Zitting 1989, 10.
324 See Tuomisto 1993, 45.
325 A collision may likewise occur between two abstractly defined objects, with the collision
being resolved according to the concurrence principle. The right is granted to the one
who is the first to realize it. See Zitting 1989, 11 - 12.
326 There are some factors in particular that change the essence of intellectual property: (i)
the ease of replication of digital material, (ii) the ease by which this material can be trans-
mitted, (iii) the ease with which it can be manipulated and changed, (iv) the “equivalence”
of works in digital forms, (v) the “compactness” of digital material, and (vi) the combina-
tion of material in “digital space” by third parties (e.g., via hypertext). See the list in Web-
ster - Packer 1996, 6.
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rights are in collision.323 Dynamic protection, at least at a certain level, is characteristic of
the full ownership. For example, even if the assignee has already received possession of a
thing, he or she is not really considered as having acquired ownership until he or she is
entitled to all of these three elements. Thus, dynamic protection is rather decisive if
ownership is to be developed to its full extent.
Ownership is protected at two different levels through the two different forms of
protection, static and dynamic. The existence of these two parallel forms explains, at least
partly, the strength of ownership as a tool of governance. In the case of ownership, strength
correlates with stability: fully matured ownership creates a rather stabilized position for the
owner and this position then becomes the core of governing rights. The strength of
ownership is further illustrated when a collision of rights is to be resolved. The most
durable legal basis is a right that is founded on an individually defined object. If there is a
collision of two individually defined objects, the collision must be resolved in favor of the
temporally prior one, i.e., according to the time priority rule.324 If the collision is one of
individually defined rights and abstractly defined ones, it is the individually defined rights
that prevail.325 In other words, the priority of individually defined rights clearly illustrates
the strength of those rights. Ownership is one such right and may therefore be considered
as a tool of rights governance.
2.4 Some anomalies in the digital framework
2.4.1 The breakdown of the concept of legal object
One catalyst of economic development is digitization. Digitization has a profound influence
on the products to be used, and the ways in which those products are utilized and
delivered. This influence partly affects the changing context of products.326 One of the
most significant factors in this regard is the opportunity that has emerged with digital
media, and their profound impact on distribution in the network environment (the World
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327 The World Wide Web is even seen as being enlarged and modified towards a World Wide
Grid, or WWG. The World Wide Grid is based on distributed computing over networks,
with geographically dispersed scientific research and industrial areas enabled to share data
and computing infrastructure and collaborate. The WWG is thus based on the further
development, integration and validation of technology that enables the seamless integra-
tion of networks, computers and information storage.  See COM (2000) 330 final, 8.
328 The World Wide Web provides a means of accessing the resources on the open net-
works without requiring the user to know how those resources are stored and transmit-
ted. See Major 1998, 78.
329 This is often referred as the trio of technological development steps, which are digitizing,
open networks, and globalization. See Samuelson - Davis 2000,  7.
330 A representative example here is the Napster case, where Napster included software that
enabled anyone to copy, download and transmit music. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 114 F. 2d 869 (9th Circuit 2001). The court stated that Napster should not assist
others in copying, downloading, uploading, distributing, or transmitting the copyrighted
musical compositions or sound recordings that belonged to the plaintiff in this case.
Napster has been followed by some even more sophisticated, and legally acceptable, ap-
plications, such as iTunes, maintained by Apple and MSN, Music by Microsoft.
331 Access to copyrighted material may be created through a hyperlink. See Copyright Council of
Finland TN 2001:8, 3.
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Wide Web, Internet).327 The World Wide Web is often considered one of the most successful
media for electronic publishing, and a consequence of digitization.328 With the expanding
networks, the transmission and distribution of information has become more effortless,
and  communicativity has become the most important operation.
Legal positions, on the other hand, are fundamentally based on subjective rights. The
object of a subjective right is generally strictly defined and protected. This is due to the
status of possession as the core of ownership and, further, the need for a precisely defined
essence of possession. One of the main problems that the content industries confront in
the present day stems partly from the changed requirements for defining content. It is precisely
recent technological evolution that has caused some radical shifts in the economics of
information.329 Information in digital form has changed the requirements for reproduced
information at the same time as computer networks have changed the conditions of
distribution.330 For example, the Finnish Supreme Court drew a line in case KKO:1999:115
(R98/308) ruling that an electronic mailbox used for distributing computer programs was
considered prohibited.331
KKO:1999:115. A maintained an electronic mailbox by keeping up its operativity and
accepting its users. The main prerequisite, set by A, to be accepted as a user of this mailbox
was that each user had to copy copyrighted computer programs to be made available
through the mailbox. In return, A allowed the users, among other things, to copy the
computer programs that the mailbox contained. In this way, A distributed to the public
copies of copyrighted works, i.e., the computer programs.
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332 Computers are digital machines because at their most basic level they can distinguish be-
tween just two values, 0 and 1, or off and on. There is no simple way to represent all the
values in between, such as 0.25. All data that a computer processes must be encoded digi-
tally, as a series of zeroes and ones.
See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/d/digital.html
333 Webopedia describes the difference between analog and digital as follows. Almost every-
thing in the world can be described or represented in one of two forms: analog or digital.
Digital watches are called digital because they go from one value to the next without dis-
playing all intermediate values. Consequently, they can display only a finite number of
times of the day. In contrast, watches with hands are analog, because the hands move
continuously around the clock face. As the minute hand goes around, it not only touches
the numbers 1 through 12, but also the infinite number of points in between. See
Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/a/analog.html
334 Copying is also easy and may usually be done by pressing only one button. Often it is
also quite hard to forbid or restrict the copying of digitized information. Copying the
analog products has involved some natural restrictions. The most effective prevention
has been the poor quality of copies and the lack of distribution channels.  See Järvinen
1996, 143 - 144.
335 Information in digital form radically reduces the difficulty and cost of reproduction.
Moreover, it produces perfect replicas, each of which is a seed for further perfect copies. See
Samuelson - Davis 2000
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~pam/papers/digdilsyn.pdf
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The quality of products has been improved by the use of digital technology to become far
better than that of analog information or even of the original source. The increasing quality
of copies is due to the mutual independence of information units as a system. This system
is based on discontinuous data or events.332 Digital representations consist of values
measured at discrete intervals, whereas the principal feature of analog representations is
that they are continuous.333 Consequently, copying information in digital form has become
easy and cheap. Each copy corresponds completely to the original and it is usually
impossible to distinguish a copy from the original. Copying is also easy - often pushing only
one button is enough. On the other hand, preventing or restricting copying is extremely
difficult.334
At the same time networking has changed the conditions of publication.335 These
factors shape the relationship between technological evolution and intellectual property
rights, especially copyright. New technological measures offer increasingly new tools for
circumventing protected rights and at the same time have an influence on defining the
object of possession. This is the most fundamental reason why this development is
challenging for the traditional view of an object as the kernel of rights. One factor in
changing the close connection between an object and the real context of rights is the
separation of information and its physical, commodified representation. We may also often
speak of the informatization of commodities. The increased ease with which digitized
information can be manipulated has changed the ways of viewing the connection between
information and commodities. This has likewise affected the view of legal objects.
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336 Physical information applications are for example books, CDs, or photos. Digitizing does
not, however, always mean that physical products are converted into digital ones. It is
possible to incorporate digital products also in physical applets. In traditional forms,
information is transmitted in printed form, for example, when it is bound in books,
magazines, or other publications. See Westman 1998, 25.
337 See Pöyhönen 2000, 55.
338 See Lindberg - Westman 1999, 155 - 156.
339 The distributors of intellectual property tend to have more interest in controlling access
to and the use of works that have been protected through intellectual property rights. See
Samuelson 1990, 334 - 335.
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Information can thus be separated from the physical applet in which it has traditionally
been embedded.336
The traditional view is rather extensively linked to the solidity of objects. This means
that rights need to be complete before they may be assigned to anyone; an incomplete right
is rather impossible in the traditional system.337 This is precisely where the problems of
networking and evolving network relations arise. Implications are found on three different
levels but all are connected to the need to assign incomplete rights to someone. This is an
artefact of the traditional legal system, where a right must have an object and a subject.
First, information representing different kinds of data can be  loaded up and combined. This
is due to the fact that all digital data is represented in an incompatible form that does not
depend on its actual content. Second, information can be delivered more effortlessly and more
globally. This is carried out, for example, through the global open networks. The third
implication of the incompleteness of rights derives from the ease of producing and working on
information.338 The context of rights, as well as the strict prerequisite of an object as the
necessary core of rights, has become more flexible and blurred.
The manipulation of information has some additional implications. One of these is
the easy reproduction of digitized context. The binary form of digital information results
in information being in rather compact form. Because of this compactness, copying a book,
for example, is handier and much faster using a computer than a photocopier. This affects
the other ways of utilizing and exploiting information. This has a direct impact on the
requirement that there be an object and accordingly sets some necessary requirements for
rights governance. Compactness has made it nearly impossible to govern a work only
contextually. The explanation lies in the ease of transferring information that has further
tipped the means of control towards controlling access rather than controlling the content.339
This has its implications also for the delivery of content in that there ought to exist
exchange even in the intellectual framework.
Effective exchange requires that there ought to be effective measures for managing
and protecting the release of new works into the digital environment. The communication
of  digital information is carried out through digital networks, where large amounts of
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340 It is in fact essential for the Information Society to be able to handle and transfer infor-
mation effectively. This is best carried out using information and communication tech-
nology. See Tapscott 1996, 49.
341 Acts supporting rights management have emerged from three dimensions. State regula-
tion as national and international legislation is generally directed towards updating the
fundamental copyright principles to include digital acts and uses in the legislation in an
effective way.  The reform of legislation also includes the strengthening of the position of
right holders. The fundamental aim is to establish the ability of authors and copyright
owners to implement and protect their works by taking advantage of these new
technological measures. This ought then to promote electronic commerce in copyrighted
works. If we are to have undisturbed exchange of copyrighted works, we must have tools
- both legal and technological - to provide copyright owners with the means to prevent
piracy. See Sand 2002, 2.
342 The convergence of networks may be examined through and defined as the capability of
networks to carry a range of data, voice and video services at high speeds, and two-way
interactivity. See Grewlich 1999, 37. Convergence is carried out at several levels, for ex-
ample, as media convergence, equipment convergence, service convergence and conver-
gence of contents. See NOU 1999:26, 32 - 34. A good example of the convergence of
equipment and content is the ring tones of mobile phones.
343 The purpose here is be able to treat each kind of copyrighted work in a certain way. For
example, some categories of works do not have the same sets of exclusive rights as do
others. On the other hand, certain privileges to copy are available to certain classes of
copyrighted works but not to others.  See Samuelson 1990, 332.
344 These consumer devices are telephones, TVs, personal computers, stereos, cameras,
game consoles, radios, and faxes. Further, interlocking technologies induce convergence
in the underlying industries, as the established actors merge or form strategic alliances
across sectoral boundaries. On the one hand, firms seek to take hold of a larger share of
the value chain and, on the other, strive for specialization and networking. Finally, con-
vergence gives rise to new services stemming from cross-sectoral fertilization. See Paija
2001, 14 - 15. Convergence is also carried out at the level of equipment, with the same
equipment potentially utilizing the same content. See SOU 1999: 55, 36 - 37.
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information can be compressed and transmitted rapidly.340 Here, digitization reinforces the
information infrastructure by increasing the possibilities to separate information from a
tangible object even more. The collapse of the strict requirement of an object further
requires that there exist some other tools for rights management and rights governance.
These requirements arise additionally from the potential combination of digital technology and
distribution power on open networks.341
Digital technology and the distribution power of a network have prompted changes
that have brought about the collapse of the strict prerequisite of an object. One significant
factor affecting this collapse is convergence. Convergence is defined as making objects, as well
as supply channels, similar and thus compatible.342 Convergence makes digital works
become rather consistent with each other, as the traditional boundaries and distinctions
between works collapse.343 Convergence also refers to the ability of different network
platforms to carry similar kinds of services, which makes different consumer devices
converge toward multi-functioning terminals.344 At the same time, it has become even easier
to take bits of information out of a work and reuse them. Convergence also influences
different classes of intellectual property rights. The digitization of information creates a
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345 See Dommering 1991, 15.
346 Sampling is another technique that uses digital information and information technologies.
The digital recording process is used for storing, processing and generating audio signals.
The computer-processed numbers may then be stored for retrieval or further processed
by mathematical algorithms in order to modify the waveforms they represent for musical
effect. See Giannini 1990, 510.
347 Digital processing can also be employed to compose and render music using sounds
which have no conventional instrumental counterpart. A composer may utilize sounds
from the environment, conventional acoustic instruments, a computer synthesizer or pre-
existing recorded sounds. The sampled new products are not usually recognizable as de-
rived from the original recordings. With digital techniques it is possible to capture any
sound in the universe. When the sound is sampled once it may be reproduced exactly or
altered in any way. At least two questions arise here: Are individual sounds or short pas-
sages copyrightable, and does the use of individual sounds from another’s work in a new
recording constitute copyright infringement? See Giannini 1990, 509 - 511.
348 By using sampling technologies it is possible to lift one or more sounds or an entire pas-
sage of an already existing recording and insert it into one’s own recording. Other data
that can be processed are photographs, which can be manipulated digitally, or computer
programs, which can be re-engineered. See Samuelson 1990, 330.
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certain contextual convergence for different intellectual property rights. Traditionally, there
has existed a clear distinction between patenting and copyright. Basically, patents have been
used for protecting hardware applications (hard technology), whereas copyright is more likely
to be associated with softer applications (the soft mind).345 The distinction is disappearing not
only because the two are coming closer together but also because the concept of a work
as a whole has weakened, a consequence of the plasticity of information that enables
multiple uses of it.
An example of convergence and the plasticity of information is sampling in the music
industry. Sampling is based on technologies where sounds are recorded as a series of
discrete numbers that are further processed by a computer.346 These numbers are then
converted into digital recordings and stored on computer disks through the use of a
sampler.347 The collapse of the object is evident if one considers the consequences of digital
sampling: it allows one to cut a sound recording up into sound bites that can be re-mixed
and/or combined with sound bites from other recordings to produce a new one.348
Sampling actually illustrates the most paradigmatic change in viewing the concept of a legal
object.
Ownership has offered one of the most fundamental ways to construct the
relationship between a legal object and legal subject. Now that ownership as a unified
concept is collapsing, it is even easier to see the divided character of a legal object. The traditional
way to consider a legal object as an absolute and exclusive undivided entity has thus been
called into question by recent developments. A legal object is no longer defined as a unity
that includes only one, undivided right. Rather than being a strictly defined object, a legal
object is a combination of opportunities. These opportunities are further described as the
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349 Also characteristic of this combination is that it is only temporary, in which respect it
differs from the traditional definition of a legal object. Accordingly, it is characteristically
bound to operativeness and activity. See Pöyhönen 2000, 56.
350 See Pöyhönen 2000, 53.
351 An illustrative example is a peer-to-peer network, where the operational framework and
content providers actually become more and more of a unified entity. See Still 2002, 305.
According to Webopedia a peer to peer network is a network in which each workstation
has equivalent capabilities and responsibilities. This differs from client/server architec-
tures, in which some computers are dedicated to serving the others.  See
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/p/peer_to_peer_architecture.html
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positions of several actors and are seen as interrelated. A legal object conceived of as this
kind of constellation of opportunities may be also described as a position (positio).349
2.4.2 Gradual changes in the concept of legal subject
Rights are assumed to be the link between subjects and objects and thus to bind the parties
of a legal relationship together. According to the traditional legal system, there should always
be someone to whom rights and duties are directed. The traditional system was further
built on the liberty and freedom of subjects to act.350 This is the foundation of the
dichotomy of legal statics and dynamics as seen from the traditional point of view. The
digital economy, however, affects both static and dynamic rights and changes the
characteristics of both slightly. The most fundamental change is that seen in the context of
dynamics: the kernel of dynamics is balanced with functional cooperation, where right-holders
actually have to work for their stakes.351
As such the parties to a legal relationship operate more or less as active stakeholders.
Where traditional dynamics rest on the strength of legal positions, modern dynamics are
founded on activity in cooperation. In other words, the right to attain or reach a stable position
that was traditionally created by law is now replaced by activity to fight or work for that
position. In all cases, the coexistence is a form of communication. The pure subjects of
legal relationships are replaced by cooperating parties, who may even have contrary
interests, at least partly. This undermines the established concept of the legal subject,
exactly as happens in the case of the legal object. A legal subject is defined more through
the communication of the active parties and the passive ones as the essential framework
of operativity. These parties may further be defined as stakeholders (intressitaho). The focus
is set on the interconnected interests of the stakeholders, it being equally significant
whether the stakeholder has been participating in the cooperation project him- or herself
or whether he or she has formally been considered an outsider. The fundamental element
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352 See Pöyhönen 2000, 53.
353 This means that the rights and duties are focused on the networks instead of on single
actors as legal subjects. On the other hand, a network often consists of several different
actors or organizations that vary continuously with the surrounding circumstances, e.g.,
the economic framework. See Ebbesson 2001, 11.
354 See Samuelson 1990, 332.
355 The institutional development of copyright can be seen clearly in the consequences of the
blurring of the firm distinction between data and machine. Computer programs have
made this distinction more difficult to define, and the institution suffering from this
change is copyright. Computer programs are often quite mechanical or technical, and as
such they are not necessarily a good object of protection for copyright. Accordingly, pat-
ents are also issued for methods of representing, organizing, and manipulating data in
computer programs. See Samuelson 1990, 334 - 335.
356 See Samuelson 1990, 332 - 333. On the other hand, representing analog information in
digital form may cause interpretation problems. For example, the right to transfer a table
of contents into digital form has been considered reproduction and as such an exclusive
right of the copyright-holder. See Copyright Council of Finland TN 2000:13, 2.
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here is the essential interconnection of interests.352 An illustrative example of this is offered by
networking, where single legal subjects are replaced by the overall network as an actor.353
The interconnection of legal subjects may be examined in terms of convergence.
Convergence affects content delivery even more fundamentally than by only changing the
requirement for a strictly defined object. One essential consideration is the distinction
between communication media, which has its consequences for the statuses of legal
subjects. These media have greatly affected how different works are made available to the
public. Some works may be shown as motion pictures, while others are more suitably
presented as tape recordings. Although motion pictures also require a machine to be
presented, they are significantly different as a medium from sound recordings. The
differences arise also in the technology by which the different media have been created.
Floppy disks are a medium created differently from printed books. The third divergence
is that of the distribution channels by which the different media are distributed to their
particular public.354 Books, for example, are made by a printing press and then sold widely
in bookstores. All of these changes in medium affect the subjects of the operations
involved.
Media convergence has also had impacts in that it has resulted in the collapse of
overall diversity in communication. Any work that can be represented in some other
medium can now be represented in digital form.355 In this form it may be used to operate
a computer or other data processing unit, or to perform some other function. Therefore,
once in digital form and hence protected by copyright, works will become less and less
differentiated by type and more and more equivalent to one another. They will now all be
available on the same medium.356 This digital equivalence will make it ever easier to
combine what have been thought of as separate categories of works to create works that will be
Interests of the state, the market and society
357 One important consequence of this is the elaboration of distinctions that are made
among different kinds of works. This especially concerns privileges that allow exceptions
that would otherwise be unauthorized uses of copyrighted works. These exceptions will
lose much of the significance they had when media were not differentiated. See
Samuelson 1990, 334.
358 See Rosenblatt - Trippe - Mooney 2002, 19.
359 Another illustrative example of the continuous cooperation of several different stake-
holders is open-source software, where all the producers are at the same time users as well.
See Bergquist - Ljungberg 2001, 308.
360 Multimedia makes it possible to create some interactivity for the users. Interactivity means
the ability of the user to receive and to alter the content in real time. See Grewlich 1999,
57.
361 A video game could thus be protected through copyright when the protection was attached
to the computer program as a literary creation, the music as a composition, and the images
as visual art. See Copyright Council of Finland TN 2001:15, 6.
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difficult to classify.357 The digitization of products and convergence of  distribution
channels thus both pose great challenges for rights management. Development has mostly
affected the distribution of content, which has changed from an offline model to online
one. The two means of distributing content are based on essentially different business
models. Many of those models have been, or could possibly be, enabled or improved by
digital rights management technology.358
Further, digitization makes it possible to combine many different forms of
information to create multimedia documents. Multimedia is another example of the
functional cooperation of stakeholders.359 This development here is described as a breaking
down of the physical boundaries between products, in which even the traditional ways of
defining products must be changed. Multimedia is seen as constituted of several different
types of information, which makes multimedia products information products. Multimedia may
include text, sound, still and moving images, and data.360 In digital form, traditional stand-
alone products or works may be composed of several different fragments or even pieces.
On the other hand, according to The Supreme Court of Sweden in case NJA2000:87 (B4402-
97), a video game was considered multimedia and could not be protected as a motion
picture.361
NJA 2000:87. A person had distributed video game cassettes as part of his business in an
unlawful way. The video games were made available to the public as a part of this business.
The games included audiovisual elements as well as a computer program, which was an
integral part of them, and thus could not be protected as copyrightable motion pictures.
In the broadest sense, this kind of product can be a collection of many separate creations.
As such multimedia is rather hard to consider as an asset of only one individual subject but
is sooner to be seen as a communicative process among several stakeholders. One
additional implication of the increasingly undermined concept of the legal subject is found
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362 Hypertext in fact constitutes the core of the Internet, as this global network would not
even exist without the possibility to construct a network of hypertext links. See Herler
2000, 51.
363 The Internet as a hypertext-based medium actually increases the ability of users to obtain in-
formation. The World Wide Web thus provides easily downloadable and manipulable
information, dynamic Web pages, and larger immediate audiences. The dynamics of the
Internet are strengthened through the non-linear character of electronic publishing. Non-
linear text  allows the user to surf freely through a hypertext document by selecting dif-
ferent links. See Major 1998, 83.
364 Digitization thus increases the capacity to search for text or link texts together in order to
find suitable information. This places the focus on search engines for controlling access to
information. Search engines are seen as becoming the new “virtual gatekeepers” of
cyberspace and as such may also play a key role in shaping the information environment.
See Elkin-Koren 2002, 94.
365 One good example of the opportunities offered by hypertext is a method of organizing
an index for a text, which has not traditionally been patentable. Patent law has not
allowed patenting of printed material, even if it is technically manufactured. Under this
common rule, methods of organizing indexes in printed works would not be protectable.
Yet the very same method, when put in digital machine-executable form may be turned
upside down, i.e., become patentable. Other good examples are methods of footnoting,
methods of linking parts of a text together, methods of symbolically representing how to
search a text, and methods of displaying information on a computer screen. See
Samuelson 1990, 339.
366 This is the basis of justice in general that is implied in the form of law. Justice in this sense
is defined as a social order and is then further characterized through its public nature. Justice
is a construction of social relationships and it is thus based on multilateral relationships established
between people and founded on law. See Tolonen, H. 2003, 10.
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in direct networking. Information networks are usually built up in digital form. The global
network is constituted of an overall network of a great number of links that lead the
information searcher from one site to another. This mass of information constitutes a
network of texts. This networked text is called hypertext.362 Hypertext is built up of links that
are connected and mutually operative.363 Hyperlinks constitute a fundamental part of the
infrastructure of the open network as a means of decentralized online information flows.
Hypertext connections work through the links themselves, which actually create the
hypertext.364 Thus hypertext is essentially networking text in which the networking is
implemented directly through linking technologies.365
2.4.3 Expansion of the legal relationship
The concepts of legal subject and legal object are bound together through the concept of
the legal relationship.366 Legal relationships are predicated on a twofold schema. This twofold
character is essential to a legal relationship because there exists only one right-holder and
one duty-bearer at a time. This connection between the two parties is considered the core
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367 On the other hand, a legal relationship is no longer necessarily a relationship between
two different actors but rather is defined as intersubjective communication that is carried out
between the actors in a social relationship. See Tuori 2000, 100.
368 This is questioned by the expansion of the single legal relationship towards a cooperative
model as the prototype of operations.  This may be seen as a tripartite rather than a bipar-
tite relation. Rather than being an either-or question, a tripartite frame is an assessment by
degree of the responsibilities of the participating parties. See Pöyhönen 1997b, 549.
369 These elements and circumstances may be derived from the origin of the legal relation-
ship or they may materialize later. The legally binding force is thereby defined only as
based on the circumstances where the legal relationship is realized. See Pöyhönen 2000,
56.
370 See Barlow 1994, http://wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas_pr.html
371 Open-source licenses thus ought to ensure free use of software without any discriminat-
ing restrictions, copying and distribution without any royalties, modification without any
royalties, and open and easily available source code. See Välimäki 2005, 113 - 114. One of
the most crucial issues in the gift economy of the open-source community is found in the
social context of the gift giving and the meaning of the gift in it. Basically, in these com-
munities the value of a gift is dependent on the amount of attention the giver gets from the
receivers that choose to make use of the gift. See Bergquist - Ljungman 2001, 314.
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of the overall legal relationship.367 This view is rather point-oriented, however, making it
impossible to take any external factors into consideration. It in fact implies that a legal
relationship defines only the facts that are significant in this particular relationship.368
The twofold structure of the legal relationship is further called into question by
networking as the basic cooperative form of the digital economy. Legal relationships may
no longer be seen as individual relationships but rather as based on a comprehensive
interpretation. A legal relationship will thus no longer be based on a clear and strict duality
but on a functional network. This is more like a puzzle of different possibilities to act, or
like a set of incomplete operations being carried out continuously. Different circumstances
must be taken into consideration fully; i.e., all the significant elements of any cooperative
project should be accommodated. A comprehensive interpretation hence utilizes an
operational framework (toimintaympäristö) that describes the nature of the collaboration among
significant operations, as well as a governance of collaboration (kokonaisjärjestely) that
accommodates the cooperative interests of the stakeholders.369
A good example of the expanding view of the legal relationship is the case of
information and its commodified character. Information is characteristically dynamic, as
will be any activity that is bound to information. One of the most significant implications
of the dynamics of information is that information is an experience good. Information needs
to be experienced rather than possessed.370 Even if information is uploaded onto a physical
medium, it needs to be experienced in order to get its message. This dynamic affects the
view of the legal relationship. A corresponding example is open-source software when
considered as a social community. In the open-source community, the rules of social
behavior are set by the overall networking community, with the value of shared information
assessed in terms of the social context where the information is communicated.371
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2.5 Summary: A change in the balance of the dynamics
Market communication is founded on the exchange of goods and services, with exchange
constituting the core of the functionality of the market. On these grounds, the market may
be defined as a mix of statics and dynamics in that it consists of the interplay of both of these
elements. Statics are implied in the exchange of goods through the stability of property.
Property is the kernel of exchange and it is thus property that is transferred to other actors
and by these means exchanged. In this context, property itself remains generally unchanged.
On the other hand, dynamics are highlighted in the act of exchange itself. This makes the
market essentially communicative. This communication is further composed of certain
prerequisites that constitute the very framework of the market. First of all, a market is
formed wherever there is some supply and demand, these both being necessary
constituents of any communicative market. Further, supply and demand are linked together
through exchange, which makes the market functional. The third prerequisite for a
functional market is that commodities have a price as a definitive part of their value. This
is the very core of market dynamics. The static structure of supply and demand is not
sufficient to create a functional market. It is only exchange as a functional element and
market price as a contextual one that together make the market dynamic.
Market governance as allocation of wealth is generally carried out through private
ownership. The superiority of private ownership over public is based on better economic
efficiency or the necessity of governing scarce resources by private ownership. If a resource
is really scarce, and if there are a number of people who have a free right to access and use
this resource, these users will exhaust the resource by their overuse. Overuse is usually
caused by free access to resources that are often produced publicly and offered freely for
consumption. This represents the prototype of the tragedy of commons. It is precisely
governance through private property that has been considered the solution to the tragedy
of commons. Rights governance is generally based on the mutual relation of resources and
society. It seems to be the interplay of resources and society overall that obscures the sustainable
answer to both of those problems, namely the tragedy of commons and rights governance.
These issues also arise where the amount of resources is restricted and it seems that the
scarcity of resources may best be addressed by removing scarcity. The variety of
collaborative interests is generally based on converting resources into an exchangeable
form. This means that resources need to be treated as goods and commodities although as
such resources are better suited to the needs of the market and exchange.
There exist some anomalies in the digital framework that are changing the utilization
of property as a rights governance system. Digitization in fact contributes to the breaking
down of the concept of the legal object. It thus has a profound influence on the products to be
used, and the ways in which they are utilized and delivered. This influence thus partly
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focuses on the changing context of products, whereas the traditional view is rather
extensively linked to the solidity of objects. This means that rights need to be complete
before they may be assigned to anyone. An incomplete right is rather impossible in this
traditional system. This is also why the traditional way to consider the legal object as an
absolute and exclusive undivided entity must be criticized in light of recent development.
The legal object is hence no longer defined as an entity including only one undivided right
but rather is seen as a combination of opportunities. These opportunities are further
described as interrelated positions of several actors.
Further, rights are considered to be the connective link between subjects and objects and
thus as binding the parties of a legal relationship together. According to the traditional legal
system, there should always be someone to whom the rights and duties are assigned. The
traditional system is thus predicated on liberty and, more precisely, the freedom of subjects
to act. This is the basis of the dichotomy of statics and dynamics as seen from the
traditional point of view. The digital economy, however, affects both the statics and the
dynamics of rights and thereby changes the characteristics of both to some extent. The
most fundamental change occurs in the context of dynamics. Namely, the very core of
dynamics is balanced with functional cooperation, in which the right-holders actually work
to make their contribution as active stakeholders. Where traditional dynamics rest on
strength of legal positions, modern dynamics are founded on activity in cooperation. The pure
subjects of legal relationships become replaced by cooperating parties, who may have even
opposite interests, at least partly. This development has eroded the monolithic concept of
the legal subject, exactly as has occurred in the case of the concept of legal object.
The concepts of legal subject and legal object are bound together through the concept of the
legal relationship as a twofold construct. This is further questioned by networking and the
governance of collaboration as the basic forms of collaboration in the digital economy.
Legal relationships may thus no longer be seen as single relationships but rather as based
on a comprehensive interpretation. The legal relationship will no longer be based on a clear
and strict duality but on a functional network that is more like a puzzle of different
possibilities to act or a set of incomplete operations being carried out continuously.
Different circumstances are to be fully taken into consideration; i.e., all the significant
elements of any cooperative project ought to be accommodated. The comprehensive
interpretation of a legal relationship is hence carried out by utilizing the operational
framework to describe the collaboration of significant operations.
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372 The term “commune” is Latin and means common property or state commonwealth. Fur-
ther, “in commune” is for the public good or “for the common use”. “Communis” means shared,
common, general, universal, and public. See Simpson 1977, 121.
373 Open source software covers both the right to copy source code freely and the right to
distribute it. These rights belong to everyone as members of a community. See Välimäki
2002, 851. Open source software is also developed in non-commercial, voluntary projects
where a number of developers create, test, improve, document and maintain computer
programs and program modules. For this purpose the source code needs to be accessible.
See Holtgrewe - Werle 2001, 45.
374 The point here is not that no control is present but rather that the kind of control is dif-
ferent from the control we grant to property. See Lessig 2002b, 1788. Another good ex-
ample is nature globally and its resources as a common heritage of mankind. See Wallius 2001,
89 - 90.
375 The public domain constitutes the area of commons that includes the aspects of copy-
righted works that copyright does not protect. Information is  in the public domain if all
users are equally privileged to use it. See Benkler 1999, 360 - 361.
376 Standardization may be contrasted with customization. Customization involves individual-
ization, production of an unique item, or attention to a particularized person or applica-
tion. For example, clothing may be either customized or standardized. Custom-made
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3 SOCIETY. COMMONS AND COLLABORATION
3.1 An excursion into commons
Commons are generally defined as  resources that are common to all members of society.372 As
such commons are preserved for the use of everyone, with this use typically free. At the
architectural level, commons may thus be defined as resources that are free. “Free” here
does not mean that access to  commons is granted at no cost but that if there is a cost, it
is imposed on a neutral or equal basis. A good example of commons is public streets. One
is free to enter public streets whenever one likes and one may go in any direction one
wishes. This occurs without any certificate or authorization from the government. Another
example is open-source software, where the source code is available for anyone to take, use,
improve, or pass on. No permission for this is needed.373 Public streets and open-source
software are commons because they are within the reach of the members of the relevant community
and access to them is not subject to permission from anyone else.374
Commons are often described as the public domain. The public domain does not,
however, comprise all the uses that can be privileged to a user but only the unprotected
ones. For example, information is in the public domain to the extent that no person has a
right to exclude anyone else from using the specified information.375 Products and articles
in the sphere of commons are designated for utilization by everyone. On the other hand,
the sphere of commons may be likened to the scope of standardization. Standardization
applies to the non-individualization or mass production of a class of identical items.376
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clothes are made to order, individualized, and tailored to suit a particular person; off-the-
rack clothing is mass produced. See Radin 2002, 101 - 102.
377 This implies that in the sphere of commons, if described as altruistic, no one is allowed to
behave selfishly, i.e., look after only his or her own interests. An altruistic view prescribes
that everyone take care of others and their benefit and consider his or her own good as
only secondary. See Airaksinen 1987, 118.
378 A good example of a virtual community is the community created and maintained by the
developers of open-source software. In the open-source community, the giving of gifts is
also focused on giving pointers and advice. Accordingly, such communities are often de-
scribed as “a marriage of altruism and self-interest”. See Bergquist - Ljungberg 2001, 309.
379 The prisoners’ dilemma is a theoretical construction of A. W. Tucker from the 1950s and
is the most famous illustration of game theory. The name is derived from a dilemma
where there are two prisoners speculating on their possibilities of getting as light a sen-
tence as possible. See Airaksinen 1987, 152 - 153.
380 See Airaksinen 1987, 153.
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Attention is not paid to any particular person or application; rather commons are preserved
for use by all people.
The sphere of commons is, at least partly, based on an altruistic view of society.377 In
order to be functional, society needs to cooperate and communicate and the pursuits of
individuals ought to be carried out for the good of the overall community. In virtual
communities, this takes place for instance by giving away written texts.378 The altruistic
character of commons is best described using the hypothetical example known as the
prisoners’ dilemma.379 The dilemma is based on the capture of two burglars. Both have to
choose whether or not to confess and implicate the other. If neither confesses, both will
be jailed for two years. If each confesses and implicates the other, both will go to prison
for five years. However, if one burglar confesses and implicates the other, and the other
burglar does not confess, the one who has collaborated with the police will go free, while
the other will go to prison for ten years.380 The solution to the prisoner’s dilemma is based
on rational decisions: both burglars want to minimize the time they spend in jail.  Burglar
A reasons as follows: "Two things can happen: burglar B can confess or remain quiet. If
he confesses, then I get ten years if I don't confess, five years if I do, so it’s better to
confess. On the other hand, if he doesn't confess, I get only two years if I don’t confess
either or go free if I confess. Either way, it’s better if I confess. Therefore, I will." But the
other burglar can and presumably will reason in the same way, so that they both confess
and go to prison for five years each. If they had acted "irrationally" and kept quiet, they
each could have gotten off with two years each.
The prisoner’s dilemma belongs to static game theories, where the amount and quality
of information to be utilized is complete. All the actors know all the options at the very
beginning. The problem arises with the simultaneity of decisions. The actors have to make
their decisions at the same time, without knowing the decision of the other. The actors
know all the options of the other party: the only uncertainty is the decision of the other
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381 See Virtanen 2001, 38.
382 This is characteristic of static game theories. In static game theories, the number of moves is
restricted and the actors have to make their decisions all at the same time. See Virtanen
2001, 38.
383 Some communication may arise when a static game theory is replaced by a dynamic one.
Dynamic game theory is hence based on the continuity of the game which is not one-
turn, but consists of several opportunities to act. Because of the continuity of the game in
dynamic game theory, it is always possible to exploit background information and make
decisions based on this. See Virtanen 2001, 40 - 41.
384 This, however, occurs rather rarely in modern society. There exists legislation to ensure
that the operations crucial to the existence of society are carried out as smoothly and rea-
sonably as possible. Altruistic behavior does not always seem individually reasonable. See
Airaksinen 1987, 154.
385 On the other hand, the party possessing more substantial knowledge than the others,
should, within certain limits, be offered the possibility of benefiting from his or her ad-
vantage in this respect. It may be considered a prior choice not to obtain more informa-
tion. Accordingly, a party losing a deal because of lesser knowledge cannot always receive
compensation. See Pöyhönen 1999, 53. Then again, all the market actors ought to have
equal changes to get information if considered as ideal actors from the viewpoint of civil
law. Actors are  considered to have all the information that is needed for rational choices.
See Häyhä 2000, 41.
386 See Lamberton 1998, 328 - 329.
387 See Virtanen 2001, 38 - 39.
93
party.381 This is due to the unmatched character of the decision-making, which means that
there does not exist any information about the behavior of the actors in previous similar
cases.382 The undesired result in the prisoners’ dilemma is caused by a lack of
communication.383 If all the actors pursue only their best interest or act rationally only for their
own good, their common advantage will seldom be realized.384 Pursuit of the common
good and wealth is generally the focus of the sphere of commons, whereby the commons
should be based on fluent communication. On the other hand, a lack of communication
often entails an asymmetry of information; i.e. one party does not give sufficient information
to the others.385 In exchange and  market operations information asymmetry may even be
necessary for creating innovation and growth.386 For cooperative relationships it is rather
disadvantageous, however. Asymmetric information changes the overall  operational
pattern in such a way that it becomes impossible to predict the acts of the other party.387
Both  parties act only for their own good. This does not work for the good of the
community, which implies that increasing mutual communication and thereby decreasing
information asymmetry is best for society overall.
The scope of commons thus includes the need to communicate as the key to
symmetrizing information flows. Commons are crucially based on the coexistence of cooperating
stakeholders and thereby reconciling their mutual interests. This implies rather free
utilization of the commons. As such the sphere of commons is slightly dualistic in character,
defined as located between totally free natural resources, such as pure air, and totally
controlled resources, such as ordinary commercial goods. This is well illustrated in some
Interests of the state, the market and society
388 See Rose 2003, 95.
389 See Lessig 2000, 6.
390 See Lessig 2002a, 20 - 21.
391 In Latin, the term for “republic” is “res publica”. See Simpson 1977, 814. For example, the
oceans and the air are considered as res communes. They are hence generally impossible
for anyone to own. See Rose 2003, 93.
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further descriptions of commons, e.g., access to information and to its foundational
background structures in today’s digitized and informatized society. Information thus
should be as functional as possible. In order to become sufficiently functional, information
needs to be based on some rules for circulation and access to it. An inventor is thus entitled
only to the limited ability to retain exclusive control over his or her invention, with the rest
deemed to belong to the sphere of commons.388
This look at commons requires one additional element, one that derives from
commons themselves. This is the use of ideas as completely free resources, with free
utilization best illustrated in contrast to the corresponding utilization of tangibles. The free
use of tangibles, even if they are commons or part of the public domain, differs
substantially from the free use of intangibles. The use of ideas does not restrict anything,
whereas the use of tangibles still usually consumes the utilized resource.389 Ideas are not
rivalrous in the sense that tangibles are, provided the traditional framework remains in
place. The framework, however, has been changing along with communication in the
transition to open networks.
3.1.1 Commons as free resources
The scope of commons is crucially based on communication. Communication is necessary
as an instrument for eliminating information asymmetry. This entails some requirements
for rights governance; the sphere of commons may be described as a governance structure
where no one has the right to exclude others from access to commons. On the other hand,
unrestricted access is largely based on an overall ability to control. The sphere of commons
is controlled by no one, as such resources are generally free for all to use. Commons are
thereby often described as non-rivalrous by their very nature. For example, a mathematical
theory is non-rivalrous in the sense that use of it does not compete with use by others; it
may be used by several users at the same time.390 Accordingly mathematical algorithms are
a part of commons and may generally not be patented as such.
The free character of commons is originally derived from their relation to society at
large and its organizations. In Roman Law the scope of commons was known as “res extra
commercium” or “res communes”, due to some resources being incapable of acquisition or any
other act of exclusive appropriation.391 In society some resources are completely free. All
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392 In the digital age, the central question is whether resources should be regulated at all.
Stricter control has become possible, but this does not mean that just because control is
possible it is justified. However, producing resources always costs money, even when a
resource is free for its users. Everything but use involves expense. See Lessig 2002a, 12.
393 Production seems to derive directly from the mutual communication of workers, where-
by the level of production is generally set by social norms rather than physiological capac-
ities. Further, non-economic rewards and sanctions significantly affect the behavior of
workers in that they largely limit the effect of economic incentive plans. Nevertheless,
workers often do not act or react as individuals but as members of groups. See Etzioni
1964, 35.
394 In the case of learning, intellectual property rights transfer information from the area of
commons towards the private realm. This is mainly carried out through putting a price on
information and raising the cost of borrowing. See Drahos - Braithwaite 2003, 2.
395 Governing consumption is organized in various ways. The ordinary rule for most of the
goods is the “pay me this for that” model.  In the digital environment this takes the form of
pay-per-view or pay-per-listen. Cable televison or a music jukebox are good examples of
the pay-per-view model. See Rosenblatt - Trippe - Mooney 2002, 26 - 27.
396 Among other things, there can be no valid copyright in facts that are understood univer-
sally. See Feist Publications, Inc. v Rural Telephone Service Co. (1991) 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1290.
397 See Loughlan 2002, 35.
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societies in fact have resources that are free and resources that are controlled. In this
complex, free resources are those that are available for taking freely. “Free” in reference to
the status of resources implies that the resource is free not in the sense of free
commodities, but in the sense of free speech. A resource is free first if it may be used without
permission of anyone else or, second, if permission, although needed, is granted
neutrally.These free resources are further defined as commons.392
One particular facet of commons is their collective character. This is well illustrated in
the way people learn to do new things. Learning is characteristically collective and occurs
through imitating and copying others. Copying and imitation are thus central to the general
process of learning and acquiring skills.393 Copying and imitation are thus the essential way
to obtain a great deal of socially valuable information. The creator of an innovation is
always a borrower of ideas and information. Ideas and information need to be exchanged
if they are to increase in quantity. 394Free resources have always been crucial for innovation
and creativity. There does not, however, exist any correlative relation between the
production of a resource and the granting of access to it. In other words, the production
of a certain resource by no means entails granting access to that resource. In ths way
production differs completely from mere consumption.395
Free resources are also essential to society at large. These socially essential free
resources include reference works, for example, which are supposed to remain in the public
domain. Some information is fundamentally common in that it may not be owned in any
way. One crucial argument for this policy is the generality of information stated in the case
of Feist Publications, where copyright protection of a telephone directory was denied.396 The
denial was based on a clear distinction between expression and idea.397 Information itself
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398 An illustrative example is Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417 (1984),
the so-called Betamax case, where the viewers of a videotaped program were considered to
commit copyright infringement by videotaping programs and watching them at a later
time. The Supreme Court of the United States determined that this activity fell within the
fair use exception (17 U.S.C. §107 (1994): Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use). Ac-
cording to the holding in the Betamax case, when a Web page is made freely available
there should be no copyright infringement, because a fair use exemption applies. See Ma-
jor 1998, 95.
399 This is the difference between owned, and thereby legally protected, original text, and
information that is available freely either as a part of the public domain or as a fact that
does not approach the limit of originality or creativity required for inclusion in copyright
protection. See Leith 2000, 360.
400 See Loughlan 2002, 42.
401 At least ideas, schemes, systems, functions, facts, procedures, methods, mathematical
concepts, processes, methods of operation, concepts, principles, and discoveries are ex-
cluded from the sphere of copyright protection. See Loughlan 2002, 36.
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ought to be preserved in the public domain; expression is the only thing to be protected.398
This clearly implies that the free circulation of information is a fundamental element of free
resources. The free circulation of information is thus crucial to the sphere of commons.
The free flow of information as the core of commons applies also to the distinction
between the expression and the information itself.399 This is well illustrated in the case of a
collection of information where there is no original written expression. It is only the
compiler’s selection and arrangement that may be protected; the facts themselves may be
copied freely. The dichotomy of idea and expression thus has great significance in keeping
ideas in free circulation. This actually seems to suggest a deeper division between private
and public. The private sphere contains purposes that are amenable to market relations and
individual ownership, whereas the public sphere defines the public domain as being beyond
the reach of any private ownership. Those purposes characterized as ideas are a part of the
public domain, whereas the protected form of expression characterizes private ownership.
Expression is commodifiable but ideas are not.400
The sphere of commons is sometimes even more fundamental in that the plane of
pure categories of ideas may fall into the public domain.401 These categories mainly consist of
basic societal information and ideas. Both are further considered to be so fundamental for
societal coexistence and overall functionality that they simply cannot be excluded from
common use. One example of crucial information as the kernel of society is the compulsory
license in patent law. A compulsory license is defined as permission ensured by a court of
justice. The purpose of such a license is to place the patented invention at the disposal of
society. The compulsory license system exists precisely to ensure possibilities to exploit
certain socially critical resources. The exclusive nature of a patent is reduced through a
compulsory license. On the other hand, a compulsory license sets the interests of state or
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402 See Oesch - Pihlajamaa 2003, 86.
403 See Thomas 1999, 10.
404 It becomes hard to find the most appropriate form within which one’s intellectual prop-
erty should be filed to become/remain protected. Inventions to be patented, for example,
may be based just as well on biotechnology and genetic engineering as on software and
computer code. See Webster - Packer 1996, 5.
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community above those of the patent-holder and thereby ensures the spread of
information.402
3.1.2 Control of commons
Information as a free resource constitutes the essence of ideas. The free circulation of ideas
and information is the basis of commons. The free flow of information is derived directly
from nature, where there are no boundaries limiting the spread of ideas or information.
This is well stated, for example, in defining the boundaries of intellectual property, where the law
fixes and shapes the internal meaning of intellectual property rights. Without the state there
would be no patents, copyrights, or any other intellectual property rights. Intellectual
property and the rights concerning intellectual property are thus always fictions that are
created by law. This is in fact stated in the scope of protection provided by intellectual
property rights. Copyright law limits itself to protection of expression, and in this way
makes the author’s ideas freely utilizable as public domain resources. The function of
patent law is precisely the same: it concerns the physical applications of technological
knowledge rather than that knowledge as such.403
The other defining factor in constituting the control of commons is the need to be
able to define the boundaries of certain protectable inventions. This definition ought to be
carried out in strict terms. However, the different domains of intellectual property rights
and their boundaries have been changed by digital media, making protection more and
more difficult.404 Indeed, digitization has changed the essential prerequisites for producing
and using information. Different kinds of information may be combined and information
in general may be reproduced easily. The difference involves more flexible use of
information, as both producing and reproducing it has become much easier. In this way
digitization partly reduces the distinction between protected works and unprotected
information. The scope of control is realized in accordance with this variation.
The control of commons is nevertheless necessary. Here one important factor is the
rivalrousness of commons. Rivalrousness implies control to some degree of the scope of
commons in order to organize their use. Even more significant for constituting and
justifying the control of commons is the character of a given resource and the way in which
it relates to the community. This means that any resource may be defined as being or
becoming a part of commons by simply reserving it for common use and thus defining it
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405 See Lessig 2002a, 21.
406 In the case of commons, ownership may seem irrelevant. If no one controls commons,
then everyone owns them. Furthermore, if no one controls the commons then it is irrele-
vant who owns them. Ownership is, however, an important source of controlling power.
See Ghosh 2002, 472
407 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 499 U.S. 340, 363 - 364 (1991).
408 A good counterexample of the varying scope of the public domain is the protection of
databases. Database protection has actually reduced the extent of the public domain and
strengthened the ownership of information. See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases. A database may
also be protected as a collection of information, with the protection being no longer only the
protection of labor or how the information is organized but rather being extended to-
wards protection of the information itself. See Kemppinen 2001, 14 - 15.
409 Characteristic of such resources is that they may be appropriated but the appropriation
has not yet occurred. See Rose 2003, 92.
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as a part of commons. However, society cannot afford to make all resources common ones.
There always exist at least two crucial questions: first, which resources should remain
commons and, second, how should this common use be organized reasonably enough.405 It
is thus not only the test of rivalrousness that determines commons but at least as much the
significance of the resource in the community. One established answer in examining
control of the commons is ownership.406 In the tangible world, resource distribution and
the control of tangible resources is realized by fencing. Fencing thus corresponds to the
drawing of boundaries in order to define the scope of ownership. A good example of this
kind of fencing and, at the same time, of fixing the line of demarcation between controlled
and free resources, is again found in the case Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co. Uncreative compilations of facts were considered unprotectable and thus out of the
scope of ownership.407 On the other hand, this strengthened and enlarged scope of the
public domain.408
In the case of commons defining ownership involves difficulties however. The most
serious problem arises precisely with regard to the common character of commons; i.e., the
organized utilization of the commons always requires defining the scope of utilization by
fencing. When carried out properly, fencing is usually founded on sharing arrangements.
In the case of commons, sharing is the only way to organize the utilization of a common
resource, because of the character of the resource and its relation to society. Such resources
are usually free and thereby uncontrolled. For example, it is difficult to reserve a free-
swimming fish for any individual member of a community. A free animal usually remains
free. As such a free fish is a part of res nullius, i.e., things that naturally may not be defined
as non-exclusive.409 A fish can, however, be reserved for the community as a whole, when
it is reserved to exclude a group of outsiders. The right to fish may then be developed
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410 See Mackaay 2002, 142.
411 Generally, where fencing is insufficient for establishing individual property rights, re-
sources will not be left with open access. The limited common property regimes avoid
the dangers of overuse and underproduction. Thus the sharing arguments are not primar-
ily set up for the pleasure of sharing but for better property rights because of the fencing
problems, when one must still manage scarcity.  See Mackaay 2002, 142.
412 The question should no longer be whether the state or the market should regulate the
resources but whether the resources should be controlled or free. In a democratic and
equal society, there is a general pursuit of some kind of self-governance. Self-governance
implies individualistic autonomy, on the one hand, and political self-governance, on the
other. These aims are attained in different ways and through different means of distribu-
tion. There are, however, some stable and sustainable explanations for preferring com-
mons over both a privately owned communications system - whether or not regulated as
a common carrier - and a publicly owned one. See Benkler 2002, 293.
413 See Lessig 1999, 7.
414 This applies especially to wireless communication networks and their utilization. See
Benkler 1998, 359.
415 This view has been used for describing ownership paradigms. See Määttä 1999, 268.
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within the community through rules regulating how much each member is allowed to
catch.410 In this way controlled resources are distinguished and separated from free ones.411
This is in fact exactly the extent of control where commons are concerned.412 The
controlling function of ownership is even more clearly employed in the network
environment. Ownership in a network is strictly bound to the structure of the network. It is the
structure of a network that defines ownership, with ownership then affecting the control
of the network. In this way the network architecture may become a part of its ownership.
Owning the network is further carried out through the computer code that constitutes the
kernel of the network. If the code is owned, it may be controlled. If it is not owned, control
is more difficult. On the other hand, a lack of ownership in the network, in the sense of
lacking property rights, implies an inability to direct how ideas will be used. This further
implies that the presence of commons is actually a significant tool for limiting certain forms
of governmental control.413 On the other hand, the sphere of commons may be treated
exceptionally when compared to a traditional tangible resource. The sphere of commons
does not consist of things, nor are commons even treated like things. Commons generally
consist of the capacity of their users to communicate and as such are renewable resources
that form an input into the value that is to be maximized.414
The sphere of commons is also well described through new forms of utilizing property.415
Here, the focus is set on who is entitled to introduce and exploit these new forms of
utilization. These forms may arise as expansions of the scope of previously owned property
as new definitions, or as new ways to exploit property are to be invented. Namely, it may
be that new uses are not exploited even by the owner. An owner’s use may be restricted in
favor of the common interest, with that use preserved exclusively for the use of the whole
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416 The question is interesting in environmental law, for example, because the legislation in
this sphere often concerns new and previously unknown ways to utilize property. For
example, building underground may be questionable. On the other hand, according to
the concept of ownership the rights of the owner are undefined, whereby novel forms of
utilization would also be included in ownership. See Määttä 1999, 268- 269.
417 See Vaidhyanathan 2001, 145.
418 The communicativeness of society is clearly based on the fundamental character of com-
munication. Communication is  considered as the basis of society in that a society has
always been considered to exist when several individuals begin to communicate with each
other. See Simmel 1999, 20.
419 Generally it is speech that in the Western philosophies of language has been assumed to
have come before writing. Writing was first developed as a means of pictorial representa-
tion and alphabetic writing established an effective means of representing sounds. The
superseding of pictographic by alphabetic writing may be considered as evidence of cul-
tural progress. See Mengham 1995, 29 - 30.
420 Messages were communicated to others for example through signs in nature or drawings
on objects. Colors were/are also considered signs. See Lehtonen, M. 2000, 15.
421 A good example of the framework and signs used in it are legal abbreviations. Abbreviations
have several functions in addition to making a text easier to read or sentences simpler to
understand. From the perspective of language their fundamental task is to hide meanings
from those who do not understand this particular language and to symbolize those mean-
ings. See Mattila 2005, 4.
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society.416 An illustrative example here is sampling, which is one of the new forms of digital
assets. Sampling is a means to alter and modify already existing digital content, for example,
music. If expression is defined by what the content does, it no longer counts as the same
expression in the new context. In other words, the expression is not employed similarly in
its new role. Context affects purpose. The old expression is no longer the same expression,
and not even the same idea, if the context changes radically.417
3.2 Some common interests
3.2.1 Communication and communicative signs
Society is communication. Societal communication is crucially based on communicative
signs.418 These communicative signs and communication are both crucial for societal life
overall. In the present day these communicative signs are usually written characters. The
language in which we communicate is mainly represented in a written form where the
scripts correspond closely to the phonological rules of speech. Written text thus has a close
relationship to organized uttered sounds.419 Language is, however, not realized only through
writing but is more fundamentally focused on communicating with others.420While
communicative signs may be significant in themselves, they always have a certain basis in
the framework in which they are used.421 An illustrative example of this in the exchange
economy is the bill of exchange. The meaning of signs is hence founded directly on
Society. Commons and collaboration
422 In this sense, Web graphics were not copyrightable when they consisted of words and square
boxes with search terms. See Copyright Council of Finland TN 2004:10, 4.
423 One significant relationship is based on the text itself, where the text is articulated using
certain characters. The text consists of a significant, which is further made up of letters
organized as words, sentences, paragraphs, and chapters, and a signified as the definitive
meaning of the text. See Barthes 1993, 172. The distinction clearly corresponds to that of
sign (signe), meaning (signifié) and significance (signifiant). See deSaussure1967, 97 - 100.
424 A characteristic example is found in the area of trademarks. Trademarks closely connect
the market and language. Trademarks have even a renovating task in language when they
increase the significance of names by making communication more economical. Trade-
marks create new generic words and at the same time enrich the language. See Landes -
Posner 1987, 271.
425 See Lehtonen, M. 2000, 16.
426 Social activity is based on communication. Habermas classifies society in terms of two
different spheres: communicative activity (Lebenswelt, lifeform) and strategical activity (Sys-
tem). These together constitute a functional society. Societal integration is also divided
into social and systemic aspects. Lifeform is  based on communication through language,
communicative activity and the corresponding social integration. See Tuori 2000, 91.
427 These signs do not, however, have the same meaning all over the world, or for all people.
This discrepancy implies that communication is often rather culture-bound. For example,
in Western societies owning things has been considered an indicator of wealth and suc-
cess. In contrast, for some American Indians ownership has rather the opposite meaning:
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communication and the framework in which the signs are used.422 In this respect language
is the basis of societal communication.
The significance of language as the central means of communication is based on
relationships. It is only the relationship between a sign and its bearer that makes the
relationship understandable and significant.423 In this way the relationship actually attains
some value. Additionally, signs have a clear significance in the tangible world. Signs always
have some reference in that world, this reference being effected by connecting certain signs
and certain objects to each other.424 In other words signs have a connecting task. It is
precisely this task that is employed in the domain of trademarks. It is the connective
function of signs that makes communication the central focus of societal life.
In addition to the value of their interrelationship, signs are used as a means to
explain and interpret the world and reality. Human beings are hence most definitely
interpretive creatures, meaning that they need to make conclusions on the basis of reality.
These conclusions and interpretations are then used as explanatory references to the
existing world.425 With communicativeness as the basis of society, societal and cultural
creations become intersubjective. Relations play out with reference to subjects and the
meaning of the symbols which are used in communication. Society, as well as culture, even
requires that there be more than one subject associated with any communicative activity.426
Societal communication is also based on the awareness of those active subjects; i.e., it
requires that all the participating subjects are aware of the signs used for communication
and understand what the signs used stand for. Signs connect otherwise separated subjects
to each other.427
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owning or having property was considered misery. The amount of property implied a
lack of friends with whom it could be shared. See Lehtonen, M. 2000, 18.
428 This is precisely the core of the legal language, where power is actually built into the lan-
guage itself. Legal language is based on the capability of legal conceptual systems to pro-
duce only legal decisions that do not cross the borderlines set by the legal concepts. See
Eriksson 1999, 39 - 40. On the other hand, form and style are always the most essential
elements when creating influences on justice. See Ljungstöm 1998, 199.
429 This is actually not necessarily, or not even generally, carried out using any force but by
making people want the same aim as the powers are pursuing. This indeed makes lan-
guage a powerful tool for influencing. See Lehtonen, M. 2000, 22 - 23.
430 The functions of a language may be seen as an interplay of customization and standard-
ization. In a language nothing is wholly customized, because there is always a requirement
of understanding. Complete customization would imply a kind of complete nominalism
that would make meaning impossible. On the other hand, nothing is wholly standardized,
because that would imply a kind of rule-like structure in which all the details are specified
in advance. See Radin 2002, 103.
431 At the least there is a requirement of a community acceptance of common descriptions
and their meanings in recurring contexts. Thereby, each different language is a standard
in itself. See Radin 2002, 102.
432 See Lagerspetz 1999, 77 - 78.
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The interrelated symbolic meanings of signs mean that signs and their significance
in communication constitute the core of social relationships. Social relationships, further,
always involve power. Power is used for reaching certain desired results, for example,
buying or selling things, or making people obey.428 In fact all forms of power are based,
more or less, on signs and language, whereby these communicative elements may well be
used as instruments for realizing power.429 All these examples of signs and meanings
indicate that these elements are functional. As such they constitute a part of a functional
communicative framework. Signs are not objects as such but rather functions or processes.
Moreover, they are active creations, which are related to other active creations as the basis
of societal communicativeness.
Communication thus has a close connection to language. Language constitutes one
of the central elements of the right and ability of human beings to communicate with each
other. Yet, communication is possible only if all the communicating parties are able to
understand each other. The language used has to be common for everyone and, on the
other hand, there cannot be any such thing as private language.430 In other words, language
must be standardized in order to make communication smooth and possible overall.431
Communicativeness is primarily based on the capability of others to understand the
language used. In this respect language is based especially on its communicativeness in
particular. Language is thus communal, its communal character being well expressed when
a language is defined as an official language in a certain country. At the same time, the
choice to declare a language an official language affects the societal circumstances in that
it distributes advantages and disadvantages in society in a particular way.432
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433 This definition, however, includes some generalizations that do not necessarily hold.
First, the definition requires that there is a chronology of thinking and creating speech in
which thinking comes first. Second, the definition presupposes that spoken language ex-
actly refers to the thoughts of the speaker. Third, the definition is based on the idea that
linguistic activity generally is a two-party societal activity where one party is an active
speaker and the other is a passive receiver. Lastly, the definition presupposes that the
speaker has total power over the language; i.e., the speaker is able to express whatever he
or she wants to. See Lehtonen, M. 2000, 29.
434 In this sense, for example, law is very much a communicative process. Law is  characteristi-
cally a linguistic process, with all legal operations expressed in linguistic form. As a
communicative process, law is utilized for creating relationships between people. See
Tolonen, H. 2003, 10.
435 See Renner 1949, 70 - 71.
436 Reality is always defined as lingual or non-lingual. It is always constituted of symbols and
signs and, on the other hand, elements that cannot be defined as symbols or signs. See
Lehtonen, M. 2000, 30.
437 Language is not a passive medium between the outsiders and these who use the language.
See Lehtonen, M. 2000, 35. In this sense language creates society. See Simmel 1999, 17.
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3.2.1.1 Language
Language has traditionally been defined as an instrument that is used by people for
communicating different messages to each other.433 This definition is, however, rather narrow. It
reduces language to an instrument that is used for sending and receiving messages, with
language defined only as a passive tool of communication. Language is more than this, and
the variations in the significance of language are based on its intersubjectivity. Another
essential aspect of language is its ability to create and define relations between people.434 In this
task, language operates as an intermediary.435 It is also functions as an intermediary in that
it links people to the world and reality.436
Language as such is clearly communication but in addition to this it has a clear
threefold task in society. It operates as a producer, an instrument and as a product.
Language operates actively as part of the functional interplay of human beings. Language is
an essential instrument when creating relations between the members of a society.
Language constitutes an integrated element of social communities, which are in fact
precisely derived from the active character of language. In these roles, language acts as both
a condition for and product of certain activity. This is precisely what requires activity as an
essential functional element of a language and, on the other hand, does not allow language
to remain only as an inactive tool. Language thus operates in order to constitute
significance for meanings by defining the meanings themselves. Meanings get their inner
content through language. On the other hand, language also defines reality by defining
those meanings.437
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438 For example, legal language is dynamic and has even been described as polyphonic. The
legislator, the authorities, the courts of justice, and the attorneys-at-law each have their
own specific way to use the language. See Eriksson 1999, 35 - 36.
439 See Lehtonen, M. 2000, 52 - 53.
440 Text may, on the other hand, be examined as parallel to written work, such as a writing or a
script. A written work is a piece of materia, whereas text consists of methodology. In this
sense, a writing is an imaginary extension of text. See Barthes 1993, 160 - 161.
441 The physicality of a text is clearly illustrated in the technologies that are used for produc-
ing texts. The material forms of texts reflect the producing technologies. For example,
when text was carved by using knives and axes, it was not possible to produce very long
or extensive texts. See Lehtonen, M. 2000, 106.
442 The material form of text is a direct outcome of the relevant main technology used for
producing it. The earliest technologies that were used for producing text were knives and
axes and they were used for carving signs in wood or stone. Quills and  parchment made
it possible to produce totally different texts. See Lehtonen, M. 2000, 106 - 107.
443 In the legal order this makes it possible to set out the legal consequences. See Helin 1999,
49 - 50.
104
Language is thus by no means a passive instrument, but an active operator. In this
respect language has an ability to constitute networks.438 It is precisely the active character
of language that acts as a driving force in creating networks. On the other hand, the ability
to construct networks is basically fixed to the significance of the context as the core of language.
Language does not exist as abstract phonology, grammar, or vocabulary: the very kernel of
language lies in its usability.439 Language acquires its force and power from everyday use.
In this respect language may well be considered the foundation of all human communication.
Language is crucial to the system of intellectual property rights. The closest
connection is drawn through examining language in its written form, i.e., as text.440 In written
form, text may be considered a physical entity or a semiotic entity. The physical character
of a language embodies its communicativeness, which means that texts are used as means
of human communication.441 Semantics has to do with what a text refers to. Text always
refers to something that is external to the text itself. A text and the world it refers to are
both significant in the construction of the text. Both of these elements are closely bound
together in the text, whose fundamental purpose is to physically illustrate a semiotic world.
In other words, texts as such are physical, but semiotics is embedded in the physicality of
the text. This connects texts and societal communication together closely. Written texts are
hence communicative instruments that are produced by people for communicative purposes.442
Language has further significance as a system encompassing the main concepts and
rules of societal communication. An illustrative example of this is legal language, which is
mainly based on constitutive rules. Legal definitions belong to the category of constitutive
rules, as the task of those definitions is to illustrate the scope of the legal order.443 One
example of this is copyright. A copyright is founded solely on a constitutive rule
establishing that certain acts and occurrences produce a work. A copyright is then further
bound to this rule by an enactment that if there exists a work, there is likewise a copyright.
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444 Copyright is further protected through behavioral norms and it is the prohibition norm
that forbids all others except the owner to exploit the work. See Helin 1999, 50.
445 One factor creating more effective transmission channels is the emergence of digital services.
These services also require investments in transmission channels in order to increase delivery
capacity. See NOU 1999:26, 24.
446 The term was first used in 1946 by John Tukey, a leading statistician and adviser to five
presidents. See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/b/bit.html. A bit itself,
however, is not information, but only a medium by which information is represented. See
Koepsell 2000, 86.
447 The converse of digital is analog, a form in which information is defined as a continuous
quantity. Examples of digital information are the photos in the memory of a digital cam-
era or digital transmissions on radio and television. See Järvinen 2001, 156 - 157.
448 On almost all modern computers, a byte is equal to 8 bits. Large amounts of memory are
indicated in terms of kilobytes (1,024 bytes), megabytes (1,048,576 bytes), and gigabytes
(1,073,741,824 bytes).See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/b/byte.html
449 These units are called packets and they are communicated through packet-switching net-
works. A packet in the packet-switching model is a piece of a message transmitted over a
packet-switching network. One of the key features of a packet is that it contains the desti-
nation address in addition to the data. In IP networks a packet is often called a datagram.
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Legal language hence creates a copyright and expresses by these means the functionality of
language. The intellectual property industry overall may hence be considered to be based
on a constitutive rule that makes it possible to define work.444
3.2.1.2 The digital framework
Language is dependent on the framework in which it is expressed. In traditional daily life,
language is expressed as writing and speech, but the digital framework imposes some
additional requirements on communication.445 In open networks, communication is
founded on digitized language. A digitized representation of information is a kind of language.
The representation model as such is basically individual. In formal representation,
information is expressed using the binary number system, in which it is expressed in terms
of two discrete values, either 1 or 0. In this respect, information consists of bits.446 Bit is
short for “binary digit”, which is the smallest unit of information on a computer. Bits make
up the core of digitized communication. A single bit can have only one of two values, 0 or 1,
which means that the binary system constitutes the basis of all digitized information.447
More meaningful information is obtained by combining consecutive bits into larger units.
For example, a slightly larger information unit, the byte, is composed of eight consecutive
bits and as a unit of storage it is capable of holding a single character.448 In linguistic terms
a byte may be considered the basic unit of information; information consists of bytes much
as traditional language consists of syllables.
 These smaller entities are packed together in constructing more representative
information units.449 This actually constitutes larger entities where information is more
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See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/p/packet.html
450 The term “information” comes from Latin and it means news or intelligence; “to inform”
means to give form or shape to something. See Simpson 1977, 738 - 739.
451 Data is called the raw material of information. It consists of signs or combinations of
signs, and it can be stored, saved, transferred, or transmitted using computers or the digi-
tal communication infrastructure. See Niiniluoto 1997, 236.
452 See Niiniluoto 1997, 236.
453 See Dommering 1991, 14.
454 Data is considered to be raw numerical data, such as mere observations, and as such it
lies at the bottom of the hierarchy of knowledge. Transformed data is data in context,
which then becomes information. see Cho 1998, 28 - 29.
455 Niiniluoto distinguishes three different definitions for information in its conceptual form:
syntactic, semantic and pragmatic. Syntactic information refers to the random value of
the variety of signals being transmitted through a certain communication channel; seman-
tic information refers to the content and the number of signal lines; pragmatic informa-
tion refers to the personal or cultural background of the message. See Niiniluoto 1997,
236 - 237.
456 See Cho 1998, 29.
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representative. In binary form, digitized information does not, however, reveal very much to
the people communicating. Communication is not realized until the assemblage of bits is
further organized to become information.450 In other words, information is organized data, data
being the most foundational of the three units in the theory of knowledge: data,
information, and knowledge.451 Data also has a communicative aspect, however, when it
can be described as representation of facts, concepts or instructions. Structurally data is
often defined as the physical or logical order of the internal elements of the data itself. This
structure is then further designed to support the special processing of data.452
The representation of data is carried out in a formalized manner that is suitable for
communication, interpretation, or processing by human beings or by automatic means. In
this form, data may be described as a language. At the level of normal human
communication, however, these representations are actually only signs that can be
combined by the receiver to form an informative message.453 In this sense, data and
information have a close connection. Data constitutes the kernel of information in general,
with information in this context being slightly closer to human communication.
Information is thus more systematized and compared to data implies an organization of
substance and energy.454 Typically information is connected conceptually to language or
other systems of signs. As such it is defined as compacted and interpreted data and constitutes
at the same time the third level of information structure: knowledge.455 Knowledge is
considered to be the collection of all organized information which additionally has
contributions of the human mind.456 Increased information is thus not increased
knowledge, nor is the increased potential to receive information an enhanced capacity to
acquire knowledge. Knowledge always contains a more processed and individualistic aspect.
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457 Niiniluoto 1997, 237. Knowledge has also been defined as a justified true belief. To be-
come knowledge, a belief must be justified on some grounds. See Lammenranta 1993, 79
- 80.
458 The use of knowledge implies one more classification in the pattern. This is wisdom,
which refers to the correct use of knowledge. Knowledge may also be defined as a inter-
mediate form of reasonableness and rationality. Reasonableness may also be called wis-
dom and rationality knowhow. See von Wright 1978, 33 - 36. Knowledge may also con-
sist of concepts such as knowing how to act (savoir-faire), knowing how to live (savoir-vivre)
or knowing how to listen (savoir-ecuter). These definitions imply that knowledge is much
more than simply defining the truthfulness of a belief. See Lyotard 1979, 36 - 37.
459 Information is often considered as something new, as a synonym for “news”. Sometimes
information may even refer to a message that alters our view on, or understanding of,
something.  See Karvonen 2000, 83 - 84.
460 See Dommering 1991, 15.
461 See Lehtonen, M. 2000, 95 - 96.
107
Knowledge is thus processed information. As such knowledge may be considered
a belief that is assumed to be true and that concerns how the world-order is structured.
Mere belief is not, however, sufficient; to become knowledge a belief needs to be well-
grounded and truthful.457 In this sense, knowledge and information are generally considered
synonyms. There exists, however, at least one fundamental difference in the
communicativeness of these two categories. Information usually refers to transmitted or
communicated messages, whereas knowledge, or knowing something, does not necessarily
have this communicative element.458 Something can be known without its being told to
anybody. Information, on the other hand, is generally communicated by informing
others.459
The binary form of digital language has one more implication for intellectual
property rights. Digitization makes the language rather flexible. This flexibility in turn makes
it possible to give less meaning to the originality of works when granting copyright.
Accordingly, there are an increasing number of works that are represented mathematically
whose originality does not take on so much meaning in their manifestation.460 On the other
hand, the possibility to present several different works in digital form unifies the interpretation.
Digital technologies hence blur the distinction between technology and the system of signs.
Technology no longer necessarily refers to machinery or apparatus but, rather, to certain
code systems.461
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462 Computer code is written in a special language. There actually exist several of these pro-
gramming languages, of which the best known are Java and C++. See Grewlich 1999,
394. These are both what are known as object-oriented languages and are rather close to
natural language.
See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/J/Java.html
463 This underlies the classification of software, where the structure and definition of speech
are fundamental issues. One aspect of these issues is whether a text that is a part of a ma-
chine falls within this definition. See Burk 2000, 6.
464 See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/source.html
465 A computer program is considered to be both text and machine. The development of
computerized languages, such as XML, has created a certain area of functional digitized
texts. See Radin 2002, 117. The advantage of XML is that it allows both presentation and
structuring of documents. This is considered an important prerequisite indeed for infor-
mation management. See Kirchberger 2005, 55.
466 The overall communicativeness of the digital network is founded on computer code. The
code determines how information flows online and who can control it. See Shapiro 1999,
14.
467 These characters are used by the programmer to describe and provide the basis for the object
code of a particular program. See Anawalt 1999, 127.
468 Briefly, a compiler is a program that translates source code into object code. The com-
piler gets its name from the way it works, looking at the entire piece of source code and
collecting and reorganizing the instructions. Thus, a compiler differs from an interpreter,
which analyzes and executes each line of source code in succession without looking at the
entire program. The advantage of an interpreter is that it can execute a program immedi-
ately. Compilers require some time before an executable program emerges.
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3.2.1.3 Computer code
Computer code is communication, precisely like language.462 The communicativeness of
computer code lies in its two-dimensional character: a piece of computer software may be
defined as a device or as a form of speech.463 The foundation of computer code is data, with
many computer commands involving the movement of data. The place from which data
is moved is called the source, whereas the place it is moved to is called the destination, or
target.464 Computer code closely resembles a formal language, as it is generally written in
a special programming language. On the other hand, computer code is a set of symbols for
representing something, and can appear in a variety of forms.
The communicativeness of language can be seen in the kernel of a segment of
computer code.465 The code contains written computer instructions and can appear in
different forms.466 The dual form of computer code lies in its two different levels of codes:
source code and object code. The code that a programmer writes is called source code,
which is a combination of words, symbols, and numbers. On the other hand, object code
appears as a series of zeros and ones and can be read only by a computer.467 To become
understandable to a human being object code needs to be executed.468 In this respect, the
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 See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/c/compiler.html
In the compilation process, high-level language instructions are translated into object
code. Object code is often the same as, or similar to, the computer's machine language.
See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/o/object_code.html
469 Code often refers particularly written computer instructions. See Webopedia
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/source_code.html
470 On the other hand, source code is the only format that is readable by humans and it is
never readable by computers. When one purchases a computer program, one usually re-
ceives it in machine-readable form. This means that one can execute the program directly,
but cannot read or modify the program.
See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/source_code.html
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difference between these two kinds of codes lies in the communicative background of the
code itself. Object code is used only by a computer and is ready to run. It is hence called
executable code, or machine code, whereas source code is more like human-usable
language.
 Computer code is primarily still written by humans, in which case it is called source
code. Source code includes program instructions in their original form.469 Computers,
however, can only execute the instructions written in a low-level language represented in
a machine-readable form, i.e., object code. In order for computers to understand the code
it has to be translated, or compiled. This is the interface between the two levels of
computer language. At the same time, this constitutes the mutually communicative
existence of those two levels of code. The relationship between these two codes is indeed
in its intelligibility for humans. Object code is computer-readable and is considered the core
of the computer program. It is the essence of communicativeness at its lowest level. Source
code, which is compiled into object code, is often considered human-readable computer
code.470
The interest of these two codes on varied levels is based on the interaction between them.
They are linked together inasmuch neither is able to operate alone. The human level and
the computed level create their own and special common functional and communicative
positions, both of which are equally essential. This existence of a computer and a human
level enables certain structures of interaction, one being human-computer communication.
The different levels of code make it possible to structure the communication between a
human and a computer. This is naturally essential given that communication is more and
more based on interaction between computers. Computer code is also increasingly used as
a tool to implement social order and control.
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471 Knowledge as such is not an exclusive good; there is always a need for property rights to
exclude others from using knowledge. In the academic and scientific context, however,
knowledge has traditionally been developed as a public good. See Holtgrewe - Werle
2001, 44.
472 This quality is essentially associated with ideas. A person, or even a computer, may be
creative, with this is dependent on the person’s or computer’s ability to produce creative
ideas sometimes. A person’s creativity lies in his or her ability to produce creative ideas. See
Boden 1998, 309.
473 These interconnected resources are then further used for making a particular kind of
product or in creating a particular procedural system. See Thomas 1999, 42.
474 The interaction of human beings and technology is even considered a behavioral concern.
If information systems are not built up in a human-centered way, they may cause deficiencies
where the effective use of systems is concerned. See Isomäki 2002, 20.
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3.2.2 Discourse and knowledge
3.2.2.1 Knowledge and ideas
Knowledge is communication, as is language. Both knowledge and language are based on
continuous communication giving a close connection. Knowledge is often embedded in the
form of language and is generally communicated by using language. The
communicativeness of knowledge differs slightly from that of language. The most salient
difference lies in the creative character of ideas, as ideas constitute the very essence of
knowledge itself. It is precisely an idea that makes knowledge regenerate and increase.471 An
idea itself is creative when it is novel, surprising, and valuable. An idea is defined exactly
in terms of its creativity and communicativeness. Therefore, the fundamental societal
communicativeness of an idea lies in its property of being creative.472 An idea cannot, however,
be creative alone without any connection to its surroundings. As such ideas are generally
always presented as related to society. This is also why it is communication that supplies ideas
for the use of society as a community. Without any mutual communication, ideas would
remain only individual hidden thoughts.
Knowledge has its basis in technology, to which it is closely bound. In this context
technology is considered a resource-based and resource-expending undertaking and it
necessarily uses or generates knowledge as a driving force. Knowledge and technology thus have
a mutual relationship as communicative counterparts. The content of technology may also be
described as an interplay of knowledge, methods, and other resources.473 Technology is
generally contrasted with other human activities. In this sense, technology usually involves
the use of knowledge of the properties of its input resources.474 This draws on energy,
information, tools, and human skills with the further purpose of generating material
products and procedural systems. In this respect, technology acts a gateway to make
knowledge available for societal use. The function of technology is likewise seen in the use
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475 See Thomas 1999, 42 - 43.
476 Niiniluoto 1997, 237. Knowledge is also considered as justified true belief. In other words,
the justification ought to be especially well-grounded. See Lammenranta 1993, 79 - 80.
477 See vonWright 1978, 33 - 36.
478 Wisdom consists of knowing, understanding, and general skills, augmented by an overall
estimation of its importance and objectives. In addition, wisdom includes common sense
and the ability to see knowledge as part of a larger whole. Wisdom includes the individ-
ual’s understanding and view of the world overall and the interrelationship of things as a
logical whole. Wisdom is thus a part of constructing a holistic conception of the world.
See Holma - Lappalainen - Pilkevaara 1997, 10.
479 Here a good example is open-source software, where the professional norms and indus-
trial strategies of openness are utilized for the collaborative development of software. See
Holtgrewe - Werle 2001, 49. In this respect open-source software is a community where
software projects are established and programmers communicate and contribute software
elements to each other via the Internet. See Potter 2000, 2.
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of knowledge. Technology is used in order to produce, manage and use material objects
and to control and enhance the other forms of human activity.475
The communicativeness of knowledge is best revealed through examining in parallel
the different levels of knowledge. Knowledge is defined in several different ways. According to
the traditional definition, knowledge is a true belief of the world. This actually subjects
knowledge to certain rather stringent prerequisites. Namely, in order to be described as
knowledge, pure information or data need some additional features. Knowledge has to be
justified and truthful, making the definition actually rather rigid.476 Knowledge may
nevertheless also be defined functionally, whereby it can be placed in between
reasonableness and rationality. Reasonableness is often called wisdom, which is something
more than mere knowledge. To become wisdom, knowledge needs to acquire some
personal or subjective aspects. On the other hand, the rationality of knowing, or knowhow,
complements knowledge with a practical view, whereupon it is defined more as a way to
do things.477 The communicativeness of knowledge is then mainly expressed in terms of
practical knowledge with its subjective view.
Innovativeness is often considered the most fundamental capital of an enterprise.
Innovativeness and knowledge as its core may be defined as a larger concept whose core
elements are tacit knowledge as an innovation resource and the knowledge capital of an enterprise
as the combination of these resources. This whole is often called skills or knowhow.
Knowledge is then increased by estimating its usability, value, and general significance. It
is no longer only technical or instrumental, but is defined as more objective-oriented.
Knowledge is assessed in terms of its goals and values. The largest and most challenging
element of knowledge and skills is generally called wisdom.478 Knowledge as wisdom implies
a social element in both knowledge and innovativeness, meaning that in a social context
mere technological innovation becomes a social innovation as well.479
Ideas are nevertheless the basis of knowledge and as such they frame the kernel of
communication. Communication consists of receiving and sending information that is
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480 Increases in, and the openness of, information resources strongly affect marketing. Most
marketing today is carried out in images. Image marketing aims at giving a positive picture
of the enterprise. See Rope - Vahvaselkä 1997, 62 - 63.
481 Marketing is not linked to the product itself but to the image. See Hintikka 1993, 95 - 96.
482 Further, the characteristics of explicit knowledge are detectability, independency of oper-
ations, an external view on things as objectivity, and a clear distinction between object
and subject. See Scharmer 2000, 38 - 39.
483 Contextually explicit knowledge characterizes things descriptively. The formal shape of it
is external and detectable. These elements make the explicit knowledge transferable, with
the transfer usually occurring in the form of numbers or words. See Ståhle - Grönroos
2000, 32.
484 Explicit knowledge is also easy to share because access to this kind of knowledge is possible.
See Nonaka - Reinmöller - Senoo 2000, 89 - 90.
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basically founded on the ideas. On the other hand, the significance of ideas is manifested
in the incompleteness of information. This incompleteness is based precisely on the
interconnected relationship of knowledge and ideas. Information that is transmitted is not
necessarily eventually processed. Information may also be presented in an unprocessed form,
with much of it remaining at the level of images.480 An image is an element that connects
knowledge and an idea and contains a great amount of unprocessed knowledge. An image
thus adds a subjective view to an idea due to the image being a subjective understanding that
draws on knowledge, experiences, views, and feelings that someone subjectively has.481
3.2.2.2 Tacit functionality
Even knowledge itself may be defined as having divergent aspects. Knowledge is basically
classified in two different forms, explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge. These two forms of
knowledge are always closely bound together and as such they are generally realized in an
interconnected manner. These forms of knowledge are thus seldom separable, although in
daily use it is usually explicit knowledge that we speak about and that we refer to when we
speak about knowledge. These two forms of knowing are together closely connected to the
communicative structure of society. Explicit knowledge is the visible part of knowledge
itself.482 The most interpretative definition of explicit knowledge is one that explains in
terms of understandability.483
It is explicit knowledge that may be expressed in words. Explicit knowledge
constitutes the particular form of knowledge that can be expressed in an understandable
and transmittable form.484 Therefore, it is explicit knowledge that may be communicated
and utilized for communication. Explicit knowledge is hence generally considered
communicative knowledge. In addition to explicit knowledge, there exists knowledge in
implicit form. Knowledge is often implicit when it is tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge by
definition constitutes the opposite of explicit knowledge, although they are complementary
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485 The mutual existence of explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge has been compared with
an iceberg. The visible (explicit) part would comprise only 10 % of all knowledge. See
Ståhle - Grönroos 2000, 32.
486 This is considered to be the most essential characteristic of tacit knowledge. See Polanyi
1966, 4 - 5. See also Scharmer 2000, 36 - 37.
487 Often tacit knowledge comes out in the daily routines embedded in personal understand-
ings, views, or feelings. It is also often hard to express and explain tacit knowledge to
outsiders.  Working interactively using tacit knowledge is hard as well. See Nonaka -
Reinmöller - Senoo 2000, 89 - 90.
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elements in the overall framework of knowledge. The difference lies mainly in the invisible
form of tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is principally embedded in people’s minds and
in patterns of communicative behavior. It may be found in ways of doing things. In this sense
tacit knowledge is characteristically rather practical.
Tacit knowledge is thus functional and communicative in essence, but it is still often
rather impossible to express in words. It is precisely tacit knowledge that further constitutes
the basis of communicativeness. Tacitness is linked to the lower level of communicational
structure,  in which communication takes place on several interconnected levels. Some
communication, e.g explicit knowledge, is clearly visible and  processed through clear
communicative patterns. Tacit knowledge is communicated at a clearly lower level, where
the communicative processes are not visible in the same sense as they are in explicit
communication. Additionally, the mutual expressions of these two forms of knowledge
differ considerably from each other. The principal distinction lies in arranging words in
speech as against observing someone doing something. There is at least one connecting
level in between these two clearly separable ones, where the communicative processes are
mutually more active and the functionality is based jointly on the expressions and
functional patterns.
The communication of tacit knowledge is mainly based on common social
behavioral patterns. Indeed this is one of the most important factors in considering tacit
knowledge as a part of commons. Namely, it is most characteristic of tacit knowledge that
it cannot be transmitted in any understandable form.485 It is, however, included in daily life
in different ways despite its being impossible to explain contextually or illustrate formally.
For the most part we know much more than we can explain.486 The core of tacit knowledge
is therefore embedded in concepts and actions.
3.2.2.3 Communicating with tacit knowledge and ideas
Tacit knowledge may only seldom be expressed in words. It is characteristic of tacit
knowledge that it cannot be expressed verbally, or in any other definable form.487 The
abiding incapability to verbally express tacit knowledge generates some fundamentally
different ways to express it. This links tacit knowledge closely to human creativity and ideas
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488 An idea may also be creative. It has then the property of being creative, that is, of being
novel, surprising, and valuable. See Boden 1998, 309.
489 This may also be described as the inner content of patents. A patent concerns the physi-
cal application of technological knowledge rather than the knowledge itself. See Thomas
1999, 10.
490 This means that creativity is not an all-or-none phenomenon, or even a matter of degree.
This is precisely due to the variety of ways in which ideas can be creative. See Boden
1998, 309.
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as its essence. It is precisely a person’s creativity and ability to produce creative ideas that
generate communication.488 Therefore, even more than communicating information or
knowledge, tacit knowledge encourages communication as a way to operate in society.
Human creativity embodies ideas in tacit knowledge. It is then precisely this
interconnection where ideas and knowledge are linked together. Further, the close
connection between tacit knowledge and ideas also implies their cooperation, which is best
manifested in communicating ideas and tacit knowledge with others. First of all, the special
nature of communication is characteristically reflected in tacit knowledge. Communication
is also practical and effective when it is tacit knowledge that is communicated. In this
practical communication, tacit knowledge is embedded in procedures and ways to do things
and perform operations. In the area of communication this constitutes the fundamental core
of tacit communication.
Tacitness is clearly expressed when the distinction between an idea and its expression is
drawn at the lower level. This distinction may be examined in relative terms, i.e., as
relationships, where the distinction between an idea and an expression may be reduced to
one of expression and tacit knowledge. Expression is then depicted as ways to do things
more so than as expressing ideas in words.489 On the other hand, ideas are mainly acquired
by observing the surrounding community. The roots of new ideas basically lie in something
that someone has already done or that someone already knows. This is actually the
foundation of the circulation of ideas in a creative way, which is a continuous and
communicative process.
Communication between ideas and tacit knowledge makes society more stable. Ideas
are based on creativity and as such they have some characteristic features. For instance
ideas are relative, which means that they are always represented as related to their
surroundings. Ideas can thereby be creative in various ways and it may become even
impossible to define their creativity in terms of a single individual quality. Ideas are always
creative, not in some way, but in some respect.490 Accordingly, ideas always need to be
communicated in accordance with the framework in where they are to be applied. Ideas and
images as the kernel of knowledge thus place the essential focus on subjectivity, making the
subjectivity of knowledge the most crucial foundation of the communicativeness of
knowledge. Subjectivity is based on the knowledge, experiences, and attitudes of people,
and in this way individuals actually increase information through their own experience.
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491 Marketing is often also based on images. See Hintikka 1993, 95 - 96.
492 Money as a means of transmitting information is actually closely bound to all three main
tasks of money: money as a medium of payment, money as an indicator of value, and
money as a form of property. See Tarkka 1993, 52.
493 In the Habermasian classification of society into two different scenes, Lifeform (Lebenswelt)
and System, the economy belongs characteristically to the sphere of system, where com-
munication is carried out in the form of money and exchange. There is no need of any
integration through communication by speech; rather integration is realized through the
systemic instruments, that is, money and administrative power. See Tuori 2000, 91.
494 In society, it may even be thought that human beings are defined only as actors in the
exchange relationship, thereby acting as subjects of payment and counterpayment. This
would then be the only descriptive factor needed in our present societal communication
and existence. See Simmel 1999, 57.
495 Exchanges in tribal societies were ceremonial in nature. They were considered an
outgrowth of the practice of reciprocity, whereby they were designed to bring tribal
members closer together rather than to maximize the benefit from the exchange. See
Wray 1999, 43.
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Images as a crucial part of knowledge constitute a continuously developing process. In sum,
it can be said that the communication of knowledge is founded on cooperation.491
3.2.3 Circulation and money
3.2.3.1 Money as a medium of payment
Money is communication, and communication is one of the central elements of a well-
functioning society. A crucial part of this communication lies in having a means of exchange.
Money acts to this end as a transmitter of the essential information in the market and in
exchange.492 In other words, money communicates information that is usable for exchange.
The very foundation of exchange is found in nature. Indeed, exchange is actually
fundamentally based on the close connection between human beings and nature. Communication
can be realized through money, no longer only through language.493 Nature and human
beings are bound closely together in being able to exchange goods. Moreover that bond is
based on the character of exchange; that is, the relations in exchange correspond in the
main to social relations. Society is thus composed almost completely of some kind of
communication in the form of social or exchange relations.494
The description of society as a network of different relations is well documented in the
traditions of ancient tribes.495 For example, for the Maori obligations had an extraordinary
personal significance: the connection that was created through obligations was a connection
between human souls. Objects had a spirit of their own and they actually constituted a part
of the soul of their owner. For ancient tribes this is actually the main factor that signifies
the connection of nature and exchange. With tradeable objects representing a part of the
soul of their owner, giving them away means that one gives a part of oneself to the
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496 See Mauss 2002, 40. The giving of a gift in today’s digitized network society is essentially
founded on giving away something intellectual or intangible rather than anything material.
See Bergquist - Ljungberg 2001, 306.
497 The giving of gifts thus may not involve explicit bargaining. In bargaining, no obligation
exists after the exchange is completed. See Bergquist - Ljungberg 2001, 313.
498 See Habermas 1989, 161. In this way social, economic, and governmental life are bound
together. See Heiskala 2000, 175 - 176.
499 Coincidence of wants is generally based on the existence of money as a medium of ex-
change. It is comprehensively explained as the outcome of individual maximization of
rational utility. See Ingham 1999, 20.
500 See Begg - Fischer - Dornbusch 2000, 376. Further, the barter economy originates in a
supposedly inherent tendency of human beings to gain mutual advantages by exchanging
goods and resources. See Heinsohn - Steiger 1999, 73.
501 It is very expensive indeed to trade in a barter economy. People have to spend a lot of
time and effort finding others with whom they can make mutually satisfactory exchanges.
Moreover, since time and effort are scarce resources, a barter economy seems to be
wasteful. See Begg - Fischer - Dornbusch 2000, 376.
502 If it economizes on the time and effort spent in trading, society can use these resources
to produce extra goods or leisure. See Begg - Fischer - Dornbusch 2000, 376.
503 In this sense money is used as a means of material reward that is actually a form of material
control. Material rewards consist of the granting of symbols, like money, that further al-
low one to acquire goods and services. The use of material means of control constitutes
utilitarian power. See Etzioni 1964, 59.
504 This applies especially to the ritual exchange of valuable objects. See Habermas 1989,
163.
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recipient. In other words, whenever we give something away, we actually give away a part
of nature.496 Accordingly, a commodity that is purchased and then given as a present is
transformed from a product to an obligation.497 In this way exchange may actually serve more
to foster socialization than to accumulate wealth.498
The exchange of ancient, or even modern, tribes is based on the double coincidence of
wants.499 To be able to exchange goods or services the seller and the buyer must each want
something the other has to offer. This is what has become known as the barter economy,
where each person is simultaneously a seller and a buyer. Further, to be functional the
barter economy has to be based on a double coincidence of wants.500 The barter economy
thus has no means of exchange; trade is carried on by swapping goods for other goods.
Here money is a more convenient means of exchange, as its use does not require any
arrangements for finding any coincident buyers or sellers for the goods that are to be
exchanged.501 The use of money makes trading smoother and simpler and at the same time
generally more efficient.502 On the other hand, the market is based on the utilization of
money as a medium of payment. In other words, a unit of money may be exchanged against
goods at a certain value.503 At the same time, exchange stabilizes society and increases
societal integration.504
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505 See Mengham 1995, 146. In other words, the optimal amount of exchange will not be
reached even if all the possibilities of the barter economy are exploited. See Tarkka 1993,
27.
506 See Mengham 1995, 146.
507 See Tarkka 1993, 29.
508 See Tarkka 1993, 36.
509 At the same time, this changes the natural economic exchange of goods into trade in
commodities. See Habermas 1989, 171.
510 See Tarkka 1993, 36 - 37.
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Communication is then carried out as daily communication at the level of people and
society. As such it could easily be considered to be an act similar to speech. Commodities
are further defined through their value. They may take on some exchange value, use value,
or natural value in which the worth of the thing is thought to inhere in it. The goods
operate in this way as communicative instruments when the value is set and measured
through exchange. In this respect the utilization of money at the same time increases the
efficiency of exchange. In a functional society, cooperative communication ought to be
smooth. This applies to exchange as well. However, if exchange is based only on the double
coincidence of wants, it is not necessarily very functional: the smoothness and efficiency
of exchange requires that there always be an equal number of sellers and buyers for the
same product. This actually restricts and decreases exchange.505 Exchange is more effective
when the commodities are interexchangeable. Money acquires a structural dimension which
allows it to be employed as a defining instrument of communication and exchange
overall.506 Communication is hence best carried out when there is a large number of actors,
and it is useful for exchange if relationships are multilateral.507 It is in fact multilateral
exchange that employs money as a medium of payment, inasmuch as there is no longer any
need for a double coincidence of wants.
3.2.3.2 Money as an indicator of value
Value is utilized as the foundation of market communication, with the market based on
setting prices for goods.508 In order to enable communication everything in the market needs
to be valued. Valuation is thus one of the most fundamental factors in implementing
exchange. In this task money is employed as a special exchange mechanism for
transforming use values into exchange values.509 Without any value on goods there would
be no exchange. In the monetary economy a price is actually the most fundamental factor
that defines the mutual relations of goods. Goods may be limited in supply and values
make it possible to compare the goods to each other. This is the very basis of
communication in the market; prices actually define the extent of exchange.510 Further, in
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511 In other words, the economy can be constituted as a monetarily steered subsystem only
when its interactions with its social environment are regulated via the medium of money.
See Habermas 1989, 171.
512 See Tarkka 1993, 39.
513 See Tarkka 1993, 38.
514 See Lehtonen, M. 2000, 84.
515 A means of exchange does not have to be money in the sense in which we understand it.
Money may be dog’s teeth in the Admiralty Islands, sea shells in parts of Africa, or gold
during the nineteenth century. What matters here is not the physical commodity used but
the social convention that this commodity or unit will be accepted as a means of pay-
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the pricing system it is money that is used to render goods and prices commensurable.
Commensurability is the essence of the interexchangeability of goods, with money
functioning as an indicator of value.
In the market and exchange money is likewise used as a medium of payment,
whereby it has some value of its own. The value of money itself is nevertheless always the
same; the value of money does not change. This is one of the fundamental prerequisites of using
money as a means of commensurability in the market. As such money also has a structuring
effect. This effect can only be realized, however, if money becomes an inter-systemic
medium of interchange.511 Money thus needs to be utilized as a medium of exchange.
Commensurability, on the other hand, is possible only with money as a solid foundation.
Without this condition it would not be possible to use money as an indicator of value,
either: the values of goods would change with changes in the value of money. Money is
thus the measurement by which all other exchangeable goods are valued.512 It puts prices
in perspective and makes it possible to value them in accordance with each other. It is
precisely commensurability that acts as the definitive factor in the communicativeness of
money.
The market is hence basically constituted on communication in the form of
exchange. On the other hand, exchange - and thus communication in the market - requires
that each product have only one price in the market.513 This is the essence of the fluency
of exchange. The communicativeness of exchange is further manifested in parallel
communicative systems: i.e., writing systems are generally closely connected to money. The
very beginning of writing systems in general has often been connected to the need to
record trade agreements. The use of coins interconnected money and language, through the
close connection between significance and value.514
3.2.3.3 Money as property
The existence of a functional society requires a medium of exchange. Society thus derives
some benefits from having a certain fixed medium of exchange.515 One of these lies in the
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ment.  See Begg - Fischer - Dornbusch 2000, 373.
516 Exchange may be broken down into two categories: barter exchange and indirect
exchange. See Tarkka 1993, 26.
517 See Tarkka 1993, 26.
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stability of money as an organizer of social relations, whereby it is an instrument for
realizing societal communication through exchange. It is possible to utilize money to create
and stabilize communicative relations. This in turn is based on money as a commensurable
indicator of value.
In societal relations, money has some other functions as well; e.g., it serves as a store
of value. Here money increases and facilitates exchange crucially. By using money it is
possible to store income for unstable times. It not necessary to use all one’s money at once;
money may be stored in the form of property. It is thus possible to sell things today and
buy them tomorrow with the value usefully preserved in the meantime in money. In
between, money benefits its owner. As a store of value money needs to be rather stable and
fixed to its functions. The value cannot be preserved without this qualification. This means
that money needs to preserve its value to be useful as a medium of exchange.
Conversely, unless money is able to preserve its value, it is rather useless in creating
a sustainable network of social relations. As this kind of medium of exchange, money is
actually an instrument of indirect exchange.516 Indirect exchange means that the traded
commodities are not consumed but used for later exchange. It is further characteristic of
indirect exchange that the payments are carried out non-simultaneously. Non-simultaneity is
in fact a crucial prerequisite for constructing any indirect exchange at all.517 It is precisely
the indirectness of exchange that makes it possible to use money as a medium in social
relations.
3.3 Basic elements of commons
The sphere of commons consists of certain socially crucial elements. At least language,
knowledge and money may be defined as such common interests. These interests ought to
be implemented dynamically and hence in the form of interrelated mutual communication.
This communication is further realized by supporting dynamics through innovativeness.
Innovativeness refers to a developed kind of activity where activity no longer means using
the same transmission channels, or refers to changing requirements in the transmission of
information. In this context it is further necessary to define the foundational elements of
the sphere of commons as an interrelated architectural construction.
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518 A good example of this is open-source software and its relation to the Internet. The
growth of open-source may even be following a pattern similar to that of the Internet. In
this sense, open source and the Internet have developed together. The software-based
compatible protocols were  developed on the basis of open source. In its early stages the
Internet has become very difficult to regulate. On the other hand, the Internet has
changed the way software is priced and valued. See Potter 2000, 9.
519 Openness has two basic underlying elements in the area of information and communica-
tion technology: one is to decrease or even control the dominance of one single firm in
the computer industry; the other is to ensure or increase the emergence of computer net-
works and overcome the difficulties of interconnecting computers of different brands or
linking different networks to one another. See Holtgrewe - Werle 2001, 46.
520 See Lessig 2002a, 34.
521 See Lessig 2002a, 34.
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3.3.1 Openness
The innovativeness of commons is based on activity in operations, with activity rather
explicitly realized as different ways of using information rather than the passive receiving
or transmitting of it.518 Activity is functional and operative by nature and is further
employed in the overall architecture of the active use of information. In this pattern of
activity, it is essential to be able to affect the right to decide what is allowed and what is not
rather than remain a regulated object. This then has a direct influence on overall
innovativeness: if access to a network can be denied by not allowing certain applications,
innovativeness will be reduced accordingly.519 The core idea of innovativeness in this
system is to keep the network as simple as possible, and to create smart applications instead.520
To become part of the sphere of commons, a network should be freely accessible. Free
access to a network supports the sphere of commons. At the same time, it increases openness.
A freely accessible network is thus open to all users. Free access has further implications
for innovativeness to the extent that innovativeness is based on what is known as the end-to-
end principle (e2e). According to the principle, the intelligence in a network ought to be kept
at the ends, or in the applications, with the network itself remaining relatively simple.
Computers within the network should perform only very simple functions, i.e., those that
are needed for and utilized by many different applications. The functions that are needed
by only some applications should be performed at the edge instead. By these means
complexity and intelligence are kept off the network and free access is ensured.521
Utilization of the network may thus be carried out equitably despite any technological
limitations; i.e., the network is open. Openness means that the network is open for all
actors to run their applications on.
Openness correlates with communicativeness. The usefulness of information in an
active network further requires that information may be communicated. The
communicative function of information is thus part of the essence of information itself.
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522 It is actually rather essential for the Information Society to be able to process and transfer
information effectively using information and communication technology. See Tapscott
1996, 49.
523 This means that a single copy can be uploaded onto a computer that is connected to a
network of computers or a network of users in a larger computer system. Each user may
have virtually simultaneous use of the same copy. This is a very real threat where
copyrighted material is concerned. It is mostly pirate copies that are uploaded and used
on networks. See Samuelson 1990, 326 - 327.
524 A centralized state-regulated system restricts the decision-making power of the owner.
Basically, telephone wires are privately owned, which easily leads to restrictions how they
are utilized. In other words, the physical communication platform is preordained. How-
ever, the legal right to use the wires is not necessarily preordained; governmental regula-
tion might ensure the right to use privately owned telephone wires. In this way state-
based regulation has two functions: it strengthens the power of the owner and, on the
other hand, ensures the right of others to use the wires. See Lessig 2002a, 44 - 45.
525 See Lessig 2002a, 32.
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The communicativeness of information is actually one more of the advantages of the end-
to-end principle. An open network makes it possible for all the active actors to use their
own applications and communicate information. Transmission of information is carried out
through certain transmission channels, i.e., a digital network. In these networks large
amounts of information can be compressed, which makes it possible to transmit
information rapidly all over the network.522 Rapid distribution of information together with
the digital context enables extremely effective use of content.523 Openness of
communication networks is thus essential. The development of an active network is firstly
and most profoundly carried out on the level of a concrete communication network. The
traditional communication network is mainly based on state-regulated telephone lines,
which means that access to the lines is controlled by the state, or government. This means
that the owner of the lines is free to decide on their use. The network is by no means open.
The lines as such are closed and excluded, and set aside for use by only one actor.524 Naturally,
the right to use the lines can be granted to others, too, but when the lines are exclusive, the
right to make decisions is reserved only for the owner. This exclusivity makes the
communication system extremely centralized.525
The centralized character of the communication system is manifested likewise in its
technical structure. The centralized communication model is based on circuits, which are
embedded in telephone wires. The model is thus constructed on a circuit-switched system,
where a certain dedicated channel, or circuit, is established only for the duration of a
transmission. The most widespread circuit-switching network is the telephone system,
which links together wire segments to create a single unbroken line for each telephone call.
Technically, in this design a circuit is opened between two ends for the duration of a phone
call. Still, the line remains open and thus reserved until one hangs up. In other words, the
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526 The real advantage of the circuit-switching system is the possibility to transmit data in
real-time. See Lessig 2002a, 31-32. Circuit-switching networks are sometimes called con-
nection-oriented networks.
 See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/C/circuit_switching.html
527 The offering of information is carried out basically on three different levels and every
piece of information offered to the user consists of collaboration between these three
levels: 1) the information service, for example, a broadcasting company offers software
along with the supplier of computers; 2) the transportation service, which takes care of all
functions required for transportation, for example, the postal services; and 3) the infra-
structure as a system of connections and functions that make up the actual communica-
tion network, for example, the road transport network. See Dommering 1991, 17.
528 The Internet is based on the packet-switching model. See Gulliksen 1999, 13. Problems
arise here as well where intellectual property rights and the creator of a work are
concerned. One is the question of what would anymore be considered original. See
Borgman 2001, 64.
529 See Lessig 2002a, 31 - 32.
530 This may be called the principle of identifiable information associated with an address. The
next step might be to add payment mechanisms and other instructions to these informa-
tion packets. Thus, information could operate on its own in a decentralized way, without
any continuous control or guidance. See Noam 2002, 56 - 57.
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wire is kept reserved even when nobody is saying a word.526 The model relies on an on/off
-solution rather than estimating the need for reserved space for transmission. For this reason
the design is relatively static. The static nature of the system is not a given and in an active
network it is even impossible. Dynamics are introduced by the development of the
structure of information and lie in a different idea of activity. In the circuit-switched model,
activity is based on transmission of data. The active part of the model is the information
transfer from one place to another. This is carried out by keeping the line busy when it is
reserved and out of use by others. In this way the activity as a functional unit remains
centralized, like the regulation of wires overall. The centralization of activity comes first
from the model of the structure of communication and second from state regulation of the
communication network.527
In this kind of structure the basis of the communication system in dynamic
operation is to release the wires when they are not reserved for information transmission.
The model is called a packet-switching model, and its essence lies in digitization and the packet-
switching technique, using which more information may be packed in smaller units.528
Transmission that traditionally took place in circuits is first translated from waves to bits
(=digitized), and the resulting stream is then cut up into packets.529 Information and its
transmission networks are changing from continuous streams of analog or digital signals
to discrete packets which are transmitted discontinuously. Information is labeled by its
sender, its location within the document and other operational data.530 In traditional
communication, like in the circuit-switching model, information was therefore analog or
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531 Tapscott 1996, 49.
532 This is actually one model of rights management system. The core of rights management
seems to be document delivery and the authentication of documents.  Another good ex-
ample of rights management is the International Standard Book Number (ISBN) for books,
which represents the most traditional form of rights management. It was established in
1967and is widely used in the book publishing industry. See deKroon 2000, 230. Yet an-
other good example is the bar code systems Uniform Product Code (UPC) and European Arti-
cle Numbering (EAN), where the tools of identification are embedded in a symbolic bar
code. See Sakki 1999, 194 - 195.
533 The packet-switching data network (PSDN) may also be called simply a packet-switched net-
work, or PSN. See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/P/PSDN.html
534 One purpose of digitization is to improve access. Instead of one physical copy of a docu-
ment, digital information, or an image of the  document, can be distributed online to
multiple users at the same time and accordingly overall. This is the great advantage of
digitization; it has greatly improved access to information. See Borgman 2001, 64.
535 See Lessig 2002a, 31.
536 See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/P/PSDN.html. However, despite
packet-switching being essentially connectionless, a packet-switching network can be
made connection-oriented by using a higher-level protocol. TCP, for example, makes IP
networks connection-oriented. For more details, see Webopedia
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/C/circuit_switching.html
537 See Shapiro 1999, 16.
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physical and information itself was relational.531 People communicated by using their physical
tools when the communication was engineered primarily for voice rather than data.
In contrast, packet-switching networks do not establish any physical communication
channels between communicating devices. Instead, signals are formed into fixed-length
packets that are affixed with a source and destination address and packet ordering details.
The packets then rely on network routers to read the address data and route the packets
through the network to their destinations.532 When the packets arrive at the receiving
device, the packet ordering data is used to reassemble the original signal.533 However, in the
packet-switching model the information is not analog anymore. For this reason, unlike
analog information, it is not necessarily related to the other information units. In digitized
form the packets can flow independently across a network yet create the impression of a real-
time connection on the other end.534 At the same time they release the wires for some other
uses during downtime.535 The packets from different sources going to different destinations
can share common data pathways.536 The packet-switching transmission model affects
communication by equalizing the use of wires, which increases efficiency. At the same time, the
centralized control of the state is diminished and decentralized.537 Decentralization has
some additional influences in that it brings the market and collaboration along with it. By
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538 In other words, the social structure of cyberspace is considered to mirror its technical
structure, with peer interactions preferred to hierarchical modes, and power, control, and
authority distributed. This makes the system open and responsive to bottom-up initia-
tives. See Grewlich 1999, 29.
539 The Open Source Initiative was founded in 1998 to promote the commercialization of open-
source software and it indicates that the source code of a computer program is made
available free of charge to the general public. Open-source software and the Open Source
Movement are both based on free access. In order to support freedom of access, all
open-source software has to be maintained free of charge. The author or holder of the
license to the source code cannot collect any royalties for the distribution of a program.
Keeping the source code free of charge ensures for its part the free distribution of the
code. See Open Source Initiative at http://www.opensource.org/
540 See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/o/open_source.html
In this respect open-source software is mainly based on hackerdom, where software devel-
opment is founded on the creativity of computer enthusiasts, hackers, and programming
and success in it is an expression of identity. The central normative orientations of hacker
culture are the freedom of information and knowledge, universal access to technology
and a commitment to technological excellence and aesthetics. This is also called elegant
code. See Holtgrewe - Werle 2001, 49.
541 See Lessig 2002a, 57.
542 The developer-centered attitude enables an even more hacker-centered view of the world.
The Open Source Movement usually defends the freedom of users and considers a user
to be a competent software developer, i.e., not just any point-and-click end-user. This is
often called the developer-centered attitude.  See Rosenberg D. 2000, 11. See also
Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/o/open_source.html
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these means the decentralized communication model is a rather clear manifestation of
society at large.538
The openness of a network may also be implemented directly in computer code.539
Openness of code has various implications for innovativeness overall. It makes it possible for
basic ideas to converge in numerous different ways. In order to be open, the distribution
of  source code ought to be based on free access. The distributed program should then
make the source code accessible to all users. Access should be granted to everyone on equal
grounds and no person, group or field of endeavor may be denied access to the program.540
If the platform is strongly protected, innovativeness becomes compromised through that
protection. In remaining neutral, open code invites different kinds of innovation. At the
level of code no innovation will be excluded, which also means that the market is allowed
to decide on the robustness of any idea.541 The openness of code thus actually lowers the
barriers to entry into the communication network, which further lowers barriers to
innovation. Innovativeness thus gets some dynamic impetus through the openness of code,
which is the basis of the free flow of information. “Free” does not mean that no money will
be involved but that no authority or non-disclosure agreement will prevent developers from
sharing the code. In other words, the products of a developer’s mind remain free for all
other developers to use and rework.542
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543 If the network were not interoperable, tribalism would easily emerge. Instead of getting
access to the resources and communicating with anyone anywhere, users would begin to
communicate through remote data islands. See Shapiro 1999, 16.
544 An important feature of the openness of the Internet is its basic protocol of information
exchange. The protocol (TCP/IP) is non-proprietary and thereby no one owns it or is
able to control its use. The non-proprietary character of the transmission protocol closely
resembles a set of grammatical rules, which cannot be owned by anyone. See Shapiro
1999, 16 - 17.
545 Interactivity is introduced also as a service enabling a member of the public to receive, on
request, the transmission of a particular message (for example, a sound recording) chosen
by or on behalf of the recipient. Services such as audio-on-demand, pay-per-listen, and
celestial jukebox transmissions are interactive services. See Balaban 2001, 255.
546 The interactivity of traditional communication channels is not, however, many-to-many
interactivity. The telephone and telegraph are interactive, but they allow only one-to-one
communication between two parties. On the other hand, mass media, such as television
and newspapers are one-to-many but not interactive. See Shapiro 1999, 15.
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The openness of computer code further contributes to the interoperability of a network.
Interoperability is one extension of the end-to-end principle and ensures that the network
is open to all. In an interoperable network both hardware and software are designed in such
a way that information may flow freely throughout the network without any barriers. This
actually substantially supports the kernel of an open network by sustaining precisely its
networking character. Without interoperability the network and its openness would be crucially
undermined.543 Interoperability in networking is further supported by a technical structure
that ought to be as open as possible in this way.544 Openness thus ensures some degree of
interactivity in communication. In this way communication and openness are bound together
as elementary counterparts of the sphere of commons. Communication is further carried
out as many-to-many interactivity, where several people communicate with each other at the
same time.545
Interactivity in the sense of many-to-many communication is rather similar to
interactivity in traditional communication networks. The only additional dimension is that
many-to-many interactivity makes it possible to communicate with many people
simultaneously.546 The possibility to communicate with several people at the same time
makes many-to-many communication rather crucial for the networking society. It involves one
of the most potentially democratic aspects of network because it allows individuals to be
creators of content rather than only passive recipients. Further, those recipients may
become active participants in a dialogue instead of just being mere bystanders. In open
networks, democracy is based on real possibilities to get access to networks. To be able to
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547 In order to ensure access for all people and sufficient capacity for transmitting all kinds
of information, the capacity of the Internet ought to be based on broadband. This means
that there should be large bandwidth or carrying capacity. See Shapiro 1999, 15 - 17.
548 See Lessig 2002a, 36.
549 A peer-to-peer network may accordingly be considered as a network that is based on the
end-to-end principle. A peer-to-peer network is based on a distributed structure with no
single central service provider. Further, peer-to-peer communication is equal, with all
networking computers operating equally as clients and service providers. See Kallioniemi
2001, 497.
550 Here, one major factor for improving the participation of small groups of individuals is
technology. Technology thus now makes possible the attainment of decentralization and
democratization. See Benkler 2000, 562.
551 See Lessig 2002a, 37.
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promote openness there is accordingly a need to construct sufficient network capacity as
a prerequisite for concrete access.547
3.3.2 Flexibility
Openness is crucial for free access to a network. The core of openness is the end-to-end
principle. The end-to-end principle has some further implications, in addition to being a
type of network, and some crucial consequences for innovation. This is basically due to the
structure of an end-to-end network, which makes the utilization of such a network easy and
open for everyone. In an open network, applications run on the edge and allow the network
itself to remain “stupid”. In keeping with the nature of openness, this makes the network
flexible. Innovators need only connect their computers to the network to let their
applications run.548
The end-to-end network is decentralized.549 Decentralization increases the flexibility
of a network. Moreover, the decentralized and hence flexible structure of an end-to-end
network enables maximal innovativeness.550 This is due to the non-optimization of any
particular existing application, which further makes the network open to innovation that
was not originally imagined. Access to any application actually makes the network flexible
for all innovations. Moreover, an end-to-end network is open and flexible with regard to
adopting novel applications not originally foreseen by their designers, whereby a flexible
network supports active innovativeness.551 Activity in innovativeness requires some rules
based on flexibility. These rules may be based on network code, which together with the
software and hardware implements the overall network architecture. The architecture then
further affects the freedom and control that are made possible by the general system. At
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552 See Lessig 2002a, 34 - 35.
553 State regulation that is based on laws enacted by the government is often called East Coast
Code. The term has its derivations naturally in the United States of America, where the
legislative actions are primarily carried out on the East Coast (Washington D.C.). The op-
posite is West Coast Code, which is the computer code implemented by the code writers
and mainly written on the West Coast of the United States (Silicon Valley, California). See
Lessig 1999, 53.
554 See Lessig 1999, 7.
555 See Lessig 1999, 53.
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the same time, the architecture affects the overall innovativeness that is generated on the
network.552 This is the most salient implication of flexibility.
The operational framework may well be constructed artificially, as it often is. The
structure of a network generally affects its flexibility. Flexibility and architecture have a
close connection in the case of digital content in particular, where there exists a rather
unique architectural construction. This architecture is based on two kinds of values taken
up in chapter one, the substantial ones and the structural ones, although they are
implemented somewhat differently. Substantial values are built on legislation and are aimed
at supporting the checks and limits of governmental power. As they constitute a part of
legislation, they also mean that the architecture is structured through legally binding rules.
These rules direct in words how to behave; i.e., the government uses laws and commands
to control behavior.553 Legislation may be called legislative code and it makes up the
substantial part of the legal architecture of the digital environment.
Legislation is a rather stable and static implementation form for behavioral rules. As
such it may even prevent the flexibility of networks. In contrast to legislative code, there
exists computer code, which may rather easily be constructed freely. Computer code is in fact
the other main regulative tool in the digital framework. In architectural design, computer
code has one quality which is superior: the code is exactly as it is built up. It thus has a
certain artificial manifestation of its own. It may contain some strong restrictions or freedoms
that are realized only by creating the code. The code is always a creation of its writer. On
the other hand, basic structural values are implemented through the computer code, with
those structural values mainly directed towards the structure of the government or other
governing body to ensure that the power of the governing body does not become too
strong.554 Computer code hence contains the instructions that are embedded in both
software and hardware and they together make the digital framework operate. In this sense
the code appears in its most modern sense.555
The flexibility of a network is implemented in computer code in two different ways.
Computer code is both active and performative in nature. The active role of computer code
hence distinguishes it from legislative code. Computer code differs from legislative code
in activity in that computer code is highly active. This means that the computer code
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556 The traditional tendency has been to keep computer code secret, or if it is revealed, this
occurs only under a patent or copyright protection. In this way the majority of ideas have
always become public and have been free for others to take. It is in the nature of limits
on patent rights and in the transparency of the market that innovators cannot keep their
good ideas to themselves. Some protection is granted for ideas and some more for ex-
pression, but this protection is always incomplete. Perfect control is never the aim of any
legal system. Ideas can therefore always be used by others. See Lessig 2002a, 71.
557 For example, the code of a Web page on the Internet is primarily written in the HTM
language, which means that the source code of every page can be revealed in order to see
how it has been structured. See Lessig 2002a, 57.
558 Using computer code for power in the market is mainly based on the exclusivity of the
code. However, instead of keeping the code exclusive it can obviously be revealed as free
code. The acquisition of public value is also part of the essence of the free code move-
ment. This occurs in two different ways. First, innovativeness is guaranteed and made
possible by implementing code that is common for everyone. This also means that the
right to improve and use it as a basis for other innovations is assured. Secondly, the stra-
tegic use of code is not possible. Open code can not be used strategically. See Lessig
2002a, 68.
559 Analog information is wavelike and imprecise, whereas digitized information is
represented in binary fashion as one of two numbers (one or zero). See Shapiro 1999, 16.
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functions in two different ways, which is indeed the unique characteristic of the code. First,
because of its fundamental nature, computer code can be openly examined and its content
and structure are freely available. The code is also capable of revealing the ideas embedded
in it and in this sense is always open. As it is a part of regulation, it also should be openly
examined. This is actually one natural consequence of the publicity of law, which includes
computer code. Because of its openness, computer code itself can be regulated: it is not
only a means of regulation but an object of regulation as well.556 For these reasons,
flexibility is introduced by the performative character of the code: computer code is
performative; it does what it says. Learning about the code is not just a matter of reading it,
but also of implementing it.557 This implies that computer code may be used as means of
implementing and enforcing certain patterns of behavior. Therefore, the performative
nature of computer code is the essence of it regulatory force.558
Flexibility also derives from information itself, in particular digitized information.
Specifically, flexibility is based on the simplicity of digitized information resulting from the
ways in which the information is stored, used, and manipulated.559 Flexibility in this respect
further implies that the network must be neutral in character. Neutrality is hence mainly
based on both the openness and flexibility of a network.
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560 In this sense, neutrality also includes technological neutrality. None of the communication
equipment may be favored at the expense of other. In this way neutrality also aintains
democracy. See Pöysti 2002, 47 - 48.
561 See Lessig 2002a, 37.
562 From the autonomy perspective, a system based on distributed capacity is preferable to a
system where control is concentrated. It is no matter whether this control is in the hands
of a governmental or non-governmental organization. See Benkler 2002, 292.
563 A computer network that is based on service providers as information transmitters is
more effective in controlling information. This is an advantage especially for copyright
owners. See Kallioniemi 2001, 498.
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3.3.3 Neutrality
Flexibility in the design of a network ensures that operations may be kept as accessible as
possible. As such flexibility is essentially fixed to the structural design of networks, with the
contextual design realized through some other features. One of these is neutrality, which is
mainly aimed at increasing innovativeness. Innovativeness is ensured by the neutrality of
the end-to-end network. In this design, the end-to-end principle clearly affects the
neutrality of the platform in the sense that the network owner cannot discriminate against
new innovations and a new innovator’s design.560 The influence is thus contextual. All the
packets flowing through a network are treated equally. If a new application threatens a
dominant one, there is nothing the network owner can do about it. The network will
remain neutral regardless of any of the applications on it.561
In this respect the neutrality of the network supports the sphere of commons.
Indeed, commons should be preferred over traditional controlled resources. Neutrality is
thus made part of commons through the actions of individuals as its essence. Therefore, the
information system actually supports the communicative ability of individuals. It is
decentralization that is the focus here. Decentralization is primarily carried out by
distributing the capacity to acquire, manipulate, and communicate information. The
decentralized system supports the actions of individuals in permitting them to act in a
crucial role when defining their understanding of the world and defining the possible
options for actions open to them. This distributed system also enables individuals to
communicate with others and to persuade others to accept their individual choices.562
The neutrality and decentralization of the communication network decreases
control.563  From the perspective of autonomy there is another consequence of how control
is arranged, besides the active role of individuals. The focus is not necessarily on how the
information environment is controlled. The environment can be regulated by administrative
processes, or rules of property, and it is less important which of these is the core of control.
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564 See Benkler 2002, 293.
565 This is generally referred as open architecture, an illustrative example of which is found in
the computer industry. For example, in the handheld computer market there exist vari-
ants of the open architecture strategies. The fundamental kernel of these strategies is to
make available at no charge and free for all comers the interface specifications for their
respective computer platforms. The motivation of the open-architecture strategies is al-
ways to allow platform developers to decentralize the innovation process. See Lichtman
2000, 616.
566  See Lessig 2002a, 40.
567 The circuit-switched model is totally centralized because of the essential role of telephone
wires. Further, the wires are often and usually owned by a state or some private organiza-
tions. The applications of the model and the decisions concerning its use are made by the
owner, traditionally by the state in the case of telephone wires. Along with the centraliza-
tion of wires this kind of control affects the technology making use of these wires. Cen-
tralization is thus used for protecting the existing models of doing business. At the same
time the centralized communication monopoly affects innovations, which must be as the
single organization owning the means of communication decides. The reason for control
is a desire by a monopoly to defend its superior position by excluding others. See Lessig
2002a, 32 - 34.
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More essential is the effect on the pattern of distribution of the rules that govern
information production and exchange.564 In this sense the neutral architecture of a network
and innovativeness itself are bound together by the design of the network. A stupid
network would facilitate the greatest degree of innovation, whereas an intelligent network
would probably be optimized only for certain users. A stupid network is thus neutral. It is
based on the end-to-end principle and is thus structured to disable central control over how
the network develops,  and thus supports innovativeness.
On the other hand, innovators may develop and deploy new applications or content
without anyone else’s permission. Because of the end-to-end principle no one needs to
register an application before it will run, nor is permission required to use the bandwidth.565
The end-to-end principle thus in practice means that a network is designed to ensure that
it cannot decide which innovations will run.566 As such, the design of a network becomes
dynamic. Neutrality thus changes the role of activity and makes it even more operational and
thus more dynamic. The changing role of activity brings about development in the internal
structure of innovativeness. Networks become more decentralized.567
Dynamics constitute the essence of innovation, where wires are better utilized if the
architecture of the communication system enables the sharing of wires. This is exactly
where the centralized structure could be replaced by a decentralized one. At the same time,
a completely static structure would be replaced by a dynamic one. The focus is, again, on
the decentralization of the controlling power. The ownership of the information
infrastructure will affect the control. In particular, ownership affects the access granted to
that infrastructure. In such cases, centralization may even increase the power of the owner.
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568  See Benkler 2002, 293.
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The other threat to autonomy is the control over the information flows that may arise when
the infrastructure is privately owned. Decentralization may decrease this as well.568
3.4 Summary: The interplay of statics and dynamics
Commons are generally defined as resources that are available to all members of a society
to use and to take advantage of. Commons are preserved for the use of everyone, with this use
usually being free. The sphere of commons is mainly based on an altruistic view of society.
This in turn is fundamentally based on the functionality of society: in order to be
functional, society needs to cooperate and communicate and accordingly the pursuits of
individuals ought to serve the good of the overall community. Pursuit of the common good
is the most fundamental focus of the sphere of commons. In this respect, commons ought
to rely on fluent communication. This implies rather free utilization of commons. However,
the fluency of communication in favor of the common good ought to be achieved by
making the information flows as symmetric as possible. The symmetry of mutual
information supports the cooperation of several stakeholders in the sphere of commons.
Accordingly commons are crucially based on the coexistence of cooperating stakeholders
and on reconciling their mutual interests.
On the other hand, even within the scope of commons there exists always a need
to control resources to a certain degree. The control focuses on the essence of commons. The
sphere of commons is actually slightly dualistic in nature. It is defined as located between
totally free natural resources such as pure air and totally controlled resources such as
ordinary commercial goods. The need to control commons is clearly reflected in the
essence of ideas, which are the kernel of commons. The free flow of ideas is derived
directly from nature, where there are no boundaries to the spread of ideas or information.
While such free flow is the core of commons, it is nevertheless necessary to be able to
control commons to the extent that they are rivalrous. In this respect, rivalrousness requires
control to some degree of the scope of commons in order to organize their use. Not all
resources may be made commons but where this occurs it must always be justified at least
on two crucial grounds: which resources should be defined as commons and how common
use is to be organized. In other words, it not only the test of rivalrousness that determines
which resources are classified as commons; every bit as important is the question of how
beneficial the resources are to the community.
Society is based on communication and societal communication is further crucially
based on communicative signs. These signs and communication are both crucial for  societal
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life overall. Communication is mainly founded on language, which is further based on
communicative marks and signs. Communicative signs are never significant alone, but
always have a certain basis in the framework in which they are used. The meaning of signs
is based directly on the communication and the framework in which they are used. The
significance of language as the central means of communication is thus based on
relationships. It is only the relationship between a sign and its bearer that makes
communication understandable and significant. These societal relationships also always
involve power. All forms of power are in fact based more or less on signs and language. As
such they constitute part of a functional communicative framework where signs are not
only objects but also functions or processes. They are thus active creations which are
further related to other active creations in the course of societal communication.
Language has traditionally been defined as an instrument that is used by people for
communicating different messages to each other. Language operates as an intermediator
in that it is essentially based on its ability to create and define relations between people.
Language operates actively, interconnected to the functional interplay of human beings; it
is not a passive instrument but rather an active operator. As such language has the ability
to constitute networks, it being precisely the active role of language that provides the
driving force in that process. On the other hand, language is dependent on the framework
where it is expressed. In the digital framework information as a digital language consists of
bytes, much as traditional language consists of syllables. Bits make up the core of digitized
communication. Digitized language is rather flexible. The communicativeness of language
is even found in the kernel of computer code, which may be described as a type of
language. Source code contains instructions written by human beings for a computer.
Computers execute these instructions when they have been compiled into a low-level
language called object code. What makes these two codes of varied level interesting is their
mutual interaction: neither is able to operate alone. The human level and the computer level
create their own and special common functional and communicative positions where both
are equally essential.
Societal communication is also based on knowledge. Knowledge is often embedded
in language and is generally communicated using language. Knowledge is founded on the
creative character of ideas. It is thus ideas that allow knowledge to regenerate and increase. An
idea is defined precisely in terms of its creativity and communicativeness. The fundamental
communicativeness of ideas in society lies in their being creative. An idea cannot, however,
be creative alone without any connection to its surroundings. Ideas are generally always
presented as related to society and are thus often presented in an unprocessed form as
subjective images. Here, an image is a factor that connects knowledge and an idea and
contains a great amount of unprocessed knowledge, bringing a subjective view to the
concept of an idea. An image is thus defined as an aspect of knowledge. Knowledge, in
Society. Commons and collaboration
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turn, may be  defined in different forms, i.e., as explicit knowledge and as tacit knowledge.
These two forms of knowledge are always closely bound together and generally occur
interconnectedly. The difference between them lies mainly in the invisibility of tacit
knowledge. Tacit knowledge is principally embedded in people’s minds and in patterns of
communicative behavior. It is precisely the interconnection of tacit knowledge and explicit
knowledge that constitutes the basis of communicativeness.
Communication also occurs in the form of money. A crucial part of societal
communication is founded on exchange, where money acts as a connecting factor between market
information and exchange.  Exchange is thus fundamentally based on the close connection
between human beings and nature as communicative actors. In this cooperation, exchange
constitutes multilateral relationships that employ money as a medium of payment. In the
market everything is valued and each item has a price. Valuation is one of the fundamental
factors driving exchange overall. Without any value on goods there would be no exchange.
The valuation of goods and exchange thus defines the mutual relations of goods.
Communication in a market is based precisely on these relations, with prices defining the
extent of exchange. The value of money itself is always the same, whereby money may be used
as a means of commensurability in the market. Money is the measure against which all other
exchangeable goods are appraised. It is precisely commensurability that acts as the
definitive factor in the communicativeness of money. In societal relations, money has at
least one further task: it serves as a store of value, and increases and facilitates exchange
crucially. Money makes it possible to store one’s income; it is not necessary to use all one’s
money at once.
The sphere of commons consists of certain socially crucial elements. At least
language, knowledge and money may be defined as such common interests. These interests
ought to be implemented dynamically and thus in interrelated communication. This
communication can be further realized by supporting dynamics on the basis of
innovativeness. In operations dynamics are reflected in activity in operations. Activity is thus
explicitly realized as different ways of using information rather than passively receiving or
transmitting it. Activity thus contains the core idea of innovativeness, i.e., keeping the
network as simple as possible and creating smart applications instead. Free access to a
network supports the sphere of commons and increases openness. A freely accessible
network is open to all users, with use of the network being equally available despite any
technological limitations. In the digital framework, openness may also be introduced
through computer code, which contributes to the interoperability of the network.
Interoperability is in fact one extension of openness and dynamics in the use of networks.
It strongly supports the essence of open networks by sustaining their networking character.
Commons are also based on flexibility. In an open network, applications run on the
edge and the network itself remains stupid. The network is open, and at the same time
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openness supports flexibility. Innovators thus need only connect their computers to the
network to run their applications. Open and flexible networks are decentralized, which
enables maximal innovativeness. This is precisely due to the non-optimization of any
particular existing application. The support for all the applications in a flexible network is
hence constructed artificially in that the structure of the network generally affects its
flexibility. Flexibility may be applied in two different forms of code: legislative code and
computer code. Computer code seems to be more artificial and thereby also the more
flexible of the two. The flexibility of computer code is realized in two different ways in that
computer code is both active as well as performative. This means that computer code is
operational and thus dynamic and in that it does what it says.
The scope of commons is supported through neutrality. Neutrality is mainly aimed
at increasing innovativeness in network applications by preventing the network owner from
discriminating against new innovations and new innovators’ designs. The influence of
neutrality is thus contextual and it is aimed directly at the realization of the commons.
Neutrality ensures that all the information flowing through a network is treated equally.
This is precisely due to the decreased amount of control. Neutrality and decentralization
of the communication network thus decrease control significantly. Innovators may develop
and deploy new applications or content without anyone else’s permission. The design of
networks as such becomes more dynamic. Neutrality thus changes the role of activity and
in fact makes it even more operational by rendering it more dynamic.
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569 See Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb: Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning. Yale University Press 1964.
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4 SUMMARY. ISSUES TO BE FOCUSED ON
The theoretical frame of the research is based on the conceptual frame elaborated by Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld.569 This consists of eight fundamental juridical conceptions that constitute
the foundation of legal relationships overall. In this research the application of Hohfeldian
theory, however, differs slightly from the customary interpretation. The traditional
interpretation is fundamentally based on examining the legal relationships and their mutual
coexistence. In this study, the principal aim is not to examine so much the legal
relationships as such but the increased dynamics of the legal framework overall. It is no
longer sufficient to be able to describe legal conceptions or the legal relations in their static
sense, or their non-functional status. Rather, there is a crucial need to examine and describe
the rebalanced status of statics and dynamics in the digital and networking framework. It
is incontestable that Hohfeldian theory may be utilized for examining the alterations in
overall functionality that are built into the concepts themselves and their interconnected
coexistence as the elementary components of the conceptual frame.
The first chapter has set the foundation for the study by analyzing and describing
the collaborative interests. This communication of interests is carried out on the basis of
different stakeholders, with the stakeholders being classified as the major actors in society.
Communication is carried out between three different interests, those of the state, the
market, and society. These are the stakeholders participating in the construction of the
modernizing scope of intellectual property rights. This threefold communicative pattern
is also the basis of the operativeness underlying business ideas, as business ideas are
likewise constituted of those interests.
Chapter two will present operational illustrations of the digital economy. These
illustrations focus on the interests of the state, market, and society as the essential
cooperating elements. It is these interests and their interplay that constitute the concept of
business. In order to offer a broader view of the problem,  these illustrations are classified
as names, ideas and money. All these functions are then further viewed as collaborative and
thus cooperative units of interests. The most paradigmatic illustrations of the digitized
economy are domain names, business ideas and venture capital. All these illustrations
embrace elements that are essential to the digital economy. As such they are rather
complicated and hard to fit into the traditional legal system. Functionality constitutes the
essence here.
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Chapter three concentrates on designing a rights governance architecture for the
innovative digitized framework. The explorative illustration to be introduced is based on
the cooperating dichotomies that are revealed through the Hohfeldian conceptual frame.
The elementary basis of the Hohfeldian concepts provides the basic elements of the
architectural interpretation. Only the balance of statics and dynamics is examined slightly
differently from the customary interpretation. The chapter also examines the difference
between statics and dynamics by comparing inventiveness and innovativeness as examples
of statics and dynamics.
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1 The right of self-determination and autonomy are both part of being a human being. See
Saarenpää 2002, 115. Self-determination and autonomy as illustrators of being human
being are included even in free speech. See Government Proposal HE 54/2002 vp., 6.
2 At the European level this was stated as early as in 1994. See COM (1994) 347 final.
According to that document the most keys to the information society are communications
systems combined with advanced information technologies. Networks (e.g., telephone,
satellites, cables) were considered to be removing the constraints of time and distance. On
the other hand, information networks carry information and basic services (e.g., electronic
mail, interactive video). These, further, allow people to use the networks and applications
(e.g., distance learning, teleworking) which offer dedicated solutions to user groups. See
Bangemann et al. 1994, 25.
3 Communication is often described as the cooperation of an economic and a governmental
system. See Heiskala 2000, 175.
4 See Dommering 1996, 15
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CHAPTER TWO.
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
1 PLUG IN AND GET RECOGNIZED
1.1 Communication as society
Society is communication. As a communicative complex, society is built on the mutual
coexistence of communicative units and cooperation among them.1 Society is accordingly
generally defined as mutually interactive behavior and may be described as a communicative
entirety where the cooperative units form the essence of the societal structure of the
whole world.2 Societal cooperation thus crucially consists of communication, whereby
societal control is likewise generally based on communication.3 There are two essential
elements that define the possible controlling devices. These devices are linked, on the
one hand, to the communicating parties and, on the other, to the conditions controlling
the overall communication structure. These elements may be termed the communication
parties and the communicative environment.4 Above all, communication is carried out by
different parties, and it always takes place in a certain framework or environment.
Society as communication is best clarified by examples. Trade constitutes the very
kernel of exchange and is accordingly the communicative core of society. People sell and
buy things. However, at the same time trade constitutes a form of communication.
Namely, the seller and the buyer, in addition to trading, also communicate with each
other. Trade is thus one of the basic communicational institutions in society. Another
good example is found in family life. The family is basically a communicative unit similar
to trade, although the communication in a family is not based on exchange or economic
wealth. Nevertheless, as institutions both trade and the family constitute some of the
Illustrations of the digital economy
5 The environment may also be described from the perspective of the transmission of
information, with the shift from paper to data also being significant and having an impact
on communication. See Blume 1989, 334.
6 This actually is closely linked to the conditions for how people communicate in society.
Basically, the communication of information, and especially improvements in this
communication, have been said to enhance the general welfare, for example, by increasing
the efficiency of markets or by increasing the rate of innovation and, thereby, growth. See
Benkler 2002, 296.
7 Communication in this respect is considered to be a system of activities that are used for
transmitting information from a sender to a receiver. Communication may be carried out
by using  information about law, whereby the communication process overall is also
considered a legal one. See Bing 1982, 15 - 16.
8 Communication is realized as point-to-point or face to face communication. Peer-to-peer
is also a communication form, although it may also be considered a means of distribution.
One of the greatest advantages of peer-to-peer applications is that they smoothly connect
one end-user to another. See Still 2002, 293. Distribution has traditionally been defined
as publication offering copies of a phonogram to the public in reasonable quantity. See
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organizations: Article 3 (d).
9 Personal communication is, further, supposed to be carried out secretly, or at least it is to
be secured. The most traditional form of point-to-point communication was couriers,
whose task was to deliver mail. See Kajser 1994, 42.
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fundamental cooperative relations of society. Conversely, there would exist no society
without trade or families as fundamental forms of communication.
Communication is bound to a certain environment. For example, an ordinary
discussion is carried out face to face, whereby the communication environment is bound
directly to personal contact among the participants. In the case of personal
communication, i.e discussion, the conversational prerequisites and the consequences of
the conversation are directly derived also from this personal aspect.5 The personal aspect of
the environment has, however, at least one even more crucial implication. It opens up
the possibility to use power to decide who controls the choice of subject, timetable and
the pace at which the information is presented.6 This deciding body may well be some
central institution, or it may be an individual. The status of the deciding body is rather
extensively dependent on the communication environment, however. The other essential
element of the communicative act derives from the communicative parties, i.e., the
parties entering into the communicative situation. These communicative situations ought
to have at least two actors in order to constitute any framework of conversation.
The communicative parties are generally referred to as the transmitter and the
receiver.7 In ordinary conversation, the parties are simply called speakers. Further, the
communication may be personal or impersonal.8 Personal communication is generally
point-to-point  communication, whose most important qualification is precisely the
personal relationship of transmitter and receiver.9 The conversing parties need to be
recognized, and the content of the message needs to be directed to someone. To this end it is
indeed essential to define the interfaces properly. These are defined, on the one hand, as
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10 See Kangas 1991, 4 - 5.
11 Identification is carried out by making oneself known as an identifiable person, i.e., an
entity that fulfills the identity conditions for a person that cannot be identified merely
through observation. Further identification is then carried out through a proper name. See
Habermas 1989, 104.
12 The changing communication environment was one of the main reasons for expanding
the name system towards using both a first name and family name. When one’s operative
area expanded, the familiar name known in smaller circles was no longer sufficient for
reliable identification. See Paikkala 2004, 123.
13 This concerns all the general communication networks. A general communication network is
the one that is offered to a number of users that is not restricted beforehand. Mobile
communication networks, fixed telephone networks, mass media networks, and the
Internet are defined to as general communication networks. See Helopuro - Perttula -
Ristola 2004, 14.
14 The further development of communication at the European Union level is carried out
within the scope of the three most recent and thus most important Green Papers: COM
(1994) 145 final “Towards the Personal Communication Environment: Green Paper on a
Common Approach in the Field of Mobile and Personal Communications in the
European Union” and COM (1990) 490 final “Towards Europe-wide Systems and
Services: Green Paper on a Common Approach in the Field of Satellite Communications
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between the communication itself and the communicative parties, and on the other,
between the communication and the communication environment. Nevertheless, the
parties themselves remain free to decide about the source of information, which is either
a central institution or an individual.
Societal communication is generally personal. In personal communication the
simplest interface is the name of a human being. Names have even been considered the core
of different branches of rights, and have served to bind these branches to each other.10
A person’s right to his or her own name is the very essence of his or her ability to act in
society in a proper way. A name thus seems to be part of the essence of societal
communication. Personal participation in societal communication is realized by making
oneself known as an identifiable person. In other words, by these means a person
indicates that he or she is able to participate in social interaction and to act
communicatively in a commonly accepted way.11 In the societal context, a name thus has
even several parallel purposes, each of which is important in its own way. This requires,
however, that the communicative environment remain change.12
The overall communicational structure affects the usefulness of names in
communication. The use of names as communicative devices arises from two distinct
developments: the evolution of the communicational environment, and second from the
transformation in the character of communication. However, the greatest pressure for
change in the communication environment originates in the emergence of global networks
as a communicative framework.13 More specifically, the pressure for change appears
earlier than in the communicative act itself. It emerges with the computing technology,
which has significantly facilitated both the processing and the use of information.14 On
Illustrations of the digital economy
in the European Community - Communication from the Commission.” The third Green
Paper concerns broadband communication and its development and is the most recent:
COM (2004) 369 final “Communication from the Commission to the Council. The
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions Connecting Europe at High Speed: National Broadband Strategies.”
15 Mass communication may be also defined as public communication. See Kajser 1994, 42.
16 This is precisely stated in the overall definition of context. Context includes that the
content is created in the sense of traditional production, but parallel to this content is also
created through receiving texts. See Lehtonen, M. 2000, 166 - 167.
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the other hand, the evolution seen in communication has arisen with the development of
the communicative structure itself. The structure has developed from a horizontal
communication pattern towards a vertical one. In this context it is the horizontal pattern
that is considered the traditional one, the prototype of the horizontal communication
structure being that between people. This is exactly why communication of this form is
characteristically personal. Communication has traditionally been carried out between
people and as such it is an instrument for realizing societal integration.
Communication is often vertical. Vertical communication is basically realized between
a person and the state. This might even be described as a form of public communication
that is usually carried out as of mass communication. Mass communication is rather
different from private one because of its generality. Public communication is usually
derived from the transmitter to a larger group of people, with the content of the message
generally the same all the time.15 In vertical communication both the structure and the
participants are both clearly totally different from each other. The audience and the
message are mutually rather unchangeable, which makes a vertical communication
structure more rigid than a horizontal one.
1.2 Names as communication
1.2.1 The communicative function of a name
Communication is generally functional, with the communicating parties constituting the
very core of the functional communication.16 As functional interaction, communication
can only occur when it is directed to someone. In this framework it is a name that actually
establishes the core of the communicative event. A name is also a crucial element of any
business method. A name is a binding and unifying component of that method, the
totality of its elements being captured in a single name. A good example is the Internet
store Amazon.com and its one-click patent. It is the one-click buying method that has
made Amazon.com well known inasmuch as it is the name “Amazon.com” that usually
is associated with the one-click method. The one-click method was actually used
commonly in network shopping even before Amazon.com patented it.
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17 A name as such is not sufficient, but may be used as a signpost by which communicators
can orient themselves in gathering the data that is sufficient for identification: date and
place of birth, family background, nationality, and religious affiliation. See Habermas
1989, 104 - 105.
18 See Kangas 1991, 33 - 34. According to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(CCPR), article 24 “... point (2) Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and
shall have a name”.  The article implies mandatory use of a name. In Finnish legislation
this right is written in an obligating form: “Everyone shall have a family name and a
forename”, (Names Act 1§). See also Kangas 1991, 34. The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights can also be found on the Internet:
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm
19 The provision of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), article 24, pont
(2) is designed to promote recognition of the child's legal personality, see Office of the
High Commissioner of the Human Rights: Rights of the child (Art. 24) : . 07/04/89.
CCPR General comment 17.(General Comments)
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CCPR+General+comment+17.En?Ope
nDocument
20 Confidentiality actually refers to the ability to be private or secret. Confidentiality is
further established in relation to a particular classification of data, and a corresponding set
of rules authorizing and limiting collection, dissemination, and storage of data. See Parker
1981, 40. On the other hand, confidentiality, integrity and availability are the three main
dimensions of information security. See Bishop 2003, 3.
21 See Parker 1981, 40. Confidentiality is clearly connected to the data itself and it stipulates
that the data and communication are to be kept confidential. See Grewlich 1999, 173.
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A name thus operates as an interface for communication overall, with the name
falling within the sphere of commons. A name may also be considered an instrument that
is used as the kernel of communication: it constitutes a set of rights in societal
communication. This foundational character is based on the significance of names as
allocators of rights.17 In establishing rights and duties, a name as a communicative
interface, is hence the essence of the functionality of the overall communication system.
A name itself has several different functions which are among its integral elements. A
name thus always includes some built-in functionality where functionality is an essential
part of a name as a communicational feature. Names often comprise different
modifications that define their content.
For a human being, a name is both a right and a duty.18 Having a name is actually
essential for anyone to become a member of a society and, on the other hand, to be able
to communicate with others in that society. Here, a name can be considered an aspect of
personality in the legal sense.19 The ability to communicate with one other is very
significant for human beings as a community. On the other hand, a name as a right and
duty ensures a certain confidentiality for the communication.20 Communication becomes
more efficient when it is possible for the parties to identify themselves and to trust each
other. Confidentiality is clearly further connected to the ability of communicators to
identify themselves reliably. Identification creates confidence. This is why confidentiality may
even sometimes be connected to privacy.21 Names are thus tools of confidential
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22 Kangas 1991, 1. The needs of communication were actually the main reason to introduce
the family name system as there was only a certain small number of first names available
and accordingly there arose the problem of several persons having the same name. These
family names were originally patronymics, i.e “belonging to someone”, generally the father.
See Paikkala 2004, 79.
23 Personality may be described as a certain way to realize communication as mere
descriptions of the private and the substantive. The individual was thereby considered
only as a certain scene where social relations were bound together. All the human actions
were thus carried out in the society and everything was thus under the influence of
society. See Simmel 1999, 16 - 17.
24 A clear distinction here is the medieval position of women being objects and a part of
their husbands’ property. The name of a woman was not officially used and if needed she
was referred to only anonymously or as the wife of the husband. See Mäkelä 1989, 28 -
29. It was also usual to refer to a woman by using her first name only. See Pylkkänen
1990, 55 - 56.
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communication: likewise they may be used for guiding the communication in the right
way.
Daily communication requires that different kinds of symbols be utilized in
communication. The personal name of a human being is an extremely useful symbol in this
communication.22 A name is considered a clear expression of personality and therefore
has some close connections to human personality.23 Personality as associated with names
arises from the function of a name as a means of communication. Acts and speech need to be
directed to someone and in this context a name makes an excellent connection between
the symbol and the individual behind the symbol. The functionality of a name is clearly
implied in its connective nature. A name is an implement to make individuals subjects,
which at the same time increases the confidentiality of communication. As subjects,
individuals are able to operate in society. In other words, only a subject can have a name.
Without a name, one remains a mere object.24 Further, the use of a name as the basis of
human communication occurs on two different, but closely connected, levels. In this
communication names constitute the most fundamental interface. Communication is
internal when it occurs among the members of a community. Communication mostly
consists of the ordinary collaboration among people living in a certain community or,
more extensively, in a certain society. Simply put, people live together: they speak,
discuss, and do business, and, at the same time, communicate with each other. In internal
communication, the pattern of mutual communication is horizontal.
The other level of societal communication is external and it is realized as vertical
communication that is still based on a certain internal functionality of its own. Vertical
communication is usually founded on the relationship between a state or other sovereign
maintaining the controlling power in a society and an individual. The essence of vertical
communication is control. Individuals are subordinated to this control, whereby the
communication between these two actors is always vertical. Vertical communication is
used for directing societal operations and it is also generally based on the names of
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25 It is essential for the functioning of society to be able to individualize persons. They must
be distinguished from each other. See Kangas 1991, 1.
26 See Kangas 1991, 1.
27 In addition to names, the other connecting factor is a common language. The
combination of name and language was used in history in Finland for changing the
position of the Finnish language and for raising the national identity. The names were
mainly Swedish or originally Swedish, and translating them in Finnish was one of the
political weapons of the nationalists. See Kangas 1991, 8 - 13.
28 In this sense, names may be defined as pure symbols used as a means of control. Pure
symbols are ones whose use does not constitute any physical threat (physical control) or
a claim on material rewards (material control). Symbolic control is based on normative
symbols, like prestige or esteem, or social symbols, like love and acceptance. The use of
symbols for control purposes is referred to as normative, normative-social, or social
power. See Etzioni 1964, 59.
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individuals.25 In this sense, a name, again, is a link between a human being and his or her
visible or even more; recognizable, position in society. On the other hand, the position
that is created through a name is really rather crucial for the governmental actions.
Namely, the governance of societal operations and actions is carried out by legal
regulation in which the legal norms have to be directed to someone, as must any
sanctions. For this reason the objects of regulation need to be identified and
individualized by name.26
There is a certain level of coexistence between the horizontal and the vertical forms of
communication. Both levels are equally useful, or even necessary, in a dynamically
functional community due to the continuous development of society. This development
in turn is a clear consequence of continuous societal communication. The overall
completeness of the community grows up from within, where it acquires its internal
order.. The order is further constituted of the communicative relations between the
members of society. In this communicative functionality, individual names and their
general use solidify the societal structure.27
1.2.2 The stabilizing function of a name
Societal stabilization is carried out likewise through the communication. In this respect,
names may be considered symbols that are utilized as a means for crating the societal
control.28 Stabilization is furthered  through names in their being commons. Today the
very foundation of individual names is based on privacy, with the name itself
emphasizing that privacy. This occurs by defining the scope of individuality, further clarified
through a name. Accordingly, individuality is more than merely being a human being; it
includes many values and impressions that are merely summarized in a name.
Furthermore, a name is used as a means to define the extent of individuality. A name and
the impressions embedded in it are utilized as inclusive elements. The information
Illustrations of the digital economy
29 Integrity has even been considered as one of the most fundamental elements of
cryptography in modern communication. Integrity is thus a crucial element of digital
signatures and its purpose is to verify whether data have been altered. The other two
crucial elements of modern communication are  authentication and confidentiality. See
Grewlich 1999, 173.
30 The stability of names is usually the basis of the name legislation and the totality of names
should be as stable and unchangeable as possible. This applies to the legal cultures in the
Nordic and the Roman-Germanic countries. See Kangas 1991, 2.
31 See Kangas 1991, 3.
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included in a person’s name, and the information excluded from it, in fact draw the very
fundamental boundaries of individuality. At the same time, individual information
constitutes a communicative element between society and the individual.
A name as a communicative societal element also creates integrity.29 Integrity is
further sustained through the stability of the system of names. Generally, to be able to
operate as an expression of individuality, a name needs to be rather stable. To ensure the
smoothness and success of communication, a name may thus not be continuously
altered. In a communicative society the very expression of individuality, as well as
integrity, is the fundamental stability of names, with stability emphasizing the control-
oriented aspect of a name. Names also have a central task in horizontal communication,
which further contributes to constancy. The stabilization of names enhances vertical
communication as well.30 The stability strengthening the society as a system of rules. In a
society, the existence of a human being as a member of the society is ensured by his or
her name, with behavioral rules directed to people through their names.
A stable system of names binds people to the community rules. If people were not
bound to these rules society itself would be rather unable to operate. The stability of
names accordingly stabilizes the overall functionality of society. Stabilization through the
system of names is achieved by legislation. The core of the name legislation is the
regulation giving and changing names (both first name and family name). This makes
privacy rather bureaucratic Then again, societal  stability explicitly requires the
bureaucratization of the system of names, with the stabilization at the same time
bureaucratizing privacy.31 Therefore, the system of names as a stabilizing factor changes
the mutual relationship between privacy and names. A name is basically one of the
fundamental concepts of privacy and as such includes a great deal of individual information
concerning the bearer of the name. Names also have their task as a means of societal
communication.
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32 The first law concerning names was enacted in 1921. See Government Proposal HE
1919/66: Family Name Act.
33 See Kangas 1991, 13 - 15.
34 A name may acquire value purely as a name. The individuality of a human being becomes
attached to his or her name, and a name can easily be considered as the focal element of
one’s personality. For this reason there is a register of protected names in Finland. The
register includes the old traditional names  used in Finland by some certain families. The
register and the names approved to become a part of it derive from the time before the
name legislation. See Kangas 1991, 19.
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1.2.3 The status-creating function of a name
Names stabilize society. Along with the stabilization a fixed system of names increases
communication in society. In addition to its specific function as a communicative
element, a name has also the task of creating certain societal statuses. The status function
of a name appears in two different aspects and likewise has had two different lines of
development. The first of these has its origins in the unregulated use of names. There was
no name legislation in the Finland until the beginning of the 1920s meaning that the use
of names was bound only to  community rules and the societal practices.32
Second line of development is connected to the value of a name. This value is
clearly reflected in the need for legal protection of a name. This was especially the case
when there did not exist any legislation on names. The need arose from the demands of
those people whose name included some extreme value for them, or whose name was
particularly significant in some other way. The value prompted the need to protect the
name in one way or another. Those name-holders were mainly noblemen or members of
the upper class and thus people who used their names in some symbolic meaning or as
an indicator of their societal position. In this way, the need to protect names legally arose
from the desire to protect a special position. Mere protection of the name as such was not the
primary focus of the legal protection provided.33
The protection of a name thus entailed the protection of a certain position; i.e the
protection of a name was acquired as a part of the need to protect a special status. The
connection between a name and protectable status was thus clear. A strong position was
easy to protect by protecting one’s name, which was a visible expression of this status. A
name was, moreover, a creation that was easy to protect by legal means. The
juridification of societal position as such would have been much more complicated. The
protection of a name and status together was actually quite versatile: the name and status
actually strengthened each other. The protected societal status gave rise to some serious
demands that even the name itself should be protected.34
A name as status approximates the value of a name. This is clearly manifested in the
protection of certain names and symbols (Finnish Name Act 12§). On this basis, a name
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35 Proposition on forename and family name legislation, OLJ 3/1989, 26 - 27.
36 Communication is based on mutual voluntary relationships between the parties involved.
Identification is essential to defining this relationship. See Votinius 2004, 62 - 63.
37 First, they acquire their identities as persons if they are identifiable as persons at all, and
if need be, as specific persons. As persons acquire their identities through linguistic
interaction, they satisfy their conditions of identity for persons, and the basic criteria of
identity for specific persons. Further, through this they understand that they are persons
who have learned to take part in social interactions. See Habermas 1989, 105.
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may attain some protection as an expression of status. This protected status may be
granted to a name in two different ways. Protection may, at the same time, also create
some value for a  name. Protection is granted either by establishing a name or by
applying to have a name entered into the Finnish Population Register as a specially protected
name.35 The official value of a name is explicitly established by these means. Here the
analogy between protecting a name and establishing a trademark is clear. Indeed, the
close similarity of a name and a trademark reinforces the role of a name as a value-
bearer. As a value-bearer, a name may acquire a protected or a protectable position of its
own. The difference between a name and a trademark lies in the close connection
between a name and its bearer. A name is not usually detached from its bearer, but rather
always continues to symbolize the subject overall. A name as such illustrates the subject’s
status.
1.2.4 The identification function of a name
Communication requires identification. Identification of the communicative actors is
essential for smooth communication overall.36 The special nature of identifying persons,
as opposed to objects, is explained by the fact that persons do not naturally fulfil the
conditions of identity. Unlike objects, people are not identifiable only by looking at
them.37 The identification of human beings is not possible without sufficient
information. The availability of information is thus crucial for successful communication.
The different functions of a name are also closely bound to each other. For example, the
identification function of a name is actually complemented by its status-creating
function. A name as a status thus has a great significance in identifying individuals,
whereby a name as a status is directly linked to a name as a means of identification. A
name in fact constitutes a versatile framework for assigning rights and duties in proper
societal communication. The core of this framework is based in the legal position of a name
as a right and a duty.
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38 See Kangas 1991, 34.
39 This double meaning often implies that such norms take on some special significance in
state governance. Right-duty norms imply that both the right and the duty are to be
realized through the same act. On the other hand, they are also bound to this act. See
Pöyhönen 2000, 74. An illustrative example of right-duty norms is the care of a child: the
care of a child is both a right and at the same time a duty for his or her parents. The
parents are thus allowed to take care of a child, and obliged to do so as well.
40 A name is usually given to a child quite shortly after his or her birth. For example, in
Finland the duty of giving a name is fulfilled by entering the child into the Finnish
Population Register. See OLJ 3/1989, 18 - 19.
41 There is, however, no obligation to use one’s name, e.g., one does not have to use one’s
name when communicating with others. Avoiding the use of a personal name may be
necessary, for example, to  protect one’s privacy. A name may even be replaced or
covered up by using a pseudonym or going about incognito. See Kangas 1991, 35.
42 This was a particular reason for changing the multiple-name system towards a single-
name one. A person’s  name in the single-name system was not, however, a family name
but rather a sobriquet (cognomen). See Paikkala 2004, 83.
43 The rules usually concern the use of language and how we describe and speak about
something in our mutual communication. Icons (sign resembling somehow its referent
object), indexes (causal relationship with its object) and symbols (referring to the object
according to agreed rules) are the basic concepts for defining signs according to their
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More specifically, a name as both a right and a duty serves as the key to identifying
a person. With regard to identification, the right to have a name is more like a duty.38 In
this sense, right and duty are connected together as a right-duty norm, meaning that a
certain norm has a dual meaning.39 Everyone must therefore have a name in order to
become identifiable in society. An individual’s being identified is rather essential for
vertical societal communication, i.e., for the state as a registering authority to be able to
identify him or her. This is due to the use of names as the basis of registration, which
reflects the verticality of the communication between individuals and the state. The
identifiability of a person is thus one of the main functions of a name.40 Identifiability as
the foundation of vertical communication may then be defined as an essential element of
the identification function of a name.41
Identification also creates integrity. Integration is a direct consequence of
identification as the basis of societal communication. It is easier for people to
communicate with each other when they can be reliably identified. Identifiability and
interactive communication then further integrate the actors rather substantially into
society itself. The identification function of a name is crucial in preserving the close
connection between a name and its bearer.42 A particular name, perhaps with certain
additional features, is always connected to a particular human being. In our daily life and
communication within family or friends this is exactly how names are used and how they
acquire their functionality. The identification function of a name is also closely
connected to its symbolic meaning, a symbol being a given image referring to its bearer in
accordance rules set down by the community.43
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referents. See Niiniluoto 1997, 23 - 24.
44 In this sense, friendship as one of the foundational elements of cooperative relationships
closely resembles the concept of informal organization, where friendship and social grouping
of the actors constitute a significant part of the organization. See Etzioni 1964, 20.
45 The balance is reached through the cooperation of both parties. This is basically due to
friendship as the basis of contractual relationships and loyalty. See Votinius 2004, 66 - 67.
46 These basic elements of friendship are further defined slightly more contextually. Mutual
respect consists of the mutual respect of friends that is shown for its own sake. Respect
is thus not valuable only, or at all, because of the expected result. Friends have value only
because of themselves. Openness has its further purpose in closeness and solidarity,
which further have their own effects on participation. See Votinius 2004, 58 - 59. In
addition to friendship, justice is closely defined through aesthetics, with form, style,
emotions and symbols constructing the overall scene. See Ljungström 1998, 199.
47 It is a rather general view, however, that friendship is complemented by friendship and
affection only. See Votinius 2004, 68.
48 Good practices are moreover defined as favorable practices, which are further defined within
a particular operational area. The more accurate definition of a good practice is thus
carried out by all the participating parties working together. Accordingly, the strongest
parties are allowed to dictate matters to the detriment of the weaker ones, without a
favorable practice becoming an unfavorable one. See Pöyhönen 2000, 97.
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The integrity and confidentiality of communication is also created through
cooperation, with coexistence being defined by social relationships. Names play an
essential role here. The exchanges of names as a part of confidential communication is
actually carried out in accordance with the idea of fundamental social friendship, which is
further needed for establishing cooperative relations.44 Social friendship is thus an
instrument for defining the further prerequisites for cooperation. For example, in
contractual relationships there exists a crucial need for distributive justice that underlies
the operational balance of both parties.45 For instance, loyalty has to be defined in advance
if it is to be incorporated it into operations later. Loyalty has to be defined contextually,
inasmuch as it is based largely on the mutual respect of friends, mutual openness, and
intermediating participation.46 On the other hand, loyalty is also based on fairness as the
basis of friendship.47 Loyalty is clearly illustrated, for example, when defining the limits
of cooperation. Common practices function as the fundamental criteria for the accepted
forms of behavior.48
1.3 Communication as verticality and control
In any society, people and the state must communicate with each other. This
communication is essentially vertical in form due to the superiority of state as a governing
power that exercises its power over the people as governed subjects. Verticality is thus
based on the need of a state to control the behavior of people, which is crucial for keeping
public order; verticality in communication is a clear manifestation of the sovereignty of
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49 Computerization may also be referred as automatization. Automatization and
informatization have a close connection but with informatization being only a minor
factor compared to automatization. See Seipel 2005, 21.
50 The new technology is actually changing the relationship of citizens to the state. The most
fundamental change is based precisely on automation and surveillance. See Shapiro 1999,
63.
51 One expediting factor here was the creation of electronic databases that made it possible
to collect data and apply specific computerized functions individually. These electronic
databases allow users to make their own tailor-made extractions from the mass of data
available in the collection as a whole. See Reichman - Samuelson 1997, 65.
52 This increased the need for data protection as computerization and the developing
information technology had made it even easier to collect, save, utilize, and distribute
personal data. See Government Proposal HE 49/1986 vp., 3 - 4.
53 Informatization and computerization together made it possible to create databases
containing masses of information. In this respect both of these lines of development are
useful in several other areas of information retrieval. See Blume 1989, 291 - 292.
54 The relationship of information and information technology is well described as the one
of bottle and view, according to Carl Shapiro and Hal R. Varian. The technology is the
package that allows the information to be delivered to the end consumer. On the other
hand, an information product would be of little value without a distribution technology.
See Shapiro - Varian 2003, 54.
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the state. This verticality underwent changes in the 1960s when two radical
developments emerged. These trends have been going on ever since, and at an increasing
rate.
The first of these developments is computerization.49 Computerization refers to the
range of possibilities offered by technology, especially computing technology. The most
significant factors here are dynamically developing information technology and
digitization.50 Both of these factors have their impact on communication, which in fact
has changed rather drastically; i.e., computerization made communication more technical.
In the early days of computerization it suddenly became possible to employ significantly
more information than before in a significantly shorter time than before.51 At the same
time, information processing increased and became more effective. Among other things,
computerization facilitated vertical communication as a means to control individuals as
societal operators.52
The other development l ine, informatizati on ,  has  occurred a longs ide
computerization.53 In fact it is closely connected to computerization and the development
of information technology and  is hence closely linked to the information processing.54
Informatization can be seen as a direct consequence of the increase in the amount of
information: it has became possible to utilize more information as the basis of
operations. On the other hand, information became more and more significant in order
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55 An informatized society is often called a network society. As such information is not a
new invention and the amount of information has not really increased. See Saarenpää
2000, 3 - 4.
56 This is due to the development of equipment and the ease in transmitting information.
Both of these developments make it seem and feel easy to receive and transmit
information. However, the information flood and information inflation make it rather
complicated to actually find the information that one needs. See Vakkari 2000, 12 - 13.
57 Information is power even traditionally. Government bureaucrats have treated
information as  a source of power and the job of the information manager was simply to
integrate information flowing upward from subordinates. See Nelson 1998, 341.
58 See Kangas 1991, 2.
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to function properly.55 It also became crucial to be able to classify and process
information, as it was increasingly fragmented. Information was dispersed and complicated
to collect and the amount of it was increasing. Informatization is thus only a result of the
increase in the possibilities to transmit and receive information.56 It became crucial to be
able to classify information that was retrieved and gathered, inasmuch as this affected
vertical communication; it became essential to collect and store more information about
people.
Both computerization and informatization crucially affect the relationship between
the state and people. The importance of computerization and informatization is actually
fundamentally based on the significance of information as a means to implement
governing power. Information is treated as a source of power.57 This in turn modifies
vertical communication, which becomes more and more aimed at controlling people in
society. Control becomes easy using information technology and the increased
possibilities it offers to gather information about people. On the other hand, this all
functions as a catalyst for the additional requirement of controlling and classifying the
carriers of information. In societal functions, the most important carriers are naturally
human beings and this is precisely where the control is to be focused.
1.3.1 The requirement of more effective control
The controlling power of the state is aimed at people. People are best identified, and
thereby controlled, through their names. Every person has a duty to have a name, which
makes it a useful instrument for identification, and effective control by the state. A name
is an excellent tool for controlling purposes because of its stability: it is not seen as
continuously changed.58 This is in fact the most crucial prerequisite for the constancy of
the whole name system. The justification is found in the system of names itself. First, the
identification function of name would be ruined without continuity. Second, the
stabilization function would be useless. This is how the constancy of names upholds the
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59 Today the registration of people is principally carried out on the basis their names. The
stability of the system is a great benefit here. It is possible to change one’s name but this
must be done through state registration authority. The procedure itself is also strictly
regulated. See Kangas 1991, 4.
60 This is actually the intersection of personality and personal information that is protected
though data protection. Data protection is complemented through privacy as one of its most
essential elements and constitutes a crucial part of the protection of privacy. See Saarenpää
1994, 157.
61 In Finland everyone must have a national identification number which consists of the
date of birth and a four-character identification string. The national identification number
is used as a reliable means of identifying people in public documents. See Blume et al.
2001, 41.
62 See Kangas 1991, 4.
63 See Varho 1993, 190.
64 The controlling function was one of the most fundamental tasks of the name legislation
in the beginning of the 20th century. One problem to solve was how to direct the
punishments to the right persons. For this, and to avoid punishing the wrong persons, the
need for reliable identification of a person was unquestioned. See Kangas 1991, 17 - 18.
151
stability of the controlling system. This is the essence of the vertical control of the state
to the extent that it draws on the use of a name as an identification tool.59
The basis of the controlling structure of the state lies in the close connection
between names and other identification tools. These identifiers are closely linked through the
personal dimension: names and other identifiers link the personality of a human being
and official identification instruments.60 With the official instruments of identification
becoming personalized in the process. In this respect, name legislation and the overall
legislation on combining names and the other instruments of identification are closely
linked. This means that names and national identification numbers, for example, are
connected, creating in practice a combination that includes a great amount of personal
information.61 The personal national identification number system links each individual
and his or her unique identification number.62
Individuals and the instruments of identification are thus connected. Linking
individuals and information concerning them requires some connective tool, a name
being an important example of such a tool. Identification of individuals ought to be
carried out on the basis of their personal data, for which their name and date of birth
provide a natural and sustainable basis. This is a good beginning, but not enough for
confident identification.63 The controlling function of a name needs more effective tools
when the control is necessary for stabilizing society overall. Integration may if necessary
be carried out through more effective control. The social law and order must be
stabilized as well, for which a secure and dependable system is needed. A name is a
perfect tool for these purposes, whereby a control becomes one of the key aspects of
name legislation.64
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65 Electronic identification acquired more significance with the emergence of electronic
administration and electronic transactions. Electronic transactions are the distant services
offered at the request of the client and generally for payment. This service is even defined
as the one of essential services the information society. See Government Proposal HE
194/2001 vp., 25 - 26. In the networked society the identity card will change from being
mere a printed card to become an electronic product. See Blume et al. 2001, 41.
66 The fundamental purpose of electronic communication is to improve access to, and the
quality of, certain administrative services, as well as the customer orientation in
administration. Effectiveness is also one of the crucial aims of administration. See
Korhonen 2003, 350 - 351.
67 This is realized though the digital identity card, which, in addition to enabling others to
identify the cardholder, enables the cardholder to use a digital signature. See Blume et al.
2001, 41. The main advantages of an electronic identification card are authenticity,
integrity, confidentiality and security in communication. See NOU 2001:10, 27.
68 See HaVM 2/1999 vp., 2. The electronic identification card is supposed to increase
security in communication between the public administration and citizens. See
Pöysti1999c, 1113 - 1114.
69 The customers in electronic transactions are also found from the private sector and more
precisely from electronic commerce. See Government Proposal HE 194/2001 vp., 25. The
smoothness of electronic transactions is also regulated at the EU level, see Directive
2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects
of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market. This directive
is also called the Directive on Electronic Commerce. Closely related to this is Directive
1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 December 1999 on a community
framework for electronic signatures.
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The controlling function of the state may be strengthened through the emerging
electronic identification.65 Electronic identification is realized technically by connecting the
name and the personality of a human being. This is carried out more effectively than by
using only specific person identification numbers, although the identification number is
a solid basis for this.66 Identification is carried out by using an electronic identification card,
which is to be used when communicating with the public administration. Reliable
identification is one of the main prerequisites for the functionality of electronic
communication in public administration, and an electronic identification card makes it
possible to operate confidentially on open communication networks.67 Confidential
identification instruments in electronic administration are essentially integrated to ensure
a client’s identity.68 A document and a person have to be connected to each other in a
reliable way. The client in electronic administration is actually rather different from the
traditional physical client and identification be carried out using reliable instruments.69
1.3.2 The national identification number as a personal identifier
The system of names is characteristically rather stable and this stability contributes to
stabilizing society. The stability of the system makes a name a useful tool for
Plug in and get recognized
70 This naturally depends on the circumstances where the identification tools are to be used.
Other significant means of identification comparable to name are, for example, bar codes
for commodities, and the ISBN and ISSN numbers for books. On bar codes, see Sakki
1999, 193 - 194. On ISBN and ISSN numbers, see deKroon 2000, 230.
71 Identification may be carried out as physical or as electronic identification. Electronic
identification is different form the physical identification of a person. Physical
identification is generally carried out by looking at a person and identifying him or her
through personal features. Electronic identification is realized through certain universal
instruments of identification. See Pöysti 1999b, 1113.
72 Confidentiality ought to be preserved for all forms of communication and thus it should
be constructed as technology neutrally as possible. See Government Proposal HE 85/1998 vp., 4.
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identification.70 The overall exploitation of names is, however, rather considerably
restricted and the system is under pressure to be slightly modified. The pressure arises
from two main arguments. The first has to do with the framework in which the identifiers are
to be used. These circumstances actually define rather extensively how reliably the actors
are to be identified, and what kind of identification tools are to be used. The operational
framework may enable mutual personal communication. Communication carried out face
to face or point to point makes it easy for the actors involved to identify each other, and
there is no need for more complicated identification systems.71 The name and the
communicational framework can be said to function in consensual interaction.
The other factor causing pressure to change is the communication structure itself. The
pressure arises from within the structure as a cooperative arrangement. The smooth and
unfailing functionality of the system is decisive for the means of identification. To be
able to function properly, the communication structure must tie into the reciprocal use
of names. This reciprocity constitutes one of the most important focuses of the system
of names. These focuses are the ability to identify the actors and to direct speech (the
communicative act) at someone. These factors are crucial to the overall reliability of the
system.72 In fact, they are foundational for both horizontal (face to face, point to point),
and vertical (state to human, sovereign to subject) communication. These two forms of
communication differ substantially in character. The most essential difference, including
the similarity of means of identification, is the point which the pressure of change
affects. This point is found in the need for confidential identification and control. The
intersection also lies in these factors because of the character of the communication
between the state and the people.
The communication between the state and the people is vertical, the state basically
setting rules and individuals subject to that control. The reliability of identification and
the effectiveness of control are based on personal data as a means to effect vertical
communication. Personal data is thus needed for purposes of the vertical state
administration, where the main communication needs are identifying people and
controlling them. For these purposes the state administration has replaced the name as
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73 The basis of the national identification number was the employee pension scheme back
in the 1960s, where it was essential to be able to distinguish people in order to calculate
the amount of retirement benefits for everyone without mistakes. See Varho 1993, 189 -
190.
74 See Kajser 1994, 42.
75 The history of the basic social register goes back to the 1960s. Before this there were no
social registers and accordingly no need for more accurate identification of people. See
Korhonen 1999, 219.
76 Computerization and hence more effective ways to gather personal information have also
their perils. The most threatening of them comes from the power of the sovereign, as it
has become possible to link power and surveillance closely. See Mitchell 1995, 156.
77 Computerization and more organized and effective ways to collect, register and use
information concerning individuals have been defined as one main reason for establishing
basic registers. See Korhonen 1999, 219.
78 See Paikkala 2004, 86.
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an identifier by the personal national identification number.73 The personality of a name
was replaced by more public means of identification. Societal measures are thus mainly
directed to a large group of people and in this sense vertical communication is public.74
In the context of vertical communication, it is informatization that ultimately gives rise
to the requirements of modify the communicational environment. This situation stems
from the amount of information and the difficulties in managing the information on people.
In any event the system should be confidential and secure, fulfilling the compelling need
to identify the actors especially when the communication is vertical and public. These
requirements for confidential identification give rise to further demands for a more
effective way to individualize people. This concerns state governance especially, where
there is an ever greater need to register people. This registration is designed to create basic
state registers where every citizen would be registered and could  later be identified.75
An other influential factor has been computerization. Computers make it easy to
collect information and use it.76 Difficulties had arisen difficulties in controlling and
managing the information collected.77 Name turned out to be a rather impractical
identifiers when there was increasing need to control a large amount of information and
registration required a more reliable way to individualize people. A name is rather
common and as such a comprehensive means of identification, but it was no longer a
sufficient tool for the new requirements of identification precisely because of this
feature. Clearly there will always be several people who have exactly the same name.
Confidential identification would obviously be disrupted if names were the only means
of identification.78
Using names as the only communicative tool thus faces several pressures for
change. Names have been modified tools for vertical communication by attaching to
them some additional features. In addition to a name, the identification of a person could
thus be based on some other personal data, basically the date of birth. A name as an
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79 The personal identification number is also logistical tool and as such is called an
“informative code”. This code includes a message in that it tells something about the object
it is linked to. The personal identification number in Finland includes information on the
date of birth and the sex of its holder. See Sakki 1999, 193.
80 See Varho 1993, 189 - 190.
81 The aim of this coherent register was to make the services of state administration easier
and more flexible. All the information was to be collected in the same register, whereby
there would no longer be any need to retrieve personal data from several different
sources. There was, however, a threat of increasingly effective supervision. See Häggman
1997, 149.
82 The registered public information is often collected together and these collections are
then called public information resources. See Korhonen 2002, 10.
83 It has been predicted that communication between the citizens and the state is
increasingly carried out in the form of electronic administration. Moreover, the public
authorities maintain Web sites on open networks to provide information to citizens. See
SOU 1999:12, 17.
84 See Korhonen 2002, 372 - 373.
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identification instrument was thus complemented by adding to it a certain combination
of personal data. This combination consisted of an individual’s name and date of birth
together and was then used in state administration as a tool to identify people.79 This was
still not accurate enough for the needs of state governance, however.80 The principal
need was to be able to identify a person reliably and to be able to distinguish persons
having exactly the same name and date of birth. In Finland, for example, the
fundamental aim of  government was to collect the personal information about the entire
population. As the basis of this information, the state authorities established registers, in
which everyone was recorded using a particular number.81 Information about all those
identified, and thus numbered, was then collected and place into certain basic registers
maintained by the  state.82
1.3.3 Transactions in the network society
Communication between people and the state is vertical also in the network society.83 In
this communication in the age of digitized registers the identification of people is more
effective than before. Identification now occurs through an electronic identification card, with
identification mainly based on certain identifiers in addition to the name and date of
birth.84 As an instrument of identification the card ensures vertical communication even
more effectively than before. The electronic identification card makes it possible for
citizens to communicate electronically and on open networks with the public
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85 Communication between customers and public administration is consequently increasing.
Identification in these networks is carried out by using technology that ensures the
confidentiality of this communication. This technology ensures that an electronic
document may be signed and the authentication of this document may be ensured. If
needed, the message may also be secured. See Government Proposal HE 18/1999 vp., 4.
86 See Government Proposal HE 194/2001 vp., 25.
87 The electronic identification card includes a technical component designed exactly for
communication requiring exceptionally confidential identification of a customer when
communicating over open networks or the reliable securing of a document and an
electronic signature.  See Government Proposal HE 18/1999 vp., 10.
88 Detaching the name from an identity clearly illustrates the colonization of the lifeworld in the
Habermasian sense. Colonization of the lifeworld occurs when the systemic mechanisms
of the economy and administration, i.e., money and power, filter into the lifeworld as
well. The lifeworld becomes colonized when money and power replace the integrating
solidarity and lingual communication in ordinary social life. See Tuori 2000, 91.
89 Electronic identification cards, as well as electronic identity, involve problems, one of the
most serious of which is connected to data protection. Electronic communication always
leaves a mark, making it always possible to determine the identity of the communicating
party. See NOU 2001:10, 52.
90 See Government Proposal HE 18/1999 vp., 4.
91 Electronic vertical communication as between public administration and customers is
strengthened, for example, by approving electronic signatures as being as valid as personal
signatures. See Government Proposal HE 153/1999 vp., 16.
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authorities.85 On the other hand, vertical communication somewhat different on open
networks. The communication is more likely to take the form of transactions, with the
transactions of the network society typically being ones carried out at the request of the client
and usually for payment. 86 Verticality has thus evolved towards horizontal
communication and cooperation in communication.
Vertical communication in the network society is strengthened through electronic
identity. The electronic identification card is designed precisely for confidential communication
between the clients and the public authorities.87 The card  is thus an instrument
particularly of the digital network society and its vertical communication. Confidential
communication is crucial in authenticating the content of a message and its sender on
open networks. Electronic identity has, however, brought with it changes in the
significance of names in communication. Names have become detached from the identity
itself.88 On digital communication networks, a name and an identity are hence rather
separate attributes. This is actually the only way to implement communication between
people and the state in the digital framework, where it is not even intentioned that the
communicating parties would have a personal contact.89
Of course, vertical communication that is based on the electronic identification and
open networks should also ought to be as confidential as possible, with the identity of
the operators being unchangeable and stable.90 Electronic communication may be
employed as an alternative to traditional forms of communication.91 Electronic
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92 The improvement of electronic administration with respect to interactive communication
between public administration and its clients is realized precisely through constructing
communication networks. This is carried out as technology neutrally as possible. See
HaVM 10/1999 vp., 2 - 3.
93 See SOU 1998:36, 5.
94 See Government Proposal HE 197/2001 vp. One of the specific aims, for example in
Finland, is to increase the use of digital signatures. This would, in turn, improve the
supply of the products and services based on electronic signatures. One significant aim
would also be to increase the data protection and the information security of electronic
commerce and electronic administration. See Government Proposal HE 197/2001 vp., 18. A
similar trend is seen at the level of the European Union. See COM (1997) 503 final
“Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
Economic and social committee and the Committee of the Regions - Ensuring security
and trust in electronic communication - Towards a European framework for digital
signatures and encryption.”
95 See SOU 1998:36, 7. At the European level the security of communication through open
networks is ensured by Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic
Communications Sector, especially in article 4.
96 Secure communication through secured identification is significant in vertical
communication. It is at least as essential in electronic commerce See Laine 2001,196.
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identification makes the communication on open networks much easier and smoother,
whereby interactivity can be improved in vertical communication. Verticality can hence
become more flexible.92 In this way, electronic communication networks change the
character of vertical communication: verticality becomes more interactive, but its
controlling function decreases at the same time.
Electronic identification is significant for the realization of the fundamental
network-based economy.93 The presupposition here is that the overall operations of the
communication network are to be economized and filtered through the society. The
foundations of the networking society are based on electronic signatures and security in
using them.94 This is also termed secured identity.95 In other words identification ought, to
be implemented in a secure way and by secure means. This security consideration
underlies the detachment of names from other means of identification. A secured identity
is essential in public administration and in vertical communication as well.96
Identification is thus essential for the fluent communication and networking.
1.4 Names in business communication
1.4.1 Signs in business and the functions of trademarks
Business is communication, too, and names and symbols used for the purposes of business
communication. On the other hand, the use of names and symbols in business corresponds
Illustrations of the digital economy
97 The symbolic value of a name has even more importance in communication. It is also
generally utilized, for example, in creating brands. See Aaker 1996, 84 - 85.
98 The origins of modern intellectual property rights actually lie in mercantilism and its
system of privileges. In that era privileges were granted to merchants to ensure the
exclusive right to do business. See Bruun 1983, 154.
99 Beside of labeling the products and services the enterprise may be identified and
symbolized through a commercial name. The commercial name identifies the enterprise,
whereas the trademark refers to products and services. The commercial name and/or the
dominant of it can be also used to identify the products, for example, Paulig. The
dominant does not, however, individualize the products if the company produces or
markets different products or services under the same commercial name. The commercial
name can be nevertheless used as a part of a trademark. See Salmi et al. 2001, 3 - 4.
100 A trademark is different from traditional intellectual property rights, as trademark
protection is more likely to be aimed at protecting the market position and the
communicative relationship of clients and an enterprise. A trademark may, however, get
some value of its own through its character as a creative work. In order to get this
protection, a trademark should be original. See Schovsbo 2000, 10.
101 A trademark was originally used as an indicator of origin. Different marks as illustrators of
origin have a long history. Traditionally, stock workers used to mark the cattle by burning
brands and china was generally marked by engraved imperial symbols. Further, it was
possible to clarify the origins of bricks, the owner of the estate of production, and the
producer by examining the hallmarks of the bricks. Marks were likewise used for
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exactly to the general use of names and symbols. The most significant function of both
is to symbolize and to identify.97 In the market, the symbolizing function is further bound to
modern business where, in order to create a properly functional market, products and
services need to be marked somehow. Proper signing makes it much easier to connect
products and services and the producer. In this respect trademarks are engines of trade,
where they serve as information and advertising channels.98
Consumers need information about quality, prices and the other attributes of
products and services. The freedom of the market requires that consumers be able to
compare products and thus make their decisions freely. This is where product symbolization
is needed. Symbolization is carried out through naming. When referring to a product or
service, a name is used as trademark. The sign used to individualize a product is often
also called a product mark.99 A trademark, however, differs slightly from an ordinary
proper name. When a proper name is general, a trademark is granted only to the
entrepreneur and as such is an identification tool being used for market purposes only.100
Trademarks are basically signs used by companies to distinguish their products and
services from similar ones produced by other companies. Here, symbolization of
products in the market closely resemble commodification in that both are connected to
making products marketable. To be distinguishable enough a mark must somehow be
individual. The general words of the standard language are seldom distinguishable
enough for these purposes, for which reason trademarks are used to identify the
existence of a product when those trademarks interact closely with society overall.101
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identifying houses through the occupation or business. See Rissanen 1978, 129 - 130.
Moreover, all handcrafts had to be marked by a trading stamp of the manufacturer (in
Finland: Ammattiasetus 1720). Nobody was allowed to sell anything manufactured in the
country without a stamp and in 1879 a trademark became an exclusive right of a
tradesperson (in Finland: Elinkeinoasetus 1879). See Committee Report KM 1945:2, 23.
102 The use of a trademark by its possessor is the core of it. All the functions of trademark
(competition, advertising, distinction, and guarantee) are basically bound to this core
element. See Drockila 1986, 33.
103 A trademark may get some elements of originality and as such it may be protected
through  copyright. The protection may even be doubled if the symbol can get protection
through both trademark and through copyright. See Schovsbo 2000, 12.
104 The protection is especially bound to the connection between the enterprise and its
customers. The state of affairs might be also otherwise: the customers do not belong to
anybody. In this sense the relationship is continuously dynamic and variable. See
Koktvedgaard - Levin 2004, 339.
105 A trademark can be expressed differently. The basic prerequisite to get a trademark
registered is that it can be expressed graphically. A trademark can be a figure, a word, or
a slogan. Further, it can consist of a few letters or numbers, as well. Also a special
appearance of a product can be registered as a trademark. Salmi et al. 2001, 2 - 3. Unusual
marks may cause some problems here, whereby it may be possible to protect certain
elementary aspects of a product through trademark. These elements are not trademarks as such
but rather qualities of a product. For example, a scent may get trademark protection if it
is clearly applies to the product. The scent of a perfume cannot, however, constitute a
trademark. See Palm 2002, 65 - 66.
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Some trademarks may nevertheless be expanded to be used as general words. A
good example is Coca-Cola. In creating a successful and a worldwide trademark, Coca-
Cola has expanded the meaning of the word “cola” to mean all the soft drinks similar to
Coca-Cola, i.e., coke. Society has thus created a new word. In this respect a trademark
functions as an interactive tool. Interaction has two closely related but still rather distinctive
elements. First, the owner of a trademark uses his or her trademark in a certain way. This
use then creates a certain reputation for the trademark itself.102 In this way, the trademark
and its use become closely linked together. A single trademark does not have very much
(market) value as such. The value thus needs to be vested in the trademark. A trademark
gets certain form of legal protection, however, and this is actually one important implication
of it. Protection is bound to the right to trademark itself, with the trademark then
included in the intellectual property of a company. However, protecting a trademark
through intellectual property rights is somewhat extraordinary measure. A trademark is
essentially a symbol and its value does not derive from any creative contribution as
such.103 Rather, a trademark only provides a tie between an enterprise and its customer
but without any intellectual dimension involved. It is this connection that is protected by
a trademark.104
A trademark is considered one of the basic elements of free competition and the
free market economy, meaning that it is strictly bound to the environment in which it is
exploited.105 When detached from its characteristic environment, a trademark may rather
Illustrations of the digital economy
106 See Koktvedgaard - Levin 2004, 339.
107 A clientele may also be defined as the customers who are the target of particular
segmented marketing. See Drockila 1986, 30 - 32.
108 A proper trademark is thus not a public good. It has social value only when it is used to
designate a single brand. See Landes - Posner 1987, 274.
109 See Mansala 1994, 22.
110 This requires that entrepreneurs be independent. They must be able to operate under
their own name and on their own behalf. They must also be able to take responsibility for
their operations. See Drockila 1986, 19.
160
easily lose a great deal of its value or even become totally valueless.106 This contingency
is closely related to the ability of a sign to distinguish and individualize different products
or enterprises. Completely identical signs may be misleading. For this reason the
implication here is that trademarks need to be targeted to certain consumers or a certain
audience, with this audience constituting the environment in which the trademark
operates.107 This links a trademark and its use rather closely together.
A trademark is thus highly dependent on the market as its defining context.108 This
close connection between the market and a trademark derives from the communication
between the market and its consumers. This in turn requires close cooperation.
Consumers use information concerning the features of products and freedom of the
market requires that consumers be able to make their buying decisions freely after having
compared the relevant features. Production and marketing have traditionally been the
essential elements in granting exclusive rights, which here means a trademark, or labeling
products. Despite this long history trademarks have only acquired real usefulness in the
age of mass production. The reason is obvious: the possibility arose to mass produce
goods and this naturally prompted a need to individualize those products. Delivery, too,
became much easier, which for its part speeded up labeling.109
The market use of a trademark is the essence of its exploitation. The actual
meaning of a trademark, however, still lies in names as symbols. Associating symbols
with products is a rather useful means of differentiating them. Conversely, without
trademarks there would not be any distinguishing tools for products. All articles would
be part of the same, nameless mass. This places some significance on trademarks in the
overall communicational pattern: they have advantages for both enterprises and
consumers. Enterprises are able to mark their products and in this way distinguish them
from the mass of like goods.110 Consumers, for their part, are able to get information
about the enterprise behind a product as well as the quality of the product. Without any
trademarks, there would be no names on products. For example, all tea would be just tea,
or all cars just cars. Trademarks thus make the communication possible.
A trademark is not only a tool of the market but something of significance to
consumers as well. Significance is implemented through proper market actions, or at least
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111 The guaranty function is closely bound to both the distinguishability and originality of
products. A trademark does not, however, require that the quality of all the products
under the mark must be equal. It is more bound to the expectations of consumers and
their conceptions. See Salmi et al. 2001, 7. A trademark does not even legally have to
guarantee stable quality. See Committee Report KM 1981:43, 50 - 51.
112 Here, a trademark makes it possible for a consumer to connect the products or services
to the expectations they have of the quality of a certain product, while the guaranty
function enables the connection between the good reputation of an entrepreneur and a
trademark. See Tiili 1972, 234.
113 The emergence of trademarks is thus closely bound to the beginning of mass production.
Increased production brought with it a need to differentiate products. The main purpose
was to be able to distinguish products for advertising. Associating certain marks with
goods was the main tool for this. See Rissanen 1978, 130.
114 The distinctive function is generally based on two complementary aspects. First, a mark
is used for making the products distinguishable from all other products. Second, the
goods that carry a certain mark have some common qualities, for example, the same
origin and/or equal quality. See Tiili 1972, 232.
115 According to this, a trademark can be called a sign of the factory (marque de fabrique) when
it is used by the producer and a sign of commerce (marque de commerce) when the marketer
is using it. See Hakulinen 1954, 11.
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the possibility to operate properly in the market. Using a name as an instrument
reinforces guaranty function of trademark, which is closely connected to the quality of
products or services.111 At issue here is the consumers’ ability to choose between
different competing products in the market: a displeased consumer will not buy the same
product again, whereas a satisfied consumer will do precisely that.112
1.4.2 A trademark as a distinctive instrument
The identifying function of a name is also found in the domain of trademarks. In
business it is utterly essential to be able to  distinguish oneself from the other market actors,
or competitors. This implies identification, with a name generally used for this purpose.
In business, a name is utilized in the form of a trademark, a trademark being in the main
a commercial symbol of a product.113 A trademark is used by an enterprise for its business
activity and the most fundamental purpose of a trademark is to be able to make the
products of one enterprise distinguishable from the products of others.114 The basic
relationship between an enterprise and its customers is thereby the basis of all the
different functions of a trademark. In practice a trademark is a tool of the market and as
such a means to identify a certain enterprise or its products in that it connects a certain
product and a source to each other.115
The distinctive function of a trademark is crucial in two different senses, both of
which are connected with identification. In business it is often essential for consumers to
differentiate certain products from the enormous  mass of others. This actually makes trade
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116 A trademark may be divided into certain components. The negative component indicates that
goods under a certain particular trademark are different from all other products. The
positive component  implies that products under a certain trademark have similar and often
stable good qualities. See Drockila 1986, 42 - 43.
117 See Hakulinen 1954, 12.
118 See Hakulinen 1954, 12. Connecting a trademark and positive consuming experiences
creates value. This is carried out over a somewhat longer time period, with the goodwill
value continuously increasing. See Tuominen 2001, 107.
119 The meaningfulness of trademarks is closely bound to functionality. When a trademark
becomes generic, it tends to become functional at the same time. A functional feature
cannot, on the other hand, be trademarked and a trademarked feature loses trademark
protection when it becomes functional. For example, the maker of a tire could not
trademark its circular shape but could trademark an irregularly shaped hubcap. See
Landes - Posner 1987, 297.
120 See Salmi et al. 2001, 5.
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easier and more relevant for both market parties. On the other hand, it is essential to be
able to recognize a certain desirable product. This then ensures consumption and trade.116
Nevertheless, making products identifiable is nevertheless not the main purpose of a
trademark. A trademark is actually designed to cluster all the products or services that
derive from the same sources; i.e., all the products having the same trademark derive
from the same source. In this sense, a trademark is an anonymous and nameless tool of
identification.117
The main purpose of a trademark, however, is to operate as a connecting instrument
between an enterprise and its product. In the market there is no need to have oneself
identified as a producer. The most principal purpose is to make consumers notice a
product and to buy and consume it.118 This need to be noticed is thus crucial for market
purposes. In the market it is essential that a trademark be able to distinguish one’s
products from those of other businesses. This is mainly carried out by having products
identified and noticed. Consumers then complete the process when they connect a
trademark and familiar or unknown products to each other. This connection constitutes
one of the fundamental forms of business communication, the essence of which is
precisely creating meanings for things.119 Names in business are no longer mere acts or pure
signs. The unified significance of name and image is the most important dimension here.
The distinguishing function has become the most important role of trademarks, with this
function linked squarely to communicativeness in business.120
A trademark is not only an instrument of identification, although its ability to
distinguish products is rather essential. The significance of trademarks for market
purposes is, however, one of their essential roles. The market needs trademarks when
those are used and understood as symbols. Further, these symbols make it possible to
create a functional market; i.e., trademarks facilitate exchange. These advantages are
derived from the informational value of a trademark. Trademarks include important
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121 Trademarks work to get undesirable goods rejected. This naturally stimulates competition
because poor quality is easily eliminated, while high quality survives. See Drockila 1986,
45 - 46.
122 The main purpose of competition is to endeavor to make sure that a consumer does not
choose a competing product. Four means for achieving this are usually distinguished:
product, price, communication, and distribution. See Rissanen 1978, 130.
123 A properly functional market is ensured through protection of economic profit. This is
one of the crucial aspects of the economic system based on private property. Competition
is thus fundamentally based on profits and advantages that are reached through successful
competition. Moreover, protecting trademarks increases economic growth. See Rissanen
1978, 173 - 174.
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information concerning both the product itself and the manufacturer of the product. The
informational value of a trademark thus represents a value for consumers. The distinctive
aspect of a trademark is substantial in this respect. Namely, by the virtue of this
distinctive information consumers are able to distinguish products from each other. This
is naturally based on consumers’ need to identify products. For consumers a trademark
is a means to recognize desirable goods and hence to buy them again.121
1.4.3 A trademark as business competition
Competition creates stability and control. In the market enterprises generally operate in a
network of relationships. These relationships need to be clarified and balanced with each
other; the balancing binds together some essential elements of each enterprise. These
elements then further constitute the competitive function of a trademark. The ability to
compete is one of the most important conditions of the overall existence of an
enterprise. Enterprises compete with each other by making their products seem
priceworthy for consumers.122 Competitiveness is an integral element of any enterprise
that is to survive.
A name gets its particular significance through the competitive function of a
trademark: it has become more and more important to be able to get oneself associated
with some symbols. To be able to compete effectively, an enterprise needs to become
recognized in the market. A name is bound to the competitive function through its
identifying character. It is characteristic of the market that there are several products and
services that resemble each other closely. Accordingly, there emerges a crucial need to be
able to differentiate one’s products. Here, the clear and strict classification of trademarks
serves to ensure competitiveness. Competitiveness is a natural consequence of the ability
to differentiate one’s products.123 Products and services as a uniform mass do not comply
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124 See Salmi et al. 2001, 7 - 8.
125 A trademark may be used also as an expanding factor: a trademark owner may register
several other trademarks close to the leading trademark. The main function of registering
these trademarks is to expand the scope of protection and prevent competitors form
using these marks. See Koktvedgaard 1965, 219.
126 Symbols that are used in business may sometimes be protected through copyright. In
these cases the protection is completely general and is not based on a competitive
relationship.  See Schovsbo 2000, 14.
127 One important factor here is the marketing of images and its close relative, branding.
Both of these are connected with subjective views and images. See Rope 1995, 129 - 141.
On the other hand, traders are no longer totally focused on selling or advertising a
product, but more on images. In other words, traders offer products that we, as
consumers, may buy us a certain identity. See Lehtonen, M. 2000, 18.
128 A trademark may be used in two functions: on the one hand, it links advertising or good
experiences and expectations to a certain product. On the other hand, it is a tool to create
a company image or conquer a (new) market. See Drockila 1986, 34 - 35.
129 Advertisement using a trademark is sometimes considered one of the functions of a
trademark. The advertising function illustrates the ability of a trademark to affect
consumers and attract them. A mark generally has advertising value. Advertising value
may further be created through a mark and its features. A mark may be an effective eye
catcher in appearance, the idea of a mark may attract consumers by creating certain
positive associations, or a mark may become established through advertisement. See Tiili
1972, 236 - 237.
130 This is connected to the value of the product. The value of a product and a trademark are
connected to each other, and the value of the trademark is a direct result of the product
that it symbolizes. A decrease in quality, and thus a decrease in sales reduces the value of
a trademark accordingly. See Tuominen 2001, 90.
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with the needs of either the market or consumers. To avoid this situation, trademarks are
used for differentiating products.124
Where competition is concerned, a trademark closely resembles a symbol or sign that
is used by an enterprise to promote its products. In the market, signs are often employed
in the form of names. Signs and names are further utilized in advertising, which links a
commodity and a trademark. In this sense, a name is also used as a connector in the
market.125 The competitive function of a trademark highlights an enterprise’s ability to
symbolize its goods and services. The symbolizing function is closely bound to the
competitive function of a trademark.126 A trademark hence becomes essential for
building up a certain company image.127 One of the functions of competition is to increase
the consumption and sale of products.128 In this competition, advertising and marketing
are both made part of the market through a trademark. Consumers make their buying
decisions according to this advertisement.129 Identification is hence essential for the
competitiveness of an enterprise.
The quality and the sources of a product are supposed to correspond to those of
the product that a consumer has bought before. A satisfied consumer tends to buy the
same product again.130 This generally creates brand loyalty, which is then often
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131 The mark itself thus attracts consumers. Brand loyalty among consumers is closely bound
to the quality of a product but also to the advertising function of a trademark and its
attractiveness. It may even happen that consumers buy the product only because of the
trademark. They buy, in other words, the trademark itself. The consumer wants to
identify him- or herself with a certain trademark despite of the product’s price. See Palm
2002, 19.
132 See Drockila 1986, 36 - 37.
133 A trademark thus has a positive and a negative aspect. The positive aspect includes the
privilege of holder of the exclusive right, which means that he or she has right to use the
mark (=privilege) and transfer it to someone and license it. The negative aspect includes the
right to forbid others to use the mark or even to interfere with the owner’s use. The right
to forbid includes use of the trademark as well as use of a similar or confusingly similar
mark. See Salmi et al. 2001, 13.
134 Similarity ought to be assessed as a whole. See Salmi et al. 2001, 80. See also SOU
1958:10, 254.
135 See Drockila 1986, 37.
136 The goodwill value is often associated with trademarks that are famous or at least well-
known. See Salmi et al. 2001, 93.
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strengthened by advertising. Advertising thus aims to affect the consumer experience,
with a trademark perhaps being the instrument that has the most significant value for an
enterprise in the process.131 These experiences of quality are nonetheless strongly
subjective, which basically makes the competitive function of a trademark rather relative
as well. This relative aspect of a trademark is derived from its legal origins, however. A
trademark is still fundamentally privileged and its context is mainly a form of monopoly.
A trademark is a protected privilege that includes the right to exclude others from exploiting
any similar or confusing sign in business. No one other than the owner of a trademark is
allowed to employ the sign that is included in the privilege.132 In this sense, exclusivity
strengthens distinctiveness.133
The subjectivity of a trademark appears here as well; the right to exclude is highly
relative in cases of confusing similarity. This means that two or several trademarks are
confusingly similar only if they are associated with products in exactly the same way or
are at least closely alike.134 Protection is thereby clearly attached to the market utilization
of a trademark and moreover to its market value of a trademark. Protection is granted
against competitors and trademark protection is realized only in this particular
competitive relation.135 The competitive function of a trademark is clearly manifested
also in the protection of the goodwill value of a trademark, which is mostly attained in a
certain environment. Goodwill is linked to the clientele or the customer base of an
enterprise.136 A trademark is modified through the customer base in that customers often
have certain associations, either positive or negative, that are connected with a trademark.
Illustrations of the digital economy
137 This influence is actually two-way. The more value trademark gets, the more the products
referred to by it are to be bought. On the other hand, the more visible a trademark is in
market, the more it is to be traded. See Tuominen 2001, 104.
138 Kodak mark has its own advertising function as well as its own image. See Drockila 1986,
38.
139 The sphere of protection of these well-known trademarks resembles closely functional
protection in patent law. Protection through patent is thus interpreted in two functionally
active aspects, i.e., as the protection of an invention and as the protection of the inventor.
The right to exploit an invention is protected as related to competition, the one entitled
to exploitation being the inventor. On the other hand, an invention may be protected as
a result of the combination of the knowledge of several inventors. Protection is a
functional reward for this. See Godenhielm 1950, 16 - 17.
140 This doctrine is known as the rat poison doctrine. See Salmi et al. 2001, 94.
141 These marks are often copied because of the strong advertising function. If these
trademarks were not protected, the trademark would degenerate. This means that a
trademark would become only a common noun and it would thereby lose its
distinguishing function altogether. See Drockila 1986, 39.
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In the longer run the enterprise-customer link clearly affects a trademark, which regularly
acquires its value only through a market.137
Protection is no longer targeted only at the protection of a trademark as such, but
attached to the market position of a trademark and its value in a certain market. The
competitive function of a trademark is thus actually left aside, at least partly, in the
interests of the marketing enterprise. A trademark may thus be able to attract the
attention of consumers without the origin or the quality symbolized by a trademark. This
trademark is called a Kodak mark and it is not product-bound like an ordinary trademark.
A Kodak mark alone and as such thus draws the attention of consumers and its
competitive value is so strong that it is possible to market branded articles using this
mark only.138 On the other hand, the Kodak doctrine maintains that if a trademark is well
known, the sphere of protected products is enlarged.139 A strong market position also
implies  strong protection through a trademark. The competitive function of a name is
thus well exploited. Similarly a reputation created through a trademark is also protected.
For example, it is not allowed to refer to a poison using a trademark for foodstuffs.140
The competitive function of a trademark is thus not sufficient for protecting the value of
Kodak marks.141
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142 Thereby, at least the originating function, advertising function, and guaranty function are
derivations of the individualizing ability of a trademark. See Riis 2000, 20.
143 See Maniatis 1997, 77.
144 This is mainly done by the distinctive element of a trademark, with the given information
linked to a certain identifiable product. The other is naturally the advertising element,
which enables informing in the first place.  See Salmi et al. 2001, 8 - 9.
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1.4.4 A trademark as business communication
A name is  communication in business, too. Moreover, a name is  used as a
communicative instrument between the diverse functions of a trademark.142 In fact, a
name may be described as a sort of summary of all the other functions of it, the basis of
the overall functionality again being the ability to symbolize and individualize products and
services. The communicative function of a trademark is therefore one of the main
competitive instruments. The communicativeness of a trademark is illustrated through its
ability to connect enterprises and consumers and serve as an information channel
between them. In a functional market, enterprises need to create a stable link to
consumers in order to communicate with them.143 It is this interactive operation between
enterprises and consumers that makes up the core of the overall communicative aspect
of a trademark.
A trademark is utilized in market communication in the selling and marketing of
products under a trademark. In this respect trademarks actually work for the good of the
market by making the commercialization of products and services more efficient. This
can be seen, for example, in the launching of new products, in which continuous
communication with consumers speeds up and eases entry onto the market. 144
Commercialization takes place through consumer acceptance. The more rapidly consumers
accept products, the more efficient the entry onto the market is. All this takes place as a
subjective reaction of consumers; i.e., the communication is closely bound to the insights
of consumers. In this respect a trademark is often used for improving the likelihood of
consumers noticing products and considering them. On the other hand, a trademark does
not require any consistent quality in a product. As such, it is directly dependent on the
subjective expectations of consumers, whereby consumers and marketers are the
complementary halves, so to speak, of a market relationship in which a trademark
functions as a communication channel between the two.
Communication is also one of the bases of exploiting trademarks in marketing.
Enterprises use good trademarks often to influence the relationship between the enterprise
and its products. This relationship is often highlighted when utilized in marketing. A
trademark provides a foundation for embedding some prominent values in products,
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145 See Salmi et al. 2001, 9. This kind of trademark has usually a great goodwill value. This
goodwill value thus creates some absolute value. See Riis 2000, 28.
146 See Koulu 2003, 81.
147 The value of a trademark is only seldom at its highest when the trademark has just been
registered. Its value increases slowly and is closely bound to its use. See Tuominen 2001,
93.
148 Salmi et al. 2001, 11.
149 It is actually through advertising that traders achieve levels of product differentiation
between articles which at first glance seem more or less the same. See Drahos 1996, 157.
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such as good price or high value. This relationship is also highlighted through advertising,
which has some additional functions related to trademarks. Advertising may be used as
an instrument by which a trademark attains a certain intrinsic value. A trademark may thus
become valuable as such.145 This value may result in a trademark being treated even as a
commodity that can have a value of its own. This is primarily achieved through the
goodwill value of a trademark, which refers to the value of trademark along  with the
reputation of an enterprise and its clientele.146
Goodwill value is increased through operating a long time in the market or having
achieved some renown inside the particular product niche. The better known a mark
brand is, the more goodwill value is associated with it.147 At the same time, goodwill
value brings the economic function of a trademark into the sphere of protection.
Goodwill value is the subject matter that can be protected by legislation. This protection is
further based on the connection between an enterprise and its products. Protection thus
pertains to the goodwill value of a trademark, the basis if which is the connection
between an enterprise and its products. Also of significance in this connection is a
trademark’s value in future marketing and commerce.148 Protection is hence more likely to
be based on the future profile of an enterprise than its present image.
A trademark is strengthened by advertising that creates a particular image for the
trademark and the company. A corporate image is essentially communicative and it is
often made to work for a company and its products.149 The advantage may be
considerable when the image is based on some fundamental values that are highly
regarded by consumers. A good image makes the products of a company desirable for
consumers. Consumers may also want to associate themselves with the image by using
the product or by obtaining it. An image is thus one of the basic factors when creating a
brand for a company. In this task, a trademark may easily be employed as a tool for
representing products and connecting them to the company’s image.
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150 The economic function is clearly illustrated, for example, in the marketing of new
products. Namely, new products are often launched under some already existing
trademark in order to get products introduced to consumers more quickly and at lower
costs. Salmi et al. 2001, 9.
151 The commercial value of a trademark is often also the basis of new business models. For
example, franchising is used for transferring a more complete business concept.
Merchandising, on the other hand, is focused on transferring elements of the brand to
other innovations. Trademark licensing and co-branding are likewise used as strategic
tools in many businesses. See Petrusson 2004, 44.
152 Branding and brand management are thus considered some of the salient characteristics
of an intellectualized economy. See Petrusson 2004, 43.
153 See Barth et al. 2003, 154. In this respect a brand may also be considered an attribute. A
brand brings to mind certain attributes which are translated into functional and emotional
benefits. See Kotler 2003, 418 - 419.
154 In the present day the core of business is seen as consisting of “softer assets”, such as
quality or image. See Palm 2002, 23.
155 A brand is defined as a name, term, sign, symbol, or design, or a combination of them. Its
most fundamental function is to identify the goods or services of one seller or a group of
sellers and to differentiate them from those of competitors. See Kotler 2003, 418.
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1.4.5 A name expanded into a brand
An existing trademark is in fact exploited already when entering the market, when the
fundamental aim is to create profit.150 A trademark often gains significant commercial
value, making it one of the most essential market instruments.151 Accordingly, it is often
reasonable to  expand towards an even more intellectual creation than a trademark: the
usability of a name in the market is expanded through branding.152 A brand is defined as
a particular product or feature of product that identifies a particular producer. A brand
is by definition a distinctive name of which consumers have a higher awareness and for
which they are willing to pay higher-than-average prices or which they purchase more
frequently than otherwise.153 In this context a trademark tends to remain two-
dimensional as compared to a three-dimensional brand. This three-dimensionality makes
a brand a company’s most significant competitive advantage in the modern market.154
A brand is thus defined through a name, but the content of a brand is much more
extensive than that of name.155 Modern brands are considered more like product
personalities than mere trademarks: they are often used for establishing images in peoples’
minds, e.g., “Nokia -connecting people” (closeness to friends) or “EAGames -challenge
everything” (experience of power or omnipotence). Consumers describe branded
products more in terms of attributes of quality than pure concepts. Further, the
Illustrations of the digital economy
156 See Palm 2002, 23.
157 Accordingly, a brand identifies the seller or maker of goods. However, under trademark
law, the seller is granted exclusive right to the use of the brand name. A brand thus
differs from other assets, like patent or copyright, in that a brand has no expiration date. See
Kotler 2003, 418.
158 These elements are considered primary identity elements. Further, a brand consists of
secondary identity elements, which include image style, type style, tone of voice, color
palette, and brand hierarchy systems. See Mono Design 2002, 19. The intellectual
dimensions of products, services, and enterprises are defined through a brand and its
basic concepts, such as brand awareness, brand identity, brand position and brand image.
See Aaker 1996, 71.
159 The rest of these essential elements are the product itself, its packaging and appearance,
the name of the brand (trademark), promotion, advertising, and the overall marketing
approach. See Tuominen 2001, 105.
160 Further, a name extends the brand or, conversely, hinders its expansion. The naming
architecture is also dependent on the strategy behind the name. See Tuominen 2001, 105.
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identification of a brand is thus carried out at the emotional level, which makes the
assessment rather subjective.156
Traditionally trademarks have been used for defining certain goods that are
produced under that trademark. It is thus the name of a product and accordingly a privilege,
exactly like a name of a human being.157 The classes of goods marketable under a
particular trademark are strictly defined, a practice bound to the stability of a trademark
as the name of a product. As such, the system remains rather stable. A brand, however,
changes this by making it possible to group different classes of goods under the same
label. A brand as a name is thus no longer a defining factor for a product, rather, it plays
a role as only one of many overlapping attributes. A name as a brand may include several
different classes of goods. In this respect a brand modifies a trademark slightly and
places some pressures for change on it. In sum, a name is a crucial part of a brand,
although it has several different functions.
A name positions a brand and exerts a unique influence on it. A name is thereby
one of the most important components of a brand, given that identity is the first element
in creating a brand. Identity actually consists of several elements, including at least a
name, a logo or a logotype, and colors.158 In the market, a name is used as a trademark,
which makes the trademark an essential element of a brand.159 There thus exists a clear
and fixed relationship between a name and a brand. When connected to brand, a name
is utilized as an identifying instrument; it positions the brand. It likewise stabilizes the
brand in a certain framework. Moreover, a name tells what the brand does and
accordingly creates certain associations in the buyer’s mind. These associations then also
operate as identifying factors when connected to the brand.160
A brand thus has some advantages that make it slightly more fixed in the market
compared to a name. As such a brand has at least greater loyalty among customers,
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161 Moreover a brand has less vulnerability to competitive market actions, less vulnerability
to marketing crises, larger margins, more inelastic consumer response to price increases
and price decreases, greater trade cooperation and support, increased marketing
communication effectiveness, possible licensing opportunities, and additional brand
extension opportunities. These factors create further network effect. The benefit of this
is that a branded product potentially provides a firm with a higher level of operating
earnings over time than does an otherwise unbranded product. See Barth et al. 2003, 154
- 155.
162 In this way buying and using a product is made personal and people using the same
products often constitute communities where everyone uses the same brand. See
Haapanen - Vepsäläinen - Lindeman 2005, 207 - 208.
163 A logo may also be copyrighted. Protection through copyright, however, requires a high
level of originality. See Copyright Council of Finland TN 1990:5, 1.
164 A strong mark and along with this a strong brand have some additional advantages in the
market. Market leadership and the superior position of a mark have a strong correlating
relationship. The leading marks usually have better profit margins. See Arnold 1992, 19.
165 In this respect, branded articles actually constitute the core of advertising and marketing.
A branded article is thus created through a product that is fundamentally based on
increasing and supporting its goodwill value. See Rissanen 1978, 131.
166 A trademark would replace, or complement a patent. See Maniatis 197, 80.
167 This illustrates the functional protection that is highly similar to functional patent
protection. Functional protection through a patent is realized in two different aspects, the
protected invention and the protected inventors. See Godenhielm 1950, 16 - 17.
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which also makes it rather stable.161 Brand is mainly employed by creating images on
peoples’ minds and forming up communities connected by a brand.162 A brand is
generally identified through a logo or a name that strengthens the stability of the brand.
Moreover, a logo is rather descriptive and thus easy to connect to a certain brand.163 This
kind of logo is rather capable of maintaining its position in the market.164 Stability is
connected also to the brand essence. Brand essence represents the core identity of the brand
and it further defines the “soul” of the brand. The identification of a brand is also closely
bound to the view of consumers concerning the quality of the products or services in
question. In this respect, a brand is not bound to any particular, fixed quality but more
to the expectations of consumers and their views.165
Brands and trademarks also have a functional cooperative relationship that is
characteristically dynamic. This dynamism is realized through trademarking and
innovation. These two factors in turn have a close connection that is generally reflected
in the brand. A trademark has namely been sometimes considered a method of securing
property.166 The rationale for such protection lies in the principles of protecting
commercial and practical investments as inventions. It is vital to protect operations and the
actors involved in them.167 Operativity further dynamizes a brand. Protection would improve
innovativeness at the same time. Innovativeness may be included in a brand when the
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168 In the view of a brand as an organization, the perspective focuses on the attributes of the
organization rather than those of the product or service. The focal attributes include
innovation, pursuit of quality, and concern for the environment. At its best, a brand
captures much of what that brand stands for. The brand essence can be viewed as the
glue that holds the core identity elements together. See Aaker 1996, 82.
169 The connection to a trademark is clear. Trademarks in real commerce thus often function
as definers of innovative products or enterprises. See Maniatis 1997, 80.
170 A band has its own identity, which provides direction, purpose and meaning for the
brand. Brand identity consists of associations. See Aaker 1996, 68.
171 The values of worldwide brands have been ranked by Interbrand for the year 2005. The
most famous brands of today are generally known by names. Coca-Cola still holds the
leading position as its value has been estimated to be 56 million Euros in 2005. The other
in the top five are Microsoft, IBM, General Electric, and Intel.
See http://www.interbrand.com/best_brands_2005.asp
172 Brand loyalty is closely connected to brand personality. A brand may acquire some
qualities that make it resemble a person. Like a person, a brand can be perceived as being
upscale, competent, impressive, trustworthy, fun, active, humorous, casual, formal,
youthful, or intellectual. See Aaker 1996, 83.
173 See Tuominen 2001, 108.
174 Consumers thus provide some important knowledge of the brand image; consumer
information is even essential when creating and developing a brand identity. See Aaker
1996, 69.
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brand is considered an organization.168 For example, a trademark as a form of protection
of innovation would introduce an innovation quality label that would further identify
protected objects.169
Names and brands likewise have a mutual cooperative relationship in which they
both operate as functional counterparts. A name often supports the identity that is
created through a brand.170 This makes a brand a rather powerful communicational
instrument. A name is precisely the aspect of a brand that projects the enterprise and its
products to the customers. A name is generally used as a tool for making the brand
known and remembered by the consumers.171 The aim is brand loyalty, in pursuit of which
it is reasonable to strive for stable quality.172 Brand loyalty in practice means that a
product being traded under a certain trademark will be bought even if there exists some
negative change in circumstances. The price of a product may increase or the quality
decrease, but consumers buy the product regardless. In other words, they are loyal to the
brand. Brand loyalty also has a great influence on the value of the brand itself; the greater
the brand loyalty, the higher the value of the brand.173
Much of the value of an enterprise is based on the connection between the
enterprise and consumers. The customer base constitutes the core of brand identity.174
Creating this connection is increasingly complicated in the digital economy, whose
fundamental character lies in its transparency. Owing to transparency, consumers are able
to access an enterprise and its products in a definitively new ways whereby brands have
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175 A brand thus includes certain values whereby it says something about the producer’s
values. A brand is further associated with certain culture and has a certain personality. See
Kotler 2003, 419.
176 experiences are often generally founded on images and associations in people’s minds.
See Shapiro - Varian 1999, 5. Sometimes customers even pay for the intellectual
experience; e.g., men buy Marlboro clothes to become a Marlboro man. See Petrusson
2004, 44 - 45.
177 Brands consists of a program that is parallel to code. They may also be described as the
DNA of the network economy. See Gad 2001, 22.
178 A brand code does not describe only the content or definition of a business.  A brand
code may be divided into four sectors: the functional, which is linked to the usefulness of
brand; the social, which promotes identification and group unity; the ethical, which refers
to global and local responsibility; and the psychological, which is linked to mental
supportiveness.  See Gad 2001, 22 - 23.
179 Cyberspace is generally considered to refer to the interaction of people, businesses and
other entities over computer networks, this is, electronic messages and commercial on-
line services. As such cyberspace may also be defined as the invisible intangible world of
electronic information and processes. The largest and best known manifestation of
cyberspace is the Internet. See Grewlich 1999, 19.
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even increased their significance in the digital economy.175 The digital economy is based
on experience goods where branding and good reputation have a clear influence and this
is why images play a crucial role precisely in the digital economy.176 The expansion and
progressively more effective use of open networks will likewise increase the importance
of a brand.
The significance of a brand is thus in informing consumers and getting clearly and
unambiguously identified in the market. A brand generally consists of a kind of code, a
brand code, that defines its raison d’etre.177  The code defines the character of business
operations, what the business looks like, how it feels, and how it operates.  The code is
therefore the heart that embodies the personality of the brand and makes it special.178
The tasks of informing and identifying are also realized through the brand as
communication. This communication essentially occurs in the society where the brand
operates.
1.5 Innovation: Communicative domain names
1.5.1 New communicative requirements
Society is communication. Communication is, however, undergoing continuous
development, with sweeping changes in the communication environment emerging due
to open communication networks.179 The most profound change derives form the design
of communication in the open networks, where it is fundamentally based on routers,
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180 Routers are computers that are designed to receive and forward packets of data. Hosts are
storage points for programs and data and transmission facilities connect hosts and routers.
See Grewlich 1999, 37.
181 A name is generally utilized as an instrument of ensuring confidentiality in communication.
Confidentiality refers to the ability of being private or secret. Confidentiality is thus one
of the main dimensions of information security. See Parker 1981, 40.
182 On the other hand, identification may be confronted with anonymity and privacy.
Anonymity thus protects privacy and in this sense it has even been considered a shield
protecting people form having to associate their identities with some data. See Bishop
2003, 375 - 376.
183 Confidentiality thus embraces data itself and the qualities of keeping data and
communication confidential. See Grewlich 1999, 173. Confidentiality is sometimes also
connected with privacy. See Parker 1981, 40.
184 All these techniques are called code-based. See Biegel 2001, 199.
185 A cookie is thus a code-based entry that is basically located on a Web browser’s cookie file
when an online user interacts with a site in a certain way. When a user, for example,
registers at a site, the delivered content typically generates the placement of cookies
directly on a person’s hard drive. These cookies often include basic information that the
person has provided. When the person types in the Web site address at a later time, his or
her browser automatically sends the cookie along with the request for that site, and the
server can the set the preferences according to the individual account. See Biegel 2001,
199.
186 Digital certificates can reside on user’s computer, and a server may automatically check
the certificate and authenticate the information after unlocking a pass phrase. See Biegel
2001, 199 - 200.
174
hosts, and transmission facilities.180 Communication on such networks is no longer
personal, face to face communication; indeed it has become more and more important to
be able to identify invisible and unfamiliar communicative actors reliably.
Communication becomes smoother when it is possible for the parties to identify
themselves and therefore to trust each other.181 Accordingly, the issues of identification
become even more important than before, when communication was personal.182 The
confidentiality and trustworthiness of communication are both further connected to the
ability of the communicator to identify himself or herself in a trustworthy manner.
Identification creates confidence.183
Identification in the communication on open network is realized through certain
identification tools. There exists at least three techniques that may be used for identifying
a person in an anonymous online world: passwords, cookies, and digital signatures.184
Passwords basically verify that the person using the system is authorized to do so. On the
other hand, cookies operate for governing data when they basically include some basic
information that the person has provided.185 Nevertheless, when communicating on open
networks digital signatures are even more elaborate and secure method of establishing
identity in cyberspace. As being based on encryption technology, digital signatures enable
digital certificates. These certificates then serve as a “passport” in the online world.186
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187 Reliability, security and confidentiality of communication are considered essences of the
communication on open networks. See Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy
in the Electronic Communications Sector.
188 Data protection is here essential in order to safeguard certain interests and rights of an
individual when information concerning him or her is processed by others. These
interests and rights are usually expressed as privacy, autonomy and integrity. See Bygrave
2002, 2. In this sense even the communication of personal information on open networks
ought to be carried out according to Directive 1995/46/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the processing of Personal
Data and the Free Movement of Such Data.
189 On open networks, communication is supported through electronic identity. Electronic
identification cards have been designed precisely for confidential communication between
citizens and public authority. Identification on these networks is carried out using
technology that ensures the confidentiality of this communication. These technologies
ensure that an electronic document may be signed and the authentication of the
document may be assured. If needed, the message, too, may be secured. See Government
Proposal HE 18/1999 vp., 4.
190 This connection is often referred to as access to network and it often is controlled.
Bishop 2003, 103.
191 On the other hand, communication security is related to computer security that describes the
protection of information within a computer system. computer security includes, for
example, security properties of operating system software and database management
software. See Ford - Baum 2001, 94.
192 Access control is further divided in two: discretionary access control being based on the
identity of the subject and the identity of the object involved, and mandatory access control,
where a system mechanism controls access to an object and the individual user cannot
alter that access. See Bishop 2003, 103.
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All these identification tools are essential in a reliable communication.187 Reliable
communication and the ability to authenticate the content of a message and its sender is
crucial on open networks. This is exactly where personal information is to be
protected.188 The network environment is still basically impersonal and in this sense neutral.
A name and an identity may easily become detached from one other. On the network the
identification of actors seems to be the essential way to classify them. The identification of
parties is thus the core of any further ability to operate on the network.189 The ability to
operate is thus two-fold; i.e., in order to access the network there typically has to be a
connection, but besides a connection there is a crucial need to be able to act on the
network.190 A mere connection alone is not sufficient for communication and the
expansion of information networks in communication should be made available to
everyone. Here the security of the communication is essential. Communication is even
impossible if it is not secure; communication security thus refers precisely to the
protection of information while it is being transferred form one system to another.191 On
the other hand, access control is here an essential requirement in order to ensure the
secure communication.192
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193 With the Internet becoming global and commercial, the original arrangement of network
communication may become less efficient and less equitable. It could indeed affect
electronic commerce negatively by limiting the range of technical options for entities
other than those operating in the United Sates. See Hart - Chaitoo 1999, 926 - 927.
194 Authorized access is ensured through access control services, which protect against
unauthorized access to resources, such as processing, communications, or information
resources. See Ford - Baum 2001, 98.
195 In this respect, a name is an important means of communication even on an open
network. In the communication through open networks a name constitutes a certain link
to anonymity and personality exactly as in face to face communication. See Pöysti 2002,
50. One of the fundamental tasks of the domain name system is to offer domain
addresses that are utilized by the actors on a network to identify each other. See Committee
for Constitutional Law Report PeVL 54/2002 vp., 2.
196 See Rahnasto 2002, 20. An IP address is a numerical identifier that is significant to other
computers. To become a part of a network on the Internet, a user must have a unique IP
address. See Grewlich 1999, 387.
197 In this sense, a communication network is a group of computers linked together in such
a way as to allow information to move amongst them. See Koepsell 2000, 82.
198 The new communication network is often referred as information system. Information
system encompasses computer and communication facilities and networks and data or
information processed by them. Information technology denotes a set of tools for the
processing of data or information. In this context operating parties are called data subjects
and data controllers. A data subject is the person to whom data relate, and a data controller
is a person who determines the purposes and means of data processing. See Bygrave
2002, 20 - 21.
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The use of networks as communication channels should not be the advantage of
a select few.193 For this reason, actors on open network need to be able to make their
presence known and make themselves recognizable. This correlates authorized access to
communication networks.194 To this end they need some connective symbols, which on
communication networks are built on domain names. A domain name is a means of
identification and symbolization on the Internet that replaces ordinary proper names.195
A domain name is usually a registered address or a symbol connecting different
communicative units to the Internet. Domain names are used as a means of access to
network services based on the World Wide Web. Basically, domain names are built on
numerical strings, with every domain address consisting of a string of four numerical sets.
Every set consists of not more than four numbers each. These numerical strings then
make up IP addresses.196 Messages are sent over the network to these IP addresses and
converted into the corresponding human-understandable domain names again. As such
domain names operate as the basis of the communication on open networks.
Communication is further r ea l ized  in  a  cer ta in  framework .1 9 7  The new
communicational framework changes the character of the communicative community
and changes the prerequisites for communication as well.198 In the new framework
information transmission is carried out using certain protocols, with the relevant protocol
being a crucial, even definitive, factor. Namely, the protocol regulates how the data is to
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199 The protocol disregards what is built into the data or how that built-in part works. This
exemplifies the neutrality of a network. See Lessig 2002a, 149.
200 In this development, the advent of NSFnet was important in that it encouraged
researchers to use distributed computing as a part of their work. It thus allowed and
encouraged the development and establishment of technical protocols that would allow
a network with heterogenous parts. It also became possible to construct a network
without any centralized administration and network design for exchanging information.
See Grewlich 1999, 34 - 35.
201 The TCP/IP protocol is thus the basic platform for the Internet and the intranets. The
protocol was original ly created by the US Defense Department  as its common
communication protocol. See Grewlich 1999, 395 - 396.
202 The TCP/IP protocol has been slightly modified by the European research center
CERN. CERN is the French acronym for the European Laboratory for Particle Physics and is
located in Geneva, Switzerland. The most active researcher in CERN was Tim Berners-Lee.
Further, CERN augmented the Northern-American protocol through a modification that
made it possible to interconnect its own networks using the TCP/IP protocol. It thus
allowed different computers with different standards to communicate with each other
easily. CERN became the largest Internet site in Europe and its development work
relating to the WWW had a global impact. See Grewlich 1999, 35.
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be divided and how the resulting packets will be shipped.199 The foundational usefulness
of a protocol lies in the diversity of transmission channels, which makes the whole
network flexible in nature. This is the very basis of openness and it is further manifested
when sending different messages: differentiation makes it impossible to prevent sending
a message and the whole network is hence constituted on as neutral a basis as possible.200
Open communication networks closely connect domain names and transmission
protocols.
Communication itself on the Internet is also evolving. It is open, to be sure, but
strictly bound to certain technical protocols. The environment is based on standards, the
most fundamental of which is TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol).201
TCP/IP is one of the Internet’s most basic layers of functionality and in fact defines
what kinds of applications network operators have to use.202 The essence of this protocol
lies in its certainty and openness in communication. These factors then operate to make the
communication environment common for everyone. Certainty is derived from the
functional basis of the protocol. The protocol is designed to be reliable and it is hence
supposed to be able to function even when other communication channels fail. In
communication using TCP/IP, a message is split to several separate components and all
the components may be sent to the receiver through a different transmission channel.
Openness derives in part from the character of TCP/IP, as it is based on the principle of
open standards; the protocol is freely distributed to anyone who wants to use it. In practice
Illustrations of the digital economy
203 Over time the protocol has been revised and built up based upon the experiences of the
users, not only the original authors.  This is indeed the very basis of the openness of an
open network. See Grewlich 1999, 34 - 35.
204 According to Webopedia Hypertext Mark-Up Language (abbreviated as HTML) is
considered the other of the main standards controlling how the World Wide Web
operates. The HTML protocol actually covers how Web pages are formatted and
displayed. At the same time it defines the structure and layout of a Web document by
using a variety of tags and attributes. The correct structure for an HTML document starts
with <HTML><HEAD>(issue what the document is about)<BODY> and ends with
</BODY></HTML>. All the information one wishes to include on the Web page fits
in between the <BODY> and </BODY> tags.
See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/H/HTML.html
205 Language has to be common to everyone and no private languages can be utilized in this
communication. Language is standardized in order to make the communication fluent and
possible overall. See Radin 2002, 102.
178
this is carried out in the TCP/IP technology by sending a message digitally to its
recipient.203 The protocol thus simply operates to make this procedure straightforward.
TCP/IP ensures the functionality of open networks. Information transmission is
also carried out on another protocol, one mostly used for information transmission on
the Internet. It is called HTTP protocol (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) and can be used only on
the World Wide Web. The main task of HTTP is to transfer files from an Internet server
onto a browser in order that they may be viewed on the Internet. As a protocol, HTTP
defines how messages are formatted and transmitted and what operations the Web
servers and browsers should take in response to various commands. For example, when
one enters a domain address in the browser, this sends an HTTP command to the Web
server directing it to retrieve and transmit the requested page. This protocol is based on
the lingua franca of the Internet, Hypertext Mark-Up Language (HTML).204
Communication is thus carried out in standardized form. This closely resembles
language as a means of communication in face to face communication, where it is
language itself and the communicative circumstances that form the communicational
“protocol”. However, where communication is carried out using language,
communication is possible only if all the communicating parties are able to understand
each other.205 Similarly, the communication protocols of open communication networks
constitute the core of digital communication, with communication carried out on the terms
of these protocols.
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206 Internet was first used as the name of the open world wide network in the early 1980s.
The crucial advantage of the Internet is that it does not consist of only one operational
mode. The most common operations are e-mail, bulletin boards, newsgroups and the
World Wide Web. See Rahnasto 2002, 14.
207 This first version of open communication networks was called Arpanet and it served both
military and academic needs at the same time. Today the Internet is considered a
commercially self-sustaining network of networks. Its development has, however, at least
periodically been carried out by political decisions and governmental acts. This process
began in 1969 by developing the Internet protocol. The main actor then was the
Department of US Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Administration, i.e., ARPA or DARPA.
The fundamental purpose was to design a robust communication network. Arpanet
(Advanced Research Projects Agency Network) linked together a number of high-tech research
institutions and was deployed both to demonstrate the workability of the protocols and to
facilitate communication among research communities. Arpanet was built in the 1960s
and was later connected to the other local networks in the USA. These were mainly
governmental networks, universities, or other research units. In the 1980s Arpanet was
divided into two separate networks: The Data Defense Network, which replaced Arpanet,
and the network of the National Science Foundation, NSFnet, for academic purposes. See
Grewlich 1999, 34.
208 The origins of the Internet are a single complex of four units of networking computers
being interconnected. This network of four was first used mainly by university
researchers as a co-operative communication channel. The basis for this network of four
computers was created by the US Department of Defense and it derives from the
DARPA project. See Grewlich 1999, 34.
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1.5.2 The information community
The best known of the open communication networks in the present day is the Internet,
which was originally created in the United States for military purposes. 206 The
fundamental military purpose of the Internet was to ensure continuous communication over
the network even if some of the nodes failed. The communication was thus designed to
remain unaffected even if the traditional communication channels were destroyed or out
of use for some other reason.207 As a communication technology, the Internet is based on
an open architecture whose kernel lies in a number of several different technologies that
complement each other. The Internet is a world-wide network of interconnected
computers, all of which work together. 208
Interconnected computers constitute a network where the communicative
processes need to be governed. This governance is generally realized through names,
which are essential in communication on open networks otherwise. Moreover, proper
names involve some disadvantages in technology-based network communication and
with the development and growth of Internet it became hard or even impossible to
control the whole mass of names and addresses in use on the network. Some system of
identification and governance was needed for the fast-growing network. It was to this
Illustrations of the digital economy
209 See Government Proposal HE 96/2002 vp., 5.
210 The operations of computers may well be illustrated by an example form Matt Bishop: “a
computer has an Ethernet (describing media access layer) address of 00:05:02:6b:8A:21,
an IP address if 192.168.35.89, and a host name of cherry.orchard.net. At the data link
level, the system is known by its Ethernet address. At the network level, it is known by its
IP address. At the application level, it is known by its host name.” See Bishop 2003, 366.
211 Communication on open networks also faces some threats. One is the possibility opened
for every computer input device to become a potential recorder of our actions on the
network. Every digital transaction potentially leaves some signs somewhere in cyberspace,
which makes it possible to gather databases of personal information. On these grounds,
it is possible to collect fragments of information from multiple locations in cyberspace
through writing efficient software. These pieces of information may then be put together
to form a complete picture of how we are acting. This is called dataveillance. See Mitchell
1995, 157.
212 A browser or Web browser is a software application that provides Internet users with a
navigation tool to locate and display Web pages. The two most popular browsers are
Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Internet Explorer.
See http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/b/browser.html
213 Usually the domain name is the Web address of the Web page of an enterprise, and it is
used for identifying the home page of the enterprise, or searching for it on the Internet.
The domain name can also be the identifier of the e-mail address of an enterprise. See
Rahnasto 2002, 19.
214 Domain names are basically expressed in letters or numbers. A domain name does not,
however, even have to be an understandable name; any string of characters may be a
domain name. See Rahnasto 2002, 20.
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end that the domain name system (DNS) was created. The purpose of the domain name
system is to connect host names (i.e., domain names) and IP numbers and the system
thus makes up part of the essence of the Internet.209 Domain names are based on IP
numbers, which are used for the communication between computers. The numerical IP
addresses alone would be perfectly adequate for the computers as such.
In the interconnected cooperation of computers the operating devices recognize
each other by their particular IP numbers.210 These numbers allow for perfect
identification in the hardware environment; they would be adequate for the computer
network.211 This also applies to browsers, which make it possible to navigate on the
Internet.212 However, in human communication domain names are usually expressed as
a human understandable names or symbols.213 These names are only artificial creations to make
human communication easier. They do not have very much significance in the realization
or successful functioning of the communication itself. Most often a domain name is an
understandable and reasonable name or word made up of characters, typically letters.214
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215 Such data may include details concerning, for example, on the corporation’s name,
contact address and date of establishment. Moreover, these details may include
information about a corporate’s ownership structure, employees, operations, assets and
finance, strategies, customer base or products. See more on this, Bygrave 2002, 174 - 175.
216 See Rahnasto 2002, 19. Actions on the network can be done by computers and programs
as well. These programs are called electronic agents. They are computer programs, or
electronic or other automated means, which are used by a person to initiate an action, or
to respond to electronic messages or events.
See http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/a/agent.html
These agents are not bound to any specific country or region; they can physically be
located wherever. Agents may, however, be found according to their URL address. The
form of these Web addresses is still unclear. See Ören 2001, 90 - 91.
217 The main root is called the A-root and it is governed by the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA). IANA was founded only for coordinating the domain name system and
governing the A-root server. Physically IANA is located at the University of Southern
California. See Hart - Chaitoo 1999, 926 - 927.
218 See Government Proposal HE 96/2002 vp., 5.
219 There exist several different protocols on the Internet. Generally, according to
Webopedia, a protocol can be described as an agreed-upon format for transmitting data
between two devices. The protocol determines the type of error checking to be used, data
compression method, if any is used, how the sending device will indicate that it has
finished sending a message, and how the receiving device will indicate that it has received
a message.
See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/p/protocol.html
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1.5.3 Communication using domain names
A domain name or domain address locates an enterprise or any other actor on the network.
Enterprises operate through Web pages (home pages, home sites), which are files saved
on a World Wide Web server used by an enterprise. A Web page usually contains
information about the enterprise or information about its products or services. These are
often those data from which a particular entity can be identified.215 The domain name
associated with this Web page is often based on the name of the enterprise.216 This is
how the overall network structure is implemented at the level of domain names. The
communication structure based on domain names is complemented by root servers,
which hold information about all of the computers connected to the World Wide Web.
These servers thus constitute the essence of the domain name system.217 At the top of the
hierarchy is one, unnamed root, i.e., the top root. Under the top root there exits several
lower-level roots which are either worldwide or national ones and configured in groups.
These roots are called first-level domain names.218
The domain address contains two main components, the protocol and the domain
name.219 Domain names can be broken down further into segments. The domain name
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220 URL is another name for domain name. It may also be called domain address, Internet
address, www address, or Web address. Lehtonen A. 1999,  98. The URL is the most
complete form of identifier, because it contains both a description of the protocol to use,
and in a specified form the IP address or the domain name where the resource is located.
The letters URL are an abbreviation of Uniform Resource Locator.
See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/U/URL.html
221 There are a limited number of predefined top-level domain (TLD) suffixes. The current
top-level domains include: com for commercial businesses, which is the most common
TLD. The others are: gov for U.S. government agencies, edu for educational institutions
such as universities, org for organizations (mostly nonprofit), mil for military, mainly in the
United States, and net for network organizations.
See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/T/TLD.html
In addition to these there is a suffix int for international organizations. The rest of the
top-level domains are the country codes, like ca for Canada, or fi for Finland. See
Lehtonen A. 1999, 99. The number of country codes exceeds 240.  See Gulliksen 2001,
22.
222 There exist also so-called third-level domain names, which are expressed in the form:
[protocol]:// [computer].[domain name].[country or organization]/[third-level domain
name], for example http://www.ulapland.fi/home/oiffi (Institute for Law and
Informatics at the University of Lapland).
223 A domain name has thus a dual character: it is both a name and an address. It both
identifies and locates Internet resources. See Gulliksen 1999, 24. A domain name is thus
often considered an electronic address despite its character as a trademark. See Koktvedgaard
- Levin 2004, 354.
224 In the domain name system a “name” has been considered to identify the principal and
an “address” describes where on a network the host is located. See Bishop 2003, 366.
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component of a URL consists of three or four segments.220 The general segment is the
abbreviation “www”, which  means that the computer or the domain name referred to in
the address is a World Wide Web server. The domain name proper then consists of the two
latter parts of the URL, for example, “ulapland.fi”, which is the domain name of the
University of Lapland.  The last segment is what is known as the top-level domain (TLD),
which is usually either a country or organization code.221 The complete domain name in
its URL form thus consists of four different parts: [protocol]://[computer] .[domain
name proper].[country or organization], for example, http://www.ulapland.fi, the URL
of the University of Lapland.222
In the new communicational framework, domain names are utilized as identifiers and
as such they discharge the function of a name in face to face communication. A domain
name is basically used as an identification symbol and is indexed to a quadripartite IP
address. For this reason, domain names may also be considered addresses.223 As addresses
they are never identical, however. Every user in the network will be identified according
to its domain name. Therefore, a domain name can be equated with ordinary addresses
in the postal services, or phone numbers in telephone communications.224 In this context
the legally interesting part of the domain name is what is known as the second-level domain
name, that is, the human-understandable part of a domain name. The second-level
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225 See Lehtonen A. 1999, 99.
226 Moreover, a domain name is often considered a service mark rather than a trademark.
Domain names thus usually represent the services associated with the Web instead of
representing any goods. Branson 2001, 297.
227 These two approaches are the main areas in the governance of domain names. The
fundamental difference between these two governance structures lies in the distinctions
between domain names and trademarks. Two countries representing the two opposite
extremes of regulation may, for example, be Finland and the USA. In Finland the national
domain name system is governed by the state, whereas in the USA the domain name
system is based on market governance. See Rahnasto 2002, 31 - 32.
228 This is exactly where the second level domain names play a key role. For example, in
Finland a domain name may not legally be based on a protected commercial name or sign
(Law on Network Identification 4 §. In Finnish, Verkkotunnuslaki.) See also Rahnasto
2002, 60 - 61.
229 Domain names are thus considered as tools of identification not only for an actor but also
for a certain service or product. See Tuula 2002, 252.
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domain name is that part of the name located between the abbreviation “www” and the
country or organization code, e.g., [ulapland. ...]. In everyday legal usage, it is exactly this
part of  the URL that is called the domain name.
1.5.4 The domain name as a communicative position
The legal interest embraces two different issues, i.e., organizing the internal system of the
domain names and the exclusivity of domain names themselves.225 A domain name may
be considered as an address or as a position on the communication network.226 Domain
names are generally registered by international organizations in order to bring the names
into use. Registration brings out two distinct aspects of domain names. One has to do
with state governance of the domain name system and is based on strict restrictions on
the use and granting of domain names. The other is derived from minimal restrictions
concerning domain names and a system basically built on market governance.227 The
distinction involves the problematic area of exclusivity of domain names. Exclusivity is
related to both the state governance of domain names and the relationship between
domain names and trademarks.228
The view of a domain name as a position is well illustrated in state-oriented
governance, also described as a technical approach, and has relatively broad basis. The
breadth can be seen in the low requirements for getting a domain name registered. The
technical approach concentrates solely on the form of the word or symbol whose
registration one is applying for.229 There are essentially no restrictions on granting a
domain name: the only reason for rejecting an application is that someone already
possesses precisely the same domain name. The names must be absolutely similar; even
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230 See Rahnasto 2002, 32. For example replacing the letter “o” with zero.
231 See Rahnasto 2002, 34.
232 See Rahnasto 2002, 33.
233 In these cases, the governance of a domain name system is strictly concentrated in the
hands of the state and access is controlled by the governing authority or organization. See
Benkler 2002, 292.
234 See Rahnasto 2002, 20.
235 This is the fundamental difference between a domain name as an address and a domain
name as a name. The systems of domain name and trademark are in this sense
fundamentally different in that a trademark may be granted to several different
enterprises as long as they act in different niches. A domain name is unique and it may be
granted to only one actor. See Lindberg - Westman 2000, 256.
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small differences in the written appearance constitute a sufficient distinction.230
Processing an application thus concentrates only on the similarity between the domain
name applied for and existing ones.
In this way a domain name comes to be considered more like an address, where
the requirements to get a domain name registered are based on the unique differentiation
of numerical strings. This  leaves the influence of signs on the market totally aside thus
supporting the view of domain names as mere addresses. The view is likewise supported
by the non-absoluteness of the right to acquire a certain domain name. Domain names
are not in this sense owned; rather, their use is based entirely on the right to use. A domain
name holder thus only gets the right to use the name while the name itself belongs to an
authority (in Finland, the Finnish Communication Regulatory Authority). This corresponds to
the status of phone numbers, which are considered to be only technical in nature and as
such property of the telephone companies.231
A domain name as an address is rather static in nature. This is implied in the rigid
process of registering a domain name. The assessment of an application does not
consider the effect of registration on the market or competition.232 As such technical
registration seems to be aimed solely at governing the existence of the domain names in
neutral communication.233 Governance strives for neutrality and equality between domain
name holders and does not consider the actual value implemented in them as a whole. In
other words, the core of the technical approach lies in the view that domain names are
basically created for the network operations carried out by computers. There, it is only
the technical communicative part of the domain name that has significance, for
computers only need the numerical name to connect to the network properly. The
written part of the address is meaningless in this perspective.234
A domain name as a position reflects the identity of the communicative actors.
The position is in fact designed precisely for this purpose. This is why domain names as
addresses are unique. It is impossible for there to be two identical domain addresses or IP
numbers. This is one of the fundamental conditions for network communication.235 This
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236 This is clearly manifested in the increasing electronic communication, for example,
between citizens and the public authorities. In these relationships the electronic
identification card makes it possible for citizens to communicate electronically and
through open networks with the public authorities. The essence of the functionality of
this communication lies in confidential identification. See Government Proposal HE 18/1999
vp., 4.
237 This activity and access to networks is ensured through a properly functional domain
name system. A functional  domain name system also supports free speech on
communication networks. See Committee for Constitutional Law Report PeVL 54/2002 vp., 2.
238 As a service a domain name has a status of a telephone number. See Gulliksen 1999, 26.
239 See Haarmann 2001, 237.
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renders the communication neutral. Communication overall is based on neutrality, with
computers acting neutrally on the basis of pure numbers or IP addresses. They merely
transmit messages regardless of the content of the messages. Numerical symbols and
connectives are thus useful for neutral communication. Communication on the open
networks would be impossible without any means of identification.236
Domain names function as identifiers when they are employed as addresses and
are therefore unique. Identification has further implications that then help ensure and
guarantee access to the network. In this respect, domain names have become significant
tools enabling network actors to get access to networks. The identification of actors is
essential for them to be able to operate on the network.237 Domain names and the access
granted through them are also essential if the actors are to be able to transmit and receive
information. This is the essence of the overall operativity of the network, where all
functionality is based more or less on getting and giving information. Access and
operativity are closely bound.
1.5.5 The domain name as a market identifier
It can be argued that human beings communicate essentially on the basis of names, signs,
and symbols. The significance of a domain name on the network lies in its dual role: it is
a symbol as well as an address. A domain name is often considered a mere address when
it is defined as a pure service.238 Domain names have, however, a lot of value implemented
in them. A good example is domain name grabbing, where an enterprise registers a domain
address which is actually the business name of another company. The only purpose is to
go on to sell the domain address to the business name holder and make money in this
way.239
Domain names were not originally considered to have much value, if any.
Basically they were only connective units and their purpose was merely to lead the network
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240 See Rahnasto 2002, 33.
241 The international governance of domain names has been organized by the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). The most important tasks of
ICANN are governing IP addresses, granting the domain names and governing the root
servers, and defining the Internet protocols. See http://www.icann.com
At the national level the governance of domain names has been organized by private
associations. In this practice Finland is an exception. In Finland the governance of
domain names is organized by a governmental organization, the Finnish Communication
Regulatory Authority. In this way the regulation and allocation of domain names is under
the supervision of the state. See Government Proposal HE 96/2002 vp., 8 -9.
242 Domain names and search strings are not necessarily the same thing: domain names may
include even some search terms. This may be realized even more fundamentally by
including certain identifiers, like signs or marks on the Web page of the competing
enterprise. These identifiers are then found by a search engine. These identification marks
are called meta tags. See Lindberg - Westman 2000, 220 - 221. A meta tag is a special
HTML tag that provides information about a Web page. Unlike normal HTML tags, meta
tags do not affect how the page is displayed. Instead, they provide information such as
who created the page, how often it is updated, what the page is about, and which
keywords represent the page's content. The significance of meta tags is in their usability
for search engines, as many search engines use this information when building their
indexes.
See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/m/meta_tag.html
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users to the correct Web page.240 They were thus considered more like addresses than
names or meaningful symbols. The commercial character of domain names has changed
along with the development of the communication framework., in which information
and access to it play a central role. Information retrieval systems, for example, search
engines, use domain names to recognize the right Web site; i.e., domain names are
utilized as search terms for identifying actors on the network. Accordingly, enterprises
become visible on the network through their domain names. The ability to identify
oneself is essential if one is to be operative on the network.
In business, domain names thus connect domains and enterprises. Therefore,
domain names seem to have an identification function similar to that of a name in
personal communication. The main task of domain names in the network environment
is to ensure access to information resources. This involves both the sender and the receiver of
information. In order to guarantee equal access, domain names are basically granted and
governed by the state and generally on a non-profit basis.241 The communication
network, on the other hand, is based on the ability to get and give information, whereby
equality in access to information is essential for properly functional communication. The
balance in the significance of information may, however, be altered for market purposes.
This occurs to a considerable extent in the use of domain names, but even more
fundamentally in the design of certain special search phrases for the Internet. This can be
achieved through certain characters or strings of characters that are then used by search
engines. When a search is carried out through language, it is characteristically the
symbolic meaning that is the focus.242
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Meta tags and word stuffing are only one of the infringements that trademark owners may
experience on their Web sites. Others are copying and disseminating copyrighted material
or breaching moral rights by abusing personal information on the Internet. See Wood
1999, 23 - 25.
243 All these three aspects of a domain name contribute to free speech on open networks.
See Committee for Constitutional Law Report PeVL 54/2002 vp., 2.
244 To cite Ilkka Rahnasto’s example: it is easier to market the Web page of the Olympic
Games under the domain name olympic.org than under some other symbol that is
probably hard to remember and possibly has no connections to the Olympic movement.
See Rahnasto 2002, 33.
245 It ought to be possible to register a domain name even as a private person. This has even
been considered essential in order to ensure free speech on the communication networks.
See Transport Committee Report LiVM 23/2002 vp., 2.
246 A well-known trademark has thus already some guaranteed value when used on an open
network. See Heveus 1997, 200.
247 The protection is thus provided on two levels: normal trademark protection and
protection for a private domain name. See Koktvedgaard - Levin 2004, 355 - 256.
248 In other words, it is possible that two enterprises might use the same trademark to sell
unrelated goods, for example, firearms and bread, under the same trademark as long as
doing so causes no consumer confusion. This is where the problem with domain names
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Communication between companies and consumers is essential for the proper
functionality of the market. Consumers need to receive information about goods and
services and companies need a channel for disseminating information about their
products. Today open networks are widely used for commercial advertising. Commercial
operations would not be possible without proper means to represent oneself somehow.
Domain names play several roles here. A domain name is an  identi f ier used for
recognizing an actor, which makes the name essential for network communication and
the domain name itself often constitutes a message to the audience.243 This is in fact the
essence of the market uses of domain names. However, the domain name of a company
must be easy to remember and be easily distinguished from the other domain names on
the network.244 A symbol needs sufficient capability to individualize an enterprise and its
operations, products and services.245
The registration of a certain name as both a domain name and a trademark
strengthens the position of an enterprise in the market. On the open network domain
names and trademarks have a connection through the market. Well-known trademarks in
fact have precisely the same functions on the network that they have in the traditional
tangible market.246 This results in double protection for registered trademarks or
registered domain names.247 This double protection has its problems, however, owing to
the enlarged global operational framework. In other words, no market or market operations are
realized locally any longer: operations are global. Moreover, all market operations take
place on the same network. Problems arise with both trademarks and domain names, for it
is possible to get a similar or the same trademark granted for different products.248 A
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emerges, for only one enterprise may register the same domain name. See Smith 1999, 11.
249 See Lindberg - Westman 2000, 256.
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trademark is thus not unique or absolute. A domain name, by contrast, is unique and
may thus be granted to only one actor at a time.249
1.6 Summary: the need for identification, the power to communicate
The governance and usability of names is fundamentally based on the framework and the
overall operational environment in which the names are to be used. The framework and
its background conditions also define the overall functions of the system of names. The
prerequisites of functionality are defined through the framework in which those
functions are to be carried out. Accordingly face to face communication requires
different communicative tools than distance communication. For example, identification
needs to be realized differently. Communication is almost impossible without tools for
identification or any means of control. These attributes are usually incorporated into a
name, with the name and the overall naming system clearly revealing the changes in the
operational framework and the functional environment. In this operational framework,
a domain name is considered an address and as such as a position on the communication
network. On the other hand, a domain name may also be seen as an identifier in
communication. The utilization of domain names is thus twofold, which entails
problems. The problems are basically connected with the exclusivity of domain names,
exclusivity being based on both the state governance of domain names and the
relationship between domain names and trademarks. On the other hand, changes in the
operational framework affect how communication itself occurs. The problem is rather
the opposite of exclusion, i.e., the collision of a domain name as identifier and address.
Communication is established through positions. A domain name as an address is
rather static in nature. As an address, a domain name merely describes the position of an
actor as part of a neutral communication event. Governance aims at neutrality and
equality between domain name holders and thereby does not take into consideration any
of the practical real values of domain names. Domain names are basically created for the
network operations carried out by computers, where only the technical part of a domain
name has significance. A domain name as a position reflects an ability to operate and
accurately identify the communicative actors. A domain name as a position is in fact
designed precisely for this purpose. Domain names as addresses are unique in  character.
This is the kernel of the exclusivity of domain names as addresses. Each domain name
is unique and that exclusivity implies a distinctive identity on the part of the domain
name by which identification takes place. Uniqueness also makes it possible to
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communicate on open networks. Indeed, the unique character of domain names is one
of the fundamental prerequisites of network communication. On the other hand, this
makes the communication neutral, for computers act neutrally on the basis of pure
numbers or IP addresses. It is exactly these connectives that make the communication
neutral.
Domain names were not originally considered valuable in market use: they were
basically considered only as connective units whose fundamental purpose was to lead
network users to the correct Web page. This is exactly the character of domain names as
addresses: they are considered more like communicative positions than names or
meaningful symbols. However, domain names have a significant role in network
communication. They connect domains and enterprises, which makes domain names an
instrument of identification like proper names in personal communication. The main task
of domain names in the network environment is to ensure access to resources by making
those information resources identifiable. The communication network, on the other
hand, consists of the ability to get and give information. Equality of access to
information is essential for properly functional communication. In the operational
framework, it is essential to identify oneself in order to communicate. Both of these tasks
are bound closely to having a name as an instrument of identification. However, the
character of a name has changed with the development of communication. A name as
such is no longer useful in modern, impersonal communication but needs to be modified
to comply with the requirements of  the changed framework. On the other hand, the
impersonal character of network communication has in general become somewhat
personalized by defining the identities and positions through names.
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250 This is clearly reflected in a trade secret, which protects all subject matter principally
included in the public domain. See Bone 2001, 106.
251 In this sense even culture is commercial or non-commercial. See Lessig 2004, 7 - 8.
252 The digital economy seems to be characteristically founded on sharing and it is thereby
generally based on intensive sharing of work, social experiences and other forms of
knowledge between the members of the community. This is clearly illustrated, for
example, in the easy copying of information, with the contributor able to give away an
infinite number of copies of a document without losing it or diminishing its value. See
Bergquist - Ljungberg 2001, 309. However, Creativity and innovation have been
considered two of the most important assets of the European Union.  See Bangemann et
al. 1994, 21.
253 Obsolescence, as well as innovativeness, are both closely associated with branches of
business going through some kind of transition. These are also a major interest of venture
capitalists, given the possibility to take advantage of disruptiveness in creating new
operations and even totally new branches of business. So far the revolution has been
deepest in the branches of information and communication technology and the Life
Sciences. See Lauriala 2004, 24.
254 See Tapscott 1996, 59 - 60.
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2 CREATE AND MARKET. IDEAS AND BUSINESS IN THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY
2.1 Communication as ideas
Ideas are generally included in the scope of the public domain and likewise in the sphere
of commons.250 In this perspective, information, knowledge, and culture constitute the
essence of the communicative society. The digital economy seems to encourage the
control of ideas.251 Mainly this is due to the importance of innovativeness and innovations
as the essence of the functions of the digital economy.252 Along with control comes a
need to protect those essential elements. For example, the digital economy is based on
rapid innovations, an increasingly global economy, and information and communication
technology. Innovativeness is in fact the core of the digital economy overall. The key to
innovativeness lies in obsolescence, which in turn is crucially based on rapidness.253 Rapid
innovativeness is best manifested in the renewal of inventions: if one has just developed a
great product, one’s goal is to develop a better one that will make the first one obsolete.
The digital economy is generally described through its rapidness: Absoletum Obsoletum - if
it works, it is out of date. On the other hand, obsolescence is inevitable. If one cannot
make one’s inventions obsolete, someone else will. Accordingly, a key driving force of
the new economy is the capability to produce fast innovations.254
Business methods are closely related to innovativeness and ideas. This is clearly
illustrated in business competition, where rapidness as the essence of the digital economy
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255 Earlier, in the 1980s the structure of the economy differed markedly from today’s. The
direction of economic life was carried out through the government platform, among
other things, in industrial policy. The robustness and functionality of industrial policy was
made possible through educational policy and tax policy. States were economic units, and
their competitiveness depended on the operations of government officials.  It was
revolutionary step when the view was shifted from the level of the economy towards
enterprises. It became apparent that the driving force of  economic growth was, instead
of the direction of the sate, enterprises and their mutual competition. See Ståhle -
Grönroos 1999, 43 - 44.
256 Product and service leadership is one way to win in the innovation economy. However,
the need to understand customers and their concerns and desires has become more and
more important. Innovation has to be done beyond the conceptions of the markets. Thus
it is essential to understand the needs of the customer’s customer. See Tapscott 1996, 62.
257 See Ståhle - Grönroos 1999, 45 - 46.
258 The so-called “new combinations” definition includes several other innovations parallel to the
technical ones. Innovations can be: 1) new products, 2) new production methods, 3) new
market areas, 4) new supply channels or sources for the commodities, or 5) new
organization structures. This classification is from Männistö 2002, 22.
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creates competition. It is business competition that creates economic growth. Therefore, it is
important for enterprises to be able to innovate continuously in order to make product
life cycles shorter. Ideas play a crucial role in this innovativeness. Business and
technological development are means in mutual interaction that together cause the life
cycle of individual products to decrease sharply and the number of products to rise
dramatically. Innovativeness is essential for competitiveness, as enterprises compete by
innovating.255 Accordingly, the essential challenge for any digital company is to create a
climate in which innovation itself is prized, rewarded, and encouraged. In order to keep
innovativeness alive, there is a need for organizations that foster creativity.256
Innovation is closely linked to both ideas and knowledge. In order to create an
increase in value and a competitive edge, innovation should be created inside the company,
however.  Innovations that are created outside of a company become public. Their use
is also public, whereby they do not - and cannot - create any competitive advantage.257
This is basically why internal knowledge is extremely valuable for an enterprise.
Innovativeness is an essential prerequisite for economic development and growth.258 In
this respect it also drives the economic growth of the digital economy. An invention does
not become an innovation until it has been approved by the market and therefore only
few inventions become innovations. Many do not get market approval at all. All these
elements, however, maintain the significance of ideas and brisk economic progress.
In the digital economy, ideas and innovations are generally commercialized in order
to create economic wealth and growth. This is achieved by commercializing ideas or
products. Further, commercialization makes articles accessible to consumers, which
increases wealth. Economic growth is also achieved by opening access to wealth to
everyone. Here, the commercialization of ideas has an even more significant task in
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259 Mass marketing has its advantages here, although in the present day such marketing is
often more likely based on mass customization. Democratization of ideas and information
products is carried out through mass marketing when it is possible to lower the prices and
make articles available to consumers. Otherwise the technologies are often too expensive
for the consumer markets. See Steinbock 1998, 5.
260 The free elements of an idea are described in the letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac
McPherson, August 13, 1813. All restrictions are artificial, like a patent or other intellectual
property rights. All relevant boundaries are constituted through legislation. See Lessig
2002a, 94 - 95.
261 See Ståhle - Grönroos 2000, 108.
262 It is thus possible to own an idea, even when it exists purely in one’s mind. Ideas are
hence products that may be owned when transformed into forms that can be protected.
See Cho 1998, 174.
263 This also applies to trade secrets, and keeping business information secret easily impedes
innovativeness. Trade secrets therefore have a unique nature. Whenever a trade secret is
infringed, it is always misused. Unless it is misused, it is not considered to be infringed.
See Soga 2003, 15. In the free market economy it is a common practice to gather
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democratizing technologies.259 Economic growth requires the communication of ideas,
the ability to communicate being the most essential element of innovativeness. In such
communication, information is circulated smoothly and exchanged freely.
The free flow of ideas is based on ideas as one of the most independent resources in
modern society. The role of ideas as fundamental communicative building blocks usually
suggests that ideas should freely spread from one person to another. In other words,
ideas are basically non-exclusive and non-rivalrous and as such free. This clearly distinguishes
the treatment of ideas from that of tangible resources. Ideas are considered to be the freest
resource of all. In nature, for example, ideas are free, which means that there are no natural
restrictions on the diffusion of ideas.260 In this respect both technological and economic
development are bound to the regulated spreading of ideas in that they depend on the
direction and strength of information flows. Information thus gets its value and power
only when it is circulated. It is likewise through these qualities that information creates
innovativeness and the capability of inventions to regenerate.261
2.2 The basis of an idea
2.2.1 The exclusive function
Ideas have a special character in communication, which is well expressed in the exclusivity
of an idea. The essence of an idea basically determines the possibilities of excluding other
people from access to it. An idea may, for example, be excluded from normal
communication if it is kept secret.262 As a secret an idea is excluded completely, which in
practice means that the exchange of ideas is altogether lost.263 A trade secret is an
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information on competitors. New technology often has an extremely high value in
competition. See Nasheri - O’Hearn 1999, 17.
264 A trade secret is generally described in terms of the information included in it. To qualify
as a trade secret, information must be secret in fact, confer a competitive advantage as a secret,
and be protected by reasonable secrecy precautions. Even the infringement of a trade secret
defines its content; i.e., in order to be liable for trade secret infringement, there exists two
requirements to be satisfied. First, the information has to be a trade secret; second, the
information must have been acquired, used, or disclosed by breach of confidence or by
other improper means. See Bone 2001, 102.
265 This is generally called interest in keeping a trade secret. See Government Proposal HE
114/1978 vp., 14.
266 It is as essential for a trade secret that the owner uses the trade secret and that it affords
a competitive advantage. See Chandra 2002, 549.
267 See Bone 2001, 102.
268 Ideas and property rights here are opposed to each other. Ideas may never be subjects of
exclusive rights; rather they tend to spread once they become known or understood by
others. See Koepsell 2000, 51.
269 The exchange of ideas is realized, for example, though patents. A patent may be
considered an application of abstract principles or ideas. This is particularly the case with
processes or formulas, where the substance is expressed by a formula or other model. See
Koepsell 2000, 52.
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illustrative example of this. It is the very essence of a trade secret that it excludes all
others from the idea being kept secret.264 It is also crucial for the business of the holder
of a secret to keep is secret when a trade secret is also defined as an issue that is
significant for the enterprise when it is kept secret.265 It is characteristic of a trade secret
that the underlying secret must not be generally known in the trade.266 The exclusivity of
an idea is the core here.
An idea as a secret entails complete exclusivity, which means that the idea must
precisely be kept secret.267 Excluded ideas are thus blocked from the use of the overall
community. Excluding ideas explicitly and necessarily also causes their exclusion from
societal dialogue. Complete exclusivity is therefore a rather strong tool for protecting
ideas and it may easily turn against itself and exclude the community from ideas. The
exclusion of an idea is imperfect, however, and this imperfectness strengthens the
exclusive character of the idea. Even when it can be kept secret, the revelation of an idea
changes its position; once the idea is disclosed, it is not (cannot be) a secret anymore.
The secrecy or exclusivity may not be restored once a secret has been told to someone.268
The best and the most effective way to protect ideas thus seems be to keep them away
from others. The exclusivity and secrecy of ideas is nevertheless principally an exception
in the digital economy, given that the focus is on rapid innovativeness.
The digital economy is principally based on ideas and the exchange of ideas through
communication.269 Communication is mainly carried out between human beings and is
generally based on the free flow of ideas. Ideas are thus exchanged and communicated
Illustrations of the digital economy
270 See Lessig 2002a, 94.
271 These things can, for example, be told or taught to a virtually limitless group of
individuals but the teacher has still  not lost anything and retains the same idea, thought,
or information. This also applies to some forms of arts: a movie or a piece of music can
be copied almost endlessly without in any way diminishing the master copy. See Ståhle -
Grönroos 2000, 63 - 64.
272 For example, a calculator is a rival innovation. It may be used only by one user at the
time. A mathematical method, on the other hand, is an example of a non-rivalrous
innovation. It may be taught to a great number of people and everyone of them may use
his or her skills at the same time. See Ståhle - Grönroos 1999, 46 - 47.
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freely. On the other hand, the free flow of ideas is based on information transmission
between the transmitting parties only. Roughly speaking, the information does not affect
this level of communication; in this sense it is external. Indeed, it is more likely that the
operational framework defines the treatment of information. In the digital economy,
ideas and information create wealth and communication using ideas, and information is
essentially always one source of wealth. The exclusivity of ideas forms a certain special
structure for distributing resources and wealth. The distributive structure is fundamentally
based on control. The reason why some of the wealth needs to be controlled lies mainly
in the varying character of resources in general. The character of a particular resource
affects the ways in which it is supplied.270
The character of a resource and its foundational relation to society defines the way
it is treated. One manifestation of the relationship between society and an idea is the non-
rivalrousness of ideas. Ideas are often non-rivalrous. Ideas, new thoughts, or even
information are non-rivalrous in the sense that they can be used by several people at the
same time.271 Generally, the same idea can be used several times without lessening its
value or usefulness. The non-rivalrous character of ideas in fact accounts for a great deal
of their strength. The consumption of an idea does not lessen the possibilities of others
to “consume” exactly the same idea. Ideas are thus multiply usable. All in all the non-
rivalrousness of ideas contributes to the cohesion and integration of society in the ideas
being shared by many actors in communication. The less rivalrous a resource is, the more
compellingly it may be used in solidifying society. The rivalrousness of ideas also
constitutes the basis of innovativeness. The clear difference between rivalrousness and
non-rivalrousness, when comparing innovations and ideas, is manifested precisely in the
character of ideas. Ideas, or new thoughts in general, are not rival innovations and can be
used by several consumers at the same time. Use by one consumer does not make use by
another any harder.272
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273 In a mechanical operational framework it is significant only to be able to deliver
information linearly. Communication in a mechanical structure is linear and flows only in
one direction, mainly from the top towards the bottom. See Ståhle - Grönroos 1999, 92.
274 The significance of the balanced horizontal communication is clearly manifested, for
example, in electronic transactions. These transactions ought to be carried out on the
basis of free speech, meaning that even the restrictions in marketing and advertising
ought to be assessed for their impact on the realization of free speech. See PeVL
60/2001 vp., 3.
275 Therefore, the internal communication of information creates as much value as the
external communication. See Ståhle - Grönroos 1999, 93.
276 Innovation comes into existence when a new and a creative product or process has been
commercialized successfully. This definition comes straight from business life, where
innovations have been an essential part of entrepreneurship. See Männistö 2002, 22.
277 See Rönkkö 2001, 86.
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2.2.2 The cumulative function
Ideas are communication, and communication is used as an instrument to compound
ideas and innovativeness. Generally, the communication of ideas is linear, with
information transmitted vertically between operators.273 The free flow of information has,
however, another task within the information structure: it operates to transmit different
pieces of information inside the information structure itself. The information structure is thus
organic and communication is carried out horizontally.274 Horizontality in communication
requires that all the information flows are equal. This is the factor that generates the free
flow of information; the more smoothly information flows, the more capacity it has to
regenerate. Ideas and innovativeness are thus combined together through the free flow
of information and the ability of actors to interpret information.275
One of the essential elements of innovativeness is the ability to communicate
ideas and to utilize them for increasing creativity. Communication thus increases
competitiveness, which is essential in business. Competitiveness is generally pursued
through innovations by commercializing new and creative products or processes.276 Ideas
are the foundation of innovations as the most important resource in today’s enterprises.
This is clearly manifested, for example, in the technology and product development
process, which consists of functions aiming at the creation, development, and
commercialization of products and services. The starting point of the technology and
product development process is always in the emergence of potential ideas and their
formulation into tentative product concepts.277 Innovation is therefore made part of
communication in society. The cumulative character of ideas is clearly manifested in
certain innovations of the digital economy. Namely, some products clearly resemble non-
rivalrous innovations when their essence lies in a certain idea or expression. The
Illustrations of the digital economy
278 At the same time, competitors ought to be excluded from the exploitation of ideas and
novel innovations. This is called the theory of internal growth. See Ståhle - Grönroos 1999, 47
- 48.
279 It may also be said that in the digital age the idea/expression dichotomy can be described
as a dichotomy of expression/machine. See Koepsell 2000, 3.
280 Computer programs or computer code constitute the kernel of the overall operational
framework of the digital economy. This is also where the connection of ideas and
functionality is to be carried out. Computer programs, for example, operate as a driving
force when improving the network society and electronic commerce. See COM (97) 314
final, 18.
281 Accordingly to the dichotomy, a copyright can be granted for a form of expression but
not for an idea. The idea/expression dichotomy is also called the fact/expression
dichotomy. See Loughlan 2002, 33 - 34.
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cumulative function is here introduced by the ease of copying existing ideas.
Communication is generally carried out by using ideas as a part of new innovations.
These ideas and products are similar in that it is generally hard to reproduce the original
but it is easy to make copies. This is exactly where digital technology has had an impact
while at the same time changing how we communicate ideas.
Ease of copying is well illustrated when an innovation involves the improvement
of a product but cannot be protected though intellectual property rights. Such ideas may
be easily and rapidly copied and thus abused by competitors. This implies that the
capability to renew itself is rather essential for an enterprise.278 The cumulative function of
ideas is also manifested in the rapidness of renewal and growth. In continuous
competition it is important for a company to be able to renew itself rapidly. This is
possible, however, only by continuously producing new ideas and innovations.
2.2.3 The communicative function
Ideas are communication, but it is impossible to communicate using nothing but ideas:
ideas always need to be expressed in some form. In the digital economy, the form of
expression is often a digital one.279 Furthermore, in the digital economy ideas are
founded on a digitized operational framework. In that framework, it is computer code
that in practice contains the foundation of ideas. Computer code as a functional entity
thus binds together ideas and functionality itself.280 In this way computer code mixes the
two basic categories of an idea and expression that underlain the fundamental distinction
between copyright and patent. The core of the idea/expression dichotomy is the
assumption that ideas and expressions are distinguishable and separable; ideas have to be
separable from mere expression. This provides a basis for controlling ideas and thereby
excluding them from free circulation.281
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282 The dichotomy of expression and idea is the main distinction between the systems of
copyright and patent. Expressions are copyrightable, whereas ideas are not. The
expressive manifestation is the essence of the copyright legislation. On the other hand,
ideas have been considered patentable. Basically, the distinction between idea and
expression was considered to be the core of copyright legislation. Copyright is especially
founded on expression. The traditional object of copyright is a piece of work in its
abstract form. See Haarmann 1999, 37 - 38.
283 See Still 2000, 65 - 66.
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Computer code is used to filter ideas. This function is fundamentally based on the
character of computer code as an intermediary form of functional expression. Underlying
this role is the difference between idea and expression.282 This distinction is not,
however, as significant as is often thought and a bridge lining the two can be identified.
The basic assumption is namely that an idea and its expression are in any event linked to
each other in one way or another. This notion is founded precisely on the concrete form
and appearance of an invention or a creation, which in fact always includes both an idea
and its expression. In a sense, an invention always incorporates the idea behind expression.283
These two descriptions of computer code are therefore by no means divergent; rather,
ideas become filtered through the means by which they are expressed.
The filtration of ideas is even more fundamental when it is founded on
operational patterns themselves. Computer code is generally always functional by its
fundamental nature. This functionality affects the difference between computer code and
the pure, formal copyrightable form of expression. Code is always operative and thereby
also a functional unit. Code does what it expresses. Code is, accordingly, never the mere
purpose of a  product but rather a set of instructions as well. Therefore, instead of being
described as a literary creation, computer code can be described as the embodiment of an
idea, with the idea being embedded in the component instructions. The whole process is
then driven by the particular code or software as an expression of this idea.
Communication using computer code always requires always some degree of
filtration. This filtration is carried out by protecting the form of expression instead of the
idea itself. Here, the formal expression may be emphasized too strongly, however, which
will make the overall communication process closed. Copyright is not the protection of
processes as much as it is the protection of more passive expressions. Expressions are
essential for communication in that representative expressions make communication
simpler and cheaper overall. A good example of this are the formats of well-known
televison shows, which are not as such protected through copyright. This kind of fixed-
format communication, although simpler and safer as well, easily stifles innovation.
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284 This functionality should also be founded on openness. It has even been speculated that
open source software will be the dominant mode of work of knowledge workers in the
networked society, i.e., the information-based society. See Fitzgerald - Feller 2001, 273.
285 Webopedia describes open architecture as follows: An open architecture allows the
system to be connected easily to devices and programs made by other manufacturers.
Open architectures use off-the-shelf components and conform to approved standards.
Open architecture is an architecture whose specifications are public. This includes
officially approved standards as well as privately designed architectures whose
specifications are made public by the designers.
See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/O/open_architecture.html
286 See Välimäki 2002, 851. It is exactly the openness of open code software that builds
commons of code, knowledge, and innovation upon that code. See Lessig 2002a, 55.
287 Reverse engineering is one means of infringing protected software by producing
competitive programs. Reverse engineering is not, however, always illegal. Reverse
engineering is used for breaking down software for the purposes of teaching students
how to write code, for repairing malfunctioning software, for producing similar software
to run on a different system, for modifying a program for use on one’s own computer,
and for developing software that operates in conjunction with the original software. See
Behrens - Levary 1999, 20.
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2.2.4 The restrictive function
In the digital communication network, ideas are embedded in computer code. Code is
the core of the open digital communication network, for it is computer code that enables
the  networking society to function. It is how functionality is established in the kernel of the
communicativeness of this network.284 This changes the communicative structure of the
network in the direction of computer code. The essential role of computer code in the
open network affects communication itself. Communication is consequently highly
dependent on who controls the code and by which means. This is precisely where the
restrictive function of  controlling ideas comes into play: the character of ideas may differ
depending on the controlling devices and parties. Code can be either open or closed,
open source software including its source code by definition. Open source code requires
that the source has to be kept free and thus available to all.285 Moreover, the source code
can be viewed and modified by users and parts of it can even be taken and used by other
coders.286
The restrictive force of the control of ideas through code is realized in the case of
closed code. Closed code is usually strongly protected, often by copyright. Copyrighted
source code is closed, with no one allowed to use it or even carry out any reverse
engineering on it.287 Protection is based on the view that a computer program is a literary
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288 See Haarmann 1999, 45. See also Committee Report KM 1987:8, 177.
289 See Haarmann 1999, 56.
290 See Committee Report KM 1987:8, 177. Haarmann 1999, 45.
291 This may be questioned by proposing a different way of understanding the process of
reading in which reading is basically understood as a game played entirely by the reader.
It is thus the reader who produces the meaning of the text. See Vaidhyanathan 2001, 9.
292 Thus, from the digital point of view there is no distinction between text, sound, graphics,
photographs, music, animations, videos, or software. The only difference is that software
is essentially active, whereas the rest of these works are passive. Computer programs are
thus not only texts; they also do something. See Widdison 2000, 2.
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work.288 There is, however, a great dissimilarity between computer code and a descriptive
literary work. The difference mainly lies in the expression of the computer program. A
literary work is usually represented in the signs of language and is written, often on
paper. A computer program, on the other hand, is represented in a special mathematical
symbolic language. It may also be described as a code, with the form of expression called
machine language.289 Both of the expressions are thus based on some kind of language,
where the representative elements are essentially the signs of a language used for
communication. In this respect, the two languages are very similar.
There are, however, dissimilarities as well, ones which affect the restrictive
character of closed code. One considerable dissimilarity is the functional form of these
languages: the functionality of these different languages is completely different. Machine
language is the driving force of a computer; it is the code on which the functionality of
a computer is based. Code is the foundation of the communicative language of computers.
Without that language a computer would be helpless, and it would not receive its
essential working orders and instructions. Therefore, the code is fundamentally
communicative, with communicativeness written into the code in its very origins. This is
generally carried out in machine language. Another fundamental difference between a
literary work and computer code has to do with the purpose of the two: a computer
program is fundamentally functional and it is thus designed for directing the functions of
a computer; a descriptive written work, by contrast, is clearly based more on cultural values
and influences.290 Artistic works are supposed to inform and impress more than provide
directions.291
The restriction through a closed code has a direct effect on the functionality of
communication. A computer program has a clear functional meaning, which means that it is
supposed to direct the functions of a computer, or some other machine.292 The
functionality of a computer program thereby derives from its internal structure. In order to
be functional and to process information, a computer needs code. Additionally, a
computer needs instructions, which are used for carrying out its functions in order to
make calculations fast and effective. To be able to understand the instructions a
computer needs to get them in binary form, which means the combination of two values,
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293 This is the essence of all digital information. See Plogell 1996, 13.
294 See Plogell 1996, 13.
295 Business methods in the digital economy are sometimes described only as designs that are
applied in a new environment. Thereby, there may easily arise a question of the grounds
on which a business method should be characterized as a protectable invention. Business
methods may often be described only as the delivery of a method of organizing space.
See Raskind 1999, 64.
296 The competitiveness of the overall European Union is considered to be based on
competition at the level of private enterprises, where private investments operate as a
driving force. See Kuronen 1995, http://www.gsf.fi/~kuronen/public/Bangemann.html
297 It is very common to protect customer lists and databases, brand names and logos,
research and development, and work produced by employees. See Chandra 2002, 546.
298 Some of these protected business operations even lack industrial applicability. Industrial
application would be utilized as a means to exempt them from the patent system
requirements of social observation or human behavior. For example, methods of doing
business as such lack the requisite industrial applicability. Business methods do not
manipulate physical forces to produce or transform material objects. See Thomas 1999,
53.
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0 and 1.293 For this reason the instructions are usually written in a special language, called
machine code. Machine code is binary in form, making it readily understandable by a
computer. If a computer does not understand the language, it cannot operate. Operating
instructions can be, and usually are, combined to solve a larger problem, or a series of
smaller problems. This combination of instructions is termed a computer program.294
Operativeness is thus controlled and restricted by a closed code.
2.3 Business models in the digital economy
2.3.1 Business as experiences
Business is communication and as such it is clearly designed to operate in the digital
economy. Innovativeness is closely connected to business in the digital economy, where
the competitiveness of an enterprise is often derived from its rate of innovativeness and
its ability to create new products.295 The focus of business in the digital economy is thus
often on rapidness of innovativeness, as a competitive edge may often be improved only
by continuously creating new ideas and innovations. Both the knowledge of an enterprise and
its information resources constitute significant  factors in its competitiveness.296 Moreover, it
has become more and more essential to protect business operations as extensively as
possible.297 This expanded protection must even be extended to include methods of
doing business, mathematical formulae and algorithms for automating business
functions, and software that implements key business transactions.298
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299 In other words, the production of information goods involves high fixed costs but low
marginal costs. See Shapiro - Varian 1999, 3.
300 Information may be offered to customers at a very low price or even completely free of
charge. The information vendor pays basically nothing for distributing additional free
copies. For information goods, copies are free for the producer as well as for the
consumer. See Shapiro - Varian 1999, 22.
301 Experience goods thus include many values that no classes of property are able to
acquire. See Lessig 2004, 28.
302 See Shapiro - Varian 1999, 5. Information is like a life-form which consists of
communicating with its surroundings. Information is a process and thus less like an
inflexible object to be implemented in unchangeable conditions. This makes information
a relationship that does not exist in isolation but rather is linked to its more fundamental
meaning. See Czerniawska - Potter 1998, 223.
303 A good example here is computer games as they endeavor to offer experiences to the
people playing, whereby they resemble fictional literature or films. Games have, however,
one special character that is significant in the digital economy. They provide the players
with something to interact with, creating an experience. See Manninen 2004, 19 - 20.
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Ideas as such are also crucial in business, particularly in the digital economy. The
significance of ideas is due to different values being embedded in information. First of all,
information is costly to produce, but cheap to reproduce.299 Therefore, the price of
information is rather relative. It is not possible or even reasonable to price information
and information products according to their real production costs. The overall pricing
process needs to be evaluated in terms of the coexistence of production and
reproduction.300 Pricing is in fact more likely to be founded on the consumer base than on
the producer base. The price of information is generally defined through the value which
the information has each time for each consumer. People often ascribe very different
values to a particular piece of information. Using the consumer base for pricing
information entails some further requirements. The rate of digital business is dependent
on the nature of information as an experience good, which makes information even more
intellectual than it is by definition.301 This intellectualization of information makes intangible
assets especially difficult to value. The valuation of information is linked squarely to its
experiential character. Intellectuality makes it essential for the consumers to experience
assets in order to value them. Information is an activity rather than a possessable object;
that is, it is experienced rather than possessed.302 Thus, in terms of its very essence
information is a communicational asset.303
One fundamental factor in defining the character of information is its virtuality; i.e.,
in virtual terms any product is an experience good, which basically means that any
product may be converted into such a good. For example, a magazine may be virtualized
when, instead of being read, its content is experienced. Information differs somewhat
from physical products in that it is an experience good every time it is produced or
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304 See Shapiro - Varian 1999, 5.
305 A business idea and a marketing strategy are often described as the complementary
elements of an enterprise’s marketing model. See Timmers 1998, 4. A business idea
answers the question “why“and does much to define the core of the business concerned.
See Markides 2002, 17.
306 See Kokkonen 1993, 52. A business concept does not have to be unique in order to be
usable. Other essentials elements in addition to the business concept are the strategic
decisions made in the business and their realization. All these elements together then
create the success of the enterprise. See Karlöf 1986, 29.
307 A strategic innovation may be connected, for example, to a particular clientele, with the
strategic thinking applied to either identify new customers or resegment the existing
customer base more creatively. The aim may also be to form some new customer
segments. Often customer needs remain unchanged, but customer priorities change. For
example, customers still need warmth and style in their overcoats, but, compared with
thirty years ago, style has risen on the list of customer priorities. See Markides 2002, 24 -
25. Often this kind of innovation has created such advantage that the competitors have
not been able to reach the leading enterprise. Often the competing enterprises tend to
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consumed.304 This has two consequences when communicating information to
consumers. First, one has to pay for something that one does not know beforehand. The
payment is charged for information or, more likely, for an opportunity to get to know
something. The communication of information is thus rather asymmetric. Second,
information conveys experiences. Basically, this means that information has the ability to
create experiences; it does not actually contain them. This is the core of the
communicativeness of information.
2.3.2 Communication as strategies
Business strategies are rather closely linked to business ideas, which are generally the
core of an enterprise. In this sense, for example, information security or data protection
may be considered a business idea. Business overall is based on two fundamental
elements that are closely related to each other but still describe business from slightly
differing viewpoints. These are the business idea and the business concept. The business idea
is the insight by which the enterprise finds its position in the market. Without a business
idea, there is no trade, and thus no communication through the exchange of
commodities. Communicativeness in the business idea suggests its significance in
business. Business ideas are generally defined as the source of functionality in business.305
The idea is thus not the end point of the inventive process but rather its beginning.
Further, a business idea may be based on an innovation that can be exploited in the
market. It may be simply the discovery of a certain market niche.306 A business idea can
also be called a strategic innovation, whose aim is to achieve a dynamic comparative market
advantage in a certain market.307 The business mission, for its part, defines why the
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extend or expand their business concept into new business branches, an example being
fast-food enterprises. See Ståhle - Grönroos 1999, 56.
308 The concepts “business concept” or “business mission statement” are essentially Anglo-American
concepts. In Scandinavia we are more likely to speak about the “business idea”. Usually the
business concept clarifies the justification of the existence of a certain business. It is also
often a process which significantly clarifies the economic existence of an enterprise. See
Karlöf 1986, 29.
309 Close to the business concept is the business revenue model, which describes the competitive
advantage of an enterprise more precisely than the business concept alone. Business
mission and business concept are often used as synonyms. Kokkonen 1993, 52. A
business concept can also been described as a detailed description of the advantages of an
enterprise. It consists of three elements and the relationships between them.  These
elements are market segment and the needs of it, products and services, and organization
structure, which means the resources and knowhow of an enterprise and the way in which
it operates See Räsänen 1994, 40.
310 Defining the core knowhow of an enterprise is not always simple. The core knowhow can
be for example a certain technology, like Honda (core knowhow: motors of high quality)
or Apple (core knowhow: architectures of operating systems). For more details, see Lokka
- Möller 1994, 9.
311 According to Constantinos Markides, the strategic innovations emerge in this way: at a given
time the mass market is served by a  number of competitors. A new company spots a
segment or a niche and goes after it. The existing competitors do not care because the
company is not really taking customers away from them. They still keep control of the
mass market. Given the way the new company plays the game in its little niche, it may not
even be seen as a competitor yet. Then, suddenly the niche grows, and the niche company
emerges as the new market leader. See Markides 2002, 27.
312 All the vital shifts in market share occur not necessarily because companies try to play the
game better than their competitors but because they change the rules of the game.
Exploiting the rules of an old game in a brand new way creates innovation in business. In
this respect, business is always based on business designs. Two prototypical business designs
are the “make-and-sell” model and the “sense-and-respond” models. The make-and-sell model
is founded on the organizations predictions on the demands of market, producing the
product, and going out and selling it.  The make-and-sell enterprise relies thus on
interchangeable parts and economies of scale. The sense-and-respond model, on the other
hand, works through the clients’ desires. The sense-and respond enterprise describes itself
as an adaptive system that is responding to unpredictable requests. It is further built
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enterprise exists at all.308 In this task, it is essential to be able to recognize the needs of
customers and to communicate with them. An enterprise’s identification of its business
mission and
business idea is based on its resources.309 The most essential of these resources is the
enterprise’s core knowhow, which, given that ideas are the basis of knowhow, requires some
intellectual investment.310
Creating and maintaining competitiveness depends crucially on strategic
innovations. Competition is based on communication between competitors.311 Strategic
innovations have in fact been described as the behavior of actors competing against each
other in the market. Strategy is thus a kind of communicative game where all market actions
are fundamentally based on the communication between competitors.312 Communication
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around dynamically linked subsystems and  relies on economies of scope. See Barabba
1998, 37.
313 Success in the market is often based on breaking the given rules. This is rather risky when
coming up with new ideas and does not always guarantee success. It is one thing to get an
idea but another to make it work. See Markides 2002, 13 - 14.
314 For example, Henry Ford was not the first to invent the assembly line but, instead, he came
up with the idea that even the working class may act in a consuming role. The innovation
was to change the income of the work force into demand for the items produced by this
very same work force. Goods had traditionally been produced only for consumption by
the idle class. See Pantzar 2000, 111.
315 Strategic innovativeness is based on communicativeness inside the sphere of market
actors. This is why strategic innovation is basically founded on answers to three questions,
which form up strategical levels of innovativeness; “Who is going to be the customer?”,
“What services or products should be offered the chosen customer?”, and “How should
these services or products be offered cost-effectively?” The answers to the who, what,
and how questions form the strategy of any company. See Ståhle - Grönroos 2000, 66 -
67.
316 The answers to the question who, what, and how are determined by what that company
thinks its business is. See Markides 2002, 15. The questions may also concern building the
competitive advantage, positioning the company, the marketing mix or the product-
market strategy to be followed. See Timmers 2000, 32.
317 A company that identifies such changing priorities, like relations, instead of needs, can
reach a specific niche of customers. Similarly, a company can identify a specific customer
segment that competitors are not currently serving. The reasons for this vary, but not
necessarily because the companies do not know about the needs of those customers.
They may have decided that the customer segment is not big enough to go after, or that
they cannot serve this segment profitably. If a new company can serve this niche
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also takes place between enterprises and consumers. Communication between a marketer
and market is essential for making something work in the market.313 This communication
on the whole is based on strategic innovations, where strategic innovativeness is founded on
some change in a business.314 Strategic innovativeness gives an enterprise a sharp
competitive edge. Communicativeness as a strategic innovation is vertical as well as
horizontal.315 Verticality is illustrated in the breadth of innovativeness. Succeeding in
developing a strategic innovation and thus gaining a sustained competitive position often
gives an enterprise the possibility to exploit the strategic innovation in other sectors of
the market.316
2.3.3 Business as relations
Business strategies may be carried out according to several different patterns. These
patterns are generally described and classified as business relations. Business relations are
fundamentally based on communication between an enterprise and its customers, which
actually makes these relations characteristically communicative.317 The most traditional
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efficiently, it has a new customer segment at its disposal. This  is not because any new
customer needs have emerged but because the company has found a more efficient way
to fulfill existing needs. See Markides 2002, 25.
318 This may also mean that goods contain both material or objective information and
common social language, or discourse. See Vähämäki 2002, 68.
319 Another good example of informatization is found in distribution. The distribution of
products is called logistics. Logistics is not, however, only the distribution of concrete
objects but is at least as much concentrated on communicating information about the
objects being distributed. See Sakki 1999, 24.
320 Some examples of a product-oriented strategy are Ford in the car business, Boeing in the
airplane business and Philip Morris in the cigarette business. See Markides 2002, 21.
321 By asking what benefits the customer really derives from a product, a company can
identify its true value added and more precisely define its business. For example, instead
of thinking of a certain business as a car business, it is better to think of it as a transport,
or entertainment, or some other business, depending on the function its product fulfills.
See Markides 2002, 22 - 23.
322 Overall customer satisfaction is actually a result of the enterprise’s unique combination of
assets and capabilities. All the capabilities of an enterprise are thus significant together.
See Markides 2002, 24.
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relation emphasizes a product that is to be sold. Here, the view is product oriented or
object oriented, with the principal focus on the goods to be marketed. An object orientation
is useful when marketing mostly concentrates on products. The view is static and may
not be applied directly to any communicative or dynamic business relations, as the
overall view might become too narrow in focus. All products contain communication,
which is generally embedded in them.318 In this sense, products have been informatized.
Goods are thus made more like intangible units.319 On the other hand, information and
its significance are brought into an object-oriented perspective by commodifying the
information involved. Here, information becomes more like other tangible objects. At
the same time the communicational basis of products has changed. Therefore, defining
businesses only by the products to be sold may be too narrow an approach, one which
might lead businesses astray.320
An object orientation is not a necessity when describing business activities. An
alternative approach is to focus on the customer function that the enterprise is trying to
fulfill. Such an approach places more emphasis on customer communication. The view
thus makes customers the primary focus and at the same time encourages companies to
identify the underlying functionality of their products. In other words, the static, product
oriented view is tilted the other way, towards a more dynamic, function-oriented view.321
It is strategically more significant to focus on customers rather than on mere products. In
this context, the quality of products and services offered to customers depends on
whether a company is able to serve its customers better or more efficiently than its
competitors can.322
Illustrations of the digital economy
323 For example, Sony might say it is in the business of selling pocketability or portability.
Apple might say that it is in the business of supplying user-friendliness. See Markides
2002, 22.
324 Electronic commerce may be interpreted widely or narrowly. In its widest sense,
electronic commerce often includes any kind of transaction that has been carried out by
using digital technology on open networks, closed networks, and credit or debit card
transactions. Open networks are networks like the Internet, closed networks like the
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). See Hart - Chaitoo 1999, 912.
325 The most important communication service for e-commerce is the Internet. Access to the
Internet and e-commerce is based on portals that act as connections and provide access
to the Internet. Clients have thus become one of the most important assets of enterprises,
and especially enterprises controlling portals. The holder/owner of a portal also controls
access by clients and makes a profit from this. See Sakki 1999, 208 - 209.
326 See Hart - Chaitoo 1999, 912. E-shipping may include only Web marketing in order to
promote the company and its goods. This basic model may then be augmented by a
variety of possibilities to order or pay. See Timmers 2000, 35.
327 Electronic commerce includes the electronic trading of physical goods and of intangibles,
such as information. Moreover, electronic commerce includes the provision of electronic
services, or electronic support for collaboration between companies. See Timmers 1998,
3.
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The third view of business strategies concentrates on the business portfolio of core
competencies.323 It is these competencies that enterprises exploit in business. The portfolio
view is somewhat more dynamic than the views that concentrate solely on products or
customers. The portfolio view is also more dynamic because of its communicativeness:
a properly functional portfolio has to take into consideration the communicative part of
a business in order to be functional . In other words, a portfolio is one of the
communicative components of an enterprise.
2.3.4 Functional transactions
2.3.4.1 Simple electronic transactions
The digital economy is mainly based on developing network services. The most
fundamental of these is traditional electronic commerce.324 The core of the electronic economy
lies basically in a rather broad description that consists of the production, advertising,
sale, and distribution of products via telecommunications networks.325 These operations
of the digital economy also constitute the kernel of private governance. Three
corresponding stages in the process of electronic commerce can be distinguished:
searching, ordering and payment, and delivery.326 The ways to engage in electronic
commerce are various and thereby electronic commerce is generally defined simply as
doing business electronically.327 Basically electronic commerce includes the Web marketing of
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328 Here, an increasingly common addition is the possibility to order and pay electronically.
Benefits sought for the enterprise are increased demand, a low-cost route to a global
presence, and cost reduction in promotion and sales. On the other hand, e-business may
be carried out as an e-mall, that is, a collection of e-shops basically enhanced by a
common umbrella, for example, a brand. E-procurement is yet another form of e-
business, offering electronic tendering for and procurement of goods and services. See
Timmers 1998, 5.
329 For example, many Web servers have been developed through which vendors can
advertise and sell products. This is basically founded on the distribution of products and
the logistics connected to this includes mainly material management. See Sakki 1999, 23.
The services available via the Internet fall into six categories: one-to-one messaging (e.g., e-
mail), one-to-many messaging (e.g., mailing lists), distributed messaging databases (e.g.,
newsgroups), real time communication (e.g., chat), real time remote computer utilization (e.g.,
telnet), and remote information retrieval (e.g., www and Gopher). See Gulliksen 1999, 14.
330 It is thus control of these most crucial elements of electronic commerce that gives a
powerful position to the holder of a patent - if these elements are patented as business
methods. Patents may be granted, for example, for real-time credit/debit card processing,
the use of electronic shopping carts and digital coupons and the ability to record and
analyze user-browser histories. See Henderson - Kane 2000, 10.
331 In the area of music, old-fashioned jukeboxes are the best known example of a pay-per-
view system. See Rosenblatt - Trippe - Mooney 2002, 26 - 27. Moreover, electronic
commerce on open networks may be either complementary to traditional business or it
may represent a whole new line of business. See Timmers 1998, 4.
332 These products may be delivered physically or electronically. See Hart - Chaitoo 1999,
912.
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an enterprise, which in practice involves promoting an enterprise and its goods or
services.328
Cyberspace is an effective instrument for channeling electronic commerce.329 It
represents a modern form of communication that is governed privately. Electronic
commerce may include items that are delivered electronically to the purchaser over open
communication networks (e.g., music) and items that are delivered through conventional
distribution channels (e.g., books). On open networks, pay-per-view or pay-per-listen
models depending on the content constitute the most traditional business models.330 The
communication network is mostly used for delivering content, such as concerts, plays, or
movies produced by the entertainment industry. The pay-per-view model has also been
used for some cable televison content deliveries.331 Commercial activities included in
these deliveries focus on the sale of products that may be advertised, ordered, and paid
for electronically.332
Electronic commerce may be described in more communicative terms. I essentially
combines the traditional marketing channels with electronic applications.  However, the
structure of electronic commerce resembles the design of traditional sales and is thus not
as such any more communicative than traditional commerce. Communication needs to
be carried out on a different basis, i.e., in the relationship between the operating parties to the
sale. Since the Internet is an open communication system based on a certain common
Illustrations of the digital economy
333 This includes in particular basic and enhanced telecommunications services. See Hart -
Chaitoo 1999, 912 - 913.
334 An illustrative example of a business method as a consortium of business activities is
Amazon.com’s one-click ordering model. Juha Pöyhönen/Karhu describes the one-click
model as an example of an agile contract. One advantage of the agile contract is that it
enables the governance of contracts through profiling. See Pöyhönen 2001b, 204 - 205.
335 See Barabba 1998, 35.
336 Today the value chains are increasingly described as value networks. The aim is not
anymore to decrease costs but rather to produce as much added value as possible for a
customer. See Haapanen - Vepsäläinen - Lindeman 2005, 25 - 26.
337 Business models are often considered products of the digital economy and e-commerce.
See Rajala - Rossi - Tuunainen - Korri 2001, 18 - 19.
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protocol, it has become a boundless environment for communications and electronic
delivery. Commercial activities in fact provide the infrastructure that makes such
transactions possible and economic incentives channel private governance through these
transactions.333 Electronic commerce is not a particular sector of the economy but may
be applied across a large range of services. Clearly, there is no business sector that could
not operate electronically.
2.3.4.2 The communicative balance of business models
A business model is generally defined as a combination of business activities. A business
design includes the business relationships that are made possible by business activities in
general and it is thus the totality of diverse operations carried out by an enterprise.334  It
includes the entire system of delivering utility to customers and earning profits from that
activity. The functionality and operativity of an enterprises are embedded in a
comprehensive system of activities and relationships, that together constituting the
business design of the enterprise.335 A company’s business model thus indicates the
means by which the company makes a profit by specifying where it is positioned in the
value chain, or the value network.336 In this respect, business models are closely related
to methods of private governance.
A form of private governance the business model is commonly described in terms
of information and the products and services associated with it.337 Accordingly, the
foundation of electronic business models lies in possibilities to manage electronic
transactions. The majority of economic activities that are carried out entirely on the
network constitute a combination of information, knowledge, and ideas that are
digitizable and usable in various ways. Basically, a business model is an architecture of
product, service and information flows. The architecture constitutes of a communicative
governance structure which includes various business actors operating in different
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338 To become completed the definition must also include a description of the potential
benefits for the various business actors, and a description of the sources of revenues. See
Timmers 2000, 32.
339 Some electronic activities being handled completely on the Internet are, for example, the
capacity to browse search, order, and pay for selected goods and services. See Hart -
Chaitoo 1999,  915.
340 See Benkler 2000, 562.
341 See Shapiro - Varian 1999, 53 - 54.
342 Characterizing the customer population and identifying different customer groups create
some essential competence in congregated market places. See Rajala - Rossi - Tuunainen -
Sorri 2001, 30.
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roles.338 The overall view of a business model is that it is internally communicative; it is
based on the electronic impulses involved in delivering the digitized products that
constitute the physical basis of a service transaction.339
Business models are based more on customization than on marketing. This means
that it is no longer enough to minimize the purchase price in order to succeed in
competition. In other words price is only one element of the overall value when striving
to optimize the financial performance of the entire business. Competitiveness more likely
requires a focus on customer communication.340 The communicative basis of customization
is capitalized differently than that of marketing  in a purely price oriented approach.
Pricing requires information about customers and their individual buying habits and
motives, with this information best obtained directly from the communicating
customers.341 It is therefore significant to consider a customer as a constant part of the
enterprise value network. Customer loyalty then creates economic incentives to maintain
private governance through business models based on customer communication. In sum,
one essential factor in building up a sustainable business model seems to be to
concentrate on customers.
Customer information and continuous communication with customers constitutes
the essence of marketing and creating business models.342 A good example of governing
client information is usage metering. Usage metering is a means to monitor and charge for
the consumption of many immaterial utilities. Usage metering works well with electricity,
or water, or other utilities that are consumable and measurable like them. Digital rights
management technologies also work well with metered usage pricing because they are
capable of measuring and reporting to a server precisely what the user is doing with the
content. The technologies are also applied to things other than pricing. Observing what
a customer is doing with one’s content helps one determine which particular content
items users find most interesting. This allows a business to perform tasks such as
Illustrations of the digital economy
343 Usage metering is valuable especially for video content to see how people are viewing
video clips and which segments are the most popular. Textual contents is the other
popular group.  See Rosenblatt - Trippe - Mooney 2002, 28 - 29.
344 This applies at least to the companies operating on the Internet. See  Rajala - Rossi -
Tuunainen - Sorri 2001, 19.
345 See Rajala - Rossi - Tuunainen - Sorri 2001, 19.
346 Networking is actually founded on mutually connected business relationships where there
also exist certain chain dependencies between relationships. This may be called indirect
connectedness. See Håkansson - Snhota 1997, 19.
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improving its editorial selection process or steering advertisers towards more highly
trafficked content.343
2.3.4.3 Networking
The communicative balance of a business model is based on governing the different
communicational patterns within the model. A business model therefore requires that
different information streams be combined in order to communicate properly. A
business model can be conceived of blend of three overlapping and interlocked streams that are
crucial in business. The communication between buyers and vendors is tightly structured
through value streams. These streams are in one way or another, based on communication
and the communicative relationships being built through cooperation. These critical
streams, more precisely key business processes, make the communicative structure very much
part of any modern business model.344
The second crucial stream - revenue - is more or less fixed inside the company,
although it is also part of the communication realized between an enterprise and its
customers. The perspective here is nevertheless  company oriented, inasmuch as revenue
is still the primary focus of any company. The third instrumental stream has to do with
information flows and is called the logistic stream.345 In the digital economy, information
logistics is one of the main focuses of any enterprise because of the great importance of
information, ideas and innovativeness. These essential elements are the main factors in
a sustainable business model and in its competitiveness in the digital economy.  Variance
in  business models is fundamentally bound to the changing balance between these three
critical streams. Networking is in these cases carried out between enterprises. Good
examples are a furniture store IKEA with its purchase networks, or Nokia by keeping its
brand, R&D, and customer management but at the same time establishing network
relations in distribution and manufacturing.
The communicative balance of business models can also be seen in networking.346
Traditionally, sales have typically been based on a cooperative relationship between one
seller and one buyer, with the essential communicational structure based on the simple
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347 Networking in this sense is decentralized; that is, it does not have a certain defined center,
nor any clear boundaries. Networking is thus founded on the chain effect that results from
connectedness. Accordingly what happens in one business relationship then affects
another one, with a change in one relationship propagating through the network. The
chain effect is not automatic or deterministic but occurs when transmitted by at least
some of the actors. See Håkansson - Snhota 1997, 19 - 20.
348 The network effect may, for example, increase the favor of a certain product among
consumers. See Shapiro 1999, 93 - 94. Here the converse is found in marketing, where
the pure open architecture strategies are only the second best alternative. The best way
for the platform owner to introduce a new platform technology might thus be to make it
profitable for a large number of unidentified enterprises to develop compatible hardware
and software accessories. See Lichtman 2000, 618.
349 Many of the electronic marketplaces have a common Web page which is used as the
starting site for the Web services. This is also how these service providers get customers.
See Järvelä - Tinnilä 2000, 64 - 65.
350 The purpose of these marketplaces is to encourage as many customer relationships as
possible. See Timmers 2000, 36. For more marketplace models, see Mercer Management
Consulting, White Papers
http://www. mercermc.com/Perspectives/Whitepapers/Commentaries/Comm00Beyond
theExchange.pdf
351 An e-mall operator would not have an interest in an individual business that is being
hosted. Instead, the operator may be seeking benefits in enhanced sales of supporting
technologies, or benefits in servicing, or advertising space and/or brand reinforcement.
For more details, see Timmers 2000, 36 - 37.
352 A network structure as a form of organization differs from a hierarchy in which
components are assumed to be invariably linked. Accordingly, it is also different from the
market as a form of organization generally assumed to be an atomistic structure. See
Håkansson - Snhota 1997, 20.
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value stream of this relationship. The structure must, however, be adjusted slightly when
the number of actors either sellers or customers increases.347 A network effect occurs
when individual users of a product gain value from others using the same product.348 As
a result of the network effect the critical mass of customers will be rather exponential,
which is unique to the environment of Web services.349 It thus becomes profitable to
attempt to gather as many potential customers as possible. These complex marketplaces
take the form of e-malls, mega-marketplaces or simply e-marketplaces.350 They are
conceived of as rather cooperative and therefore their purpose is not only to encourage
a simple sale but to stimulate communication. Basically, an electronic mall or an e-
marketplace consists of a collection of e-shops that have built a common site on the
Web. These shops are usually promoted under a common umbrella, which might, for
example, be the use of a well-known brand as a trademark.351
The network effect suffers slightly from the isolated position of customers who
communicate simply through communicative relationships with the marketplace, that is,
vertically.352 This vertical communication seems to work adequately, but horizontal
communication is also needed if a vendor and customers are to become a complete and
Illustrations of the digital economy
353 For example, the vast majority of new technologies today are generated within corporate
structures. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 14.
354 See Pöyhönen 2002, 581.
355 A virtual enterprise has several advantages. It may be advantageous, for example, when
adapting to the increasingly global competitiveness of the market, producing shorter
product lifecycles or IT-enabled opportunities, or when adopting new organizational
forms. See Gallivan 2001, 280.
356 This is the very essence of making enterprises virtual. As the traditional organizations
break down, the walls between organizations are falling too. See Tapscott 1996, 85.
357 This kind of business model is introduced even by some enterprises operating in more
traditional ways. For example, Nokia has modified its operations towards a more project-
oriented operational frame. See Tervo 2004, 108.
358 Originally SMSs were used only for the purposes of network maintenance. It was thus
end-users who ultimately made a SMS a killer application. See Tervo 2004, 164.
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genuinely networking community.353 This mainly requires communicative relationships
among fellow clients in addition to co-existing horizontal communication. The
communicational structure of networking business is thus somewhat more complex than
that in two-party relationships. This complexity further affects private governance and its
organizing power. Marketers and their audience are still communicating, but the network
architecture needs to be enhanced and governed continuously. The network effect is thus
never complete.
Another good example of networking enterprises in the digital economy is virtual
enterprises. A virtual enterprise is generally described as a form of cooperation among
several legally independent enterprises that produce services based on a common
business understanding.354 Most of these enterprises are founded on the principle of
modularity.355 The key element in a virtual enterprise is partnering, rather than staffing up.
Partnering is rooted in the core competencies of an enterprise, which are then further
joined with those in other companies.356 The most important task for a virtual enterprise
is hence the capability of forming alliances and modifying operations accordingly.357 On
the other hand, a usable innovation may be brought about the end-users. Here, an
illustrative example is an SMS (Short Message Service) for sending short text messages to
mobile phones. SMS is an innovation prompted precisely by the users of mobile
phones.358
2.3.5 Informational restructuring
2.3.5.1 The independent significance of communication
Communication changes the significance of information. Accordingly, when the structure
of business activities is to be renewed, the traditional foundation of the customer-vendor
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359 For example, an electricity bill shows how may units have been used and how much one
has to pay. See Czerniawska - Potter 1998, 40.
360 This is the traditional method of sharing knowledge. This was also the only method that
organizations could adopt when their knowledge assets were kept in the physical domain.
See Czerniawska - Potter 1998, 198. This obviously applies also information.
361 See Czerniawska - Potter 1998, 198 - 199.
362 This is also found in the different types of innovations. Some innovations are autonomous,
meaning that they can be developed independently from other innovations. On the other
hand, some innovations are systemic, meaning that their benefits can be realized only in
conjunction with related, complementary innovations. See Chesbrough - Teese 1998, 28 -
29.
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relationship needs to be restructured on a different communicative basis where
information is concerned. This is use of information conflicts with the traditional one.
The shift towards informational restructuring has emerged with the increased
significance of information in the digital economy and the information-oriented character
of the economy. Information has traditionally been a mere representation of something
else, i.e., recycled information concerning something, and therefore in itself, has traditionally
been considered lesser in value than what it represents.359
The traditional form of communication, even if it was founded on information
and  communication, was rather narrow. There was not very much interactivity: rather,
the communicative model was based on a clear ownership strategy.360 As such the system
was rather centralized and closed. Communication was mainly based on one moderator at
the core who was clearly considered the owner of the information. As such an ownership
strategy as the anchor of private governance is simple: it is clearly based on the
theoretical foundation of ownership in general, where the owner has the privilege of
deciding on the use of the object owned. This applies to information as well: only the
owner of information is able to decide on the importance of the information and on
making it available. Yet, given that a high degree of interactivity constitutes at least part
of the significance of private governance as the core of business operations, private
governance needs to be structured in a more functional way than traditional governance.
Centralized communication namely impoverishes the communicative structure. Control remains
under the power of only one actor, the owner. This is also where the biggest problem
lies: information does not always have equal value for everyone and its value may also
vary according to the other information in the marketplace.361
The value and significance of information is thus variable. This is why it is
impossible to know or define it beforehand. Moreover no one can estimate its value
when it is combined with information from elsewhere in the business.362 This can be
illustrated by examining information and its significance from a slightly different
viewpoint. One stable way to design an e-business is a model that offers solutions and this
Illustrations of the digital economy
363 See Beyond the exchange: Promising business models for the next round of B2B
e-commerce. Mercer Management Consulting, White Papers
http://www. mercermc.com/Perspectives/Whitepapers/Commentaries/Comm00Beyond
theExchange.pdf
364 See Czerniawska - Potter 1998, 40.
365 Business actions as business strategies may, for example, be bound to open source
software since enterprises are generally able to make profit by distributing the open
source software. They may add value to the software through additional proprietary
products or by bundling it with their own products. See Bergquist - Ljungberg 2001, 308.
Open source software has sometimes even been considered as a kind of virtual organization
where the context and the processes allow the agents to coordinate their work effectively.
See Gallivan 2001, 284.
366 Pull strategies require well-developed information sources, wide and indexed databases of
information, selected software and hardware, procedures designed to ensure the acquired
and updated information, systems that ensure user availability, and the monitoring of
proper functionality. The opposite is push strategies, where information is arranged around
communities. All these communities have common interests with regard to the
information. See Czerniawska - Potter 1998, 200 - 201.
367 See Czerniawska - Potter 1998, 163 - 164.
368 Strategically this is defined as a push strategy. This model was used by the early Internet
users, who banded into different communities of interest. People wishing to find out
about a topic could scan the list of available groups and select those that they wished to
subscribe to. See Czerniawska - Potter 1998, 203.
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model is clearly based on the shift in the importance of information.363 The traditional
way to establish competition is to keep information incomplete, but in the solution-
offering model consumers have the opportunity to get as much information as they want.
The offering of information is thus the main idea of the model. The focus is on supporting
consumer choices. The model overtly combines products and services with information
and in this way allows the customers themselves to make more informed decisions. The
shift in the informational structure is clearly recognizable in this development. It has very
much to do with the fact that information about an object can now be separated from
the object itself giving the information a value of its own.364
Digital business models are closely linked to interactivity, which clearly changes the
informational structure of business actions.365 The more information there is available,
the more active consumers need to be, with the communicative structure of giving and
receiving information definitely playing a crucial role. The strategy of sharing information
in these cases is called a pull strategy; i.e., those who want to access a piece of
information pull it to themselves.366 Information is produced and communicated in
various ways and investing in searching for information makes it possible to provide
different information to different consumers in addition to combining sets of different
information and different products.367 Information is then arranged around communities
of common interests, with the users themselves selecting where they wish to place
information and which communities they wish to access.368 Information and the
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369 See Czerniawska - Potter 1998, 203.
370 Basically, this means that the information needed will be retained for use at the optimal
costs. Further, the information produced inside the organization is shared in an
economically optimized sufficiently effective way. See Pöysti 1999a, 202.
371 This concerns information logistics, which connects information processing, information
management, and data system and data communication architectures. See Pöysti 1999a,
202.
372 Often we speak about the restructuring of value chains. Mostly this is due to more
effective operations, widening the  service base, updated information spreading, and
customer-based additional services. See Järvelä - Tinnilä 2000, 75.
373 The value chain was essentially based on the distribution of products. The prototype of
distribution was the process from buying from producers to selling through distributors.
See Haapanen - Oksanen 1986, 9.
374 For example, Napster was a solution based on peer-to-peer communication that is
fundamentally based on meta-information. By these means, the information producer and
the end-user are brought into mutual communication, with the service provider only
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gathering of it are thus based on interactivity, the communication itself being interactive.
From the viewpoint of the consumer this resembles closely a flood of information, which in
practice requires his or her active participation.
The difficulty in managing the flood of information lies in identifying which group
should be set up.369 The information cannot be delivered to everyone and, moreover, the
whole community is not interested in the same information. Information is thus relative
and diverse interests are linked to the relevant information. In adhering to functional
lines, however, there is a risk that cross-functional opportunities will be lost. For example
topic-oriented approach might lead to a quite haphazard process in which individuals are
misled in looking for information matching their interests. Information includes thus a
relative value that is generally associated with commodified information.370 Information itself
has thus become a consumable commodity due to the replacement of material streams by
informational streams that are characteristically intellectual.371
2.3.5.2 A sifting communicative balance in the value chain
The digitization of the economy is changing the information delivery structure, and the
digital economy has caused direct modifications to business models themselves. This has
altered the balance of the sales prototype from the traditional exchange between a trader
and a purchaser. The traditional business model needs to be changed in one way or
another if one examines the traditional value chain from a slightly altered perspective.372
The modified view of the value chain is due to a slightly different interpretation,
reflected as a shifting balance in and the evolving structure of communication.373 A good
example of this is peer-to-peer (p2p) delivery as a business model.374
Illustrations of the digital economy
producing information about services. See Still 2002, 294.
375 One kind of e-auction is now patented by Priceline.com (U.S. pat. 5,794,207).
376 There is no need for physical transportation until the deal has been established. Sources
of income for suppliers are reduced surplus stock, better utilization of product capability,
and lower sales cost overhead. See Timmers 2000, 37 - 38.
377 The infrastructure of an e-market has four main parts: ways for trading partners to find
each other, communication facilities and protocols for working out deals, legal
enforcement of contracts resulting from the deals, and a communication system to tell
other traders about the deal. See Hall 2001, 14.
378 See Hall 2001, 11 - 12.
379 See Hall 2001, 28.
380 Finally, transparency may be sought by keeping the terms of deals transparent. See Hall
2001, 30.
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Business models on open networks are mainly based on their success in delivering
digital content. Success is necessary in two senses. On the one hand, it is needed for
establishing a market and on the other for satisfying consumer requirements. In the
digital framework this is generally realized by restructuring the communicational balance,
one way to affect it being simply to ease communication within the value network. This is
accomplished by changing the relationships of different stakeholders. An illustrative
example of this is an electronic auction, which offers an electronic implementation of
bidding mechanisms.375 E-auctions may offer integration of the bidding process with
contracting, payments, and delivery and, at the same time, benefits for the supplier and
buyers in the form of increased efficiency and saved time.376
An e-auction is a good example of a business model in the digital economy in
another sense as well: it is based on two different forms of communication.377 One, bound to the
price, is further based on incompleteness. It is never sustainable to reveal the price one
wants for something or that one would be willing to pay for something. Concealing the
best price, and thus concentrating on maintaining different prices for different
customers, usually brings the best profits.378 The other is transparency, which is primarily
based on the identification of traders. The identity of a seller is important for two
reasons: first, bidders care about the reputation of the seller for describing the product
accurately and for delivering it as promised. Second, sellers may have special knowledge
that makes buying from them dangerous.379 The terms of bids, on the other hand, reveal
the prices offered by the other bidders.380 The overall process of an e-auction is based on
both transparency and incompleteness, like most of the transactions of digital economy.
In digital transactions, transparency and incompleteness are also the essence of private
governance, in contrast to the public consumer-protected view.
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381 See Timmers 2000, 36.
382 See Korpelainen - Lampikoski 1998, 176 - 177.
383 Value chains may also be moderated by value-service providers. These are specialized in
several functions for the value chain. The functions may be, for example, electronic
payments or logistics in which revenue comes from consultancy or transaction fees. See
Timmers 2000, 39 - 40.
384 They are additional to on-line channels. See Timmers 2000, 39.
385 This is called choice board customization, see Mercer Management Consulting, White
Papers
http://www. mercermc.com/Perspectives/Whitepapers/Commentaries/Comm00Beyond
theExchange.pdf
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2.3.5.3 Communication at the level of networking
The balance of traditional business models may be sliding towards implementing the basis
for all revenue differently. Competition is not necessarily focused only on simple reciprocal
relationships between individual actors, each of whom is acting alone on his or her
respective side. Electronic tendering and procurement of goods and services bring in
some possibility to choose from a greater number of suppliers.381 In these cases the
change in the balance is due to the significance of information, with the whole value
chain becoming virtual, i.e., a virtual value chain. In a virtual value chain, it is information
that has most greatest significance. Moreover, products at each level of the value chain
may be converted into virtual ones. In other words, each stage of the process is capable
of producing information products.382 This changes the communication throughout the
value chain by implementing variations in the value chain itself. Multiple steps in the
value chain may be integrated in order to exploit the information flow between those
steps as further added value.383
Further, the communicative balance in the overall value chain may be altered by
leaving the marketing to a third party. Essentially, this means that the value chain will not
be completely integrated by only two dominant players. In other words, the basic schema
of two cooperating actors is changed through the addition of an extra operator. Third-
party marketplaces thus complement the existing two-party channels, modifying
conventional dualistic communication.384 Further, the value chain may prompt otherwise
separate parties to operate together, shifting communication more towards varied balancing
within the value chain.385 This takes the form of allowing customers to configure their
product or service from a variety of different options; i.e., they are given an opportunity
to describe exactly what they want.
Electronic actions offer an illustrative example of networking, too. E-actions are
closely related to business models where all the players in a value chain are integrated
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386 For more on the hub model, see Mercer Management Consulting, White Papers
http://www.mercermc.com/Perspectives/Whitepapers/Commentaries/Comm00Beyond
theExchange.pdf
387 Communication in the networks is also provided through organizing collaborating
platforms. These provide a set of tools and an information environment for collaboration
between enterprises. This can then focus on specific functions, such as collaborative
design and engineering or project support to a virtual team. See Timmers 2000, 38.
388 The fundamental framework of a virtual community is provided by a company operating
the virtual community. A virtual community is often also an important add-on to other
marketing operations in order to build customer loyalty and receive customer feedback.
The members of a virtual community are often customers or partners. Business
opportunities lie in managing the platform and in selling the specialist tools, with
managing the platform mainly consisting of membership, or usage fees. Selling the
specialists tools consists of designs, workflow, or document management. See Timmers
2000, 38 - 39.
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and become interdependent. The system rests on a tight core and an operating network
that is supported by that core.386 These interrelated hubs then further assimilate players
all the way along the value chain into joint communication and transactions. The value
chain itself becomes communicative and thus functional as a network. These networking
consortia are founded on a hub as a common operative core. The networking
communities may, however, also operate without any hub as their basis, in which case
they are simply called virtual communities.387 The ultimate value of a virtual community
comes from its members, who add their information to the basic framework.388
2.4 Patenting software
2.4.1 The significance of a software patent
Private governance is essentially based on governing the natural business value chains,
motivated by the economic profit to be had from governing those value chains. This
characteristic pattern has, however, a tendency be modified by public governance, which
takes the form of patenting or copyrighting software. The core element of software
protection is the computer program. A computer program or computer software may be
defined in terms of several elementary parts that make up the functional totality of all
software-based inventions. Four elements are typically distinguished. First, a software
application includes source code that is written by programmers in a high-level computer
language. Source code is translated into object code, which is a machine-readable version of
the source code. The most controversial part of a software application is the algorithm,
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389 The arrangement of commands as the core of an algorithm may be presented in either the
source code or the object code. See Bynum 1998, 284.
390 See Bynum 1998, 284. Further, a computer program may be broken down in terms of six
parallel levels of declining abstraction: the main purpose, the program structure or
architecture, modules, algorithms and data structures, source code, and object code. See
Derclaye 2000, 59.
391 The brains of the operation, i.e., the algorithm, is thereby divided from the brawn, i.e., the
hardware. See Kerr 2002, 48. It is precisely the expansion of the Internet that has brought
about some fundamental changes in both the hardware and software industries. For
example, innovation and value chains have been fragmented, moving towards
differentiated and more modular patterns. See Holtgrewe - Werle 2001, 55.
392 Moreover, all these interests ought to be preserved in parallel. Accordingly, they should
be balanced. See COM (2000) 199 final, 5.
393 This is the view in Europe. See COM (2000) 199 final, 19. Parallel protectability through
copyright and patent may even diminish the need for completely new sui generis
protection for computer programs. See Amper 1998, 13.
394 Copyright would be utilized as a form of protection for computer programs that do not
satisfy any requirement of a technical character other than that they process data. See
Klami - Neejärvi 1997, 593.
395 A computer program is often typically manufactured as a collaborative effort of several
programmers. Horizontal cooperation consists of a series of parallel tasks realized by a
programmer or a group of programmers. Vertical cooperation is carried out by building on
the work of other programmers. See Koivumaa 1995, 130 - 131.
396 See Tepora 2004, 195.
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which is a sequence of instructions represented in the computer code.389 Finally, a
program consists of a “look and feel” that inspires the way the program appears on the
screen and interfaces with users.390 Software is thus rather complex and because of its
abstractness it is also relatively complicated to represent it in any clear two-dimensional
form.
Software is the fundamental element of a computer system. A computer consists
of both hardware, that is, the equipment itself, and software, which includes operating
instructions for the machine.391 Both components are usually protected in different ways
and all of the interests, i.e., those of right-holders, their competitors and users of the
computer programs, generally need to be taken into consideration.392 In software
protection, patent and copyright are hence considered complementary forms of protection.393
Copyright protects the computer code itself as a code language, whereas a patent protects
the functional technical ideas and principles.394 These forms of protection are employed
accordingly and together they constitute complete protection for computer programs.395
The legal protection thus comprises two complementary approaches.396 This protection
is cumulative in the sense that the exploitation of a particular program may infringe both
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397 See COM (2002) 92 final, 8.
398 This is the main rule of the Berne Convention, article 2. A similar set of provisions is
included in the WIPO Copyright Treaty, article 4 and TRIPS Agreement, article 10 (1). At the
level of the European Union, the copyrightability of computer programs is based on
Directive 91/250/EEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 1991 on the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs and in Finland on Copyright Act 1§. Directive
2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonization
of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society does not change this.
In the United States, computer programs were outside the scope of copyright protection
until 1976. This was based upon the reasoning of White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo
Co., 209 U.S. 1, 28 S. Ct 319 (1908). The Supreme Court of United Sates held that since
the expressions contained in piano-player rolls were not directly obvious for humans and
because the underlying work could not be directly reproduced without the aid of a
machine, the piano-rolls were considered not to be amenable to copyright protection. See
Koepsell 2000, 61.
399 Additionally, the person having the right is specified. Restricted acts generally require the
authorization of the right-holder whereas acts which do not constitute an infringement
are determined. The conditions for the protection of the program are defined. See COM
(2000) 199 final, 6.
400 The difference between expression and idea is the one of the focuses of copyright today,
even in the area of software. The difference is most problematic in the branch of
knowledge products, where it is essential to be able to distinguish unprotectable ideas
from protectable expressions. Fixing this boundary is actually rather significant for the
information industry. See Bobko 2001, 67.
401 This is carried out, for example, by using the melody as a beat, and as such an element of
the rhythm. This is used in sampling, which is thus mainly claimed to be only
transformation. See Vaidhyanathan 2001, 145.
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the copyright of the computer code and the patent covering the underlying ideas and
principles.397
The main rule in the protection of computer programs and software is to protect
them as literary works.398 This is accomplished through exclusive rights by copyright, with
copyright operating as a form of public governance.399 Copyright does not, however,
protect any ideas or principles, which nevertheless are the most significant element of a
program. Thus the fundamental kernel of a software application may easily be excluded
from copyright protection. On the other hand, expression may be used as an idea.400 This
occurs in practice by creating something merely only by exploiting the idea embedded in
the expression.401 This is not, however, the only loophole where the protection of
software is concerned. Namely, copyright disregards the original work of the
Create and market. Ideas and business in the digital economy
402 Software is rather distinct from other fields of research and development. Traditionally
software development was considered a craft or an art. Software is nevertheless
rationalized in commercial industries, where it still counts as knowledge work. It is thus
an interpretative process of creative problem-solving. See Holtgrewe - Werle 2001, 49.
403 This applies very much to knowhow, especially when software is transferred to a new
owner. The transfer of a new machine in its conventional sense may be carried out by
transferring only the machine and leaving the knowhow involved in manufacturing this
machine out of the transfer. Software cannot,  however, be transferred in this way, since
anyone who comes into possession of a computer program has all of the manufacturing
knowhow with it. See Reichman 1994, 2517, especially footnote 453.
404 A computer program as a term may describe a large range of examples. It may thus either
be described as a basic algorithm capable of application, or then it may be described as
indefinite number of some more specific uses to detailed instructions for the solution of
particular problems. See Cornish 1996, 181.
405 An algorithm is a formula or set of steps for solving a particular problem. To be an
algorithm, a set of rules must be unambiguous and have a clear stopping point. We use
algorithms every day. For example, a recipe for baking a cake is an algorithm. Most
computer programs, with the exception of some artificial intelligence applications, consist
of algorithms. See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/a/algorithm.html
406 See COM (2002) 92 final, 7.
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programmer almost totally.402 Owing to the character of software with its several levels
of originality and authorship.403
The kernel of a software application is based on a mathematical algorithm that
constitutes the core of the software.404 An algorithm is generally simply defined as a
formula or set of steps for solving a particular problem.405 It is also described as a
detailed sequence of actions that are further intended to perform a specific task. It is the
mathematical algorithm that is the most sensitive part of the computer software where
protection is concerned. An algorithm is not necessarily a technical in nature; it may form
part of non-technical processes as well. An algorithm may underlie either a computer-
implemented invention or an invention relating to a conventional machine or the process
carried out by that machine. Thus, an algorithm often constitutes a crucial part of even
mechanical or electrical machines, but software differs from these in one respect. An
algorithm is the most crucial part of a piece of software in that a computer program is
executed by instructions directed to the computer by algorithm. A conventional machine
operates though its mechanical or electrical components; the functionality of a machine
is thus not achieved by an algorithm.406
The technical nature of a computer program generally operates as the basis of
public governance through patenting. The patentability of software is thus based on
patenting an algorithm. A software patent converts ideas into inventions, the
fundamental purpose of commodifying ideas in this way being to treat them like all the
Illustrations of the digital economy
407 Computer software has not always been a commodity; rather it has generally been treated
as a public good. Only the diffusion of workstations and personal computers made
software to turn into a valuable private good which can be treated separately from
hardware. See Holtgrewe - Werle 2001, 43.
408 The third powerful actor in the global market is Japan. In Japan there is a doctrine similar
to the one in Europe. An invention has to be a highly advanced creation of technical
ideas by which a law of nature is utilized. See COM (2002) 92 final, 5.
409 It fulfills the requirement of technicality if a program has the potential to produce a
technical effect when loaded and run on a computer. See EPO T1173/97 and EPO
T0935/97.
410 Technological qualifications, i.e., technical character, technical potential and
reproducibility, constitute only a part of the industrial utilization of an invention. See
Klami - Neejärvi 1997, 590.
411 The main rule in protecting computer programs in Finland is to copyright them. The
copyright of a computer program excludes, however, the ideas and principles that
constitute the fundamental basis of the computer program. See COM (2000) 199 final, 20.
412 The investigation of patentability is generally carried out with regard to the invention as
a whole. This is also how a computer program can be patented when the invention as a
whole is technical enough. See Klami - Neejärvi 1997, 590 - 591.
413 This was precisely the implication of the Freeman-Walter-Abele Test. Under that test the
mathematical algorithms in question were required to be applied to or limited by physical
elements or process steps. See Quinn 2002, 142.
414 EPC 52 (2): “The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions within the
meaning of paragraph 1:
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic creations; (c)
schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business,
and programs for computers; (d) presentations of information. See accordingly in Finland,
Patent Act 1§. (Italics added here.)
See http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar52.html#A52.
The unpatentability of computer-implemented inventions is to remain in Europe given
that the European Parliament dismissed the proposal for patentability of computer-
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other commodities in the market.407 Patentability is based on the overall patentability of
inventions. The views of patentability vary somewhat in Europe and the United States
and the fundamental difference lies in the technicality of an invention. In Europe an
invention must make a technical contribution.408 Inventions are generally protected
through a patent only when they satisfy three contextual prerequisites: technical character,
technical potency, and reproducibility.409 It is thus essential for a patentable invention offers a
solution to a technical problem. An invention must also be industrially utilizable, novel, and
inventive.410 A computer program as such is not generally a patentable invention.411 On the
other hand, a computer program can be patented as part of another invention, whereby
the program gets indirect protection.412 In Europe, software is thus considered patentable
only as part of some additional physical application.413
The European Patent Convention EPC 52 (2) in fact denies the patentability of
computer programs. Computer programs as such are defined as not being inventions and
are accordingly excluded from patentability.414 An invention may be patented if a
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implemented inventions (COM 2002/92 final) in the beginning of July 2005.
415 As such they are, accordingly, patentable inventions. See EPO T 0931/1995 Controlling
pension benefit system/PBS.
416 This, however, diverges from the patentability of business methods in the USA and Japan,
where it is possible to patent even some non-technical inventions. These inventions only
have to have great economic significance; there exists no prerequisite of technical
investment. See COM (1999) 42 final, 13 - 14.
417 See also TRIPS, article 27 (1), according to which patents must be available for inventions
in all fields of technology.
418 See VICOM T208/84, [1987] 2 EPOR 74 and VICOM’s application [1987] 2 EPOR 74,
80 - 81. The VICOM case concerned hardware and a computer program which together
would digitally process images in a sophisticated way. The hardware and software were
thus combined and the invention was not a computer program as such. See Lambert
2000, 8. It was not sufficient that mere changes in the physical state of hardware were
produced. In relation to software making a technical contribution to the internal workings
of a computer, this was thus not enough, but there was still a requirement of further
technical effect. Thus, a patent may be granted in every case where a program for a computer
is the only means, or one necessary means, of obtaining a technical effect. See IBM twin
cases T 0935/97 and T 1173/97. See IBM’s application [1999] RPC 861 - 871. See
Widdison 2000, 5 - 6.
419 Software was thereby used to control the patentable electronic circuits and it was
considered as patentable as those circuits. Software was thus as industrial in character as
the more traditional technologies. An increasing number of computerized processes have
been eliminated, or at least obscured, the demarcation line between patentable and non-
patentable processes. See Thomas 1999, 13.
420 Software algorithms could therefore not be patented. See Gottshalk v. Benson 409 U.S.
(1972).
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computer program is part of it. Technicality is thus one central element in providing any
public governance of software by patenting it. When run on a computer all the programs
are definitely technical because a computer is a machine.415 An invention may thus be
patented when it augments the existing technology with some technical contribution.416
It is thus fundamental for all inventions that they have a technical character, i.e., an
invention has to belong to a field of technoloy.417 On the other hand, even in Europe an
invention that is otherwise patentable may not be excluded from protection merely
because it uses a computer program.418
In the United States an invention need only fall into the category of technological
arts, with no technological contribution is required. The difference between Europe and
the United States thus lies in the requirement that in Europe the patentability of an
algorithm is closely bound to the prerequisite of physical structure as the core of
patentability.419 The unpatentability of software is nevertheless the main rule in United
States as well and it was fundamentally stated by the United States Supreme Court in
Gottshalk v. Benson.420 The core of the case was a patent sought for a mathematical
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421 See Kerr 2002, 49.
422 In re Alappat 33 F.3d, 1544. Programming thus creates a new machine. In this respect, a
general purpose computer becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to
perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software. The
patentability of computer programs is based on three radical  cases where patentability of
software was consolidated. The first of these was Gottshalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63 (1972)
where the patentability was denied. Further, there was Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584
(1978) where the decision was similar that in Gottshalk v. Benson. On the other hand, in
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U. S. 175 (1981) the court stated that the application of an algorithm
does not necessarily exclude an invention from patentability.  See Henderson - Kane
2000, 8 - 9.
423 This is why, for example, business methods are patentable in the United States. See COM
(2002) 92 final, 5. The paradigmatic case in this respect in the United Sates was State Street
Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1093 (1999).
424 See Korn 2002, 1370.
425 See Bynum 1998, 284.
426 See Thomas 1999, 13.
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algorithm, which was deemed as unpatentable.421 The landmark case in this respect was
In re Alappat, where a federal circuit court considered a programmed computer to be a
patentable invention.422  Programing alone, i.e., complementing a computer by software,
was enough to convert it into a new machine and as such an invention. Thus, the mere
fact that an invention uses a computer or software makes it part of the technological arts,
with all that is needed for patentability being that the  invention provide an “useful, concrete
and tangible result”.423 An invention that provides a useful, concrete, and tangible result is
patentable and the existence of an algorithm as part of the invention will not make it
unpatentable per se.424
The peculiarity of patenting mathematical algorithms stems from the most
fundamental characteristics of a patent, i.e., its exclusivity. A patent provides an exclusive
right of use to the patented item. Mathematical formulas like algorithms are thus
generally considered abstract ideas and as such  part of the public domain. Use of them
should be common and free. If an algorithm were patented, the patent-holder could deny
others the use of the mathematical formulas that make up part of the algorithm.425
Patenting mathematical algorithms would thereby remove and exclude parts of
mathematics from the public domain.  Patentability in the case of mathematical
algorithms would mean that the abstract ideas involved would be excluded from all free
utilization.426
Create and market. Ideas and business in the digital economy
427 Software programs have a dualistic character. The technology of the program in use can
be duplicated in the same way that one creates and duplicates literary works. See
Reichman 1994, 2517, especially footnote 454.
428 On the other hand, the protectability of a computer program is relative. The main
purpose or function of a program is generally not considered an unprotectable idea. On
the other hand, source and object codes are almost always found protectable. See
Derclaye 2000, 59.
429 A computer code may be viewed as both text and performance. The text of a computer
code consists of both the source code and object code and the performance is what the
computer does when it uses commands. See Derclaye 2000, 56.
430 Unlike recipes or manuals the source code instructions do not instruct a human how to
carry out computational processes. Humans do not follow source code instructions to
regulate voltages. Humans may also choose not to execute instructions, that is, an action
that a computer is completely incapable of. See Burk 2000, 17.
431 A software-configured universal machine is equivalent to a dedicated machine that is
hardwired to perform the same task. In other words, as physical machines are built from
tangible media such as wood, steel, or plastic, so programs are built from source code. See
Burk 2000, 17 - 18.
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2.4.2 Software as functionality
Software is essentially a combination of writing and functional components of a
machine.427 It is not an expressive application that could easily be included in the scope
of either a patent or copyright.428 Software has elements of both. The most fundamental
difference is based on the significance of instructions as the kernel of a piece of software.
Software is a functional construction that is further based on certain behavioral patterns
in the form of instructions.429 Instructions for a computer are not the same as
instructions for a human being, however: they are more theoretical. Even when read by
a human, computer code remains abstract machine code and as such can be executed by
the machine only. Instructions to human merely describe how to perform a task, whereas
software instructions are actually a part of the machine that executes the task.430
Software is technical and as such characteristically mechanical. The mechanical
character of software is manifested even more clearly in the interplay of software and
hardware: any function that can be implemented in software may correspondingly be
implemented in hardware as well. This is due to  software-configured universal
machines that are capable of performing a variety of functions only by being configured
in different ways by computer software. The unexpressive, but at the same time
functional, character of computer software is the core of a computer and its
operativeness. Instead of being the manual for an intricate and complicated machine,
computer code is the machine itself. In other words, software is not text but a machine built
of text.431 In being a functional entity software also changes the character of its internal
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432 Language is at the same time both functional and expressive, because its function is to
convey meaning. When language is well crafted, its words and phrases are closely chosen
to optimize that function. See Burk 2000, 18.
433 For instance, blueprints may instruct humans how to build a machine, but computer code
is part of the machine. See Burk 2000, 18 - 19.
434 The requirement of technical aids constitutes one of the threats of digital media. This also
applies to software and digitization. Digitization cannot be carried out without specific
tools. The necessities are a computer (hardware) and a program (software). The
threatening point here is that it is the same technology that is used in both producing
digital media and copying them. The same technology one needs to use the digital work
is the technology that can be used to make multiple and qualitatively perfect copies of the
work. To cite Pamela Samuelson’s  example, selling computer programs is comparable to
selling a customer the Ford automotive plant at the same time as selling him or her a
Ford automobile.  Each instance of the program has the potential to become its own
factory. See Samuelson 1990, 326.
435 An invention should show technical progress over the prior state of the arts. It should thus
in some practical sense be a better way of doing things. See Cornish 1996, 165.
436 Computer programs were thus simply what one told one’s computer to do. These
programs were typically written by the hardware manufacturer and were delivered
bundled with the hardware. See Widdison 2000, 2.
226
communication. Instructions to humans and instructions to machines are both functional
but  in entirely different ways. The distinction lies in the different functions of language.
Human language is always functional, as it conveys information to humans.432
In contrast to human languages, computer code is carefully designed to optimize
the speed and efficiency of the machine’s operation. Its purpose is thus by no means to
inform a reader. The function of computer code is not to convey meanings but to
configure a virtual machine. Computer code, in other words, determines the type of
machine that the computer will become. Unlike instructions to humans, computer
instructions are functional in the sense that they produce a physical outcome.433
However, the functionality of a software patent may be approached slightly differently.
There is always a certain cooperative relation between the utilization of inventions and society
at large, meaning that in order to be functional the products need to be used and
exploited somehow in society. Use may require specific devices or none at all. For
example, books can be read with no additional tools but films have to be shown using a
projector to become useful to the audience.434
2.4.3 Software as patenting technology
Software patents were originally based on the technical character of inventiveness.435
The technical conception of software derived from the traditionally hardware-oriented world,
where computer programs were programs made for a particular computer.436 The view of
software today is rather the opposite; i.e., the technology-oriented world has changed
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437 Software is thus the heart of a computer and hardware is only a device to run one’s
favorite software. The development thus went through several steps, where the software
first came to be seen as something separate from, albeit still subordinate to hardware.
Further, programs were perceived as not only separate from hardware but of equal
importance to it. See Widdison 2000, 2.
438 The distinction between software and hardware is sometimes confusing because they are
so integrally linked. Clearly, when one purchases a program, one is buying a piece of
software. But to buy the software, one usually has to buy the disk (hardware) on which
the software is recorded.
See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/software.html
439 For example, word processors, spreadsheets, and database management systems fall under
the category of applications software.
See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/software.html
In this sense, a database alone may even constitute an invention and thus a protectable
work. See Committee Report KM 1987: 8, 123 - 124.
440 The unpatentability of software as a traditional rule was stated by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Gottshalk v. Benson. The core of the case was a patent sought for a mathematical
algorithm. According to the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court, any patent granted for a
mathematical formula would be bad for the public, and thus unpatentable. Software
algorithms could therefore not be patented. Gottshalk v. Benson 409 U.S.  (1972). See also
Kerr 2002, 49.
441 The idea/algorithm dichotomy in the area of patentabilty has been compared to the
idea/expression dichotomy in copyright. See Koepsell 2000, 71.
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towards being completely software-oriented, with software reflecting computer instructions
or data in general.437 In this context anything that can be stored electronically is software,
whereas storage and display devices are hardware.438 Software is often further divided
into two categories: systems software, which encompasses the operating system and all
the utilities that enable the computer to function, and applications software, which
includes programs that do real work for the users.439
Difficulties in setting out the prerequisites for patenting in the case of software
algorithms have led to an emphasis on technicality in protection. Technicality in this sense
has been achieved at the expense of functionality. In order to become patentable, an
invention must be bound to technology in one way or another. This is why software
applications on open networks are often based on computer software and thus
mathematical formulae or algorithms. Mathematical patterns or algorithms are not,
however, patentable as such, which means that software is usually patented in the form
of a technical device expressed in a specialized form. In this way, software patents are
largely limited to tangible and specific machinery only.440
Ideas and mathematical algorithms are often considered as corresponding to each
other.441 At the same time, ideas are excluded from the scope of patent. Underlying this
is the view that ideas cannot be patented. In other words, protection ought to be attached
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442 This view is called the mental steps doctrine and basically it barred solely mental activities
from receiving patents. Similarly, methods that required comparison of sounds, or
correlating the readings of one scale with another, were considered unpatentable because
they depended on “correct mental comparisons”. See Burk 2000, 33.
443 This physical transformation requirement is to ensure that the patent extends protection
only to the application of a law of nature or algorithm. Natural laws would alone be
unpatentable. On the other hand, the physical transformation requirement also allows for
the protection of computer programs used in manufacturing processes but questioned the
patentability of free-standing computer programs considered to be unpatentable mental
steps. See DiMatteo 2002, 16.
444 These steps must further be accurate physical steps. See Burk 2000, 33.
445 See Burk 2000, 35.
446 The exception was declared in Gottshalk v. Benson 409 U.S. (1972).
447 See Burk 2000, 33 - 34.
448 See Burk 2000, 34.
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to the physical embodiment of an idea.442 Thoughts or other similar mental action are not
patentable either because patentable methods cannot be dependent on the intelligence of
the person operating the device.443 The unpatentability of mentality sets further
prerequisites for patentable processes whereby a patent needs to be based on true
manipulative steps.444 The technically communicative function of a software patent is
founded on the difference between publicly necessary information and private use.
Inventions based on mental steps are often so abstract that they are seldom truly
sustainable objects of patent. Moreover mental processes are often basic tools of
scientific and technological work whereby permitting an exclusive right to mental steps
would restrict the freedom of inquiry.445
The clear distinction between privately used knowledge as patentable knowledge
and public domain information is still maintained. Public domain information includes
ideas, which are not patentable. Also excluded from the scope of patentability are the law
of nature and mathematical algorithms, which are considered part of those laws.446 Pure
mental steps are thus not patentable either. The change in the unpatentability of
algorithms was effected by a novel interpretation of the concepts of “mental acts” and
“physical steps”. Mental steps can be interpreted broadly, for example, as aesthetic,
emotional, imaginative, or creative thoughts or reactions, and as such their
unpatentability is clear.447
The clarity of “mental steps” is, however, sl ightly changed through the
implications of software. Mental steps that can be implemented by a machine are
sufficiently definite to make the steps physical and the process patentable. Computer
implementation of processes of mental steps hence make it possible to develop software
patentability further.448 Mathematical algorithms are widely considered to belong to the
class of laws of nature and as such are unpatentable mental steps. The controversy of
pure physicality in software patenting is also clearly seen when considering the
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449 Baker v. Selden 101 U.S. (1879). Selden had published a book, Selden’s Condensed
Ledger, explaining his bookkeeping system. The book included blank forms for practicing
the system. Baker published a variation of these forms, but they were adaptable for
carrying out the same bookkeeping system. See Stern 1999, 112.
450 See Stern 1999, 113.
451 A patented invention has to be new in the sense of constituting a part of the state of the
art. Further, the information concerning the invention may not be published by anyone,
including the inventor or someone having no connection to him or her. See Cornish
1996, 148.
452 Originality is considered one of the foundations of copyright. See Blume et al. 1998, 126 -
127. The originality of computer programs has been questioned by the general nature of
programs. Computer programs were considered so general that no programmer would
simply be able to create any different program. This was probably true in the early days
of computers but in modern times there exist so many possibilities in writing programs
that it is practically impossible for two persons to create two identical programs.
Computer programs have thus been considered works that can reach the required level of
originality. See Koivumaa 1995, 72 - 73.
453 The typical application in this category was one for a “new” machine or process in a
familiar area, in which the only novelty was the use of a computer program to run the
machine or implement the process. See Cohen - Lemley 2001, 9.
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copyrightability of business methods. Literally expressed teachings in a copyrighted book
are protected through copyright.449 The copyright protects the author’s own verbal
explanation of the teachings, but it does not prevent others from teaching the same
concept in different words or other expressions of their own. A clear distinction is drawn
between a book and the art which it is intended to illustrate.450
2.4.4 Software as novelty
The basic scope of a software patent has traditionally been fixed to technological novelty.
Novelty is essential for patenting because of the purpose of a patent.451 Novelty thus
loosely corresponds to originality in copyright.452 The purpose of both systems is to bring
out new inventions and accordingly restrict the utilization time of the old ones. It was
primarily industry and industrial production where patented inventions were to be used
in the first place. The fundamental purpose of patentability is to protect investments in
useful new technology and at the same time to provide an incentive to finance further
research and development.
On the other hand, the patent system is fundamentally constituted to protect
technology, mainly the machines that use or are made by using technology. Software is
patentable as part of a technical device or process.453 This technology, when patented, is
also referred to as technologically novel machines or devices. However, a technological
solution is not the most important element of a business method, which has caused
further problems and controversy in patenting those methods. As business methods are
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454 See Merges 1999, 3.
455 This is considered to apply, for example, to the business method patent of Priceline.com
with the advent of the Internet enabling the enterprise to obtain the exclusive right to a
traditional business method. See Quinn 2002, 123.
456 The latest “revolution” in the software industry actually has nothing to do with
breakthrough technology. See Potter 2000, 2.
457 See Korn 2002, 1371 - 1372.
458 A good example of this is recent business method patents. The best known of these are
the ones for Amazon.com and Priceline.com. Both of them basically consist of an old method
that is only applied in a new way in the cyberspace. See Chandra 2002, 546.
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not tied to particular machinery or devices, they are clearly not patentable in this
perspective.454 It is more likely the new operational framework, i.e., open networks, that may
be considered the invention when applying traditional business methods on open
networks.455 The new relation in status between patenting hardware and software is
fundamentally based on a new way of thinking about issues. Accordingly, development
will also  clearly be based on rethinking how software technology is maintained,
developed, and distributed.456
What is problematic here is that business method patents easily make it possible
to implement traditional business methods on a computer or the Internet and thereby
exclude others from using them. Business methods are thus characteristically unique and
many of them have been employed in and run by businesses for a long time already.457 A
business method, however, closely resembles software in that it is often pure software
applications that embody the business methods that are realized in cyberspace.458 In sum,
the patentability of business methods is closely bound to the patentability of software
processes.
2.4.5 Software as a commodity
Patenting is a means to create commodities. In order to become patentable, an invention
is generally examined in terms of commodification. In this respect, commodification is
actually a varying process where the varieties observed are closely linked to the qualities and
characteristics of software. The patentability of software is connected at least to the
technical character of the software, whether it is abstract and physical, and the essence of a process
as a core element of the software. These three elements of software patents then have
additional implications for the patentability of software.
The commodificational character of a software patent is well illustrated in the
controversial relationship of the software patent and the business method patent. The
distinction between a software patent and a business method patent lies precisely in the
scope of protection they involve. Software is somewhat easier to categorize in this
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459 The first step towards the creation of the business method patent was carried out
precisely in the area of software patents by the U.S. Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehr
450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). In Diamond v. Diehr the issue was a process for continuously
monitoring the temperature inside a synthetic rubber mold, using a computer and the
well-known Arrhenius equation for measuring cure time as a function of temperature and
other variables. The process was deemed patentable subject matter. See also Diamond v.
Chakrabarty 447 U.S. (1980).
460 Process patents are thus harder to obtain than pure product patents. The inventor of a
process is mainly considered as to be a creator of ideas rather than the creator of a
practical invention. Furthermore, a presumption against patentability often also works
against the process inventor. See DiMatteo 2002, 17.
461 See Cohen - Lemley 2001, 9.
462 See Diamond v. Diehr 450 U.S. (1981). In Diamond v. Diehr, the possibility of patenting
computer programs was assessed for the first time since Gottshalk v. Benson which
served as the first step toward the patentability of business methods and electronic
commerce patents. See Quinn 2002, 138.
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respect because it cuts across two areas of patentable subject matter at the same time.459 In
this respect, software is dualistic in its fundamental character. Here the software falls into
two classes of protectability in that it can be viewed both as a process and a product. As a
product, software works as a physical transformation and as such is treated as a
commodity and as a product at the same time. As a product, software inherently works
as a physical transformation and thus meets the utility standard for patentability. In
contrast, a business method can only be included in patent law in the category of process.
Hence, a process patent has been considered the most difficult to obtain. A business
method can thus only be included among patentable entities through the category of
processes. 460
The twofold basis of the patentability of software has set the foundation for its
further development, which has accordingly taken place on two fronts. First, the scope
of process was reexamined, and second, the scope of patenting the software itself was
reevaluated. These steps were both taken at the same time. The first step consisted of the
patentability of a process as such and  made a pure process patentable. The only prerequisite
for a process to be patented was that a certain method or a particular application was
included in the process.461 In Diamond v. Diehr a piece of software was involved, as the
process at issue was carried out by a computer program. The existence of the computer
program combined two developments with regard to the process and the software. The
approach taken in Diamond v. Diehr thus made software a patentable subject matter, but
only if it was patented as a part of something else.462
Nevertheless, computer-related inventions were now considered to be patentable
and,  conversely, the inclusion of a mathematical formula or a computer program did not
make a patent automatically invalid. A computer program used within a process was thus
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463 The unpatentability of software was the main rule in the 1970s and software patent
applications were rejected on the grounds that software was really just a concatenation of
unpatentable algorithms. See Cohen - Lemley 2001, 8.
464 See DiMatteo 2002, 16.
465 See Burk 2000, 34.
466 A pure algorithm patent is that is contested in AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.
172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The patent claimed a method for a phone company to
determine whether both the caller and the recipient of a long-distance telephone
subscribed to the company’s network. See Chandra 2002, 556.
467 See Cohen - Lemley 2001, 10. This naturally corresponds only to United Sates. In Europe
the patentability of software is to remain related to technological contribution as a part of
an invention.
468 See DiMatteo 2002, 19.
469 See State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). In State Street, the patent was directed to a data
processing system for Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration. It describes a
data processing system for implementing an investment structure that is known as the
“Hub and Spoke” system. This system allows individual mutual funds (Spokes) to pool
their assets in an investment portfolio (Hub) organized as a partnership. This decision is
actually considered as a business-method exception in patentability. See Chandra 2002, 554.
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no longer unpatentable per se.463 The only exception remaining was that the possible laws
of nature in a mathematical algorithm had to be applied to a physical element or process
by which it could be used it in an inventions and thereby get a patented.464 A
mathematical algorithm may include a mental process that can be represented in a
mathematical formula and when it does so, it can be patentable as long as it produces
some useful, concrete and tangible result.465 The unpatentability of mathematical
algorithms is thus no longer a strict rule. Accordingly, the development towards
patentability of such algorithms is  progress towards a more abstract scope for
patentability. The essence of development is the usefulness of an invention, not its
technical implications.466
The requirement that patentable software must produce a useful, concrete, and
tangible result as the core of patentable software moves the balance of patentability from
physicality towards abstractness. Even physical structure becomes unnecessary, as long as
the process or the idea is useful.467 This clearly derives from the approach to patentable
business methods, as they may be abstract. Business methods are essential in e-commerce
transactions that based on business models that may include original ways of doing
business. Software-assisted methods are patented as long as they demonstrate the
required degree of novelty and non-obviousness, and produce a useful, concrete and
tangible result.468 This was the essential finding in State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature
Financial Group: mathematical algorithms were deemed patentable where they produce a
useful, concrete and tangible result.469 Mathematical algorithms are not generally
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470 See Chandra 2002, 551.
471 See Cohen - Lemley 2001, 11.
472 The distinction is reported by Cohen - Lemley 2001, 20.
473 At the same time, the prerequisite of pure technological contribution was abandoned in
the United States. The ability to patent computer software was tested through the so-
called Freeman-Walter-Abele Test, where it was first determined whether a mathematical
algorithm was recited directly or indirectly in the claim. If it was, then it was next
determined whether the claimed invention as a whole was no more than the algorithm
itself or if the claim was directed to a mathematical algorithm that was not applied or
limited by physical elements or process steps. The Freeman-Walter-Abele Test was first
introduced in Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp. 958 F. 2d 1053 (fed.
Circ. 1992.). See Quinn 2002, 138 - 139.
474 See DiMatteo 2002, 18.
475 This is stated in the USA in the case Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879). These
incidental elements of a work are not copyrightable See Major 1998, 94.
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patentable as they are based on mere abstract ideas.470 In this instance the physicality of
an invention was challenged rather seriously. A physical transformation is only one of the
countless possibilities of bringing about a useful result. A physical transformation was no
longer considered  necessary.471 The essence of a process is manifested in the duality of
the scope of software patents. Software patents fall into two basic types. One consists of
pure software patents claiming improvements in programming or inventions embodied
wholly in a program. These cases involve pure software patents, as described above. The
other type comprises computer-related inventions, in which there is software involved in
the machine or process.472
These inventions are likely to be the core of a business method patent given that
the conducting business in cyberspace online are patentable, as illustrated in State Street.
The decision in the case made it clear that business methods implemented through
computer processes were no longer excluded per se from the category of patentable
subject matter. Hence, in the in conducting business both computer programs that
implement business methods and business methods themselves are patentable. In other
words, the exception of the unpatentability of business methods was eliminated.473 The
essential nature of a process is illustrated in another way as well in patentable online
business methods. In these applications, both the computer program that implements a
business method and the business methods themselves are patentable subject matter.474
This holds true as long as a business method fulfills the general prerequisites of novelty
and non-obviousness.  In contrast, a work may contain elements that must be used
incidentally to the idea, system, or process that the work describes.475
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476 See Koepsell 2000, 71.
477 This is thus the actual foundation of creativity, and the purpose of intellectual property
law is not to limit the number of creative works being produced from this background.
See Koepsell 2000, 73. The most significant area where the problem of legal hybrids
occurs is that of small-scale innovations that do not rise to the level of novelty and non-
obvious inventions or original and creative works of authorship. See Reichman 2000,
1745.
478 See Stern 1999, 107.
479 The general patent/copyright dichotomy was broken down by some novel technical
innovations. Among these innovations were, in addition to computer programs, integrated
circuit designs, biogenetically engineered organisms, new plant varieties, and electronically
generated databases. See Reichman 2000, 1749 - 1750.
480 See Reichman 1994, 2455.
481 Few of the hybrids protect art in the traditional sense and even fewer fall within the scope
of patents. See Reichman 1994, 2501.
482 Databases closely resemble computer programs in that they get less protection from
copyright than their producers need to support the expenses of data collection and
assembly. The only copyrightable element in a database is the way in which the data have
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2.4.6 Towards a more innovative view
2.4.6.1 Software as property
Software is generally protected through intellectual property rights, with the protection
carried out in the form of either a patent or copyright. The demarcation between the two
is fundamentally based on two overlapping and hence parallel dichotomies, i.e., that of
expression and idea and that of idea and algorithm.476 On the one side of the demarcation line
are legally protectable, concrete, and specific aspects of innovative contributions, the
underlying assumption being that there are an infinite number of possible ways to
express single idea.477 On the other side are the legally unprotectable, abstract, and general
aspects of those contributions.478
In the context of software, the pure property view is called into question by what
are known as legal hybrids, which are combined forms of several traditional intellectual
property rights.479 Mainly this development has proceeded from patent-oriented towards
more copyright-oriented protection.480 The most drastic change involves the basic
requirements of these forms of protection, given that the legal hybrids actually resemble
each other more closely than they resemble the traditional objects of patents and artistic
property laws.481 For example, a database that contains elements of both copyright
(originality and formality) and patent (inventiveness and access to information) may be
considered a legal hybrid in this sense.482 In Finland in Supreme Court case KKO:2000:56
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been selected and arranged. Copyright thus does not protect the data as such. The process
of assembling the data, where the greatest investments have to be made, remains
completely beyond the scope of protection. See Goldstein 2003, 197.
483 Art. 49 of Copyright Act in Finland (34/1991) reads as follows: “A catalog, table or
program, or any other production in which a large quantity of data are compiled, shall not
be reproduced without the consent of the producer until 10 years have elapsed from the
year in which the production was published. The term of protection shall expire at the
latest, however, when 15 years have elapsed from the year in which the work was
completed.” Art. 9 of same provision reads as follows: “There shall be no copyright in
laws and decrees, or in decisions and declarations of public authorities and other public
bodies.”
484 See Reichman 1994, 2501.
485 On the other hand, the hybrid character of a database is well illustrated in the basis of its
protection. Database protection is not based on any technical achievement or showing
any creative output. Rather, protection is granted to anyone who makes a substantial
investment in the development of the database. See Reichman - Samuelson 1997, 54 - 55.
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(S98/423), a database has been granted copyright protection as a compiled catalogue on
the basis of the labor and professional skills used for collecting the information included
by the organized catalogue.
KKO:2000:56. A name day calender collected and published by the University of
Helsinki was a catalogue in the sense of the Copyright Act of Finland 49§ (1) as it
included a great amount of information. Protection was also granted on the basis of
Copyright Act 9 §.483
The hybrid character of intellectual property has a strong influence on the market, this
influence being either direct or indirect. The dual character of legal hybrids in fact allows
them to compete on two different fronts: they may be presented as disembodied
representations of unprotectable matter or as components of material supports that are
distributed on the market.484 Communication in the market easily becomes concentrated
in the hands of a single distributor holding the hybrid rights.485 On the other hand,
originality is not always a necessary requirement for protection, i.e., copyright as in
established the Court of Appeal of Helsinki HHO S 1987/951, where the focus was the
labor put into collecting and combining information. The case concerned teaching
material used in a leadership development course where the literary material was
considered protectable because of its originality as well as the amount of labor used in
creating and collecting it. The main focus was thus on the work involved instead of
originality.
On the other hand, this view has been questioned lately (in May 2005) on the
behalf of computer programs by The Court of Appeal of Vaasa in case VaaHO DR03/1245
(leave to appeal pending). The Court of Appeal took a strict position on protecting labor
or temporal investments in creating a copyrightable work, e.g., a computer program. It
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486 The opinion is contrary to the opinion of the Copyright Council of Finland concerning
the very same case in TN 2003:10. The Copyright Council considered the source codes
of those computer programs original enough to get copyrighted. See TN 2003:10, 15.
487 Patent law, being founded on exclusivity as its core, is designed to create a barrier against
idea theft. The purpose is to create an incentive for inventors to invent and use their
ideas. Exclusivity is one of the incentives in the patent system. See Lessig 2002a, 208.
488 See the content of EPC 52 (2) above.
489 This, however, includes a divergence from the patentability of business methods in the
USA and Japan where it is possible to patent even some non-technical inventions. These
inventions only have to include a great economic significance, but there exists no
prerequisite of technical investment. See COM (99) 42 final, 13 - 14.
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was thus only the originality of the program that was emphasized as the basis of
copyright. Here the program was not original enough but was instead considered only a
slight modification of the original copyrighted program. Copyrightability was thus denied
and the charge of a copyright infringement was dismissed.486
The property view of software has another direct influence on communication, which
stems from the exclusive character of property. As an exclusive right, patent or copyright
gives the owner a privilege to exclude all others from interference in or use of the
patented/copyrighted object.487 In this sense, exclusivity is absoluteness. Absoluteness at
the same time affects the overall communicativeness within the communicational
structure by defining a certain, often rather restricted, circle that is included in the core
of communication. The rest are excluded from the communication. In this way the
communicative structure becomes somehow absolute as well, which often makes
property rights restrictive in the context of communication. Restrictive property rights
make it impossible to realize social innovations, which are the very essence of business
method patents as innovations. Business methods as innovations are essentially social
creations.
2.4.6.2 Software as regulation
The very core of a business method remains basically undefined at the level of
legislation. In the European Patent Convention there is no implicit definition of business
methods, although EPC 52 (2) prohibits the patentability of pure business methods as
such.488 Accordingly, EPC 52 (2) leaves computer programs outside of the scope of
patentability. However, it is possible to get a patent for an invention that requires a
computer program.  An invention may be patented when it augments the existing
technology with some technical contribution.489 On the other hand, methods involving
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490 See Basinski 2001, 13 - 14. The main rule for patentability in Europe, the EPC 52 (1),
reads as follows: ”European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are
susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive
step.“See  http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar52.html#A52
491 The core of the exception lies in the definition of a process and the capability of business
method to fall within that definition. See DiMatteo 2002, 14.
492 The regime tends to expand beyond its initial justification as intellectual property rights
as a reward or refreshment of inventiveness. The restrictions imposed are artificial and
therefore they do not promote progress. They simply benefit one person at the expense
of another. See Lessig 2002a, 217.
493 This may be further illustrated in terms of difference between the primary and secondary
legal relationships. Primary legal relationships are used for juridifying reality. They constitute
the legal rules that convert reality into a juridified form. Secondary legal relationships are
then constructed on the primary ones. See Pöyhönen 2001a, 187.
494 See Lessig 2002a, 216 - 217.
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only economic concepts and business practices have not been considered as inventions
within the  meaning of EPC 52 (1).490
This parallels 35 USC §100 (b) which states that “...a patentable process is a
process, art, or method and includes a new use of known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter or material.” Historically, business methods have not been
patentable in the USA, where a business method was considered to fall within the
statutory subject matter of “process”. In the USA an exception to denying the
patentability of business methods was established in 1908 in the case Hotel Security
Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co. where the invention at issue was a method of book-keeping
detached from the means of carrying it out. Essential to the denial of a patent was the
separation of a method itself and the means of doing it. A business method as an
invention was not patentable, and, accordingly, the ruling of The U.S. Supreme Court
established the very basis for unpatentability of business methods. In the exception there
are bound together, on the one hand, the impossibility of protecting methods themselves
and, on the other, the pure definition of a business method.491
The legal regulation of business methods is thus rather vague in that this kind of
regulation binds software closely to its artificiality.492 The conditions for the different
lines of development are mainly due to their nature. Tangible objects may be
distinguished naturally, whereas intellectual ones need to be demarcated. The constraints
of the latter are thus artificial.493 The restrictions are mainly artificial in the sense that
they do not really promote progress. Instead, the restrictions simply benefit one person
at the expense of others494 The artificiality of business methods is best revealed by
examining the changing environment and the significance of monopolies in it. Both the
property view and the regulative view are based on clearly structured monopolies. The
monopolies are constituted on the radical technological shift and its effect on the
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495 See Dreyfuss 2000, 265. Technological and social innovations may be bound together.
For example, a faster communication network may make the services more usable. Fast
broad-band services  are cheap and a reasonable price operates as a connecting link
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expanding activity on the network. However, there exists one crucial difference in the
means by which these monopolies are restricted.
A monopoly may be granted indirectly, by granting an exclusive position, or
directly, by ownership. The result is quite the same in both cases, but there is a difference
in the construction of the controlling power. The main difference between property and
monopoly (i.e. when the monopoly is created through regulating communication) lies in
their different relationship to the surrounding environment. Property is absolute in that
it is similarly valid for everyone. For this reason property has always been described as a
strong right. A monopoly in contrast is more relative due to both its regulative nature and
its artificiality. The regulation is mainly concentrated on organizing behavioral patterns
although it is at the same time aimed at communication, societal communication in
particular.
This difference also affects the ways of looking at communicative structures in
property and in monopoly. First, the absoluteness of property makes the communication
clearly fixed. The exclusivity of the owner gives him or her the power to draw the
borderlines of the communicative structure, and largely also the content. The owner is
thus in a position to decide who gets what information from whom. Second,
absoluteness defines the circle of those who may participate the communication. Some
are totally excluded while others are included, which makes the communication structure
itself unbalanced. Third, absoluteness distinguishes the communication and the
communicational  environment.  As a strong right, absoluteness makes the
communicational gap rather strong and clearly visible.
On the other hand, the relativity of monopoly nudges communication towards a
more flexible approach. A patent ensures that information will not become closed, for
the other side of the exclusive position is that it opens up access. Anyone at all is free to
get information when it has become public. This ensures flexibility relatively well.
Furthermore, the relationship between the scope of a patent and the surrounding
environment is flexible. This is due to the free circulation of information which in turn
derives from the flexibility of a patent as a monopoly. All of these aspects include
communicational patterns to be sustained as a crucial part of public governance. Here
regulation is aimed at influencing inventiveness but in a roundabout way. Patenting pure
technological invention is direct and has a direct effects on protecting technology. A
patent is granted for a certain invention that includes a certain technological application
and it is hence already a step towards innovation. In the case of social innovation it may
not, however, be enough to invent a new technology, for it seems that there would also
be a need to inspire people to learn how to use the new technology.495 Inventions and
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between services and end-users. See Tervo 2004,147.
496 The self-rewarding character of business methods is actually one of the most fundamental
differences in patenting, for example, biotechnology or computer-related inventions
generally and business methods.  Business methods are in fact much older than even the
patent system itself. See Thomas 1999, 31 - 32.
497 See Raskind 1999, 78.
498 See Raskind 1999, 81.
499 See Lessig 2002a, 212.
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knowledge thus need to be used in a way that is fruitful for the economy and society
overall.
2.4.6.3 Software as function
The functionality of software is based on communication. A patent is granted to protect
the inventor and grant him or her sufficient revenue from the invention. In this respect,
business processes have their own clear revenue logic and communicative patterns. In
other words, business processes have inherent revenue patterns that provide the
foundation for business revenues. Business revenue is generally founded on practical
knowledge that is embedded in the methods of doing business.496 These methods as such
thus often create their own rewards. Basically the revenue from an invention in the case
of business methods  is derived from success in the market. Hence an adequate return on
the inventive process of a business method or a successful business idea would create
sufficient incentive to invent.
Success and reward are closely linked to the communication between the market
and customers, success being achieved by attracting the attention of customers in the
market. Revenue is clearly connected with success in the market and is usually  even
considered a sufficient reward. This same principle applies to business methods, in that
the pressure of competition and competition by emulation have been sufficient to
provide enough innovation in methods of doing business.497 Business methods are not
derived from laboratory research or experimentation but develop and are implemented
in an environment of rivalry and imitation. Business methods are thus shaped through
interactive responses. This interactivity is further shaped by the customary practices that also
make up part of the business methods.498 Communicative consumers buy and the
inventor gets the reward depending on the customers’ decisions. The advantage achieved
by the first in the market is often called the first-mover advantage and is created without
imposing the costs of a patent.499 Often the first-mover achieves a leading market
position and extends it before the others enter the market. This reflects the balance
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500 In other words, there would be no need to refresh inventiveness by granting patents. See
Dreyfuss 2000, 277 - 278.
501 For example, enterprises with a weak market position usually opt for openness in order
to attract allies who are likewise too weak to survive. Openness is hence employed as an
instrument for networking. Openness may often take the form of open computer code.
See Holtgrewe - Werle 2001, 46.
502 For example, Amazon in www.Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble in www.bn.com These
bookstores are actually virtual malls where one can buy anything.
503 This position closely resembles patenting procedures where the result may also be
patented if there is no other process for producing this result. In this way, for example, a
new species of plant or animal could theoretically become patentable. See Wallius 2001,
57.
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created by public governance in relying on private governance but modifying forms of
governance to accommodate the public interest.
The real advantage lies in the ability to establish a first-mover position and to
increase one’s consumer mass. Because of its rapidness, the first-mover advantage is
usually also the most effective advantage in the hectic digital market. A first-mover needs
no patent, and patenting some crucial inventions would even hinder inventiveness.500 The
first-mover advantage is closely linked to the internal communication of two or more
parties.501 On the one side is the one who markets the invention; on the other side is the
customer who buys. The communication in the case of the first mover advantage is thus
more variable in nature than pure trading. Basically the first-mover advantage is based on
the cooperation and communication of the creator of the business model and the
customer. The more customers use a certain business model, the stronger it becomes. A
good example is the explosive use of e-bookstores.502 This communication frames the
operational lines of a certain business model in its entirety. In this way the  first-mover
advantage embodies rather well the communication between an inventor and the
customer base of an enterprise.
The strong protection of a business method may in fact grant a double advantage
to the protected actor. Revenue is achieved through the first-mover advantage and,
further, through the patented business method and the position reached thereby.503
Functionally this position is very strong indeed. On the other hand, the distinction
between the property view and the first-mover advantage view turns the communicative
pattern upside-down. The first in the market does not necessarily need the exclusive
position created through a patent or any other legal instrument because the revenue model
is fixed to a different part of the communication process. For the first in the market, it is precisely
the communicative environment and its internal communication that become crucial.
Communication takes on the main role in building up and  ultimately achieving first-in-
the-market status.
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504 See Pollack 2002, 70.
505 A business method includes a description of the various business actors and their roles.
Moreover, it may be defined as a description of the potential benefits for the various
business actors, and as a description of the sources of revenues. See Timmers 1998, 4.
506 A business method may include any technique used in athletics, instruction, or personal
skills, or any computer-assisted implementation of such methods or techniques. See
Chandra 2002, 562. See also Business Method Patent Improvement Act of 2000, H. R. 1332,
http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Legislative_Action/107th_Congress/
House_Of_Representatives1/hr1332.pdf
507 Communicativeness as the core of a business method is illustrated, for example, in the
interaction of business methods and the market. Business methods are largely a product
of market interaction among competitors. It is often enough in changing business that
there is some commercial rivalry. See Raskind 1999, 85.
508 This may be readily seen in business method patents. Business method patents have taken
on more significance in the business world. Businesses have started to pay much more
attention to the intellectual property in their business methods and processes. Further,
business method patents are used both offensively and defensively and have become a
great source of revenue for companies. See Chandra 2002, 557.
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2.5 Innovation: The business method patent as a social innovation
2.5.1 Communication among business, technology, and society
Business is communication. Consequently business methods are a certain form of
communication as well. The business method process is usually defined as a process where
the purpose of invention lies in the entrepreneurial strategy, with a business method
defined as an application including any method or any technique, or a computer-assisted
implementation of either of these.504 Accordingly, a business method is generally defined
as an architecture for the product, service and information flows.505 Further, it is very
much a method of processing data or performing calculations  which is uniquely
designed for or util ized in the practice, administration, or management of an
enterprise.506 The range of use of business methods thus lies particularly in business, and
the applications are usually technical in nature. On balance, the communicational
requirements are actually implemented already in the core of a business method.507
This definition, like the business method  as a concept, clearly binds together two
core elements: business and technology.508 These elements make up the kernel of the
communication inside the concept of the business method. The core of development is
thus generally founded on technological development and on new technological
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509 This was the foundation of the significance of technology in development when the
technology was more or less physical. In the present day, engineers produce essentially
technical knowhow, where the significance lies in the ability to store information about the
methods or processes of production. This information at the same time confers some
commercial advantages on those who possess it. See Reichman 2000, 1750.
510 The scope of the business method patent includes a new class of machines, that is,
basically computers, and methods for performing data processes, for calculation
operations and the practice, administration, or management of an enterprise, for
processing financial data, and for determining what to charge for goods and services. See
Love 2000, 1.
511 The information produced may also be exploited as such. See Cornish 1996, 181 - 182.
512 It was traditionally even impossible to patent anything beyond technology; patent
protection was limited only to technology, i.e., to tangible things and to physical
procedures. See Raskind 1999, 61.
513 A computer program has been defined in the legislation. For example 17 U.S.C. §101: “A
computer program is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly
in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.”
514 These business methods often deal with determining who one’s customers are while at
the same time including operations research and market analysis. See Love 2000, 1 - 2.
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inventions.509 In addition, a business method includes the communication between
business and technology, even crucially so, whereby it rests squarely data processes that
are performed by computers.510 Using a programmed computer at the same time
produces information that may then be put to some further use. In this way a computer
actually controls a step in the operation of the production process.511 It is precisely this
communicational double core that is classified and divided when examining the requirements
for patenting business methods.512
In this light, the communicational aspect of business methods may be approached
from two directions of intellectual property law, i.e., patent and copyright. This is due to
the legal background of software, which is the very kernel of business methods
implemented in a totally digitized environment. Software may thus be protected through
patent or through copyright. Accordingly, a business method as an invention is usually
built up in the form of software or a computer program.513 In order to be able to act
functionally in cyberspace, inventions for which a patent is sought need to be
constructed technically.  This is also due to the communicational background of the digital
environment. In this way  business method patents are fixed to different operations in
the overall business method. First, communication is realized as it relates to customers
and gathering information about them using a patent based on a business plan for a new
company starting to get into the new area. The communication here is related to business
methods that inform customers about the enterprise and its existence.514
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515 Priceline.com is an illustrative example of this in that it has acquired patents in several
different areas related to electronic commerce and exchange, for example, a system for
connecting users of professional services to a world-wide database of professionals who
can dispense advice over the network (U.S. pat. 5,862,223), a system for anonymous
communication between people (U.S. pat. 5,884,272), or a system of selling airline tickets
(U.S. pat. 5,797,127). Through these patents Priceline.com has even been considered to have
gained a significant position in media convergence  See Henderson- Kane 2000, 10.
516 In this way, business method patents are closely linked to the internal operations of an
enterprise, i.e., how they manage their people, their space, their time, their parts, and their
inventory. See Love 2000, 2.
517 See Henderson - Kane 2000, 10.
518 This seems to apply especially in the present day and the future. Traditionally, most of the
activity was based on hardware, and patents were likewise associated with traditional
hardware inventions. A transition towards computer systems and software has
nevertheless occurred. At the same time, the e-commerce aspect of business methods has
clearly been coming to the fore. See Love 2000, 2.
519 In the case of business methods this two-fold protection is actually totally applicable. A
business method is namely rather impossible to keep a trade secret because the technical
knowhow is generally available to everyone. See Reichman 2000, 1762 - 1763. On the
other hand, knowhow is not generally protected as an exclusive right but has to be kept
a trade secret in order to get protected. See Government Proposal HE 114/1978 vp., 14.
520 Copyright Act of Finland 404/1961 Article (1):”A person who has created a literary or
artistic work shall have copyright therein, whether it be a fictional or descriptive
representation in writing or speech, a musical or dramatic work, a cinematographic work,
a photographic work or other work of fine art, a product of architecture, artistic
handicraft or industrial art or a work expressed in some other manner. Maps and other
descriptive drawings or graphically or three-dimensionally executed works and also
computer programs shall likewise be considered literary works.” (Italics added here.)
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On the other hand, business models on the Internet are based on the commerce and
exchange itself.515 In this way business models strive to control and govern the trade. In
other words, commerce is governed by conducting money exchange and credit before,
during, and after business transactions. Further, in order to govern commerce  there is
also a need to track resources, money, and products. These means of governing
commerce and trade are thus patentable as long as they are related to a computer system
or executed by a computer system that is appropriately programmed with software.516
Therefore, granting patents for pure business methods is not riskless. Business methods
are attempts to control and govern trade, with enterprises using patents for controlling
the development of electronic commerce.517
Software generally constitutes the kernel of a modern business method in the
digital economy.518 Software as an invention is protected in two different ways, both
forms falling within the scope of intellectual property rights.519 Their path towards
further innovative applications, however, is different. Software is first protected through
copyright. Underlying this is the historical notion that software is a written work.520
There is nevertheless one crucial difference between software and other written works:
the ability to express something in particular is not the main purpose of a computer
Illustrations of the digital economy
521 This has been discussed in the United States, where the works of utility doctrine states that
functional works are not a proper subject of copyright protection. See Samuels 2000, 81.
522 This view is particularly stated in Feist Publicatoins, Inc v. Rural Telephone Service Co, 111 S.
Ct. 1282 (1991). The decision concerns the white pages of the telephone directory. In the
argumentation of this particular case, the work invested in the collection of numbers was
not enough to take the work over the threshold of originality.
523 A patentable invention has to be useful. Usefulness, or utility, of a patentable invention
requires  that the invention must achieve the intended results and that these must be
capable of replication. See Cho 1998, 182.
524 See Lambert, 2000, 8.
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program. Computer software is designed for making computers functional. From the
viewpoint of communication, copyrightable works are generally designed for human
communication, whereas a computer program is designed to run a computer.521 In this
sense, programs are more operative and as such active. The communicative purposes of
these two forms of protection are thus completely different at the level of functionality.
In addition, in order to become copyrightable software must represent a certain
level of originality. This is even precisely stated by The Finnish Supreme Court in case
KKO:2003:88  (R2001/192) where a computer program was considered a copyrighted
product and as such protected by an exclusive right. The copyright-holder had, among
other rights, a distribution right. Hence, to get any protection through copyright a
computer program has to be an original manifestation of the creativity of its author.
Originality is the essential element of copyrightability, which means that the amount of
work invested will not ensure the author a copyright if the result of the work is not
original enough. Labor alone does not fulfill the requirement of originality.522
KKO:2003:88. A had been marketing and trading software products manufactured and
distributed by software producers. The trading and marketing was carried out, among
other means, by repackage programs for updating and changing the contents of
packages. A had also traded software diskettes, demonstration products and software
with licenses written by A. In the trading, A had used protected trademarks owned by
other software producers. Here only the computer programs were protected by the
intellectual property rights, i.e., copyright.
Level of originality is not, however, the only distinction between copyright and patent.
Namely, patentability has one additional qualifier that draws a clear distinction between
patent and copyright. Whereas copyright is mostly aimed at protecting cultural values,
patents are granted for inventions that may have some use in manufacturing.523 In this
sense, a patented invention ought to be useful, with usefulness considered precisely the
potential for industrial application.524
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525 On the other hand, the source code of a computer program was original enough and it
has been considered a copyrightable creation according to the Copyright Council of Finland
TN 2003:10, 13 - 14.
526 Social innovations in this sense may even bring innovations among consumers. They let
the consumers do things that used to be possible for experts exclusively. For instance, the
principle of the Kodak system is the separation of the work that any person whatsoever
can do in making a photograph from the work that only an expert can do. This is actually
a social innovation. See Lessig 2004, 33. Another good example is Napster by making it
possible to exchange music files regardless of any controlling service provides.
527 This may lie in the background of the sceptical attitude towards business method patents.
It has been thought that they may easily stifle e-commerce. See COM (2002) 92 final, 11.
528 See Pollack 2002, 70.
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Originality and usefulness are defining factors of both copyright and patent. This
has to do with another function of them both: in the digital economy neither copyright
nor patent is as such sufficient. There is always some requirement of further innovativeness that
needs to be realized on the basis of those patented inventions or copyrighted creations.
Innovativeness is thus a step forward from a copyrighted creation or patented
invention.525 However, innovation is possible only on the basis of stable and creative
inventions, which are the main cornerstones of further innovativeness. The existence of
originality and usefulness are thus both rather essential for innovativeness overall.
2.5.2 The pure business method patent as communication
2.5.2.1 From abstract to concrete
Business methods are closely related to innovativeness. In this respect business methods
are communicative. At the same time, they may also be considered social innovations.526
The social character of business method is imparted to it through its communicative
kernel.527 However, communicativeness is changed by digitization; it is not weakened but
strengthened in the digital environment. Today, a  business method is essentially a
method of processing data or performing calculations, and it has to be uniquely designed
for, or utilized in, the practice, administration or management of an enterprise.528 Given
this context, a business method is generally created through computer software.
Accordingly, the problem in patenting a business method is the very same as in patenting
software; i.e., a line of demarcation must be drawn between a concrete, patentable object
and an abstract, unpatentable one. The distinction becomes more salient in the
Illustrations of the digital economy
529 This distinction between an idea and its embodiment is reported by Stern 1999, 109.
530 Drawing the distinction between idea and expression is rather complicated. Instead of
drawing a thick line it might also be reasonable to look at the impression of the total work
in question. See Vaidhyanathan 2001, 107.
531 The strictest reading of the idea/expression dichotomy would support the thinnest
possible copyright protection. See Vaidhyanathan 2001, 86.
532 A pure business idea may be compared to a scientific idea that will not enter the scope of
patentability. One basis for this is that patents on methods would destroy legitimate
competition and impede scientific progress. See Stern 1999, 119 - 120.
533 See Stern 1999, 108.
534 This is well manifested, for example, in the definition of a new machine in the sense of
patentable software that is part of a computer. An invention ought to be considered as a
whole given that programming creates a new machine when a general purpose computer
becomes a special purpose one by programming it to perform particular functions
pursuant to instructions from program software. See Schallop 1999, 95 - 96.
535 In terms of copyright, concrete is specific and abstract is general. See Stern 1999, 108.
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fundamental consideration of an unpatentable idea and a potentially patentable
embodiment of an idea.529
The distinction between an idea and its expression in software is clearly revealed
in examining software as copyrightable intellectual property. The very essence of
copyright is that it is founded on the expression found in a work. It is thus only the
expression of an idea that is the focus here. The way in which a certain idea is expressed
can be copyrighted, whereas the underlying idea is left open to access and use.530 As an
expressive manifestation, software has traditionally been protected through copyright.531
A pure business method, however, is clearly different from this. A business method is
fundamentally founded on an idea an having an idea as the basis of business method
makes it rather complicated to protect through pure copyright. A business method or
business idea is unquestionably an abstract construction given the abstract character of the
idea forms the core of the method.532
The distinction between idea and expression is clearly manifested in copyright in
the United States, where it is examined in terms of what is known as the merger rule.533
The merger rule is based on an evaluation of the description  of a work. The rule is at least
partly based on communication, which in turn is grounded on the coexistence of abstract
and concrete elements in the same work.534 The characterization required by the merger
rule is carried out successively along a continuum from concreteness to abstractness.535 The rule
thus makes it possible to assess a work both as a concrete creation and an abstract idea.
When a work is concrete, it is a specific type of work: on the other hand, when it is
abstract, it is a general type of work. Communicatively the structure is thus driven from
the more specific towards the more general.
It is thus the originality of a work that plays a significant role when sharpening the
edge between specificity and generality. Further, at each point of evaluation, features of
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536 The merged idea/expression thus makes the expression ineligible for copyright
protection. See Stern 1999, 108 - 109.
537 Mathematical algorithms are thus not patentable as they are based on mere abstract ideas.
This is the essence of the decision in State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group.
See Chandra 2002, 551.
538 See Quinn 2002, 128 - 129.
539 See Hall 2001, 188.
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the work may be considered as a part of its protected expression or as part of its
unprotected idea. It is thus the divergence between idea and expression that is the focus.
The principal criterion for a work to be protected for expression is whether the protected
expression leaves only some or no alternative for a possible unprotected expression available for use by
others who might want to apply the same ideas. When the possible alternatives are only few, or
none, expression is considered to merge into idea.536 On the other hand, when the
expression is concrete, the related communication is also more closely connected to this
particular form of expression. When the expression is more abstract, communication is
carried out more on the level of ideas. In other words, the form of expression directly
affects communication involved.
2.5.2.2 From creativity to usefulness
A patentable invention must be useful. A business method or even a mathematical
algorithm is patentable at present provided it produces a useful, concrete and tangible
result.537 Usefulness is thus one of the crucial prerequisites of patentability. This does
not, however, mean that all discoveries must be useful in some way. An invention may
well be functional but as such it may not be patented. Therefore, at least some degree of
usefulness is always an essential requirement of patentability.538 Usefulness also connects
an invention and society overall closely together and, accordingly, promotes effective
communication.
The usefulness of an invention is a societal qualification. In this sense a business
method becomes a useful invention when it is related to society. Societal communication
occurs through the mutual relation of usefulness and inventiveness. Further, the implementation
of an invention fundamentally encourages societal communication. Societal
communication has another task in the area of patenting business methods: an invention
gets its justification from its usefulness in the societal framework. The inventor  needs to
show that the world needs the invention. In other words, there has to be some unmet
need somewhere in the economy that the invention fulfils.539 In this sense, an invention
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540 This is manifested in an exemplary manner in the European Patent Convention, where a
prerequisite for patentability is some industrial use of the invention. EPC article 57:
”Industrial application. An invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial
application if it can be made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture.“See
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar57.html#A57
541 This is precisely where the boundaries of patentability are tested in granting patents for
business methods. It is thus processes that are causing problems in patenting as a process
is not necessarily any set of technical steps anymore. On the other hand, it seems that any
sort of communicable technique can be articulated as a series of steps. See Thomas 1999,
4 - 5.
542 The distinction is made by Stern 1999, 127.
543 The definition of “useful arts” is variable. Stern explains it to be “bodies of knowledge
relating to the trades that artisans play.” See Stern 1999, 127 - 129.
544 See Hall 2001, 188.
545 The prerequisite of novelty is stated in EPC 54 (1): “Novelty: an invention shall be
considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art”.
See http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar57.html#A57
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ought to be exploitable in the societal framework. Exploitability is thus closely bound to
usefulness.540
Usefulness is thus closely bound to the prerequisites for patenting business
methods. Usefulness is likewise often related to the technical character of an invention.
Accordingly, as a patentable invention, a business method also ought to produce a useful
result.541  Business methods are, however, characteristically not technical, whereby the
usefulness of business methods must be examined through the distinction between
practical and liberal arts.542 Business methods, like  music and paintings, fall within the
liberal arts or cultural arts rather than the practical arts;  they would seem inappropriate
as objects of patents. On the other hand, the practical arts have  sometimes been
described as technological arts. This classification brings to mind the requirements for
patenting software and at the same time any business method that now needs to be
carried out by means of programmed computer. This generally suffices to make a
business method part of the technological arts and as such patentable.543
2.5.2.3 From tradition to novelty
Inventions are generally new. Indeed, the patentability of an invention rests on the
criterion of novelty.544 An invention has to be considered new in order to become an
individual and an independent invention. The requirement of novelty is defined in terms
of the existing technology or the state of the art.545 Here, novelty in fact breaks down the
paradigmatic traditions through fresh approaches. On the other hand, a lack of novelty
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546 A patent is thus invalid when it is granted for an invention that is not new or if the
inventive step is lacking. The patentability of computer-implemented inventions may even
have some other problems. Patents for computer-implemented inventions may strengthen
a big market player’s market position or patents for incremental innovation may entail
additional economic costs. See COM (2002) 92 final, 6.
547 See Boden 1998, 309.
548 In other words, the question is not whether an idea is creative or not. See Boden 1998,
309.
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will result in a patent not being granted.546 In this respect novelty also means that the
information concerning an invention has not been published before applying for a
patent. Here an explanatory example is found in the decision of the Finnish Supreme Court
KKO:1988:16 (S86/1155) where 45 pieces of a dropper included in the patent application
had been sold before applying for the patent. A patent was denied because the invention
became public before the patent was sought.
KKO:1988:16. A had sold 45 droppers before applying for a patent. The transactions
were made without any agreement on keeping the content of the invention a secret. The
invention was therefore made public by providing access to the information for an
undefined number of people and offering them a possibility to familiarize themselves
with the invention to be patented. The patent was denied because the invention had
been made public before a patent had been sought.
The novelty of an invention is closely connected to the creativity of an idea. An underlying
idea is creative when it is novel, surprising, and valuable.547 In this sense business
methods may clearly be defined as novel creations, for the very character of a business
method is founded on creativity and novelty. This is actually a rather crucial prerequisite
for a business method to become successful in the market. Novelty is firmly established
as the core of a business method even more when examining the additional attributes of
creativity. Creativity is first of all not an all-or-nothing phenomenon. It is a continuous
process where an idea and its excellence develop successively. When related to society
overall, a business method may thus be considered a social process. On the other hand,
defining the creativity of an idea is not a matter of degree. There are actually various
ways in which an idea can be creative, and therefore the assessment of creativity is
carried out in terms of in what respects an idea is creative. Creativity is thus defined rather
subjectively. Moreover, an idea may be more creative than another in some ways, and less
so in others.548
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549 Many software-related patents can be described as having no practical application except
to digital computing. For instance, cryptography and cryptographic technologies (for
example, Schlafly v. Caro-Kann, Corp. U.S. pat. 4,405,829) has practical use generally only in
digital computing. See Schallop 1999, 107.
550 In other words, no one in the world must have seen the invention before. The invention
has to be non-obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which it pertains. See
Samuels 2000, 128.
551 Originality needs, however, to include at least some minimal level of creativity. The mere
compilation of facts as a creation does not reach the level of originality required for
copyrightability. Further, facts as such are not copyrightable because facts exist
independently, not on the basis of someone’s authorship. See Samuels 2000, 128 - 129.
552 See Hall 2001, 189.
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Even in itself an idea is thus relatively creative and its applicability is rather
extensively dependent on the framework in which it is to be exploited.549Novelty as
creativity may be further examined through the difference between copyright and patent.
The difference between these two forms of protection becomes apparent when one
contrast the essential level of creativity each requires. To get a  patent issued, an inventor
needs to demonstrate that the invention is new.550  The patentable invention has to be
novel in the sense that noone has seen it ever before. Novelty thus refers to real novelty. In
contrast, originality in copyright is at a lower level. An author may get his or her work to
copyrighted as an independently created work even if the work is closely similar to an
existing one. The only prerequisite is that the author has not in fact copied an existing
work.551 The originality of copyright is thus somewhat more subjective than that of
patentability.
2.5.2.4 From private to public
Patent is basically an agreement between an inventor and the government in which the
inventor reveals the core idea of his or her invention and receives a patent in return.552
Private information is thus made public. In this way a patent actually operates as a
communicative instrument between technological development and society at large. The
communication is vertical in that it occurs between the governing power and the
inventor. In other words, it is the governing power that opens up the possibility for this
kind of communication. The inventor grants the public access to his or her invention and
as a reward gets the exclusive right to exploit the invention for a restricted period of
time.
This is exactly where the communicative link is established. There always exists a
need for proper disclosure in order to open public access to the content of an
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553 On the other hand, disclosure and in this way making the invention public draws a
demarcation line between a patentable and an unpatentable invention. When an invention
has become public, it is no longer patentable because it lacks novelty. An invention is
public when a large group of people has access to the information included in it. See NU
1963:6, 123.
554 The disclosure may also be implemented widely and it is sometimes even too extensive.
Priceline (U.S. pat. 5,794,207) included in its patent an illustration of how to use the
method. The illustration was described in a manual that was focused on what is called
embodiment, e. g. an example of how to run a business by means of the patented method.
The purpose of the manual is to disclose enough about the invention so that someone
else could build a business based on it. On the other hand, when examining a method
similar to Priceline’s, the legal question is not whether it has copied the method described
in the manual. The manual is thus only an illustration. See Hall 2001, 190 - 191.
555 This is precisely the demarcation line of patentability in general. See Stern 1999, 130.
556 Traditionally, software was closely bound to hardware and software and algorithm patents
were integral to the operation of specific hardware devices. In the present day, software
applications are less dependent on hardware. See Moy 2000, 68.
557 In other words, the consumer demand for software enjoys positive network effects in that
the attractiveness of a product increases with the number of people using it. This applies
in the are of software, too. See Moy 2000, 69.
558 See Hall 2001, 188 - 189.
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invention.553 Business methods are comparatively complicated in terms of opening up
public access to patented information. The crucial problem lies in the high level of
abstraction of business methods. A business method is a rather abstract creation and it is
relatively complicated to describe in any concrete manner.554 The patentability of a
business method is closely connected to the ability to draw a line of demarcation between
an unprotectable abstract idea and the protectable physical embodiment of an idea.555
The mutual coexistence of private and public in business method patents is also
manifested in a slightly different perspective, i.e., in the patentability of software.
Software patents that have been granted for generic computer programs can operate on
a variety of computers.556 The granting of such patents means the overall view of
patentability is evolving slightly, at least as far as business methods are concerned. In the
network economy, there is thus a crucial desire for the compatibility and interoperability of
computer software. This is in fact the fundamental prerequisite for the network effect
and, accordingly, for the crucial networking of the digital framework.557
2.5.2.5 From evolution to inventiveness
A patentable invention has to fulfil the requirement of non-obviousness.558 Non-obviousness
is closely related to inventiveness. To be non-obvious, an invention has to be based on
some previously unknown knowledge. In addition an invention is considered to involve
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559 See EPC 56 article: “An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if,
having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art. If the
state of the art also includes documents within the meaning of Article 54, paragraph 3,
these documents are not to be considered in deciding whether there has been an
inventive step.”
See http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar57.html#A57
560  For instance, Amazon.com’s famous business method called the one-click patent (U.S. pat.
5,960,411) is a good example of an invention based on pure obviousness, or at least rather
close to obviousness. The patent thus covers Amazon.com’s ordering model in the
network environment. The invention is to be related to a computer method and system
for placing an order and, more particularly, to a method and system for ordering items
over the Internet. The business idea itself is based on profiling, where the trade services
are offered slightly differently depending on the customer.  The counterargument for
non-obviousness is well based on Barnes & Noble’s online bookstore and its feature
called the Express Lane. Express Lane permits orders with a single click. However, the
question still remains whether on-line shopping rises above an idea that would occur to
almost any Web store designer. See Hall 2001, 195.
561 A business method as an invention is considered obvious if the only significant difference
between the combined teachings of the prior art and the claimed invention is that the
claimed invention is appropriate for use with computer technology. The presumption of
obviousness is thus created when the most significant difference from the prior art is the
implementation of the method in software. See Korn 2002, 1377.
562 Establishing a workable criteria for this kind of line of demarcation is even a larger
problem in intellectual property law. See Stern 1999, 107.
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an inventive step if it is not obvious to a sufficiently skilled person.559 In the case of
business methods, non-obviousness has a close relation to patenting traditional  business
methods that have merely been implemented in the new framework.560 These traditional
business methods may have be in use for a long time and are hence part of the public
domain. Therefore, only applying a business method in a new environment does not
make it a new one.561
Non-obviousness has a close relation to novelty. In assessing the novelty of new
applications, non-obviousness constitutes an important analytical tool. Non-obviousness
is actually a rather central prerequisite when defining the patentability of a business
method. The level of inventiveness and thus the level of non-obviousness are defined
through the state of the art. Such an assessment requires the careful definition of a line of
demarcation, with the distinction again lying along the continuum abstract/concrete. On
one side of the line are the legally protectable aspects of innovative contributions as
concrete inventions. These are mostly concrete and specific applications. On the other side are
the legally unprotectable contributions. These are based on the abstract character of
inventions and general aspects of them.562
Inventiveness may further be examined through copyright. An illustrative aside
here is the copyright law of the United States, where there exists what is known as the
doctrine of scènes à faire. This doctrine recognizes that certain genres require certain
elements, or at least almost always utilize these elements. Without these stock elements,
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563 See Stern 1999, 136 - 137.
564 See Stern 1999, 138 - 139.
565 See Stern 1999, 143.
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those to whom the work is directed may fail to receive the relevant cues. This doctrine
has been extended to aspects of computer programs that necessarily result from
hardware standards and mechanical specifications, software standards and compatibility
requirements, computer manufacturer design standards, programming practices, and the
practices and demands of the industry being served.563 In this way, these elements have
become a part of the scènes à faire for computer programs. Moreover, in the context of
business and computer programs, the doctrine of scènes à faire has been extended to
practices and prerequisites of the industry that the computer program generally serves.
Hence, the concept of expression and the scènes à faire are already defined or
circumscribed in terms of business functionality.564 Elements that are considered mere
ideas or only a part of the scènes à faire get only some protection or no protection at all,
while the expressive elements of a work get much more protection.565
In the context of societal communication, inventiveness contributes to the
communicational pattern in a slightly different way. Communication is not truly vertical:
rather it may be described as mutual communication. Mutuality in communication is based
on constructing impersonal relationships, in which respect mutual communication differs
somewhat from horizontal communication. Horizontal communication may be mutual,
but the communicating parties may be rather loosely connected. On the other hand, the
core of horizontal communication is to construct cooperative networks whereas mutual
communication builds more on the substantive content of the communication. Patented
business methods constitute a crucial part of mutual communication, with inventiveness
and non-obviousness both forming core aspects of this communication.
2.6 Summary: The significance of ideas and the social nature of
innovativeness
Freely circulating ideas constitute the basis of innovativeness. Further, innovativeness is
founded on governing ideas and using them in a reasonable way. The essence of
innovativeness lies in the free circulation of information, with the strict harnessing of
ideas easily preventing or disturbing that innovativeness. The digital economy is
fundamentally based on innovativeness in using and in creating new business models. It
seems to encourage the control of ideas, which is mainly due to the importance of
innovativeness and innovations as the kernel of the functions of digital economy.
Further, in the digital economy ideas and innovations are generally commercialized in
order to create economic wealth and growth. This is realized by commercializing ideas or
Illustrations of the digital economy
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products but also through creating competitive business methods that represent social
innovations.
Business methods clearly bind together business and technology, with the core of
the method is generally based on technological development and new technological
inventions.  A business method is generally defined as an architecture for product,
service and information flows. In this respect business methods include communication
in their essential core. The communicational aspect of business methods is approached
from two directions of intellectual property law, i.e., patent and copyright. This is due to
the legal background of software, which has become the very kernel of the business
methods being implemented in a totally digitized environment. Software can be protected
through patent or through copyright and business methods as inventions are usually built
up in the form of software. In order to be able to act functionally in cyberspace, applied
inventions need to be constructed technically.
The communicational background of the digital environment is linked to different
operations within the overall business method. Communication is realized as it relates to
customers and gathering information about them, whereas a business is sooner founded
on informing customers about the enterprise and its existence. Business models in the
digital economy are based on commerce and exchange, with the models endeavoring to
control and govern trade. Computer software is designed to make computers functional,
and business methods are created for functionality as well. Further, the communicational
background of business methods lies in the originality and usefulness of the software or
business methods involved. Copyrightable software needs to be original, and patentable
software ought to be useful as well. This is in fact the difference between copyrighted
and patented software: copyright is aimed more at protecting cultural values and patents
are granted for inventions that may have some use in manufacturing. Originality and
usefulness set some further requirements for innovativeness. Innovativeness needs to be
realized on the basis of patented inventions or copyrighted creations. Innovativeness is
thus a step forward from a copyrighted creation or patented invention.
Business methods are thus closely related to innovativeness, which makes them
communicative. Accordingly, they can be considered social innovations; i.e., they are in
continuous communication with the surrounding society. The societal communication in
the core of a business method is based on the clear distinction between an idea and
expression in software. In external communication, it is founded on the expression
revealed to the outside world. In other words, it is the expression of an idea that is the
focus  when communicating with the public. On the other hand, expression as a qualifier
is ambiguous. In this respect a pure business method is slightly different when it is
fundamentally founded on a rather hazy idea. A business method as such is relatively
abstract in character.  A business method may be assessed on a twofold basis: it may be
a concrete work or an abstract general type of work. The distinction lies in the originality
Create and market. Ideas and business in the digital economy
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of the work, with the features of the work having to be assessed as part of its protected
expression or as part of its unprotected idea at each step in the evaluation.
The social character of a business method is further manifested in its usefulness.
Generally, usefulness is related to the technical character of an invention, given that
patentable inventions should produce a useful result. Usefulness is not, however,
embodied exclusively in technicality but may include a more abstract useful result as
well. Accordingly, the usefulness of a business method may be examined through the
distinction between practical and liberal arts. In this perspective  a business method is a
useful invention when it serves to society. Usefulness is closely related to society when
it closely connects the patentable invention and society at large. Societal communication
is thus carried out through the mutual relation of usefulness and inventiveness. As an
invention, a  business method hence gets its justification from its usefulness in the
societal framework. The inventor needs to show that the world needs the invention, there
generally always being some unmet need somewhere in the economy for the invention to
fulfil. Usefulness also  implies that the business method is exploitable in the societal
framework.
The novelty of an invention is a social relationship. An invention thus has to be
considered new in terms of existing technology or the state of the art. Novelty is also
closely connected to the creativity of an idea. In this respect a business method may
clearly be defined as a novel creation in that by its very nature it is founded on creativity
and novelty. This is actually a rather crucial prerequisite for a business method to
become successful in the market. In this respect, novelty and creativity comprise the core
of the communicativeness of business methods as they relate to  society overall. The
communicativeness and the social character of business methods are thus even further
emphasized through creativity. Creativity is a continuous social process where an idea
and its success evolve and develop. The creativity of an idea is not a matter of degree,
for the assessment of creativity addresses in what respect an idea is creative. Creativity is
thus defined rather subjectively.
A patent is an agreement between an inventor and the government. The inventor
reveals the core idea of his or her invention and at the same time makes the information
public: a patent is a reward. In this way a patent operates as a communicative instrument
between technological development and society. The communicative complication of
disclosure in business methods stems from their high level of abstraction. This is the
problem of social innovations in general. A business method is an abstract creation and
also often complicated to describe in any concrete manner. Therefore, the patentability
of business methods is closely linked to the ability to draw a line of demarcation between
an abstract idea and the physical embodiment of an idea. This again stems from the
subjective character of business methods.
Patentable inventions have to fulfil the requirement of non-obviousness, with
inventions in general required to include previously unknown knowledge. The level of
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inventiveness and thus the level of non-obviousness are defined through the state of the
art, with the difference assessed on the axis of abstract and concrete. This is likewise the
communicational focus of non-obviousness. On one side of the line of demarcation are
the legally protectable aspects of innovative contributions as concrete inventions; on the
other are the legally unprotectable contributions. The latter are based on the abstract
character and general aspects of inventions. Non-obviousness is defined using this line
of demarcation. On the other hand, the interplay of concrete and abstract is based on
societal communication. Here, communication is not truly vertical, however; rather, it
may be described as mutual communication. The core of mutual communication is to
build up some substantive content for the communication itself. Patented business
methods thus constitute a crucial part of mutual communication, with inventiveness and
non-obviousness both being core aspects of this communication.
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566 In Simmel’s sociology, this is clearly found in the polarity of the metropolis and the
monetary economy. Whereas the metropolis is the point of concentration of modernity,
the mature money economy is responsible for the diffusion of modernity throughout
society. See Frisby 1990, 62. See also Renner 1949, 136 - 137.
567 In primitive societies, certain categories of goods, such as livestock or articles of clothing,
serve as primitive forms of money. There is also less trade with objects of daily use than
with raw materials, implements, and jewelry. See Habermas 1989, 163.
568 An illustrative example of this is open source software communities, which have often
been described as gift economies in which gifts are exchanged for reputation. See Raymond
2001, 80 - 81.
569 See Tolonen, H. 1992, 225 - 226.
570 Money is considered to have structure-forming effects when it becomes an intersystemic
medium of interchange. The economy is constituted as a monetarily steered subsystem
when it regulates its interchanges with its social environments via the medium of money.
See Habermas 1989, 171.
571 Vähämäki writes about the soul of a thing. All things have a soul and it is the soul in
particular that includes the communicativeness and the value of a thing. See Vähämäki
2003, 66.
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3 MONEY TALKS!
3.1 Money and society
Money is communication. As such it is utilized as a societal communicative instrument. This
implies that money becomes one of the most essential links between the economy and
society, given that these are considered social relationships.566 Money is not, however, a
fundamental necessity; social relationships may surely be created and managed without
money. An illustrative example is the ritual exchange of valuable objects in which there is
no money involved at all. Nevertheless the  exchange of valuable objects actually
constitutes a primitive form of exchanging money.567
In societal communication, money also serves as an indication of human needs; i.e.,
human needs are often expressed through money.568 This means that some individual
human needs are converted into more general, abstract needs. Money makes the needs
and requirements of people somewhat more abstract. These needs are then constituted
and maintained as a market.569  Modern society, as well as modern exchange, employs
goods rather than money as the instruments of exchange. Goods are thereby utilized as
the denominators of human needs. This is fundamentally due to utilization as the basis
of modern society, which makes it possible to use goods and supplies in exchange. In
this way the communicativeness of modern society is embedded in goods and their
mutual relationships.570 These relationships then further constitute a social network that
draws on human relationships.571
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572 In the Habermasian sense the lifeworld is only a subsystem that defines the pattern of
societal system as a whole. Societal systems ought to be anchored in the lifeworld through
a certain institutionalization. See Habermas 1989, 154.
573 This may further be considered as the interplay of communicative action and strategic action.
Communicative action is more likely to be founded on linguistic communication, whereas
strategic action is based directly on causal influence. See Tuori 2000, 113.
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Human relationships ,although founded on the exchange of goods, need to be
anchored to societal foundations.572Moreover, the relationships are illustrations of the
general communicative interests that comprise the governance architecture. The
governance architecture is further based on the communication of the interests of the
state, the market and the commons.573 These interests, as well as human relationships in
society, need to be valued. In this respect, the anchoring nexus cannot be based on a
name or idea, as both of these entail a kind of second level bound to the society. Names
and ideas both have several social tasks in addition to their connective character.
Accordingly, the societal dimension entail a crucial requirement of that most absolute value
be used  in the governance architecture. This value is found in money.
3.2 Credit money and the static credit relationship
3.2.1 The verticality of credit relationships
In communication, money is generally the kernel of capital, with capital being the linking
element between money and innovativeness. Increasing innovativeness as one of the core
aspects of the digital economy always requires some capital. This is realized through
money, which is utilized by business management as an organizing instrument. Money is a
tool for strategic business designs and thereby an instrument for realizing rapid
innovativeness at a high level. Capital is essential for business investments in the
functional economy. Capital consists of either equity or current liabilities. Because of the
size of investments, the financial capital of an enterprise is generally based on current
liabilities, and thus  is often dependent on the ability of an enterprise to get credit. This
is naturally due to the lack of paid-up capital in small and newly established enterprises.
In sum, credit seems to be the only possibility for such enterprises to get their business
started.
The different varieties of capital may be examined in terms of how dynamic they are.
These dynamics derive form the essence of the financial structure. This has a direct
implication for the different ways in which communication can be seen as related to
finance. Communication and finance thus operate in a close mutual coexistence. In this
respect communication constitutes a structural part of capital. At this scale capital in its
most static sense may be found in the credit relationship. The statics of the relationship
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574 This closely resembles the functions of the basic norm as described by Hans Kelsen. A basic
norm is supposed to be valid and thus it authorizes further norm creation. A norm
belongs to an order that is founded on such a basic norm, because it was created in a
fashion determined by the basic norm. See Kelsen 2003, 197.
575 Actually many transactions today do not involve money at all. Instead, they are based on
credit, with the trader of goods receiving a promise form the buyer to pay money in the
future. Credit is thus nevertheless tied to money. See Stiglitz 1997, 724.
576 See Tarkka 1993, 49 - 50.
577 An illustrative example of this kind of openness in a credit relationship is the right of a
bank to set off debts. This right actually even strengthens the power of a bank in a credit
relationship given that most income is governed by a bank and through bank accounts.
See Koulu 1992, 588 - 589.
578 Fundamentally, the trader or the creditor has to trust in the promise of the buyer or the
debtor. See Stiglitz 1997, 724.
579 See Havansi 1984, 120.
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are founded on the basic elements of legal relations, i.e., the distinctiveness of the legal
subject, legal object and legal relationship. This is indeed the very core of the overall
traditional make-up of  legal relationships.574 This threefold structure also constitutes the
communicativeness of the credit relationship and makes it static at the same time.
The credit relationship is basically a bilateral legal relationship. It is thus closely
bound to a structure having two different subjects as the actors in the relationship. This
is what gives the relationship verticality.575 A credit relationship is an economic
relationship in which two parties have committed themselves to non-simultaneous
payments.576 In other words, the relationship is typically based on continuity, with non-
simultaneousness being its one of  core aspects. At the same time, non-simultaneousness
causes some grave problems for the statics of the relationship. The payments are equal
(or as agreed) but the non-simultaneousness leaves the relationship open and therefore
variable.577 On the other hand, non-simultaneousness of payments requires trust as the
basis of the overall relationship.578 As a rule, the payments are to be carried out
simultaneously, with the collateral remaining only secondary.579 The essence of the
relationship is still as static as the primary character or the approximate equality of the
parties.
The vertical credit relationship is based on non-simultaneousness in the
responsibilities of the parties. On the other hand, non-simultaneousness as the core
element of this relationship emphasizes the communicative character of money and
hence the communicativeness of capital. Payments that are not carried out
simultaneously leave the credit relationship open and thereby transformable. Further, the
openness and transforming character of this relationship need to be founded on some
degree of communication. Therefore, in order to be functional, this open relationship
needs to be based on communication. On the other hand non-simultaneousness keeps
the boundaries of the communicative pattern rather open. Openness keeps the
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581 The intent to be bound is actually the basis of the whole contract as it is defined as a
consensual contract. The opposite is a real contract, which also requires something concrete,
for example an object that is handed over, to become binding. See Aurejärvi - Hemmo
2004, 11 - 12.
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communication within certain bounds and anchored to certain relationships. Yet even a
non-simultaneous credit relationship is characteristically founded on money; i.e., money
drives communication. Thus, money creates a l ink for communication, with the
communication itself clearly embedded in the financial relationship. Basically, it is the
credit relationship as a basi c relationship that shapes governance through
communication.
Further, the credit relationship is based on bilateral consensus requiring the free will
of both parties.580 As such, the credit relationship is based on consistent agreements
between the parties. The parties must thus both have the intent to be bound in order to
enter into the relationship.581 Consensus really is enough: there need not be any
supplementary elements. As long as both parties are committed to the relationship, the
relationship remains stable. It is precisely this intent that requires free will. Free will then
forms the basis for further communication. This is  where the core of the communicative
pattern is constituted. The kernel is thus founded, on the one hand, on bilateral commitment
and, on the other hand, on the significance of money as a communicative medium. In the
vertical credit relationship these two main elements are also the cornerstones of the
governance structure, in which money operates as the basic medium.
3.2.2 Abstractness and the communicativeness of money
A credit relationship in its traditional sense is structurally vertical. This is due to the non-
simultaneous kernel of this relationship, where the main focus is on the compact
organization of the positions of the actors. The communicative pattern of the traditional
credit relationship remains rather unfit for the purposes of intellectual property. It mainly
seems to be too static due to the need to define the legal object narrowly. The legal
object includes credit as an object and the overall collateral security. This is exactly the
reason why intellectual capital is rather hard to fit into  the static pattern of the vertical
credit relationship.
There thus exists a crucial need to create a sustainable governance instrument for
intellectual property. This is due to the significance of money as the kernel of the credit
relationship. Namely, as a governing tool money is relatively intangible. Despite its
intangible character as a governing tool in the static communication pattern, money
ought to be treated as an object. This is also why it needs to be defined  extremely
rigorously. On the other hand, the intangibility of money is decidedly complicated to
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582 In this sense, a subjective right (subjectives Recht) is not actually a concept in the legal order
but rather a concept of jurisprudence. See Mincke 1979, 51 - 52.
583 On the other hand, money that is stored in a bank account is often considered only as a
unit of  bookkeeping and is actually a rather abstract construction. See Koulu 1992, 590 -
591.
584 Money is thus generally defined as a medium of exchange, this rather narrow focus
creating some difficulties in understanding modern capitalist credit money. Credit money
as a special means of debt or promises to pay issued by states and banks becomes a means
of payment and a store of abstract value. See Ingham 1999, 18.
585 Money may be employed even as a form or medium of governance. See Habermas 1989,
180 - 181.
586 This is clearly the idea of a negotiable promissory note. The legal basis is the foundation
of the negotiable promissory note but it does not have to be mentioned, nor is the duty
of the debtor explained through this. See Aurejärvi - Hemmo 2004, 99.
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understand within the framework of the traditional legal system. The legal system in its
traditional sense needs concrete structures, i.e., objects, in order to operate. Objects are
clearly easier for traditional legal thinking to work with. It is obvious that traditional legal
thinking concentrates more on governing legal objects than legal relationships. Things
are easier to handle than relationships from the viewpoint of the legal system.582
Money is traditionally defined as an object.583 Instead of seeing money as an
object, however, it is possible to see money as positions. Then again, when examined as
positions, money becomes extremely hard for the traditional legal system and its internal
logic to understand. As positions, money may be treated as an abstract construction, as
a mere object it clearly differs from its fundamental role as a communicative instrument
in multi-party relationships.584 Further, as an abstraction, money may be used for
arranging mutual societal relationships. In this sense, money operates as a tool of
governance where it belonging to both the private and public spheres of governance.585
This stems from the abstract character of money, which makes it detached from the
fundamental reason for payment.586 Money is hence loosened from its purpose. This is where
the non-simultaneousness of the credit relationship connects intangibility as the abstract
character of money and the communicativeness of the credit relationship. Money is a
governance tool for mutual cooperation and at the same time maintains that relationship.
3.2.3 Communication, relationships and governance
The credit relationship may also be studied from the viewpoint of communication, which
imposes some additional tasks on the relationship. The most fundamental purpose of a
credit relationship, from the viewpoint of communication, is not to construct an
interrelated communicative pattern. On the contrary, a communicative pattern is based
on bilaterality: it requires and can only even benefit two parties. This is the basis of the
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587 See Havansi 1984, 22 - 23.
588 On the other hand, in a pure credit economy there would be no need for money: rather,
the overall system of credit relationships could be defined as mutually corresponding
credits. Money would thereby be utilized only as an indicator of value. See Tarkka 1993,
50 - 51.
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verticality of a credit relationship. In other words, a credit relationship is fundamentally
constituted in such a way that it can only accommodate two parties. A multi-party
relationship is rather impossible from the viewpoint of traditional legal thinking. Parties
to a credit relationship are bound to each other through the relationship. On the other
hand, a credit relationship is the basic element of a vertical credit relationship.
Credit money constitutes a special connection within the vertical credit
relationship. The relationship operates as a connective link, with this special nature
embedded directly in the relationship. The connection makes the whole relationship
dualistic and at the same time duplex. There actually exist two ostensibly corresponding
relationships. These relationships are, however, not similar when compared to each other
because of the binding character of the relationship. One party is obligated to pay while
the other is entitled to demand payment. These obligations and entitlements correlate
with each other and constitute the overall vertical credit relationship.
An illuminating counterexample may be found from joint ownership. A tangible
thing may be owned jointly, with the mutual relationships of the part-owners being
parallel and at the same time equivalent. The relationship itself does not alter the
structure as a whole and the communicative structure of the relationship remains the
same, no matter how many part-owners there are. This exemplifies one of the most
crucial problems when constructing governance through money. The example shows
why the credit relationship is slightly different as a relation. This is exactly where money
and  traditional tangible or intellectual property differ from each other from the
viewpoint of governance. Further, this has direct implications for how to govern risks for
credit losses. It seems that a two-way credit relationship is too static for the more
complicated design of risk governance, particularly in the case of enterprises whose
capital is mostly comprised of intellectual assets
On the other hand,  credit is guaranteed through a collateral security.587 The
quality of the security instrument as a guarantee is closely bound to its value, more precisely
its economic value. Therefore, it is extremely important to be able to calculate its value
exactly and reliably.588 The difficulty of calculating value is where the problems emerge
in the area of intellectual capital. It is extremely complicated to define the value of
intellectual assets in any reliable way. Additionally, credit relationships in the area of
intellectual property are more complicated than in simple duplex two-party relationships
like the traditional credit relationship. This derives form the character of intellectual
property and essence as a consortium of several different forms of governance.
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589 See the Treaty on European Union, done at Maastricht on the 7th of February 1992:
Preamble.
590 See Rudanko 1995, 66 - 67.
591 See Frisby 1990, 66.
592 This implies a legal interest. See Tolonen, H. 1992, 229 - 231.
593 See Habermas 1989, 171.
594 The so-called meta-theory of economy that underpins the classical or neo-classical analysis of
money is concerned exclusively with money as a medium of exchange. The other
functions of money, i.e., as a unit of account, as a means of payment, and as a store of
value, are assumed to follow from its function as a medium of exchange. See Ingham
1999, 17.
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3.3 The market and communicative relationships
3.3.1 The market as relationships
Free capital is one of the four main principles of the Internal Market Act of the European
Union.589 Particularly at the level of corporate Europe, it is the integrating financial
market that is one of the cornerstones of  integration overall.590 One explanation for this
may be found precisely in the correspondence between economic and social
relationships; i.e., social and economic relationship are clearly interrelated. Social
relationships may be conveyed through the economy and exchange may include societal
functions. In these societal functions  money operates as the basis of the relationship
between things as expressed in economic interaction.591
Money is generally considered  an instrument for making earnings. Money is thus a
tool for making profit and as such  is founded on its capitalistic potential. Money is also
a factor of production in the manufacturing process. As a part of the manufacturing
process money creates economic growth and as such it is entitled to compensation.
Money thus operates as a tool to arrange economic relationships, with money itself used as tool
of exchange.592 Money hence has a kind of dual task as an instrument of governance and as
a tool of exchange. In this respect money constitutes a particular mechanism of exchange
in transforming use values into exchange values. This is exactly how money operates for
communicating human needs in societal cooperation. Through money the natural exchange
of goods is transformed into the commercial exchange of commodities.593
Money has different functions in exchange.594 These functions are based on the
substantial distinction between the tasks of money as capital and as a tool of exchange.
The distinction is linked, on the one hand, to payment for labor and, on the other, to the
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595 For example, money made it possible for a merchant to buy a ship and import spices to
be sold back at home. See Tolonen, H. 1992, 230.
596 This may actually lead to failure in recognizing that money in fact necessarily consists of
social relations between economic agents and a monetary authority. All monetary systems,
like the one where money is considered as commodity, are social systems. Further, credit
money is qualitatively distinct form a system in which money itself is essentially the social
relation of the promise to pay. See Ingham 1999, 19.
597 See Tolonen, H. 1992, 230.
598 See Tolonen, H. 1992, 231.
599 The monetary system is thus formed through accepting money as a payment. It is not the
issue, but the acceptation, which is decisive here. State acceptation thus delimits the
monetary system. See Wray 1999, 51.
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opportunity to trade.595 Payment for labor is the essence of capital, whereas money in
trade makes up the core of exchange. Money is generally employed in a dual use, with
the way it is used depending on its task in society.596 In an exchange-oriented society the
opportunity for commerce seems to be the main task of money. Thus the significance of
money is not as important in the manufacturing process, which is essentially based on
the labor force.  Instead, the main function of money is the possibility it offers to buy
something and sell it further at a profit. The significance of money  therefore lies
especially in its usability in trade and exchange, where it has an active role as creator of
value.597
3.3.2 The materialization and juridification of money
Money is a crucial instrument in exchange. In exchange the significance of money is
based on its materialization, by which money becomes an asset and is further utilized as
such. This means that the value of materialized money is based on its potential for profit
and the use of this in the market.598 Materialized money offers a clear point of reference
for money as a tool of governance. The utilization of money and its advantages in
governance are both realized in practice by accepting money in payments made to the state’s
offices. All ways to make a payment form part of the monetary system.599
The materialization of money is carried out in parallel with and at the same time
as the juridification of money. This is significant if money is to be concretized as the kernel
of governance, and the parallel materialization and juridification of money makes it
possible to exploit the features of money. This then enables the creation of a sustainable
governance system based on money. On the other hand, these two structural elements
differ to some extent. The materialization of money is still bound to its usability in the
market, while juridification is more functional from the systemic view. The juridification of
money is thus more likely to linked to how communicative relationships are arranged in
which money is still one significant and rather essential instrument. On the other hand,
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600 See Habermas 1989, 165.
601 In this sense, society is based on the modern monetary system where even culture is
filtered through the economy. The human beings living in this society are only objects
that are considered as a payment and a counterpayment. This is actually the kernel of
societal communication. See Simmel 1999, 57.
602 In this sense, a barter exchange of commodities is essentially bilateral, whereas monetary
relations are trilateral. Monetary exchange, unlike exchange in general, involves a third
party of those authorities that may legitimately produce money. See Ingham 1999, 23.
603 Token money is often identified through the legal tender laws that determine what must
be accepted as a means of payment. An even more accurate definition would define token
money through its acceptance in payments made to the state’s offices. Then all means by
which a payment can be made to the state form part of the monetary system. Thus, it is
the decision of the state to accept the payment at state pay offices, and not legal tender
laws, that creates token money.  See Wray 1999, 51.
604 See Tolonen, H. 1992, 245.
605 However, in this view money can act only as a neutral veil or a catalyst of the economy.
Money is thus not an autonomous economic force. See Ingham 1999, 17.
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the constitution of communicative relationships overall fits in with the framework of
societies organized around a state in the sense described by Habermas. Such states
include markets for goods and steer those markets as symbolically generalized exchange
relations. The steering relies on the medium of money.600
Money consists generally of claims and obligations that are directed to societal
actors. It is thus constituted significantly by social relations and cannot be fully understood
outside them.601 Therefore, money would be best understood as credit money, which is
fundamentally a social relation or a network of social relations.602 The juridification of
money, on the other hand, is foundational for rights governance. Money is used as a
central tool of the governance structure but the framework is based on legal
relationships. In the market, money is utilized as an asset, which is also the basis of
governance. Juridification alters the significance of money and divides it into certain
relationships.603 The market-oriented task of money as a communicative tool is founded
on the rise of  the monetary market. Money itself has become a commodity that can be
used and exchanged in the financial market.604 On the other hand, as a commodity,
money as a medium of exchange may have an exchange ratio with other commodities. It
may thus symbolically and directly represent commodities or real tangibles.605
Along with the materialization of money the characteristics of the market increase
the value of money as an exchange  instrument. The financial market is based on three
elements that define the use and qualifications of money as a commodity in that market.
All these elements are based on the materialization of money in the sense that  increasing
value may be clearly attached to it. These definitive elements are utilized as a reference point
of the materialization of money. First, money gets its own value through the uncertainty and
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606 This is one element of the development of money as it is in today and more specifically
it concerns the risk associated with granting a loan, periculum mutui. See Tolonen, H. 1992,
245.
607 Again, as Hannu Tolonen puts it, this means labor and costs, ratio laboris. See Tolonen, H.
1992, 245.
608 The third element is closely connected to the value of goods and in the financial market
also to money itself as the basis for an increase in value, ratio loci vel temporis. See Tolonen,
H. 1992, 247.
609 According to Simmel, money becomes the symbol of aesthetic indifference to the
subject’s demand for particular objects. It can also perform the universal role of the
medium for the attainment and circulation of all particular objects of demand. See
Simmel 1978, 74 - 75.
610 The state is generally and traditionally considered an organization in which there exists a
collective capacity for action and guidance by the state is generally based on binding
decisions. In the capitalistic economic systems some other functions are depolitized and
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risks that are associated with its use.606 For example, using money to grant a loan is a
risky business where the creditor sometimes suffers a loss. The risk of using money in
this way  requires that the activity will be compensated. Second, the materialization of
money and the reason for the increase in its value lie in the costs involved in granting
loans.607 In practice, the granting of loans is uncertain and this uncertainty ought to be
covered. The granting of loans also requires labor, in which respect it also entails a risk
of losing money. The materialization of money is thus connected with governing
uncertainty and the losses caused by the granting of loans. Materialization in this sense
is likewise the basis for defining the absolute value of money.
The third element of materialization of money has to do with the market and thus
has a direct effect on the functionality of exchange. Here, money and exchange operate
as interactive instruments of governance. This element is based on the significance of
money as a practical tool of the market. The practical aspect of the market is always fixed to
the value of money. At the same time, however, money constitutes its own market and
operates in this market. The value of money is thus bound to the demand for and need
for  it, which are heavily  dependent on the time and place where money is actually used.
The value of money is therefore not always the same; rather it varies in different places
and at different times.608
3.3.3 The communicativeness of money
Money is fundamentally communicative. However, it operates only as a symbol of value
relations.609 It operates as an essential market  instrument that is an essential precondition
of private governance. Private governance is thus fundamentally founded on the market
and this kind of governance only becomes possible at all through money.610 This makes
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given over to non-governmental subsystems. In these systems the steering medium,
instead of binding decisions, is money. See Habermas 1989, 171.
611  See Tolonen, H. 1992, 249.
612 The opposed internal relation of money and commodities is founded on particular
attention, not just to money as the form of value, but also to money as the content of
value. Money does not consist only of the content and form of value but of the value
relation as the determining process in the development of the social power of money. See
Kennedy 1999, 195.
613 When a thing has a value like this it would not be consumed, but kept for exchange. See
Tolonen, H. 1992, 255.
614 Commensurability may be examined in terms of exchangeable things, such as tangible
commodities or money. These things are thus social categories which derive directly from
the value relation where the basis lies in the value itself. Value relations hence derive
from content and form just like social relations of production in general. See Kennedy
1999, 199.
615 When labor takes on a commensurable form it becomes a good. See Tolonen, H. 1992,
254. Commensurability is possible only when the labor benefits the whole community and
it is possible to work for others. See Vähämäki 2003, 65.
616 Most relationships between people can be interpreted as forms of exchange. See Simmel
1978, 82.
617 See Kennedy 1999, 200.
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market governance a fundamental element of the governance architecture. Money is thus
a crucial prerequisite of any functional market in that it is precisely the instrument that
communicates the concrete and individual needs that are to be constructed in the form
of a market.611
The communicative combination of needs may be realized only through the
commensurable measure which makes it possible to convert the values of different things so
as to make them comparable to each other. Reciprocity and commensurability are also
significant  instruments for enabling exchange.612 Exchange is carried out through the
utilization of money as a commensurable medium that further enables the reciprocity of
exchange. This is only realistic when the values of different exchangeable objects take on
a mutual relationship in one way or another.613 In this respect commensurability is the
foundation of materialized exchange.614 Commensurability is based on communication
through products, mainly tangible things. On the other hand, commensurability as the
basis of exchange is founded on labor, which is very much the core of the overall
circulation of goods in modern exchange.615 In sum, exchange is crucially defined as
communication that has become materialized.
Goods constitute the basis of exchange.616 Accordingly, the materialization of
communication implies that the communication itself is ultimately carried out through
things. The social power of money rests on its ability to bring together the content and form
of value.617 Communication is thus not personal in character nor is it carried out I with
human beings. In this sense, a communicative materialized good has, parallel to its value,
Illustrations of the digital economy
618 At the same time, the societal assignment of a good is based on the value itself. See
Vähämäki 2003, 68.
619 See Simmel 1978, 80 - 81.
620 These aspects are basically connected to the interrelated cooperation of things and the
relationships of them. See Vähämäki 2003, 67 - 68. In an exchange-based society these
aspects are, however, easily applied also to money.
621 For instance, fabric and a coat become commensurable through their relative value as
used by a society. See Vähämäki 2003, 67.
622 Those things are examined here only in terms of their utilization value. On the other
hand, in society the things represent more than their pure utilization values. Things play
a role in society and shape the societal communication.  They serve as the bearers of
value. The societal value is not important for the societal task itself. See Vähämäki 2003,
67.
623 For example, intellectual property rights, when examined as property rights, are often
considered as a set. This applies even if copyright, patent, or trade secret rights are absent
from the bundle. Intellectual property rights as a bundle of rights are founded on three
criteria: there ought to be an interest capable of precise definition; there ought to be an
interest capable of exclusive possession and control; and the putative owner has to
establish a legitimate claim to exclusivity. See Cho 1998, 44.
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a societal task, with this value fixed to the materialization of money.618 In sum, money is
communication, and communication is (partly) money. On the other hand, the
fundamental commensurability may only be achieved through a competent cooperative
instrument, which operates as a kind of intermediary between social relationships and
money.619
The communicativeness of money is based on some basic aspects of value.620 From
the viewpoint of communication the most essential of these is admittedly the
proportionality of the value, which is closely related to the commensurability and
reciprocity of values. Proportionality requires that values are defined in relation to each
other. All objects have a value of their own but these values are then further defined
through each other. An amount of one thing corresponds reciprocally to an amount of
something else. On the other hand, communicativeness is fundamentally based on the
usability of goods. Value is therefore attained through the use value of a materialized
thing. It is further related to society, where all materia has its own task and position. This
societal significance is the core of the societal value of  goods.621
Values may be examined separately, without any connection to the counterparts that
define the values of usable things. Here the things remain mere things, however, and as
such have no societal relationship.622 In this sense a value is clearly like a range of
possibilities.623 Value is not thus expressed directly through a thing, but rather through its
societal task, or in its value in societal communication. Here, the analysis of values
requires communication between at least two value-bearers. In this configuration one
actor represents a payment to the other and together they constitute a communicative
Money talks!
624 Fair exchange is mainly carried out through contracts. It is defined by the desires and
needs of contracting parties and competition. See Tolonen, H. 1992, 254.
625 At the same time, the natural exchange of goods is converted into commerce in commodities.
See Habermas 1989, 171.
626 This is essentially also the basis of materialized things. See Vähämäki 2003, 67.
627 Capital has become more ubiquitous than ever. Technology and technocapitalism with it
are replacing the growth of capital as the most important function of society with the
growth of knowledge. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 4.
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consortium of counterparts. These counterparts are then the structural elements of fair
exchange (iustitia commutativa).624
Value is thus generally defined as a societal relationship and as an operative
position. These different yet overlapping aspects form the basis of the value of
materialized things. Accordingly, they also comprise the basis of money as a socially
communicative instrument. In this way values that are embedded in things and their
societal tasks may also be realized in the communication that is carried out through
money. Money can thus be used as a special interconnecting instrument. Money operates as
a special exchange mechanism that transforms use values into exchange values.625
3.4 Intellectuality as a denominator of capital
3.4.1 Money as capital
Money is communication, whereas capital as such is not yet communication. It is thus
expressly money that makes society run by communicating in social relationships. On the
other hand, in societal interaction, the relativity and reciprocity of values constitute the
essence of money as a tool of exchange. The essence of money thus lies in its
communicativeness. Moreover, communicativeness is closely linked to the character of
money given that money connects two very different communicative and structural
elements. Money is defined through its material aspect as an informational agent and, on
the other hand, through its common aspect as a social unit.626 In this light money can be
used in two tasks of governance; as a medium and as a position.
Money is often described as capital. However, it is not constructive, or even
possible, to define capital in general as money, at least not juridically. Even the most
fundamental capital of an enterprise includes several different elements that are made up
of different kinds of capital. Therefore, there exist even crucial types of capital that go far
beyond money. The communicativeness of money has some structural influences as well,
whereby all of the structures underlying capital are communicative.627 This is clearly
manifested in two main forces of the digital economy knowledge and globalization. Both
are considered the kernel of the new economy’s characteristically communicative
Illustrations of the digital economy
628 Globalization has a clear connection to the Internet and communication through open
networks. Intellectual property and thus the significance of knowledge as the core of
intellectual property is experiencing rapid growth in the digital economy. See Lemley
2000, 531.
629 For example, the value of intangible capital is complicated to calculate. This is basically
due to two reasons: first, most enterprises are incapable of estimating,  measuring, or
reporting the qualifications of their knowledge capital and how it is related to their
strategy. Second, outsiders are only seldom capable of estimating which element of the
knowledge capital is really important. See Ståhle - Grönroos 1999, 59.
630 The development from these factors of production towards intellectual ones has
contributed to the breakdown of the traditional paradigm of property. These traditional
factors of production are nowadays only a small part of the whole value of an enterprise.
See Koulu 2003, 4.
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elements. Accordingly, one of the crucial aspects of capital is its knowledge basis, which has
become heavily emphasized with the digitization of the economy. Knowledge is thus
defined as the kernel of the capital of an enterprise, as its chief assets are no longer
necessarily physical ones.628
On the other hand, capital still does consist of money, with property or capital
utilized as an instrument for constituting the social relations underlying capital. This is
very much based on the communicative character of the capital itself. The essence of all
classes of capital is nevertheless ultimately money. As such, money operates as an
intermediary for certain societal structures, which are eventually founded on money. In
society, law thus mediates the relations that are embedded in money itself. This is well
manifested in the exchange of tangibles, where the exchange constitutes a network of
social relations. In this context, as a form of capital, intellectual capital is also kind of a
replacement for money. This does not mean that money would totally be replaced by
intellectual capital, but that the social relationships inside the influence of money or
intellectual capital need to be structured somehow in a fresh way.629 It is thus no longer
the exchange of tangibles in the traditional way that governs the social network of
capital.
One interesting point in the discussion concerning the differences between money
and capital comes from the viewpoint of property. Property has traditionally been
described as something tangible, such as pieces of equipment, raw materials and
premises, which were the most essential factors of production in the Industrial Age.630
Yet, money has always been considered the most sustainable denominator of property.
Conversely, property has generally been described as some amount of money. The crucial
role of money has nevertheless made it possible to realize some forms of profit that are
associated directly with money. A good example of such proceeds is money laundering,
Money talks!
631 Money laundering is used for decriminalizing money, i.e., for converting illegal money
into legal. Money laundering is described as converting criminally acquired money to
make it to appear as thought originally it was acquired totally legally. Money laundering is
a means used to convert funds that proceed from illegal activities into financial uses that
involve legal instruments, such as bank deposits, investments in stocks and bonds or real
estate. See Grosse 2001, 3.
632 Money laundering is realized in three steps. Robert E. Grosse describes these steps as
follows: First, the placement of cash into the banking system is the step in which the
money launderer disposes of the criminally derived cash proceeds. Second, after the
funds enter the financial system, the launderer further separates the illicit proceeds from
his or her illegal source through layering. This layering occurs through a series of financial
transactions which closely resemble legitimate financial transactions. Finally, integration
of the funds into the legal economy moves away from the financial transfers and into the
realm of real or financial assets or purchases. This is accomplished in such a way that the
funds appear to be derived from a legitimate source, such as earnings from an ongoing
export-import business or the purchase of stocks and bonds by foreign investors.
Integration is the final stage of the process of providing a legitimate explanation for the
criminally derived funds. By this stage, distinguishing between licit and illicit funds is
extremely difficult. See Grosse 2001, 3 - 4.
633 This is clearly seen in the case of electronic money, where money is even essentially
described as information. See Friedman - Macintosh 2001, 277 - 278.
634 The accumulation and reproduction of information concerning technological knowledge
comprise the essence of the success of society. Those that emerge at the top of the
hierarchy of the reproduction of knowledge and thus technocapitalism are the ones that
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which is merely an instrument for legitimizing some illegally gained money.631 This is
carried out simply by paying out money through normal business channels.632
Money laundering reveals some other elements of the digital economy. These
elements are introduced through the differing character of money and property. In the digital
economy money is mainly based on different kinds of property. Digital property often
includes intellectual assets, such as copyrights, trademarks, or patents, although it may
also include some benefits that are dependent on future events. Money laundering gets
its characteristics through the consistency of money. Money laundering itself is
forbidden, but this concerns only money. Property laundering is actually completely
allowable legally e, as it only consists of intangibles, not of pure money. One of the basic
characteristics of the digital economy thus offers opportunities and tools for
money/property laundering.
3.4.2 Information as capital
Money includes information as one of its fundamental elements.633 Information is also
one of the intellectual manifestations of money. Information and its reproduction define the
overall functionality of the digital economy precisely because one characteristic of the
digital economy is innovativeness and the free circulation of information.634 In the digital
Illustrations of the digital economy
can build up and reproduce new knowledge most effectively. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 5.
635 Most of the activities of the digital economy are based on the newest and the most
innovative activities, such as biotechnology, software design, microelectronics, advanced
computing, bioinformatics or nanotechnology. These innovations are highly dependent on
new knowledge and creativity. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 5.
636 This has an impact even on the autonomy of people living in society. See Benkler 2001,
61.
637 Together these assets form a knowledge reservoir. A knowledge reservoir gets its value by
joining together both tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge. See Paija 1998,  33.
638 In this arrangement, knowledge may, roughly defined, be divided into two main forms,
tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge. One of the crucial elements of knowledge is data
and, moreover, data that can be converted into information, for this is the data that can
be understood. Understanding is not, however, enough for full exploitation of
information. To become understandable and most of all usable data needs to be
transformed into knowledge. Only in the form of knowledge can information be utilized
and turned into action.  This is why the notions of information and knowledge must not
be confused. See Ståhle - Grönroos 2000, 31. Tacit knowledge is elaborated into explicit
knowledge, and thus becomes  capital belonging to a certain enterprise. On the other
hand, tacit knowledge is associated with the other tacit knowledge existing in an
enterprise. See Nonaka - Reinmöller - Senoo 2000, 90.
639 It is argued that explicit knowledge is the tip of the iceberg, with the most of the mass
beneath the surface. See Ståhle - Grönroos 2000, 32.
272
economy money is converted into information or, rather, into information products. The
economy is dependent on the newest and most innovative activities.635 Information and
its derivatives thus make up one of the main forms of capital in the digital economy and
information products even give their owner the capacity to control information flows in
society.636 Accordingly, information becomes both one of the most important operational
foundations of an enterprise and a useful and powerful means to increase its competitive
edge. In this respect information has a dualistic character in the capitalizing functions of
an enterprise.
The capitalizing function of information has its potential in business, an
enterprise’s capital. It is clearly a manifestation of the competitiveness of business innovations.
Further, information resources and the core knowhow of an enterprise together
constitute its fundamental capital.637 As  resources of the enterprise, information and
knowledge are thus closely connected to each other.638  The characteristics of these two
elements are slightly different as their visible forms being realized in the terms of two
different classes of knowledge, i.e., explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge. Explicit
knowledge can be communicated to others in an understandable form, whereas tacit
knowledge is something that an individual knows or is able to do, but is not able to
transfer or communicate to others.639 Information as the knowledge resource of an
Money talks!
640 The knowledge resources of an enterprise consist of a combination of human and
physical resources that make it possible to organize activities. These are then tied into the
activities of other companies. Beneath the activities of an industrial company there is a
pooling and combining of the knowledge and skills of the individuals. See Håkansson -
Snhota 1997, 14.
641 Core knowhow may also be called skill. See Ståhle - Grönroos 2000, 31.
642 Both experiences and life-long learning are rather essential assets when the market
becomes more dynamic. The more intensive the market is, the more importance the core
knowhow has. This applies especially to branches that change continuously and there it is
essential to get masses of information at a high rate. The amount of knowledge and the
speed with which it is received constructs the key position in competition. See Paija 1998,
33.
643 This means that enterprises are always faced with rapid change in their core businesses.
Basically innovativeness and development are based on combining different elements and
making these elements cooperate and affect each other. See Ståhle - Grönroos 2000, 82 -
85. Recurrence, on the other hand, requires continuous innovativeness. See Keil 2000, 6.
644 This is a consequence of ideas, information, and technologies becoming part of products.
A good example is the rising era of smart products. Smart cards are replacing credit cards,
debit cards, and the access cards to the office. One card is sufficient for all these
functions as well as being a drivers license, personal health card and so on, and all the
information is managed by a single microprocessor embedded in the plastic card. Another
example is smart clothes. Clothing manufacturers are placing chips in clothes that contain
information on where and when the item was made, who manufactured it, when it was
imported, when it arrived in the store, and when it was placed on the rack. The item may
have a memory that can provide useful information to everyone in the value network. See
Tapscott 1996, 44.
645 See Ståhle - Grönroos 2000, 82 - 85.
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enterprise is closely connected to both of these forms of knowledge.640 A business’s core
knowhow is also foundationally defined through different ways of doing things and this
knowhow is often embedded in the organization and its employees, exactly like tacit
knowledge is.641 Therefore, core knowhow has mostly developed through experience and
learning or in unexplainable ways of doing things.642 It constitutes a significant part of
business capital overall given that an enterprise as a complex is based on innovativeness
and continuous development.643
Information has other implications as part of the information capital of an
enterprise.  Namely, information as the fundamental content of digital products and services
has now become significant.644 A great deal of the capital of an enterprise may be
embedded in information products, with these information resources then constituting
an integral part of the enterprise in the digital economy. Innovativeness and ideas in fact
require this. Knowhow is basically used as the kernel of  the innovative force of an
enterprise, with knowledge forming the foundation of operations and means to improve
the company’s competitive position.645 Competition on the market is thus also based on
knowledge as a competitive value. In innovative competition, an enterprise trades its
Illustrations of the digital economy
646 The most extensive part of knowhow and knowing is called wisdom. Wisdom is a whole
made up of knowing, understanding, and skill. Generally it includes, in addition to
intentions and values, the ability to estimate and build views of larger elements and the
significance of knowing. See Holma - Lappalainen - Pilkevaara 1997, 9.
647 The knowhow of an enterprise reflects, beside the knowledge of its personnel, the
knowledge of the other companies and organizations to which it is connected through its
business relationships. Thereby, much of the knowledge derived from information put to
use in an enterprise becomes available from its relationships to others outside the
enterprise. See Håkansson - Snhota 1997, 14.
648 Knowhow may also become an essential factor in reaching a monopolistic position. This
is especially the case if there is no appropriate knowhow available anywhere else. See
Virtanen 2001, 20. The focus of studies of information is already moving towards an
examination of knowledge. See Vicari - Troilo 2000, 64 - 65.
649 Along with the emergence of the digital economy, information and communication
technology has begun to play a major role. This is also considered to build up the so
called new infrastructure. The new infrastructure mainly consists of hardware and software
applications, telecommunications, and data storage structures. See Weill - Broadbent
1998, 6.
650 Together with the importance of knowledge and knowhow the importance of quality has
risen. See Lampola et al. 2001, 19.
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knowledge capital and the core knowhow associated with it. An enterprise always needs
to preserve its fundamental knowhow in order to maintain its functionality.
3.4.3 Creativity as capital
Information constitutes the kernel of the capital of an enterprise, in which role it is
generally defined as knowhow. Knowhow includes some estimation of the usefulness,
merit, and significance of the information and knowledge utilized in a business. Therefore,
information as capital is no longer a purely technical or instrumental concept but
includes some assessment of basic purposes and fundamental values.646 The benefit to be
had from information in this sense is thus solidly grounded in knowhow. In this sense it
is described as innovativeness.647 This is precisely where the creativity of the capital of an
enterprise lies; it is mainly knowhow that builds up this innovative force. Operating on
the strength of information resources constitutes both the core of a functional enterprise
and an essential tool for improving its competitiveness.648
Intellectual capital is closely bound to innovativeness and knowhow.649 Accordingly,
one efficient way to operate is to facilitate and increase the economy that is based on
exploiting information.650  Intellectual capital is also closely bound to creativity as the
core of a successful enterprise. Namely innovativeness may be converted into successful
output only by concentrating on the resources of an organization as a whole. It is
impossible to develop the innovative capacity of an organization without considering the
organization as a unified entity. Indeed an organization often operates as a system, where
Money talks!
651 The resources of organizations are always more than only the resources of a single
individual or individuals. Accordingly, the organization’s ability to compete and renew
itself is not the same as the corresponding abilities of the individuals in the organization.
See Ståhle - Grönroos 2000, 82 - 83.
652 Definitive here are the efficiency with which information flows between individuals, or
how well the connections and contacts are utilized. These factors together rather clearly
determine the organization’s capacity for continuous self-renewal. See Ståhle - Grönroos
2000, 84.
653 In this sense the intellectual capital of an enterprise as knowledge is an active concept. It
includes the processing of data into information and further into knowledge. Knowledge
is an active concept including both information and its effect, which means that
information has been converted into knowledge. See Ståhle - Grönroos 1999, 49.
654 On the other hand, openness and further creativity have been considered the core of new
ways of utilizing creative works. This is the essence of open content projects, such as
Creative Commons. See Välimäki - Hietanen 2005, 334 - 335. See also Creative Commons
http://creativecommons.org/
655 Capital funding is a tool to govern the mutual financial relationships in society. The
market thus delivers finances from the surplus sector to the deficit one. This guarantees
that finances are effectively used for the purposes where they are needed. Governance in
the finance market is bound to delivering information. Sufficient information thus secures
the proper function of the market and guarantees effective price formation. See Rudanko
1995, 18 - 19.
656 For example, the way in which information flows are controlled affects how culture
develops. See Lessig 2004, 120 - 121.
657 In the early days, financing was a scarce commodity and those who had access to it had
an immense competitive advantage. Today monetary capital is easy to get, but finding
intellectual capital is hard. A good example of this is biotechnology and the amount of
money being put into research in the field. Another popular and well-financed area is the
start-up organizations on the Internet. See Czerniawska - Potter 1998, 28.
275
the sum of its characteristics is essentially more than the sum of its component parts.651
Basically this means that an enterprise needs to use and communicate its most essential
skills to form relationships and to create contacts. This completeness is created by
combining the various parts together and letting them or making them influence each
other. On the other hand, the strength of information flows reveals the basic dynamics of
a company.652 Dynamics produce creativity and creativity produces dynamics. Dynamics
thus constitute one of the most important factors of a competitive business.653
Here, creative capital acts as the core of the functionality of an enterprise.654
Economic functionality is then founded on buying goods and services in different
markets and processing these goods and services in manufacturing processes.655
Creativity thus has a great influence on the overall cultural environment as an operational
framework.656 One efficient way to operate is to enable and increase an information-
based economy. Through this development the digital economy affects the relationships
between information  and finance.657 Capital remains a critical asset, as ownership and
access to money enable investments in new products. The intellectual nature of capital
Illustrations of the digital economy
658 Typical examples are biotechnology, electronics, and information technology. See Lauriala
2001, 45. The role of the private enterprise as a force of economic growth is thus based
on the belief that it is particularly innovation in high tech, information, and biotechnology
areas where the crucial growth has occurred. See Berger - Udell 1998, 613 - 614.
659 For example, enterprise’s employees constitute a very important asset. See Lauriala 2001,
45.
660 Intellectual capital comprises human capital and structural capital. Human capital is here
defined as thinking capital (i.e., anything that thinks) whereas structural capital consists of
customer and organizational capital. See Roos et al. 1997, 29 - 31. Business processes may
also be referred to as business intelligence, which includes customer intelligence, competitor
intelligence, market intelligence, technological intelligence, product intelligence, and
environmental intelligence as its constructive elements. See Pirttimäki - Hannula 2002, 9 -
10.
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has, however, made financing more insecure.658 This is most often due to a lack of
sufficient collateral securities. The problems here mostly stem from the invisibility of
capital that is not necessarily found on the balance sheet. Often the most important part
of capital is intellectual capital, however.659
3.4.4 Communication and intellectual capital
Intellectual capital is based on the utilization of information. In this way capital too
becomes based on information, with this information-based capital further constituting
the overall functionality of capital in its intellectual sense.660 In business this functionality
takes on some additional significance in terms of the capital of enterprises. Business
capital may be viewed from two different aspects, both of which are based on
communication. First, information flows and creativity in these flows constitute capital with
exploitation of these information flows based on governing them. Second, capital may be
examined as finance, with money one of the essential elements of capital. Money operates
in the background of all types of capital, whether it is in the form of physical or
intellectual asset.
Capital as finance is based on the fact that in order to be functional an enterprise
needs money. In this sense money as part of the capital of an enterprise is founded on
communication and, further, different forms of communication. Financial capital is thus
generally constituted of communicational relationships. Communication further requires
that  finance is obtained from different sources. Traditionally, in the Industrial Age,
enterprises financed investments through current liabilities. In other words, the financial
basis was founded on the ability of an enterprise to form  credit relationships. This in turn
was rather dependent on an ability to minimize risks through sufficient collateral
Money talks!
661 On the other hand, then, the essential need of collateral security excludes many
enterprises. This corresponds especially the small enterprises being only starting up their
business activities and do not have a lot of chances to receive credit because of lacking
securities. Particularly this equalizes the enterprises that are operating at the branch of
information and communication technology of Life Sciences. These companies are often
also called technology companies. See Lauriala 2004, 14.
662 This naturally increases the risk in financing. See Lauriala 2004, 16 - 17.
663 Basically, venture capital is based on the expectations of investors of materialized risky
profit  becoming much higher than in other investments. See Lauriala 2004, 21.
664 The functionality of this kind of network is based on different interdependencies of
business relationships and their effect on a relationship as a mutually connected relation.
See Håkansson - Snhota 1997, 17.
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securities. The credit relationship as a communicative pattern relies crucially on collateral
security.661
This connection to collateral securities fixes communication to a single two-party
relationship. This is the only form that a two-party credit relationship can take, in other
words multi-party relations are impossible in this kind of communicative pattern. The
twofold credit relationship is the prototype of risk governance in the traditional financial
landscape. However, the financial background is changing. Two principal reasons may be
cited. The first is the excessive statics and frozenness of the credit relationship, which
renders the governance structure too rigid for enterprises operating in the digital
economy.  The other is the incapability of young enterprises to post sufficient collateral
securities to get their business started.662 This is exactly where the intellectuality of capital
enters the picture, although this especially concerns companies or cooperative projects
that are mainly based on innovations and intellectual capital as one of their core assets.
With the changing capital context of enterprises, their financial background has become
more uncertain. Finance is now often called venture capital, which is mostly based on
substantial opportunities to make profits but also involves a grave risk of losing
profits.663
Venture capital is a more communicative form of capital than that based on
collateral securities. Its communicativeness derives directly from its character as a
functional network.664 However, this functionality, as well as networking, causes variety and
uncertainty in relationships. The traditional pattern of constructing credit relationships
and governing the risk of credit loss is far too static. Attempts are made to avoid a static
situation by somehow constructing a more flexible design for governance. A flexible
governance structure needs to be communicative when a network of relationships
becomes the core of the financial foundation of an enterprise. The traditional twofold
pattern of a credit relationship is thus not enough for governing the more complicated
networks.
Illustrations of the digital economy
665 Process is generally considered the core of development. This applies to the software
business, for example, where different developing models are described through their
change. Development is thus described as a process of change or a progression of change
events that unfold during an entity’s existence. See Warsta 2002, 65 - 66.
666 The three other core processes are the technology and product development process, the
business development process and the network and the market development process. All
of these three have distinctive measurable milestones, of which some are fully or partially
dependent on each other. Milestone achievement in any of the core processes has a direct
or indirect effect on the main process and the value development in it. For example,
before completing the first version of a business plan it is almost impossible to get seed
funding, which is, in turn, one of the milestones of the value creation process. See
Rönkkö 2001, 84 - 85.
667 See Virtanen 1996, 50.
668 See Tolonen, H. 1992, 249.
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3.5 Venture capital
3.5.1 Money as ideas
In the digital economy, the connection between money and intellectual values becomes
especially important. This connection is basically carried out through innovativeness. In
the digital economy, innovativeness is based on ideas and their free circulation.
Innovation is often founded on technological development. Innovativeness thus consists
of both technological novelty and its economic benefits. Accordingly, all the decisions and
choices concerning innovativeness need to be linked to considerations of technological
feasibility and the needs of the market. It is this combination of technology and market
that makes it reasonable to examine innovativeness in terms of an evolutionary model.665
Here the focus is a description of the development path from the initial business idea to
its economic exit or realization. This demonstrates at the same time the realization of the
value of the company. Evolution is based on a value creation process, which is
considered the main process since it should be the ultimate focus of any venture.666 This
connection is then complemented by money as a third factor.667
The marketing function of money is the main condition for its capitalization. On the
other hand, the market is the principal prerequisite for the capitalization of money. This
is basically due to the profitability of the market. Without any market there would be no
profit to be had on money; money would remain only a valueless  curiosity. It is thus the
market that makes money beneficial. On the other hand, mere exchange is not enough to
make money profitable. The function of money as capital requires that money also be
involved in the production process in a one way or another.668 Thus both exchange and
production are closely bound together. Together they constitute the usefulness and
Money talks!
669 Labor as the foundation of money reveals two essential qualitative functions that money
performs in capitalist society: money as a symbol of the development of a commodity and
money as the social coordinator of control over labor and surplus extraction. By
recognizing the significance of these qualitative social functions of money, it becomes
much clearer why the particular object expressing money must express both the content
and form of value. See Kennedy 1999, 200.
670 This is clearly seen in the mutual relationship of labor and money in the digital economy.
Labor may still be an absolute value, but in the mutual relationship of labor and money it
is money that is more important. See Himanen 2001, 52 - 53.
671 See Tapscott 1996, 47.
672 It goes back to the time when there was a need for intellectual property rights and when
they had to be strictly definable. Intellectual property rights were granted as privileges to
certain traders or manufacturers. In this way, the system created new industrial branches.
See Bruun 1983, 154 - 155.
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profitability of money as capital. This is mainly realized through money in its juridified
form.
The character of money has been modified somewhat with the digitization of the
economy. This is basically due to a gradual change in the character of the means of
production, from physical towards human. In the traditional economy, labor was the basis
of the exchange system and, at the same time, the basis of the monetary system overall.
As such, labor was considered a commodity, as it was exchangeable.669 Labor is a no
longer commodity, at least  not in the sense of the traditional economy based on the
labor of craft workers. The meaning and nature of labor has changed in the digital
economy mainly due to the crucial roles of creativity and innovativeness.670 For example,
in software companies there exists almost no labor in the traditional sense but, instead,
the knowledge and creative genius of the product strategists, developers, and marketers
constitute the key assets of these companies. The productive basis of an enterprise has
thus shifted towards intellectuality.
Intellectuality as the core of the means of production likewise changes the status
of labor. Labor is thus not  the focus anymore;  it is creativity that sets the rules today. It
is a company’s ability to attract, retain, and continually increase the capabilities of
knowledge workers and provide an environment for innovation and creativity that counts
in business today.671 This is likewise the basis of economic growth in the digital
economy. The altered meaning of labor also affects the mutual balance of labor and what
labor actually consists of. Labor is no longer only mechanical work or simply doing
something, as it used to be in the Industrial Age. At that time it was essential to be able
to produce as much and as fast as possible.672 Rapid and massive production was the
crucial factor. The balance has, however, moved slightly towards the actual context of
the labor, with innovativeness now the most essential asset of an enterprise. Along with
this, money has also taken on a special value, as it is defined through ideas.
Illustrations of the digital economy
673 Money thus offers a twofold means of control. Peter Kennedy describes the controlling
function of money as follows: Money operates as the form and the content of value: first,
control within the production process and second, control from the market place to
production. In the first case, money must express the content of value if it is to co-
ordinate and control the private labor of agents in the process of production. See
Kennedy 1999, 201.
674 The introduction of money and its value have both been carried out by common consent.
See Tolonen, H. 1992, 257.
675 In contrast, the products of nature are spoiled rapidly and it is possible to collect only a
limited amount of them. See Locke 1988, 293 - 294.
676 There are three conditions that are also considered to be the limits and restrictions of
natural ownership.  The spoilage limit defines the amount of assets (one cannot have more
than one can consume) and the sufficiency limit is fixed to the sufficiency of assets (there
has to be enough left for all). The third limiting restriction is called the labor limit and it
deals with appropriating assets (no one is allowed to appropriate more than is possible
through his or her own labor).  See Tolonen, H. 1992, 257 - 258.
677 These circumstances are together called the invention of money. The invention of money
makes it possible to collect more than one’s consumption would be and to exchange
commodities with others. See Tolonen, H. 1992, 257 - 258.
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Money is founded on a material basis in its role as a means of exchange and a
means of production. This dualistic foundation of money is the basis of its value.673 On
the one hand, money is materialized and as such creates a market and operates in it.
Money is thus the basis of exchange and as such rather independent. Money also
operates as an independent factor of production. The exchange society requires that
money have a certain exchange value. For money to be a factor of production, it must be
made marketable. For this reason money has been introduced on the market and been
given a certain value in a functional society. This then operates as the basis of
capitalization of money as well.674 Society has introduced a tool for exchange that has
certain qualities that are practical in exchange and add value in production. As an
exchangeable instrument, money thus preserves its value. It does not get spoiled and
therefore may be collected and preserved for later use.675 On the other hand, money has
several unequal components by its nature.676 Two characteristics of money, i.e., its being
a factor of production and an instrument of exchange, together mean that money may be
used for increasing capital and collecting wealth more than one might naturally
accumulate.677
3.5.2 Ideas as blurred capital
Money is introduced as ideas in the digital economy. Emerging information markets
connect money and intellectuality closely together. The connection is carried out along
the axis of informatization and commodification. Information has been commodified, and,
Money talks!
678 Intellectual property both constitutes the existence of this type of capital and determines
its ownership. See Drahos 1996, 156.
679 See Vähämäki 2003, 82.
680 See Drahos 1996, 156.
681 In intellectual property rights, only the potential to become an exclusive right is valuable.
This property is called early-stage intellectual property. Basically, the context of this
property includes a promise of the future exclusive right. In order to be early-stage
intellectual property, however, the promise needs at least theoretically, to include the
possibility of becoming an excludable right. See Koulu 2003, 12 - 13.
682 Several innovations that are part of intellectual capital may be refined into exclusive
intellectual property rights. For example, a trade secret may give birth to a patentable
invention, or a copyright of a design. Similarly, the value of an enterprise may be
converted into a trademark. See Koulu 2003, 12.
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correspondingly, commodities have been informatized. In other words, some tangible
products have become more intellectual. For example, music nowadays tends to be only
music and is no longer delivered in the form of tangible records. On the other hand,
some traditionally intangible products have been commodified. Information is presently
sold in the form of commodities, for example as usage metering. Commodification does
not, however, necessarily mean that those intangibles have been made more tangible and
thereby more like real products. Rather, they have in effect been made more usable in the
information market.
Intellectual capital and the digital economy have several other interests in
common. One of these is their essential intellectuality, where abstract objects are
considered a significant form of capital.678 Intellectual capital is the most equalizing asset
of the enterprises of the digital economy, which implies that the products are not purely
tangible anymore. Rather, the most important products have become more like ideas and
possibilities to do something or act in certain way.679 As such capital is no longer identical
to concrete goods but rather a lever that enterprises use to obtain control over concrete
goods.680 This makes it also rather complicated to define products or their real
functionality, which in turn affects the ways of governing rights that are associated with
those products. One consideration related to intellectuality is the difficulty of
determining when a product has come into being, e.g., when there actually exists a ready
and completed invention. The complexity is due to the traditional legal thinking, according to
which it is rather essential to be able to define the borderline between a real invention
and a mere potential idea.681 The time limit between a fully matured exclusive intellectual
property right and the knowhow forming a part of intellectual property is elastic. Time is
here the definitive factor.682
Refinement of goods is not, however, an essential, or even natural consequence of
the intellectuality of capital. Rather there has to be some investment by a business
organization in order to get potential innovations to become real intellectual property for
the enterprise. Refinement is a part of the life cycle of intellectual property, which
Illustrations of the digital economy
683 See Koulu 2003, 12 -13.
684 See Vähämäki 2003, 82.
685 See Barth et al. 2003, 153.
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includes the early development of intellectual property as the first step, the excludable
intellectual property right as the second one, and the commercialized product as the final
one. This is illustrated in calculating the value of intellectual capital when granting credit
or using such capital of it as collateral security.683 However, one must still deal with the
traditional requirement of having a feature to which the credit relationship or the
collateral security can be attached. It is commercialization as the completion of the life
cycle of an invention that gives it its marketable characteristic. Accordingly, it is rather
essential for inventions to be able to access the market. Market acceptance actually
creates the innovation. In other words, an invention is converted into an innovation
through the market. If not marketed, or accepted by the market, an invention remains no
more than simply a good invention. However, despite this, the whole life cycle as a
continuous process needs to be governed as part of the intellectual property of an
enterprise.
However, it is actually the intellectuality and unpredictability of the digital economy
that makes functionality the essence of the entirety of operations. Intellectual capital in
the digital economy is founded particularly on expectations, not necessarily ready
products. This is precisely the implication of functionality as the very core of
intellectuality. The digital economy is likewise more oriented towards the future and
future events, future prospects. Therefore, the main feature of the intellectual capital is
uncertainty. This is parallel to invisibility and intangibility in being a kind of
incompleteness. The new economy thus begins where the product in its traditional sense
ends, or when the outlines of the product begin to blur.684
3.5.3 Capital as venture
3.5.3.1 Viewpoints on intellectuality as capital
Money constitutes the essence of capital. This holds true even despite the intellectual
character of capital, although intellectual assets are generally described as assets of an
enterprise.685 For example, brand, technology, customer loyalty, human capital, and the
commitment of employees belong to an enterprise’s intellectual capital, with money
operating beyond all these assets as their essence. Thereby, capital should also be
examined as relationships that are conveyed through money. In this sense money is a
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686 Capital is the lifeblood of a growing business. The creativity of entrepreneurs typically shown in
starting and building their businesses often disappears when it comes to the business
planning and capital formation process. Most entrepreneurs start their search for finance
without really understanding the financial process. See Sherman 2005, 3.
687 Personality also creates a competence that makes a subject capable of speaking. See
Habermas 1989, 138.
688  See Habermas 1989, 138.
689 This in fact strengthens Habermas’ theory of communicative action, for it is possible to
draw an analogy between the significance of ideas in the digital economy and the term
“culture” in Habermas’ theory. In the theory of communicative action, the term “culture”
is used for the stock of knowledge from which the participants in communication supply
themselves with interpretations as they come to an understanding about something in the
world. See Habermas 1989, 138.
690 This is the status of the enterprises that are financed mostly by venture capitalists.
Typically the enterprise is small - it has only one or few employees - and the financing is
needed for starting up business operations and sustainable research and development.
Investments are typically made in enterprises entering the marketing stage, or enterprises
that are beginning their internationalization development. See Lauriala 2004, 25.
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competence that makes subjects capable of acting and participating in societal discourse.686
This closely resembles the concept of personality in the Habermasian sense, which
operates as a way to participate in the societal life. 687 Likewise, money may also be
described as a toll that puts a subject in a position to take part in the processes of
understanding society and thus to assert his or her own identity.688 In the digital economy
the mediating task of money is often carried out mutually with ideas and opportunities to
introduce them. Therefore, precisely in the digital economy money and ideas are bound
together very closely.689
The role of money is here manifested as a possibility to enter the market. Market
entrance is essential for properly operating business enterprises. It is especially significant
for small start-up enterprises which have not yet been able to reach a stable and firm
market position.690 The other salient group here consists of intellectual enterprises, i.e.,
enterprises that are mainly founded on intellectual property. The ability to enter the
market is important for several reasons. One is to be able to convert inventions into
innovations. This is basically carried out through the market and market acceptance of
inventions. In fact, it is somewhat risky for an enterprise to stay out of the market. It is
generally only the market that refines inventions into successful innovations and leads to
success. Further, another very essential reason for an enterprise to aim at market entrance
is to make the enterprise known among consumers. In business life, this is relatively
important and, in addition to creating a reputation for a product or for an enterprise,
affects the value of the enterprise itself. Therefore, it is rather significant for an enterprise
to be able to become a market actor. For example, this is the basis for formulating a
trademark for an enterprise and creating some market value for it.
Illustrations of the digital economy
691 In this sense the status of small and mid-size enterprises has also been a special concern
at the political level, for example in the European Union, where small and mid-size hi-
tech companies have been given special  attention. See COM (2000) 330 final.
Communication: Draft Action Plan Prepared by the European Commission for the
European Council in Feira 19/20 June 2000: e-Europe 2002: An Information Society for
All.
692 It is typically complicated to value these intellectual assets. See Tuula 2002, 32.
693 Informational opacity may thus constitute the major reason why small firms cannot issue
publicly traded securities. Public equity and debt underwriting are both characterized by
significant costs, with many of these costs being essentially fixed and creating economies
of scale in issue size. Both the issue size and asset size of an enterprise are further
strongly related to each other. These economies of scale in issue size may be difficult for
small and mid-sized businesses to overcome. See Berger - Udell 1998, 628.
694 Besides, intellectual property is complicated to evaluate. Intellectual properties are in this
sense “fuzzy”, as they result in uncertainty, lack of trust and an inability to extract values
among business actors. See Petrusson 2004, 6.
284
Access to the market requires some monetary investments, however. These usually
take the form of  current liabilities, which typically require acceptable collateral security,
often some tangible or real property. This might often pose difficulties for early-stage
enterprises given that they do not necessarily have enough assets for posting securities.691
In this respect another class of problematic actors is knowledge-based enterprises, where
the fundamental capital consists of intangibles and intellectual assets.692 Thus, aiming at
access to the market is not totally without risk for early-stage enterprises given that
success in the market and the persistence of collateral security are highly dependent on
market acceptance. On the other hand, a lack of acceptable securities may at the same
time cause problems where rapid market entrance is concerned.693 Uncertain market
acceptance is a risk for an enterprise. In the case of current liabilities, the risk lies in the
responsibility of the operating enterprise itself, and itself only. Current liabilities result in
an obligation to pay interest and this might, in the worst case, cause bankruptcy when it
is the responsible enterprise only that is liable for the interest payments.
At the same time, the risk of failure concerns this enterprise only. This is why the
investments based on current liabilities are rather onerous for new enterprises that are
founded mostly on intellectual capital. This is mainly due to the intellectual character of
capital, whose core is flexible and which keeps on converting continuously. It is also rather
hard to define the capital value, which would be essential for defining the value of the
collateral security. Besides using current liabilities, financing would be received from
marketing and selling the products or services. However, this requires that there be some
ready products, which is exactly what early-stage enterprises lack. Most of their value lies
in the potential business ideas and thereby there is almost nothing to sell.694 These
enterprises still need to access the market in order to receive some market value and market
visibility. At the same time, the inventions being marketed are tested and refined to
become marketable innovations. In the early-stage enterprise, there is, however, still need
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695 For example, Mark Suchmann analyzes the institutionalization of venture capital financing
practices in California’s Silicon Valley during the period 1975 - 1990. According to
Suchmann, the primary obstacle to commercial development was the difficulty of
obtaining funding for innovative ventures from traditional institutional investors and
other corporate entities. On the other hand, this failure of the capital markets created an
opportunity for wealthy and well-connected individuals to provide initial infusions of
venture capital. See Suchmann 1995a, 48.
696 Private markets that finance small businesses are in this sense different from the public
ones that fund large businesses. Private equity and debt markets thus offer highly
structured and complex financial contracts to small businesses, these relationships often
being acutely informationally opaque. This contrasts with public stock and bond markets,
which fund relatively informationally transparent large businesses under contracts that are
more often relatively generic. See Berger - Udell 1998, 614.
697 See Lauriala 2004, 21. It is often thought that it is precisely small companies that form the
most significant underpinning for the technological development and innovations. See
Virtanen 1996, 44 - 45.
698 A social order is considered to be a structure that is further built up by the people living
in a society, who characteristically operate as creators of symbolic social orders. The
social order and its legitimacy are founded on common societal comprehensibility rather
than any normative regulative structure. See Suchmann 1995b, 6 - 7.
699 The class of social institutions in the economy generally includes all the established
operation models together with regulations providing proper activity. On the basis of
these social institutions economic operativeness is set on certain organized patterns. See
Houtsonen 2000, 238. The forms of social institutions may also be described as social
control. See Ellickson 1991, 130 - 131.
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for investment finance. Market governance is operable here only when there exists some
financial variation. The variation needs to be based on a capability to bond with potentially
profitable assets, i.e., with assets that are not yet presently profitable. Venture capital thus
includes a modern form of this financial variation.
3.5.3.2 Venture capital as an investment
Venture capital is a modern form of finance that is mainly designed for the increasingly
innovative environment of the digital economy.695 Venture capital thus provides equity
capital for enterprises that are not (yet) quoted on the stock exchange.696 Venture capital
usually consists of a company’s own capital resources or complex-worth investments and
is often managed by professional investors.697  In this respect, venture capital comes
close to innovativeness and thereby is often focused on small or medium-sized
enterprises as the major financing instrument. On the other hand, venture capital may be
considered  an instrument for creating social order.698 Venture capital can be described as
a social institution offering different operative options.699
The background of introducing and utilizing venture capital is hence straight-
forward. The fundamental explanation is found in the emergence of the digital economy.
Illustrations of the digital economy
700 The enterprises of the new digital economy are generally described as service-based or
knowledge-based enterprises. The greatest difference, when compared to a traditional
product-based enterprise, is that those enterprises are generally founded on intangibility.
The intangible services or activities are further produced as a process where both the
producer and consumer are integrated. Even production and consumption are combined.
See Tuula 2002, 32.
701 These intellectual properties are not, however, valueless; their value may be considerable.
See Tuominen 2001, 22.
702 See Tepora 2004, 182.
703 Finance is naturally one of the main elements of an enterprise. The business development
process also includes operations development, organization building, financial planning,
and business model development. See Rönkkö 2001, 88.
704 These intellectual collateral securities include industrial rights, like patent or trademark,
or copyright that may have a significant financial value. The overall value of an enterprise
may sometimes even consist completely of intellectual property. See Tepora 2004, 182.
705 As a system, venture capital is ancient. A famous example is Christopher Columbus whose
expedition was financed by the Queen of Spain. See Lauriala 2004, 21.
706 We may also say that the value-added structures have changed towards the value-
generating ones. This is carried out by modifying the value chain to become a value
network. See Tapscott 1996, 87.
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The digital economy and technological development have together changed trade and
commerce, which have become more and more intangible.700 In this economic framework
the capability of an enterprise to survive no longer necessarily or crucially depends on
tangible investments. Further, the financial resources of an enterprises may consist
entirely of intellectual property given that it is no longer a necessity to possess tangibles
as core assets.701 This development has been extremely rapid and powerful, especially in
certain industrial branches that have become less and less bound to tangible capital. A
good example here is enterprises that design computer software: these enterprises are
characteristically based on the entrepreneurial potential in their innovative employees,
and thus solely on the innovative force of the enterprise.702
During their start-up stage, further development and expansion periods,
enterprises are often faced with the problem of a lack of incoming cash. 703 Other
difficulties are long product development time and  slow market penetration, which may
extend the negative cash flow period. Furthermore,  new intellectual capital enterprises
do not even necessarily have any tangible collateral securities, but instead have
intellectual property to offer as security.704 This is exactly the phase where venture capital
might be beneficial. Here the idea of venture capital is to provide some investment
capital for an enterprise that has a good business idea but no capital for carrying it out.705
In this respect traditional enterprises and intellectual ones clearly differ from each
other. The main difference is found in their divergent business revenue models.706 Even the
very basis of these enterprises is constituted differently. Thus, where the traditional
enterprise is first founded and thereafter assessed through different business
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707 See Pöyhönen 2002, 581. Computers operate mutually and interrelated computing is
blurring lines among organizations. This further enables new kinds of business
relationships. Along with this, business transactions become “bit streams” on a global
network. See Tapscott 1996, 86- 87.
708 The network effect of value chains is based on forming business relationships. A
relationship is a mutually oriented interaction between two reciprocally committed parties
when these parties have some mutual orientation and commitment over time. A
relationship is thus a place where some kind of interaction takes place and something is
produced. See Håkansson - Snhota 1997, 25 - 27.
709 Only the technology- and product development-related functions are excluded. See
Rönkkö 2001, 88.
710 See Rönkkö 2001, 88 - 89.
711 Venture capital is also described as “intelligent” capital because of its flexibility. Intelligent
capital is responsible, motivated, growth-focused, active and often includes experience of
entrepreneurship. See Valtonen - Bouix 1997, 13.
712 The nature of venture capital, as well as the nature of the venture capitalist, may often be
described by the stage of development in which the investment is made. Financing needs
differ depending on the development. Among these are: seed venture (before the actual
business operation have even begun), start-up venture (for research and development and
marketing), expansion venture (growth and expansion), mezzanine venture (preparing stocks to
be officially quoted), and management buy-out or management buy-in (enterprise being bought
from the previous owner). See Virtanen 1996, 21 - 22.
713 The process of venture capital often starts with the provision of seed financing where the
fundamental aim is to set up a business plan. The simultaneous character of the financing
decision and the acquisition of information about the investment project is characteristic
of ventures and more generally for the financing of innovation. See Bergemann - Hege
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opportunities, the foundation of an intellectual enterprise is quite the opposite. It is
centrally based on different business opportunities that derive from rethinking the value
chain.707 The value chain is hence becoming more like a value network instead of a
traditional linear value chain.708 On the other hand, the business development process
includes some functions that in one way or another build or stabilize the position of a
company. These functions are operations development, organization building, financial
planning, and business and model development, which all operate together to strengthen
the enterprise and its business. The establishing process includes both the planning and
execution of a company’s internal functions.709 On the other hand, the business
development process begins with the emergence of a business idea. That is why the
process starts with a business planning phase, with later development focused more on
execution and organizational development.710
This is where venture capital financing would reasonably be introduced. Venture
capital can be used for developing new products and technologies, for expanding
working capital, for making acquisitions, or for strengthening a company’s balance
sheet.711 Therefore, the investments of venture capital may basically be made in growth
companies at all stages of their development.712 Innovation is, however, a communicative
and a continuous process.713 It is not enough to invest in research and development only:
Illustrations of the digital economy
1998, 704.
714 The innovation as a whole may contain both physical and intellectual structural parts. See
Virtanen 1996, 53.
715 See Virtanen  1996, 22.
716 The annual profit is considered to be about 30 - 70 %. Risk management is carried out by
creating a portfolio that is used to control the investment risks among many enterprises.
See Lauriala 2004, 21. The other main theory concerning risk management is the theory
of expected advantage. It is founded on the investors’ assessment of the risks and profits
involved in different alternatives. See Virtanen 1996, 31 - 32.
717 This is carried out, for example, by participating in the progress of the enterprise. The
professional role of the venture capitalist may be described as a consortium of knowhow
of finance, technology, marketing, and management where the only aim is to increase the
value of the enterprise invested in. See Virtanen 1996, 21.
718 See Berger - Udell 1998, 614.
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innovation as an investment needs to be taken into consideration as an undivided whole.714
Here, venture capital financing can be justified in terms of two advantages. First, the profit
to be made is expected to be significantly higher than for ordinary investments. In other
words, one of the main reasons for venture capitalists to make venture investments is to
get as much profit as possible.715 Second, diversifying the risk may lead to some potential
advantages. The advantages seem to be considerable for an enterprise that is based on
intellectual capital. These two advantages have generally been considered the greatest
advantages of  venture capital.716
The financing company characteristically participates actively in the business
operations of the financed enterprise. Unlike in the case of passive investment activities,
the role of venture capitalist is more like that of an actively involved minority
shareholder. The most significant difference is that the venture capitalist, through his or
her active professional collaboration and ownership, also strives to increase the value and
assets of the enterprise in which he or she has invested.717 The missing collateral security
in the form of tangibles is replaced by power over intangibles. Participation thus slightly
resembles a controlling force and it further includes, among other things, identification
and  negotiation concerning the business operations of the financed enterprise, building
the structural basis for the investment, and monitoring the enterprise after the
investment.718 This makes venture capital investment rather different from ordinary
investment activities. In traditional financial arrangements, it is only significant to decide
when to sell or buy, whereas venture capital finance is more functional in character. The
venture capitalist and the enterprise and entrepreneurs are accordingly bound reciprocally
for a significantly longer period.
The other characteristic of venture capital is that it is linked to a definite duration. In
the case of venture capital, investments are not made for an undefined time period;
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719 See Lauriala 2004, 23.
720 The investments are made for the future whereby the assessment of the enterprise
invested in is not done by looking back at its history, but at its future potential for
growth. This applies also to the value estimation of intellectual property rights overall.
The value estimation is bound to the present day, but the future value is rather
extensively dependent on the general development in the world. For example, the value
may decrease significantly because of a more developed invention by the competitor. See
Tuominen 2001, 89.
721 See Lauriala 2004, 23.
722 All capital-formation strategies actually revolve around balancing four critical factors: risk,
reward, control, and capital. Venture investors want to mitigate their risk, which may be
done, for example, through a strong management team. On the other hand, the reward is
presumed to be different for each type of venture investor. Further, control is generally
dependent on risk management, whereby higher-risk deals are likely to come with higher
degrees of control. In this respect, control and capital are thus closely connected to each
other. See Sherman 2005, 4 - 5.
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rather, the duration is always decided beforehand.719 This is bound to the profitability of
the investment, which is expected to give some profit during the specified time period.720
The third essential characteristic of venture capital is the restricted liquidity of private
equities. The venture capitalist usually invests in unquotable equities, and these will not
be marketed through the stock exchange.721 Here, venture capital binds the investor
closely to the operations of the enterprise, he or she is not able to act as an outsider.
With the flexibility of venture capital, money becomes blurred. This is basically due to
the character of venture capital as an operational network. This network consists of several
actors whose interests need to be linked in a communicative way. In part, the structure
of venture capital as a network is realized through intellectual capital, which is the core of
monetary assets in enterprises in the digital economy. It is also realized partly through risks
as an essential part of the system of venture capital. In these cases, governing risks
constitutes the core of network operations. As illustrated before, this characteristic of
money as venture capital is a result of the tensions between the governance architectures
and the non-material character of capital. Money has thus become characteristically
blurred, which makes it complicated to include in the governance architecture as a fixed
entity. Accordingly, in venture capital the overlapping elements of  blurred money and its
governance need to be considered together.
3.5.3.3 Venture capital as risk governance
Venture capital operates as a unifying construction. It creates a certain unity through money.
In other words, money and the interests embedded in it become conventional through
venture capital.722 Here money becomes a common factor in the operative frame of the
consortium of investors and may take on two functions. It can be either a connective factor
Illustrations of the digital economy
723 Venture capital is mainly utilized as a means of financing by projects where learning and
innovation constitute the most important part. Due to their innovative nature, venture
projects carry a substantial risk of failure.  See Bergemann - Hege 1998, 704.
724 In a collective and  cooperative environment the duty to deliver information may be
defined and governed through a special set of regulations. An illustrative example is the
stock market, whose operations are regulated through special legislation. See Rudanko
1998, 38.
725 See Bergemann - Hege 1998, 704 - 705.
726 Information asymmetry is actually rather usual. Depending on the viewpoint it is a
possible, general, or even typical element of a decision process. See Lauriala 2001, 66.
727 Further, a good example of cooperation as an operative framework closely resembling
venture capital as a cooperative relationship is the stock market again. It is exactly the
operative framework and the functional internal arrangement of the stock market that
constitutes the contractual relationships and affects them. See Rudanko 1998, 36 - 37.
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or a distinguishing one. The connection created by money and venture capital projects is
not, however, totally free of risk. On the contrary, venture capital includes many risks,
these being characteristically either positive or negative. Positive risks refer to income or
operational opportunities. A realized positive risk thus generally implies a  profit that
may often be many times greater than that on customary investments. Negative risks
consist of losses or misfortune in business. Both classes of risks are, at least partly, based
on the character of venture capital and its structural design.
Venture capital is thus characteristically founded on a risky basis.723 The risks are
associated with the very foundations of venture capital as a financing system; that is, they
are fundamentally based on networking and information as the essential elements of the
overall venture capital process. At the same time as these essential elements constitute
the core of the cooperating process, they bring some grave risks to the core of venture
capital. These risks are very much bound to information and cooperation. Risks
associated with information are bound to the significance of information as the
foundational prerequisite of cooperative relationships.724 The entrepreneur controls the
allocation of  funds, with the investment effort unobservable to the investor. Control
over  funds implies that the entrepreneur also controls the flow of information about the
project.725 On the other hand, venture capital is always a cooperative relationship in
which there exists a continuous need to govern the risks. Here, the  riskiness of venture
capital basically lies in insufficient capabilities of receiving information. This is
characteristically due to the resources of the parties involved in the venture capital
process.726
Venture capital includes risks based on the informational status of parties. These
informational risks are usually bound to the character of venture capital as a functional
relationship, with the functionality generally based on continuous cooperation among the
parties.727 In these relationships, the information generally  tends to remain asymmetric.
In other words, one party usually possesses more information than the other one,
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728 See Lauriala 2001, 58.
729 Conditions of asymmetric information often arise between the venture capitalist and the
entrepreneur. Information asymmetry may arise at various stages in the development of
a firm. It is common that the foreclosure option embedded in a debt contract may
actually create an incentive for the entrepreneur to behave opportunistically and take the
available project payoffs. See Trester 1998, 677.
730 Unlike large firms, small firms do not enter into contracts that are publicly visible or
widely reported in the press. Contracts with their employees, their suppliers, and their
customers are generally kept private. Berger - Udell 1998, 616.
731 The asymmetry of information is highly probable in the hi-tech sector. Hi-tech is the
most common area of venture capital financing. See Lauriala 2001, 66 - 67.
732 For example, finance investments are structured in layers, with the enterprise getting
more and more incentive to develop and grow economically. The other way to govern
risk is to build up supervising systems. See Lauriala 2001, 58.
733 Information asymmetry in reverse choice cases is essentially equal to other information
asymmetric cases; one party has more information than the other but is not willing to
reveal it. This naturally lowers the advantage of the other party and often that party might
not even have entered the contract knowing all the facts. See Lauriala 2001, 60.
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information thus remaining incomplete from the viewpoint of the other cooperating
party. The problem of asymmetric information is often called a moral hazard.728 A moral
hazard is thus basically linked to information asymmetry that appears especially in
cooperative relationships when some individual acts are not open and it is thus
impossible to make any agreements concerning those acts.729 For example, small business
finance is often even characteristically defined through informational opacity, with
information frequently remaining asymmetric.730 This is due to the non-public status of
small enterprises; they are not generally listed on the stock market, for example. On the
other hand, it is precisely information asymmetry that may easily be considered the
prototype of modern exchange. Exchange thus tends to be carried out in an asymmetric
informational environment.731 Accordingly, other means e.g. operative surveillance and
incentives are found to govern the risks that are associated with information:.732
The lack of sufficient cooperative information also causes another problem, one
known as reverse choice. The problem of reverse choice is connected with choosing and
deciding about an enterprise to be invested in, which often carried out even before there
exists any cooperative relationship.733 In cases of reverse choice, it is more likely that
efforts are made to keep information secret. Here, information asymmetry is best
reduced by operating openly. Operative openness needs to be rather active than passive
operativeness, with access to the relevant information opened without any further
supporting acts. For example, the costs of reverse choice are lowered by openly
providing truthful information to all the communicating parties. Access to information
ought to be opened already in negotiations in order to make the early activity one of the
Illustrations of the digital economy
734 A good reputation is considered a guarantee of trustworthiness and it might often be
bound to the name of the investing company. Brands and certificates are good indicators
of the reputation of a financing investor. See Lauriala 2001, 60. Thus one instrument to
make financial  operations more effective and thus more concentrated is legal
standardization and harmonization. See Radin 2002, 104.
735 Neil A. Doherty describes a principal - agent problem as follows: Principal-agent problem
arises when one party, the principal, employs another, the agent, to perform a task on the
principal’s behalf. Unless the principal can monitor all actions of the agent, the agent may
be tempted to act in his or her own interest. A good example is the relationship between
the shareholders and managers of a firm. The managers are there to act in the interest of
shareholders, which implies maximizing the value of the shareholders’ investment.
However, the manager might be tempted to work with less vigor, consume perquisites,
choose projects that minimize the risk of job loss, and engage in relationships that
maximize the manager’s marketability for a new job. See Doherty, 63 - 64.
736 On the other hand, the executives of all enterprises may be considered the principal and
the  investors agents. See Lauriala 2001, 55.
737 On the other hand, the financing arrangements of venture capital do not perfectly accord
with the principal - agent theory. The agreement is made between the investor, on the one
hand, and the executives and the shareholders of the enterprise, on the other. The agent
does not meet the normal problems of the investing principal because the only duty of
the principal is to provide liquid assets for the enterprise.  The opportunistic behavior of
the investor does not affect this. Thus a venture capital project is not a pure principal -
agent relationship but a more complicated network of relationships. It also often contains
duties for both parties to the relationship. See Lauriala 2001, 55 - 56.
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implementations of active openness. The openness of the venture capital process is often
closely linked to the reputation of the investors.734
The other typical risk category of venture capital is linked to networking and is
called principal-agent theory.735 The theory considers the controlling investor as the
principal, with  the venture capital contract being a commission agreement. In this
agreement, the agent is authorized to act for the principal, who, nevertheless, makes his
own decisions.736 The traditional view is that an investor only invests in assets and
thereby makes it possible for an enterprise to manufacture and market its products. The
principal-agent relationship in venture capital is generally considered an open cooperative
project in which the governance of risks is closely linked to governing the open network
relationship itself. Risk governance in principal-agent theory is carried out by
guaranteeing some advantage to the agent. By these means both the agent and the
principal gain some benefit from the agreement. On the other hand, there also needs to
be a system whereby the principal may  monitor the agent. Governance mechanisms
connect the information risks closely to network risks. In both cases, the governance
structure is based on the same prerequisites, e.g., moral hazard and reverse choice.737
Money talks!
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3.6 Summary: the dictates of money, the functionality of venture
Money is generally utilized as a means of societal communication. This means that
money becomes one of the most essential links between the economy and society. In this
relationship money does not, however, operate as a fundamental necessity but rather as
a channeling instrument. In societal communication, money also serves as a converter of
human needs, i.e. those needs are often expressed through money. This in turn means
that individual human needs are converted into more general, abstract needs. In
communication money is generally the core of capital, and capital the link between
money and innovativeness. Increasing innovativeness as one of the core aspects of the
digital economy always requires some capital. Money as a tool of governance is clearly
founded on the correspondence between economic and social relationships. In these
societal functions, money operates as a factor that constitutes the basis of the
relationship between commodities in the economy as expressed in economic circulation.
Money hence has dual task in that it operates as a tool to organize economic
relationships while at the same time being used as tool of exchange. In this sense, money
constitutes a particular mechanism of exchange that transforms use values into exchange
values. This is exactly how money communicates human needs in societal cooperation,
how it is constituted significantly by social relations. It cannot be fully understood
outside them.
Money is often described as capital. It is possible to define capital overall as
money although even the most fundamental capital of an enterprise includes several
different elements and kinds of capital. In other words, there also exist some crucial
types of capital that go far beyond money. The interconnected constellation of capital is
communicative, which has to do with the communicative character of capital. The
essence of all classes of capital is ultimately money, however. Money operates as a
medium for certain societal structures, which are eventually founded on money. In sum,
all of the fundamental structures underlying capital are communicative. Yet, capital still
consists of money, with property or capital being utilized as an instrument for
constituting the social relations that underlie capital. In society law provides a framework
for the relations that are embodied in money. One of the most fundamental elements of
money is information. Information is also one of the intellectual manifestations of
money. In the digital economy, money is thus converted into information or, rather, into
information products, which actually makes information one of the main forms of capital
in that economy. The capitalizing function of information is a manifestation of the
competitiveness of business innovations. Further, information constitutes the core of the
capital of an enterprise, where it is generally termed knowhow.
Illustrations of the digital economy
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In this respect, intellectual capital is closely bound to innovativeness and
knowhow, at the same time it becomes closely bound to creativity as the core of a
successful enterprise. This is where communication and money are connected. The
strength of information flows here reveals the basic dynamics of a company, with
dynamics thus constituting one of the most important elements of a competitive
business. In this context, creative capital operates as the core of the functionality of an
enterprise. In other words, capital becomes based on information, and information-based
capital constitutes the overall functionality of capital in its intellectual sense. In this light,
capital ought likewise to be examined as relationships that are transmitted through
money. Money actually constitutes a competence that makes subjects capable of acting
and participating in society as a whole. In the digital economy, the mediating task of
money is often carried out in concert with ideas and  possibilities to introduce these on
the market. The role of money is thereby manifested as a possibility to enter the market.
The ability to enter the market is important for several reasons, e.g., to be able to convert
inventions into innovations or to make the enterprise known among consumers. Access
to the market requires monetary investments, however, venture capital being one of the
most useful in the innovative market environment. Venture capital is mainly designed for
the growing innovative environment of the digital economy. As such, venture capital
comes close to innovativeness and is often directed towards small or medium-size
enterprises as their major financing instrument. On the other hand, venture capital may
be considered an instrument of creating social order in that it is characteristically
founded on networking.
The reasons for introducing and utilizing venture capital are straightforward. The
fundamental explanation is found in the emergence of the digital economy and its
intellectuality, and its continuous blurred character on the capital front. The most serious
development has occurred in business revenue models as the traditional value chain has
become rather more like a value network. Further, the business development process is
more likely to be included in some functions that in one way or another build or stabilize
the position of a company. This establishing process includes several functional elements
and this is where venture capital financing can be  reasonably introduced. Venture capital
is thus used for developing new products and technologies, for expanding working
capital, for making acquisitions, or for strengthening a company’s balance sheet.
Therefore, venture capital investments may basically be made in growth companies at all
stages of their development. In this sense, innovation is a communicative and continuous
process and as an investment needs to be taken into consideration as an undivided
whole.
Venture capital financing can be justified in terms of two advantages. First, profits
are expected to become significantly higher than for ordinary investments and second,
diversifying risk may lead to some potential advantages. Venture capital still operates as
a unifying construction and it provides some unity through money. Money thus becomes
Money talks!
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a common factor in the operative framework of any consortium of investors and as such
it may have two features: it may be a connecting factor or a differentiating one. Venture
capital is thus characteristically founded on risk, with risks involved directly bound to
information and cooperation as the main elements of such. The risks associated with
information are bound to the significance of information as an essential prerequisite of
cooperative relationships. The entrepreneur controls the allocation of funds, with the
investment effort unobservable to the investor. This control over funds means that the
entrepreneur also controls the flow of information about a project. Venture capital is
always a cooperative relationship where there exists a continuous need to govern risks.
The riskiness of venture capital basically lies in insufficient capabilities to receive
information. This is characteristically due to the resources of the parties involved in the
venture capital process.
From invention to innovation
1 In this sense innovativeness is significantly a human quality. A human being and the human
world are defined through the capability of human beings to innovate. Innovativeness is
based on inventions described as discovering, i.e., finding something for the first time, and
in this way it complements the divine ability to create: creatio ex nihilo. On the other hand,
the content of innovativeness has been developing in the course of time from innovativeness
in the sense of discovery towards innovativeness in the sense of productive invention. See
Pöyhönen 1997a, 360 - 361.
2 See Suarez-Villa 2001, 9.
3 The innovation infrastructure ought to be built on two different aspects. One is static, or
physical, the other dynamic. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 9.
4 Innovativeness may be here defined by reflecting it through inventiveness. In this respect,
innovativeness is closely related to paradigmatic change which characteristically includes previous
awareness of anomaly, the gradual and simultaneous emergence of both observational and
conceptual recognition, and the consequent change of paradigm categories and procedures
often accompanied by resistance. See Kuhn 1970, 62.
5 Innovations are often based on what are known as hypercycles, where artefacts, human beings,
ideas, and organizations together constitute unpredictably dynamic develop. In these
hypercycles it is impossible to differentiate or describe any single act of actor alone. See
Pantzar 2000, 113.
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CHAPTER THREE. FROM INVENTION TO INNOVATION.
1 THE CONSORTIUM OF INVENTION AND INNOVATION
1.1 Foundations of the governance architecture
Innovativeness is communication. Innovativeness ought to be based on the circulation of
information.1 The circulation of information in fact constitutes a rather crucial basis of
information as the core of inventiveness. It is rather significant to provide the innovation
platform with the facilities for an innovation as communication. The circulation of
information ought to be carried out as effectively as possible in order to create the maximal
amount of innovativeness. To this end the circulation ought to be kept free and unrestricted.
This is also why information ought to be received, accessed and used as freely as possible.
Communication that is carried out on the basis of the free circulation of information
supports the diffusion of knowledge.2
Such communication may, however, cause some distortions inside the innovation
structure. Namely, inventiveness alone is a mere static snapshot of the whole process of
communication, or the overall innovating process. The other half of the process, and a rather
significant aspect, is the sphere of innovativeness that is characteristically dynamic.3
Accordingly, inventiveness and innovativeness ought to be treated as a whole.4 This entity,
a consortium, constitutes the fundamental basis of the rights governance architecture. In this
sense innovation as a renewal or an improvement is a larger concept than mere invention.5
The consortium of invention and innovation
6 The prerequisites for an invention have been defined at the level of patentability: an invention
has to be creative (renovation) and it has to be clearly distinguished from existing ones. See
the Finnish Patent Act 2§. According to the prerequisites for patenting it also has to be possible
to industrially manufacture the invention. Bruun 2001, 65.
7 See Ståhle - Grönroos 1999, 44 - 45.
8 As a core element of creativity, imitation can also be called diffusion. See Männistö 2002,
22.
9 Innovations do not have to be bound to the products or services of an enterprise; they may
also be reforms in organizational structure, processes, or strategy. See Ståhle - Grönroos
1999, 46.
10 Only a fraction of all ideas mature into innovations. This is why there is a need for a critical
mass of ideas. See Ståhle - Grönroos 2000, 63.
11 Knowledge is typically an individual character and cannot be transferred from one person
to another by degree. The individuality of knowledge makes it different form all other
organizational means. Creativity is likewise basically individual. It can only to a very limited
degree be ordered and coordinated by a superior in rank. Thus, the application of knowledge
is basically an individual act. See Etzioni 1964, 76.
12 This is the interconnection of static and dynamic infrastructure. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 9.
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This is due to the need for an innovation to become accepted in the market. Despite this,
an invention must to be creative and original in a way that  distinguishes it from all
previously existing inventions.6 Therefore, good ideas or conceptions as such are not
inventions, even though both are based on clear innovation.7 An innovation differs from
both an invention and an imitation and is slightly more communicative than an invention
as such.8 Innovations are mostly created by combining the knowledge and skills of several
different people.9
Innovativeness is  founded on human imagination, which is the main source of value
in the innovative economy. Innovation also requires ideas. Ideas are then exploited when
information - in a business mainly knowledge and knowhow - is gathered and linked
together. This is carried out among human beings and by means of mutual communication.10
The human contribution sets the foundation of innovativeness on a twofold basis. The
creative function of innovation lies in the relationship between tacit knowledge as a human
resource and explicit knowledge.11 The most significant prerequisite here is to secure the
communication between these two diverse forms of knowledge. This communication
constitutes the key to discovering any fresh and novel knowledge.
1.1.1 The communicativeness of the invention - innovation bond
The combination of inventiveness and innovativeness is the core of the overall architectural
structure of innovativeness.12 This link is close, but at the same varying. The variation is
founded on the character of the overall process of communication as the kernel of the
architectural design. The divergence between the process of inventiveness and innovativeness
From invention to innovation
13 Dynamic functions also rely further on subverting established ideas or recombining different
strands of knowledge. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 9 - 10.
14 The dynamics of the innovative infrastructure, and thus the dynamics of the architecture
need to provide opportunities to experiment, establish contact, interact and diffuse
knowledge. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 10.
15 A good example of continuous transformation as the core of innovativeness is the networks
of researchers that collaborate on projects. They  must generate new ideas to accomplish
their objectives. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 10.
16 This may even be described as a knowledge-sensitive infrastructure. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 10.
17 Information infrastructures may be considered in terms of universal access. Information is
considered so fundamental for innovativeness that innovativeness may easily be equated
with information. See Borgman 2001, 56.
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is accordingly a continuous process. This process, together with additional architectural
constructions, is precisely the factor that establishes a clear distinction between invention
and innovation. It keeps both areas as classes of their own as the core of additional
functionality. Both of these aspects have different functions to perform. Innovation, for
its part, is the more dynamic, or the more active party of this duplex. Dynamic functions
are intangible and are founded on generating new ideas.13 This is clearly and directly derived
from the fact that innovation originates in communication and cooperation.14
Innovativeness is carried out best in an environment where there do not exist any
restrictions on the supply of information. Free circulation of information is the most effective
generator of innovativeness; a non-restricted environment supports its smooth progress.
Innovativeness also requires real access to information. There exist certain elements of access
that are the most essential in defining the circumstances of unrestrictedness. These elements
together then explain the architectural structure as a whole and, at the same time, define
the content of the overall innovation architecture. First, innovativeness ought to be functional.
Innovativeness is fundamentally based on continuous transformation.15 It requires effectively
operating networks, which are the core of communicative innovativeness. The significance
of functional networks lies in the essential role of communicativeness as the core of
innovativeness. Innovation is not realized in a void but requires an encouraging
environment.16 This kind of environment requires connectivity to networks as well as access
to resources and services for its support. Connectivity has a close relationship to universal
access.17
Innovativeness is, secondly, closely linked to the informational context. This is precisely
the context that foundationally constructs the internal structure of communication. Overall
connectivity is rather meaningless without any reasonable and indispensable context:
contextual qualifications make information utterly crucial for certain innovations.
Additionally, it is the context that requires communication of information. Therefore, access
ought to be ensured to both the communicating network and the information contained
The consortium of invention and innovation
18 See Borgman 2001, 56.
19 The exchange of information underlies the interaction and communication of ideas. See
Suarez-Villa 2001, 10.
20 See Borgman 2001, 56 - 57.
21 Innovation is a communicative and a continuous process, however. It is carried out uninter-
ruptedly. It is not enough to invest only in research and development; instead, innovation
as investment needs to be taken into consideration as a whole. The venture capital process
is closely bound to the innovative process; it generally starts with the provision of seed
financing where the fundamental aim is to set up a business plan. See Bergemann - Hege
1998, 704.
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by the network.18 Mere access to information and its context is meaningless without usability.
This is why the third core aspect of innovativeness is largely based on various elements of
usability. Usability has a close connection to cross-fertilization and the mutual communication
of ideas as the core of the reproduction of knowledge.19 One of these is the computer network
that constitutes the very foundation of the innovation architecture. Namely, in order to be
considered accessible, or even worth accessing, a network ought to be usable by every citizen.
These designs are not primarily constructed for technical specialists but the general public.
Thus, the universal usability of a network functions as the core of innovativeness and,
conversely, without a usable network there would hardly be any innovativeness.
The remaining two aspects of usability are linked more or less to users and their
personal abilities. First of all, usability is linked to the practical skills of the users. Usability
is constructed of a set of certain skills that the users bring with them the system. In this
sense, usability may be described as user-oriented. Access is further improved by people’s
abilities to use technology and by information being available. Second, usability is linked
directly to the context itself. This refers to the practicality of the context and its additional
creative potential. In order to be considered accessible, information should be retrievable
in a form that enables the user to read, view, or otherwise employ it constructively.20
1.1.2 The financial grounds
What may be called the consortium of invention and innovation is essentially a process,
with the essence of this process being realized as a development from invention towards
innovation. Venture capital is one of the things that reflects this process. The need for financial
support is precisely due to the flexibility of intellectual capital and the blurred character
of the union of invention and innovation. Financial support is also needed because of the
increasing significance of continuous innovativeness as the core of intellectual capital in
the enterprise. Venture capital is likewise a process.21 Both of these processes, the one from
inventiveness towards innovativeness and that of venture capital, may still be connected.
Both of these elements cooperate interconnectedly and have a mutual coherence. Venture
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22 A new business may involve a new market, new technology, products, or services. External
corporate venturing is a tool for providing corporations with mechanisms by which they
can broaden their search space for opportunities and rapidly seize emerging business
opportunities. See Keil 2000, 9.
23 Traditionally, efficiency in both production and mass marketing was regarded as sufficient
for wealth creation. The shortening product life cycle and developing times emphasize being
technologically competitive. One of the most important implications of these changes is
the way knowledge producers and users secure and control the ideas, technologies, knowhow
and expertise on which their competitiveness depends. See Webster - Packer 1996, 1.
24 As a matter of fact, innovativeness is mostly market driven, as research and development
also gets their orientation from the market. See Virtanen 1996, 49 - 50.
25 This is considered one of the focuses of technocapitalism. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 7.
26 The linear nature of the traditional model, according to Perttu Rönkkö, is based on the
following phases: technology development >organization and business development >
international roll-out >value realization. The time span of this chain of inventions is 10 -
15 years. See Rönkkö 2001, 83 - 84.
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capital is basically considered as the overall activity of building up new businesses inside the
established organizational structure.22
Invention and innovation are, on the other hand, characteristically different. The
difference resembles closely the distinction between statics and dynamics as different phases
of functionality.23 This then has a close connection to the financial grounds of
innovativeness. On the other hand, inventiveness and innovativeness fundamentally share
a similar core. They are both based on the capability to use and take advantage of different
resources. These are either existing ones, in which case they are typically part of the capital
of an enterprise, or they are external ones. The capability to exploit those resources and
the financial means to do so constitute one of the most essential elements in innovativeness.
On the other hand, the fundamentally static character of inventiveness as a process is more
or less linear and is thus often referred to as the linear innovation model. In this model the
principal feature is the superiority of technology, which in fact even strengthens the internal
statics of the process.
In the linear innovation model the most fundamental presupposition is that technology
creates the market.24 A patent is one illustration of the technology-oriented composition
of the market.25 Patenting converts tacit knowledge into explicit, whereupon this knowledge
becomes a commodity. At the same time, technological intelligence is naturally brought
to the market through a patent and traded on the market. In the traditional view, the
evolution of a new technology-based company is considered as comprising separate,
consecutive stages. First, the technology is developed, which is followed by the setting up
of the organization. Technology is thus internalized, but before starting any internalization
the organization has to reach a sufficient scale of operations on the market. Finally, the value
of the company is assessed, usually at the point when preparation for realization begins.26
Technological development has become increasingly rapid, with the pace of
development having direct influence on inventiveness and its financing. Rapid competition
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27 See Rönkkö 2001, 84.
28 See Virtanen 1996, 49 - 50.
29 This applies to the traditional line in software development. The linear, sequential model
is one of the first defined and most widely used traditional paradigms for software
engineering. This development model is also called the classic life cycle or waterfall model. It
specifies a systematic and sequential approach to software development and sets out the
order of the consecutive stages while establishing the transition criteria for progressing from
one stage to the next. See Warsta 2001, 36.
30 Enterprises are typically considered knowledge systems in action. See Pöyhönen 2004, 37 - 38.
31 See Keil 2000, 131. In order to keep on developing, enterprises are focusing on research
and development, information processing, branding and other intellectual processes. This
is generally called  the new entrepreneurial agenda. See Petrusson 2004, 3.
32 Inventiveness is therefore generally bind to the dominating paradigm. Paradigm is used as
a criterion for choosing problems assumed to have solutions. Generally these exclusively
are problems that the community will admit as scientific ones or encourage its members
to undertake them. Other problems are often rejected. See Kuhn 1970, 37.
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requires dynamics in inventiveness. In the digital economy the time-to-market of a new
product has shortened and business has grown considerably. Inventiveness also needs to
be accelerated and, as a consequence, the traditional pattern of development is challenged.
The step-by-step model is no longer stable for high-tech firms, nor for the overall digital
economy. New companies have to move fast and develop all business processes
simultaneously in order to outrun their competition.27 The linear innovation model requires
that introducing inventions produces societal wealth and growth in such a way that it is
not possible for only one single organization to take advantage of it.28 Above all, this model
places the focus on innovation, which reinforces the statics of linearity.29
In this context, venture capital is basically considered as a process of developing new
business opportunities and ultimately as a process of the overall renewal of an enterprise.30
The process includes recognizing, understanding, and exploiting new opportunities.31 These
building blocks together then further constitute the core elements of both inventiveness
and innovativeness. These elements of the process overall are versatile, whereupon the
symbiosis needs to be balanced in order to be able to maintain coherence. On the other
hand none of these elements alone is sufficient to create a completely effective operational
frame for an enterprise.
1.1.3 The statics of inventiveness
Inventiveness as a linear process describes an invention as a static creation.32 Similarly, the
statics of inventiveness are due to the core of the concept of invention itself. The concept requires
that the component features of an invention ought to be defined and correspondingly the
rest excluded. For instance, a patent includes a certain description of the technical application
of the patented invention, with this scope then protected by the patent. Those prerequisites,
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33 A patent is actually functional and needs to be examined in terms of a certain situation, its
structural elements and its functional elements. See Godenhjelm 1950, 230 - 231.
34 The physical infrastructure is a necessary prerequisite of the overall infrastructure and its
functionality. The dynamic functions do not occur without the static ones; the static
infrastructure has to be in place in order for the dynamic functions to occur. See Suarez-Villa
2001, 10.
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however, link the core of inventiveness explicitly and linearly to the content itself.33 In other
words, the easier the kernel of the content is to interpret, the easier it is to define the
distinction between included and excluded. In the case of a patent it is essential to ensure
stable access to an invention in order to build up an architecture that supports inventions.34 The
distinction is, however, rather decisive for the concept of invention and it needs to be
maintained. At the same time, however, this causes inventiveness to remain static. A name is
an illustrative example, because names often operate as stabilizing elements. A name, even
when considered as invention, is rather impossible to protect as a pure proper name. This
is mainly due to the completely non-proprietary character of a name; a name simply has
no reference point in a static system such as this.
Statics are not always founded merely on a conceptual definition. It is often purely
the content of an invention that makes the distinction between invention and innovation
complicated. An illustrative example of this is an idea and its protection. An invention always
contains an idea and as an invention an idea has to be incorporated in some technological
creation, application, or process. However, even when embedded in an invention, an idea
is still slightly more dynamic than this invention. Ideas are essentially the core of
innovativeness and are characteristically dynamic. Thereby, the major problem of the statics
of invention is caused by there being a dynamic idea at the core of the proprietary character
of a static invention. This is precisely due to the significance of information as the essence
of invention. In sum, many problems in the digital economy are attributable to ideas and
their fundamental character in inventions.
On the other hand, information as a flow of ideas constitutes the fundamental core
of the digital invention. In any event, information is rather complicated to define strictly and
it is accordingly equally difficult to force into a certain pattern. The static pattern of
inventiveness may here even jeopardize the possibilities for sufficiently strong protection.
Information overall seems to be complicated to either define or stabilize. In this respect,
information closely resembles a name if one considers the content of inventiveness or the
possibilities to establish traditional ownership of a name. The problem has two main causes.
There is the lack of both a real protection object and a sufficient amount of subjectivity. To the extent
that information is not defined as knowledge - actually only someone’s subjective experience
in the sense of having good reason to believe that information contains true statements -
 information seems to be very difficult indeed to force into the pattern of invention. The
rather considerable divergence here in fact questions the crucial role of a subjective right as one
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35 A subjective right, such as ownership, is based on a large number of legal facts and legal
consequences, which are connected by the concept of ownership. More precisely, ownership
contains the legal facts which are bound together with the legal consequences in such way
that a particular legal fact is bound to a particular legal consequence or that a particular simple
legal fact requires that it can be bound together with a set of legal consequences. Further,
we can say that the concept of ownership is built up of a cumulative set of legal consequences. Legal
facts alone do not constitute a cumulative whole. They are merely facts, which can also be
described as forming a disjunctive whole. These simple legal facts are then connected to a set
of legal consequences by the concept of ownership. See Ross 1951, 476 - 477.
36 The concept of subjective right is defined in the tradition of analytical jurisprudence, which
concerns itself with the study of subjective right. The three basic axioms of analytical
jurisprudence are: 1) subjective right stands for being in legal relationships, 2) legal relationships
can prevail only between persons and 3) a subjective right does not prevail only inter partes but
also ultra partes. See Niemi 1999, 291a.
37 When a subjective right as a concrete entity can be abandoned there is no longer any need
to keep to the conception of the relationship between the right holder and the object either.
Here, the examination and distinctions can be made with regard to the position of subject
in different relations, in particular that of subject of interest, of proceedings and of
disposition. See Ross 1974, 183.
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element of invention. The fact that all rights must have a subject is generally rather definitive
for establishing ownership.35
A subjective right is firmly based on certain prerequisites. It is possible to constitute
only when three basic requirements have been fulfilled: at the minimum, there ought to
be a clearly defined object, somebody who possesses the right, and a legal relationship between these
two.36 A digital invention does not, however, necessarily include any of these elements. This
is exactly why the digital environment does not directly rely on the construction of a
subjective right. It is, instead, more fruitful to see an invention as a relationship between
persons.37 However, in the age of traditional intellectual property rights, an invention was
often frozen in such a way that it was easy to fit into the pattern of subjective right. A name,
for example, is fundamentally a part of an essentially ownerless resource. A name may belong
to anyone, and people often have completely identical names. However, a name is converted
into property, for example, when it is forced into the form of a trademark. A trademark
is then utilized in the market to include a certain invention, the invention is actually a part
of the trademark and subsumed under it.
The statics of an invention are crucial when defining who possesses it. Possession is
decisive for ownership. In order to come into someone’s possession, an invention needs
to be stabilized and defined. Stabilization defines the fundamental relationship between
possessor and invention, i.e., who possesses what. Basically, the statics of this relationship may
be readily compared to some elements of the traditional credit relationship. It is essential
for the creation of a credit relationship that there exists willingness by both parties to become
bound to the relationship. This commitment, however, at the same time compromises the
elasticity of the relationship. It is precisely this commitment that stabilizes and freezes the
whole relationship. An invention is similarly fixed through the possessor’s commitment
to the invention. Stabilization thus involves assets as defined by the traditional legal system.
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38 The innovation process overall today is not fixed to the superiority of  technological
knowhow. A competitive edge can only seldom be reached through technology alone; rather,
competitive enterprises need secondary operations such as an effective supply network, the
ability to produce effectively, and additional technology supporting business operations.
See Virtanen 1996, 44.
39 These both include, however, a clear amount of innovation underlying. See Ståhle - Grönroos
1999, 44 - 45.
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These assets are usually best capitalized, as they are set under a strict and well-protected
position, i.e., customary ownership. Intangibles such as intellectual property rights are instead
associated with some other, privileged positions. These privileges are not, however,
completely similar to ownership; rather, an invention has some excessively stabilizing
qualities.
Stabilization through defining something as an invention does not yet mean that the
asset ceases to develop.38 Invention is based on creativity and originality in a way that
distinguishes it from the existing level of technology. A fascinating idea or a worthy conception
are  not yet inventions.39 The level of inventiveness is still the minimum prerequisite for
any new invention. This is why an invention may have only one description, and, further,
this description cannot be altered without inventing something new. This circumstance,
along with continuous development, is the main problem with business method patents.
Business methods are highly innovative but are nevertheless forced to conform to the
definition of an invention. This kind of stabilization prevents the further innovative use
of patented business methods, whereby the traditional protection of inventions may well
be seen as freezing up the whole system.
As a paradigmatic example of an invention in the digital age, the business method
patent needs to be examined from another viewpoint. This viewpoint is the definition of an
invention. Namely, an invention has to fulfil certain minimum prerequisites to become an
invention at all. These prerequisites are, however, all linked directly to the invention itself.
At a minimum, an invention ought to be new and original. Novelty and originality together
give the invention a certain level of inventiveness. This level then defines the privileged
inventor, i.e., the possessor of the invention. The possessor is the one to be entitled to use the
invention freely and, on the other hand, he or she is entitled to exclude others. Further, he
or she is the only one with free access to the invention. By the virtue of possession, the possessor
is privileged to decide about the use of the invention. It is then indeed the combination of
both of these elements - the privilege of the inventor and his or her right to use - that further
constructs the very kernel of the statics of an invention. Basically, this circumstance
corresponds precisely to access with the right to forbid others access. It is defined as excluded
access. In other words, a business method patent opens excluded access to the inventor, with
access understood as the right to use the information included in the invention. A trademark
and consequently the rest of the traditional intellectual property rights open similar access
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40 There are, however, some risks involved. This applies especially to development in the long
run when the enterprise needs to be able to improve. Focusing on existing inventions
stabilizes the operation but may lead to some frustrated situations. Mainly these are due to
an excessive focus on competencies while changes in the markets and technologies render
the knowledge and competencies of the enterprise obsolete. See Keil 2000, 131.
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to their possessors. For example, names may be examined as excludable entities when a
trademark as a legally protected privilege creates this status for a name.
The opposite perspective on the statics of inventiveness is manifested in the ability
to get inventions protected. Protectability completes ownership in its static sense, and is
one primary manifestation of statics. Ownership is a legally protected right to use granted
to the right-holder; without any legal protection there would be no ownership. Factual
inventiveness may be ensured only through legally protected positions. This protection also
strengthens the privileged position in that the right is contextually completed through
protection. In this sense, protection is clearly manifested in the right to forbid someone to do
something. This is the reason why protection reinforces statics rather than making them more
elastic.
1.2 Towards a more dynamic view
1.2.1 Dynamization
These definitive elements of an invention attest to its static status. The connection to strictly
defined form corresponds to the technical development, with the statics defining the
respective level of development. A clear and exception-free link to statics, however, makes
the development level of novel technologies absolutely defined. Despite its strict abstraction
and frozenness, a business idea patent, for example, illustrates clearly the forcing of a
dynamic invention - an innovation nevertheless - into the shape of patent. More abstractly,
patenting business methods manifests exactly the dominance of human being over nature
in the sense of a business method being merely a creation of a human being. This dominating
position is granted precisely through patenting an invention, with inventiveness defined
directly through the patent. In this way, it is easy to link technological development and
inventiveness. Inventions in general reflect technological development and in this respect
drive technological determinism. Invention is an accurate reflector of the present level of
technological development. This is still one of the most essential tasks of invention.
Therefore, the statics of inventions make the utilization of existing resources rather
appropriate, particularly when aiming at incremental change.40
The dynamic view is best described by changing the perspective: it is no longer the
invention in its static sense that is the focus, but rather the connection between the invention and
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41 This also applies to the competitive ability of an enterprise, whose competitive edge depends,
in addition to rapid technological development, on sufficient financing and effective
networking. See Lauriala 2001, 46.
42 See Suarez-Villa 2001, 10.
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the environment in which the enterprise operates.41 The background lies in the statics, with
the utilization of inventions traditionally considered static. The static view nevertheless binds
inventiveness tightly to a proprietary horizon. Thereby, statics, in having a legally protected
privilege as their core element, constitute the essence of ownership. Ownership contains
a right to use and a right to forbid others to use, which corresponds exactly to ownership
in its static sense. Despite the traditional statics, however, inventiveness may be seen in
more dynamic terms. The approach is modified slightly by drawing it away from static
development towards a more dynamic view.
The change in balance makes the viewpoint functional. In other words, viewpoint
itself is revised by making it more functional and dynamizing it. Here, the dynamics strives
for frequent change in order to reproduce new and revised knowledge.42 At the same time,
the environment is taken into consideration when the whole inventive pattern is dynamized
and functionalized. This is why this perspective can reasonably be considered a
communicative one. The view makes communication as the essential focus of the overall
pattern. The change is best illustrated through examples. For instance, it reveals the different
cooperating elements of a name. A name may be examined equally as an active
communicative position and as a significant connector. Likewise, the fundamental idea
behind an invention or an innovation may be taken into consideration by considering it
as a source of creativity and as a business position. Similarly, capital is extended to describe
a network of relationships instead of only one single credit relationship. All these illustrations
are results of dynamization.
Dynamics has at least one radical consequence, namely the change in the balance of right
and power. In other words, the right to use loses its traditional definitive function as the core
element of right as a privilege. This is a direct consequence of dynamization, right to use
remaining too static when describing the function itself. Instead, dynamization ought
fundamentally to be based on power as the ability to change the legal positions of the parties
involved in operations. At the same time, it is the empowered position that makes the whole
function dynamic. When the right to use is formalized by excluding all the irrelevant factors,
the power to change legal relations becomes based on the ability to include the relevant
factors and parties who work actively in operations. In other words, dynamics as an
operational position do not directly exclude anyone. Instead, they characterize the operational
positions of the parties concerned and concentrate on governing these positions
interrelatedly. An illustrative example is the business mortgage, where the mortgage is
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43 See Ojanen - Sutinen 1991, 41.
44 It is precisely the normal and traditional utilization of assets that is definitive when classifying
business property. Principally, a business mortgage embraces all the tangible property
possessed by the enterprise. See Ojanen - Sutinen 1991, 43.
45 The awareness of all the parties is considered one of the fundamental elements of a business
mortgage. This would be stated, for example, in the securities posted as collateral. See Wallin
1982, 30 - 31.
46 This may also be described as a part of structuration theory, which is based on the interplay
between human action and social structures. The two key elements of structuration theory
are the manner in which the two levels of actions and structure are captured through the
duality of structure, and the identification of modalities as the vehicle which link the two
levels. See Hanseth 1996, 77.
47 The overall dualistic structure of communication may be considered in terms of actor-networks
theory, which denies a systemic distinction between the technical and the non-technical. In
other words, technology receives exactly the same status as human actors. The very essence
that keeps the social order in place is a heterogenous network of human and non-human
actors. See Hanseth 1996, 81.
48 Networking in this sense is often also described as clustering, with a cluster defined as a
network of organizations in which competitive advantage grows from dynamic interaction
between actors. Networking and clustering are thus rather dynamic processes. As network
structures, cluster relations cross several sectoral boundaries, making a networking cluster
a very competitive unit. See Paija 2001, 11.
49 One illustrative example of this is organizational renewal, continuous renewal being
considered a competitive advantage for an enterprise. The key element for achieving continual
renewal is flexible knowledge integration. See Pöyhönen 2004, 52.
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precisely linked to the completeness of the business property.43 The whole business and
its tangible assets are included in the business mortgage and the business operations are
carried out normally, despite the mortgage.44 Thus, it is the mutual relationships of the owner
and the creditor and the complete business property that are to be governed. In this sense
all the operators need to be aware of the mortgage and its influence on the overall business.45
None of these operations can be examined totally detached from the framework;
they remain rather closely related to the frame. This is a direct implementation of the includability
of the dynamic aspect. In this respect the framework actually becomes a part of operations.46
This is actually a two-way action in which the structure constrains actions but at the same
time human action serves to establish structure. The background as well thus partly defines
the interconnected relation of operational parties, which is represented as interaction among
them.47 At the same time, those relations are reflected towards the operational frame. These
circumstances are further modified through networking and communicating with others,
which again affects the ability of an enterprise to enter the market.48 Communication and
networking have the greatest impact in the changing balance from statics towards dynamics
as the core of operations. Communication and networking move the balance from the right
to use towards the power to alter legal relations.
In actual fact, the change from statics towards dynamics changes the dependency between
existing knowledge and the statics of it.49 The most fundamental change occurs in the internal
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50 For example, external corporate venturing provides two options entering a business area
more rapidly and increasing commitment within the existing relationship. These two options
differ in the role that external relationships play over time. See Keil 2000, 157.
51 See Keil 2000, 155.
52 See Keil 2000, 162 - 163.
53 This kind of intense interaction is necessary for several reasons. The resources and capabilities
of both organizations have to be adapted to each other and to the new business. Adaptation
may make it necessary to form a common cognitive framework that allows the enterprises
to understand each other’s capabilities. A common cognitive framework may also be necessary
to understand the opportunities and constraints of the new capabilities. Intense interaction
is necessary to be able to act sufficiently rapidly in the new business. See Keil 2000, 163.
54 Acquisition may often be used as a means to gain control over providers of critical resources
and capabilities for the business. See Keil 2000, 165 - 166.
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balance of excluded and included. The excludability of existing knowledge is made more
relative and thereby more suitable for common ownership. Further, the abandonment of
the strictly excluded statics of ownership even facilitates networking. By these means operations
have been made more rapid and dynamization has made it possible to enter new markets
or adapt new technologies in an accelerated way.50 In this task, acceleration requires some
complementary capabilities, however. It is even one of the fundamental implications of
networking to be able to increase these capabilities.51 Introducing new business opportunities
often requires resources that are not in the possession of an enterprise beforehand.52 Those
resources mainly consist of existing inventions. However, building up these capabilities
internally is rather slow and costly. This is when venture capital financing comes in, together
with networking. This is also why dynamic and effective cooperation facilitates development.
The financial background also affects the operational balance. Financing an enterprise
through venture capital changes the picture from the viewpoint of operational frames.
Cooperation is constructed on alliances or some other connections between the existing
invention resource of the enterprise and its environment.53 The principal focus here is the
pace of change, which is also one of the main factors of the changing status of operativeness
from statics towards dynamics. The pace of change emphasizes the rapidness of economic
operations, which often makes the competitive edge highly dependent on the ability to gain
control over critical assets or players in the changing market.54 The first in the market often
achieves the leading position. This is also the basic foundation of dynamics and it is generally
based on networking and clustering. The essential critical assets may, however, not be those
in the possession of the enterprise and for this reason there is a crucial need to network
and build up alliances. In this way, the empowered position as the core of dynamics
substantially affects the structure of the market. This structure and the relative positioning of
market operators are both critical manifestations of the dynamized inventiveness. The market
may be supported by creating circumstances or technologies in such a way that an enterprise
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55 See Keil 2000, 155.
56 Standardization actually sustains innovativeness given that standardization is often confronted
with the privatized information. Private rights are described as patented ones when a public
good is created through a standard. Patents are associated with the commodification of
technical knowledge and standardization with decommodification of it. See Iversen 2001,
67.
57 Especially businesses that operate on information and communication networks often require
products to comply with technology standards to be able to work together. See Keil 2000,
169. One of the fundamental aims of standardization is to increase simplicity. Moreover,
standardization operates for increasing economic efficiency, for promoting technological
safety, for removing technical obstacles in trade and for ensuring the interests of end-users.
See Committee Report KM 1993:19, 4 - 6.
58 Universal Business Language in considered an agreement on a common set of business-to-
business document standards. Universal Business Language is based on ebXML (Electronic
Business using Extensible Markup Language) and the combination of UBL/ebXML is supposed
to provide industry with boundary-less and barrier-free information needed to catalyze
economic growth and foster inter-industry global trade. See www.oasis-open.org
59 Standardization increases and supports, for example, virtual enterprises in that they operate
by networking. Virtual enterprises coordinate much of their business through the marketplace,
where free agents come together to buy and sell one another’s goods and services. See
Chesbrough - Teece 1998, 27 - 28. In this way, standardization operates as the basis of the
societal functionality in general. On standardization generally, see www.iso.org
60 Here an example is an expanding network. Especially in the information and communication
industry standardization is one vital prerequisite for technological progress. See Shurmer
1996, 50.
61 For example, plugs have two prongs that are spaced a certain distance apart and they are
all the same. Accordingly, they fit into sockets with holes that are sized and spaced properly
and all the sockets are the same, too. This is one result of standardization. Another illustrative
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may further leverage its existing resources.55 This is basically carried out by standardizing
either the environment or the equipment.
1.2.2 Innovativeness
Innovativeness is communication and is best carried out in a unified frame. Unification
as a part of dynamization is often realized through standardization.56 Standardization is an
illustrative example of dynamization and its new challenges to the legal environment.
Namely, in the development of markets and congruent technologies, the standards and
dominant designs play a critical role.57 An illustrative example here is found in the Universal
Business Language (UBL), a universal language that is created for common and standardized
business communication and document transmission.58 On the other hand, standardization
eases the problem of incompatibility that has emerged among different competing
technologies.59 The privileged status of invention easily promotes and facilitates
incompatibility.60 Accordingly, standardization, especially technical, is usually considered
a means to achieve uniform physical and design specifications.61 Standardization operates
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example is the size and format of disk drives and compact disks. See Radin 2002, 103.
62 A good example of collectivized operations is the TCP/IP protocol, which relies on
computers operating collectively. Another illustrative example is the metric system. See Radin
2002, 103. A network environment and network operations must be standardized in order
to guarantee the most effective communication. The best known standardizing organization
in the network environment is World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). See http://www.w3.org/
63 A standard may be defined rather broadly as any set of technical specifications that either
provide or are intended to provide a common design of a product or process. Even ordinary
consumers use a wide variety of standardized products, such as telephone services, computer-
modem communication protocols, or automobile ignition and transmission systems. See
Lemley 2002, 1896. On the other hand, the dynamics of standardization are manifested in
its cooperative character. The standardization process brings together commercial, academic
and regulatory actors, representing a wide range of interested actors. See Iversen 2001, 69.
64 This might be restricted by establishing a standard through a formal or de facto standardiza-
tion process such that the standard is at least partly non-proprietary. Further, standards may
be set by using an external party in the standardization process. All these approaches require,
however, that a standard-setting enterprise must predict which of several competing
technologies will emerge as the dominant standard or else face the risk of being locked out
of the market. In this process, standards are set exclusively by an external party, which makes
the standards totally non-proprietary. See Keil 2000, 169.
65 Standardization also has its disadvantages, which emerge in innovativeness and competition
policies. One single standard keeps the competition within the group of standard users and
does not consider technologically better solutions if they are not compatible with the standard.
It is also possible that the chosen standard is not the technologically best one. The larger
the number of standard users is and/or the wider the communication network, the more
expensive a change in the standard will be. See Koski - Rouvinen - Ylä-Anttila 2002, 81.
66 A case in point is Microsoft with its Windows operating system. See Keil 2000, 169.
67 For example, a computer becomes more valuable the larger its installed basis is, since a greater
range of compatible software is available. See Shurmer 1996, 50. Computer operating systems
are an illustrative example also in the sense of increasing value in two different ways. On
the one hand, the value of a computer operating system is dependent on how many users
it has. On the other hand, it has more intrinsic value regardless of the number of users, but
gains value as more and more consumers adopt it. This is due to the significance of
information in these industries. The network effect simply ensures that the consumers benefit
from standardization also because they can exchange information with the others who use
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as an instrument to enable things or operations to be shared among many actors. Operations
are in this way collectivitized.62 On the other hand, standardization supports both the network
effect and interoperability and in this way increases the dynamics of operations.
Standardization is a dynamic process. The dynamizing function of standards derives from
two different lines of development.63 Standardization is carried out either through a formal
standardization process or through the market.64 In each cases the standards are  approached
in slightly different ways.65 The market process is derived straight form the proprietary
character of standards, these standards often being constituted by first establishing a superior
proprietary technology. This technology is then further developed into an industrial standard
by utilizing a dominant position in the market.66 Market dominance, through an increasing
number of users, gives an enterprise a powerful position over the other market operators.
Compatible products become important especially for the network effect.67 On the other
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the same standard. See Lemley 2002, 1896.
68 See Shurmer 1996, 50. The emergence of technical standards on the market is actually rather
advantageous. A good technical standard is   created through market emergence when the
best product wins out in the competitive market. See Radin 2002, 112.
69 Standardization also has considerable consumer benefits in several markets, known as network
markets. Typical of network markets is that the value of a product to a particular consumer
is a function of how many consumers use the same or a compatible product. A good example
is a telephone network, in which the value of a product is driven entirely by the number
of other people on the same network. See Lemley 2002, 1896.
70 The lock-in effect is often described as an assertion of a certain technology in such a way
that it is impossible or at least difficult to change or reverse. See Lemola 2000, 164.
71 See Shurmer 1996, 51.
72 This is precisely the viewpoint of the linear innovation model. See Virtanen 1996, 55.
73 During these development phases, knowhow is refined and commercialized, and the parties
merely operate together as independent participants. See Chesbrough - Teece 1998, 29 -
30.
74 A human network is generally described as types of interconnections or links between agents,
with these connections described as a legitimate network and a shadow network. A legitimate
network consists of links that are established formally and intentionally and further are
founded on well-understood, implicit principles that are widely accepted by the members
of the organization. A shadow network, on the other hand,  is established spontaneously
and informally by individual agents among themselves during the course of interacting. See
Stacey 1996, 23 - 26.
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hand, the market-based standard setting may cause a certain lock-in effect, which means that
the market becomes locked in and concentrated on only one product.68
Dynamics also affect the variety of different enterprises. The focus is mainly on networking,
which is supported, at least partly, through standardization.69 The presence of the network
effect, on the other hand, implies that once a standard is established it may be difficult to
replace. This is often referred to as a lock-in effect.70 The stability of a dominating standard
with a strong lock-in effect is manifested in the character of standards in general. Therefore,
the dominant actor in the standardization market gets an excellent opportunity to control
the overall competition in the technological development and, at the same time, affect its
direction.71 On the other hand, innovativeness is closely and solidly linked to communication
and cooperation. Innovation is not described only as moving from idea towards invention,
with invention then remaining the final phase of the development chain.72 This view is
necessarily rather linear and for this reason static.
Innovation is a dynamic process and may not be described as a development
consisting merely of discrete phases.73 In fact, the innovation process is increasingly described
as a communicational process where the different cooperating parties are closely interconnected.
Innovations are often carried out in human networks, which do not involve linear patterns.74
Innovativeness is expressly oriented towards the degree of change. This change in turn is
connected to the search space, which is enlarged through two main mechanisms. An
enterprise may monitor the behavior of a group of firms and try to develop itself through
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75 This may further be examined through a layered construction consisting of two overlapping
layers. The substance layer describes activities carried out to create and make use of research
and development resources internally and together with external parties. See Seppänen 2000,
63. The dynamic layer makes explicit how and why the concepts of the substance layer vary.
See Seppänen 2000, 67.
76 Organizations or enterprises are generally classified by the ways in which they innovate. There
exists a distinction between autonomous and systemic innovation, with this distinction being
even fundamental to the choice of organizational design. When innovation is autonomous,
the organization may be a decentralized, virtual one. On the other hand, when innovation
is systemic, the members of a virtual organization are dependent on and have no control
over one another. See Chesbrough - Teece 1998, 29.
77 See Keil 2000, 141. It is thus significant to be able to control the mutual cooperation of
relationships and networks. One of the main relationship management tasks is the control
of resource exchange and sharing between the participating actors. See Seppänen 2000, 68.
78 See Virtanen 1996, 43. This is also called the classic innovation chain. See Korpelainen -
Lampikoski 1998, 138.
79 The invention stage may include the manufacture of the prototype. The end of the invention
stage may also be called product development. See Virtanen 1996, 43.
80 Briefly, the innovation process may also be described as a process where an idea or a
discovery is refined towards a commercially exploitable innovation. See Virtanen 1996, 43.
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its monitoring and discoveries.75 On the other hand, a group of enterprises may create
cognitive frameworks by imitating and learning from other individual organizations.76 This
illustrates significantly the communicativeness of innovations.
The search space of an enterprise is then ultimately used for effective problem solution.
The amount of information has a direct impact on the possible solutions to be found. The
more information there is, the more likely inventions are to emerge. In this way, developing
new cognitive frameworks requires an enterprise to access and process information coming
from its environment.77 Innovativeness may well be described as a process. The innovation
process consists of three different but overlapping phases, i.e., research, invention and
innovation.78 In this triplet the research phase is aimed at discovering new facts and
principles in nature and the society. In this context physical laws actually frame the domain
of discoveries. A discovery is then refined to become an invention, with the invention phase
carrying out further development. The inventive phase already includes a novel product
or method that has some potential for organizing operations in a totally new way.79
The invention phase is sometimes the end of this development chain. This is due
to the difference between invention and innovation. Innovation requires additional effect. On the
other hand, not all inventions ever become innovations. To become an innovation an
invention must be refined to become a commercial application. If the commercial application
is successfully created, the process is continued towards an innovation as the third phase
of the development process. In other words, a technological invention does not become
an innovation until it has been successfully commercialized.80 The close relation between
innovativeness and its framing environment thus constitutes the internal structure of
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81 This is the other main theory in describing innovativeness and is parallel to the classic
innovation chain. See Korpelainen - Lampikoski 1998, 138 - 139.
82 The free flow of information and the ability to engage in cultural practices is often significant
for innovativeness. A good example is the professional and organizational integration of
software developers in the open source software movement, where the cultural practices
and norms shaping communities of practice constitute the essence of software development.
These communities are generally referred as hackerdom. Hackers in this sense are computer
enthusiasts for whom computer programming is an expression of identity. See Himanen
2001, 19 - 20.
83 See Keil 2000, 143 - 144.
84 Innovativeness is often explained as a step in technological development or as an increase
in the efficiency of some operation. See Virtanen 1996, 42.
85 One of the risks of exploration is that often produces more distant, uncertain, and often
negative results. See Keil 2000, 132.
86 The difference between innovation and research and development depends here only on
the viewpoint. Innovation describes something totally new, or something that has now been
done in a completely new way, and it is a broader concept than research and development.
Innovation and marketing connected with renovations in operativeness, strategic designing
and decision making. See Virtanen 1996, 42 - 43.
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innovativeness. The fundamental issue here is that innovativeness is based on continuous
communication.81 Functional communication further involves gaining access to relevant
information that needs to be recognized and interpreted. This interpretation generally occurs
through free access to information and knowledge.82 Therefore, access to information as
such is important, but it is equally important that the information obtained is high in quality.
The quality of information thus plays an important role in innovativeness. Equally important
qualifications are the breadth and the depth of information.83
The innovation process is often described using traditional instruments. However,
in order to be able to reveal the essential dynamics of the innovation process, there is a
crucial need for dynamic examination tools. A suitable dynamic approach to development
from static inventiveness towards dynamic innovativeness may be found by examining the
use of totally new resources. The emergence of new resources and research on them is one factor
changing the balance clearly from a static towards a more dynamic operativeness. Basically,
innovativeness  seems to go hand in hand with dramatic change and is closely linked to
new and explorative development.84 Therefore, a close connection to new resources and
an ability to reveal changing foundations is characteristic of innovativeness in particular.
This is mainly due to the ability of innovations to reveal totally new viewpoints on old
inventions.85
Basically innovativeness is described as doing something in a totally new way in a branch
of the economy or inside a societal system. Innovation often refers to new products,
processes, or systems being introduced on a large scale.86 A focus on innovativeness may
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87 In these cases, without exploitation activity, the enterprise might not be able to realize returns
from the knowledge generated. See Keil 2000, 132.
88 Innovations are sometimes autonomous. An autonomous innovation can be pursued
independently from other innovations. In contrast, some innovations are fundamentally
systemic, meaning that their benefits can be realized only in conjunction with related,
complementary innovations. See Chesbrough - Teece 1998, 28 - 29.
89 One reason for this, according to Thomas Keil, is that these technologies or business models
often require radically different capabilities and knowledge than those that the organization
possesses. See Keil 2000, 146.
90 See Seppänen 2000, 67 - 68.
91 This may be carried out through what is known as a SWOT analysis, which considers strengths
and weaknesses as internal competencies and opportunities and threats as external factors.
See Lahti 1988, 26 - 27.
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imply that resources are not available to be taken advantage of directly.87 Innovativeness
is based on certain foundational prerequisites. Innovativeness is primarily based on the ability
to bring together different elements reasonably. Further, this is done in order to create
something new. Innovations are mainly created by bringing together things that have not
been brought together before, for example, forming some new associations.88 As a
consequence of this, enterprises often face difficulties in recognizing technologies or business
models that have the potential to replace their existing technologies.89 Therefore, enterprises
often prefer their existing knowledge and capabilities in defining the principal means of
achieving a competitive edge.
1.2.3 The dynamics of invention plus innovation
Invention and innovation together form a firm entity. They thus need to be examined
together and in parallel. Actually, as an entity the bond between inventiveness and
innovativeness constitutes a perfect illustration of the core of ideas in business. Ideas are founded
on a consistent adaptation of inventiveness and innovativeness together. The different
elements of this combination are further enhanced through additional supportive features
needed for completing the bond. On the other hand, the basic distinction between invention
and innovation lies in how they are related to coexisting units. These coexisting and communicating
units are  related to the external environment of the enterprise or to the enterprise itself.90
The most fundamental resources of an enterprise are generally communicative.
Therefore, there still exists a crucial need for communication between the internal view
of the enterprise and its external environmental frame.91 Inventions are relatively fixed to
existing resources and the knowledge embedded in an enterprise. The basic approach for
introducing these resources overall is simply to take advantage of them as completely as
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92 Organizational architecture is also considered a part of business strategy. See Ahlfors 2005,
69.
93 Such dynamics are actually not based on any balance or equilibrium on the continuous
transformation that a dynamic infrastructure supports. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 10.
94 Systemically the constitutive structure may be built up as a single new comprehensive idea
for a system, or it may be constructed on tensions. A tense system is more likely to produce
only signs that provide some orientation in the application phase of norms. See Pöyhönen
1999, 54.
95 A dynamic infrastructure is focused on robust continuous change and development. See
Suarez-Villa 2001, 10.
96 This characterizes the information and communication technology sector in particular. The
need for a broadened search space derives mainly from the dramatic change that characterizes
the ICT sector. The need for rapid exploitation, on the other hand, derives from the rapid
pace of change seen in that sector. See Keil 2000, 132 - 133.
97 One important element in this change is the use of external corporate venturing for
complementing internal resources, knowledge and capabilities. The need for speed and the
rapid pace of change constitute characteristics of high velocity environments like the ICT
sector. See Keil 2000, 134.
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possible, with such use directly affecting the communication architecture itself.92 The
communication architecture becomes both solidly fixed and frozen. The architecture needs
to be structured on diverse points of departure. This is the viewpoint of dynamized
innovations. Unlike inventiveness, innovativeness is based on continuous utilization of resources.
Thus, innovativeness is even by definition a dynamic and a functional whole.93 This is
precisely where the reasonable use of external resources is required. In any event, utilization
in this form requires at the same time unbroken communication. In order to capitalize resources
maximally communication cannot be dispersed or fragmented in any way. This is what may
easily happen if it is forced into a stabilized form. The fundamental dynamics of
innovativeness requires continuousness.
Inventiveness and innovativeness ought to be carried out in balance. A workable
architecture can only be constituted on a sustainable balance.94 A balanced bond between
inventiveness and innovativeness is further based on two broad functions, which may both
be supported through venture capital. On the one hand, venture capital allows enterprises
to search a broader space of opportunities. Mainly it facilitates access to information that can
be used to challenge existing cognitive frameworks and to acquire critical knowledge for
the changed environment. Stable access is essential for the physical infrastructure, where
it supports inventiveness. On the other hand, venture capital facilitates the rapid exploitation
of emerging opportunities. This illustrates the dynamics of an innovative architecture.95 This
means that external venture capital allows an enterprise to leverage its internal resources
and competencies with the help of external ventures.96
The balanced cooperation of invention and innovation is emphasized in a dual
development. One line is the increased pace of change.97 Development is increasingly effective
and in this rapid process even business needs to be modified now that, for example, time-to-
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98 Since the time-to-market of new products has shortened the traditional development line
is challenged. As a result, traditional step-by-step development model is no longer stable
and new companies have to be fast moving and develop all business processes simultaneously
in order to outrun the competition. Traditionally, the evolution of a technology-based new
company is seen in terms of separate,  consecutive stages. First, the technology is developed,
which is followed by the setting up of the organization. Before starting internalization, the
organization has to reach a sufficient scale. Finally, the value of the company is estimated,
usually at the point when preparation for realization begins. See Rönkkö 2001, 83 - 84.
99 Often knowledge and capability are the results of research and development activities, and
some enterprises may possess more knowhow than they use in their existing business. This
is a problem of large enterprises in particular. On the scale of exploration - exploitation
external corporate venturing may be utilized to shift the balance towards exploitation.
Through the leverage of internal knowledge and capabilities to the external ventures, a
corporation may be able to avoid under-exploiting its existing knowledge and capacities.
See Keil 2000, 134.
100 The development is carried out in several areas: automatization, informatization, communica-
tion via networks, integration and convergence, and penetration. See Seipel 2005, 20. All
these areas illustrate the speed of development.
101 Convergence can be defined as the unification of formerly distinct functions. For example,
the process of digital convergence means that a computer begins to incorporate functionality
previously provided by a mobile phone or vice versa. As a term, digital convergence simply
implies that this phenomenon is happening through the digitization of technology. See Keil
2000, 134 - 135.
102 One of the implications of digital convergence is that the incumbents’ existing markets are
transformed and even some completely new markets come into being. See Keil 2000, 135.
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market has become extremely important.98 The pace of development requires that enterprises
be able to use all possible resources. This knowledge, however, rarely comprises the full
set of capabilities necessary for creating and developing some completely new business area.
In this frame, venture capital is generally thought of as a mechanism to introduce knowledge
and capabilities that the enterprise may not be able to utilize otherwise.99 Further, the pace
of change is bound to the ability to enter the market rapidly and effectively enough. Rapid
development requires, however, that the knowledge already exists in the enterprise.
Therefore, it is more favorable to possess resources in a usable rather than an “immature”
form.
The other line of the dual transformation is the character of technological and market change.
This applies in particular to information and communication technology, where the overall
change in the domains of demand, competition, technology, and regulation is fast and
extensive.100 This kind of change is often described as digital convergence. Digital convergence
may be broken down into two classes: substitutes and complements.101 Both of these classes
of convergence closely affect the dynamization of inventiveness and innovativeness. Two
products converge in substitutes when users consider either product interchangeable with
the other. On the other hand, products converge in complements when the products work
better together than separately or when they work better together now than they worked
formerly.102
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103 See Webster - Packer 1996, 11.
104  This architecture is at least partly founded on technology and its impact on the framework
where it is used. The impact of technology depends on a combination of design, use, and
the environment where it is deployed. See Shapiro 1999, 14.
105 As a term, infrastructure is closely connected to the clear divergence between European
and American views on the recent development in the status of information in societal life.
In Europe we speak about the information society. See COM (1994) 347 final: Europe’s Way
to the Information Society: An Action Plan. In the USA the information strategy is based
on the information infrastructure described in the National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for
Action (NII). See Steinbock 1998. 18. The different policy emphasis is the greatest difference
between the American Information Infrastructure and the European Information Society.
See Samuelson 1996, 24 - 25.
106 For example, the traditional floor plan may well be compared to the architecture of
cyberspace. In this architecture, the different positions and forms of access to different needs
are considered the most fundamental elements. The infobahn may serve as an equalization
mechanism, i.e., as a device for providing enhanced access to people isolated in one way
or another. See Mitchell 1995, 103.
107 As a societal construction, an architecture may likewise be examined as a communicative
design of societal actors. In this sense, society is a functional or a living entity where all the
actors have a certain position and task. See Simmel 1999, 64 - 65.
108 This societal framework constructed precisely for societal cooperation is called an infrastructure.
Infrastructure is Latin and means “built beneath”. See Kajser 1994, 15. A right to communi-
cate is to be included in the infrastructure as such in the form of a principle of general public
service. See Government Proposal HE 241/2001 vp., 5.
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1.3 Basic elements of the innovation architecture in the digital network
1.3.1 Designing the framework
Innovativeness is closely linked to individual creativity. Moreover, innovativeness is also
strictly bound to articulating this creativity.103 Some forms of communication should be
included in order to bind these elements together. This communication is created through
transmitting connective designs or structures. In the digital economy, there actually already
exists the fundamental basis for this kind of design. Namely, innovativeness in the digital
economy is mainly carried out though open networks, which further are based on a certain
design structure. This structure may also be called an architecture and it has a certain basic
internal structure.104
This architectural design is traditionally often described as the infrastructure, which
nevertheless slightly differs from the architectural structure of networks.105 The traditional
infrastructure and the network architecture have, however, several links.106 The architecture
constitutes the basis of all the overall preconditions that societal cooperation considers to
be necessities.107 As such, the architecture forms the basis of communication and societal
cooperation in general.108 This makes the architecture rather essential for functionality.
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109 This may be even considered a cooperative process of communicative action in the
Habermasian sense. The cooperative process is linked to interpretation and in it participants
relate simultaneously to something in the objective world (as the totality of entities about
which true statements are possible), the social world (as the totality of legitimately regulated
interpersonal relations), and the subjective world (as the totality of experiences to which
a speaker has a privileged access and which he or she can express before a public). See
Habermas 1989, 120.
110 This is often also called the physical or static infrastructure. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 10.
111 Here delivery structures may be general, or dedicated for delivering only one certain
commodity. Roads and railways differ from water pipes and power distribution networks
because of their generality. Distribution channels that are built for delivering goods generally
often serve diverse purposes. Specific distribution channels are then built for delivering only
one certain commodity. See Tennenhouse - Lampson - Gillett - Klein 1995, Virtual
Infrastructure http://www.tns.lcs.mit.edu/publications/VI/abstract.html
112 Traditionally an infrastructure has been understood as a technical structure that makes it
possible to deliver goods and commodities. Thereby, it is mostly constructed of technical
channels or passages, for example water pipes or power distribution networks. See Westman
1998, 33.
113 See Hanseth 1996, 81. The societal actors have a certain reference system that they utilize
as an interpretative framework. This system is constituted of three worlds: objective,
normative, and subjective elements. See Habermas 1989, 120.
114 The operational frame may also be called the dynamic infrastructure, which ensures the
change and functionality of the overall infrastructure. The infrastructure as a complete
architecture is a combination of static and dynamic aspects. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 10.
115 The architecture of a system always defines its broad outlines. It may define some precise
mechanisms as well.
See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/a/architecture.html
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Indeed, such an architecture would seem to be an essential prerequisite for universal
functionality, i.e., the basic frame for functionality itself.109
The network architecture itself may be defined in several different ways. The most
traditional explanation is to describe the architecture in terms of traditional infrastructure.
As such an architecture ought to have at least some technological components.110 Technology is
thus the core of the basic architectural structure, which consists of technical channels,
physical structures, or networks.111 These structures often play the most crucial part in
delivering commodities.112 On the other hand, both the technical and the non-technical parts
of the system are equally necessary; the technology acquires exactly the same status as the
human actors. In this way the very core keeping the social order in place in the overall
architecture consists of a heterogenous network of human and non-human actors.113 Further,
the architecture includes an operational framework that comprises the basic structure of the
whole society.114 These aspects complement each other. The architecture is based on certain
institutions, with these together forming a certain social-technical system.115 This system then
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116 The social-technical system includes both a technological frame (hardware), and an institutional
frame (software). See Kajser 1994, 63.
117 Software and hardware are the most typical basic elements of information and communication
technology. PCs, modems, servers, and routers are typical pieces of hardware and they make
up a crucial part of the information infrastructure. On the other hand, browsers, operating
systems, and word processing programs are software, i.e., computer programs. See Hart -
Chaitoo 1999, 913. Infrastructure today is also undergoing convergence, with services and
contents being made interoperable. See SOU 1999:55, 35 - 36.
118 One of the most essential tasks of the software architecture is to organize the fundamental
elements of the software. This may include the mutual communication of the different parts
of the software, as well as the internal processes and the communication between these
processes, ways to get information, or other ways to arrange and construct the software.
See Koskimies - Mikkonen 2005, 18 - 19. It is precisely the construction of this architecture
that the technological development affects and where the media convergence is to be carried
out. See NOU 1999:26, 23.
119 The operational infrastructure of the network society is generally referred to as the information
infrastructure or knowledge infrastructure (tietoinfrastruktuuri). The information infrastructure
includes information resources and their internal organization. See Pöysti 2002, 36 - 37.
120 However, presently in Finland, the law on payment transactions (Tilisiirtolaki) sets the liability
to the party who gives the payment order.
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makes up the very core of the architecture. The institutions constitute for their part the
essence of modern societal functionality.116
An architecture corresponds to a certain functional design and the term “architecture”
can refer to either hardware or software, or even to a combination of both.117 In fact, the
architecture is even more fundamental when it includes, through both hardware and software,
the overall data management systems and the whole network architecture.118 The network
architecture is then structured on certain basic elements. The constitution and the
functionality of an architectural design depends highly on values and the choices that have
been made for preserving those values.119 For example, the operative framework needs to
be secure; according to the Supreme Court of Finland in cases KKO:1992:3 (S90/1270)
and KKO:1994:80 (S93/1240), it is principally the system operator who is responsible for
system security, in these cases the security of payment transactions.120
KKO:1992:3. A had sent an amount of money to the bank account of B in bank C as an
urgent payment order. The name of the payee was correct but the bank account number
was incorrect. The computer system used for payment traffic in bank C did not
accommodate the risk of mistake, whereby the account of an incorrect recipient was
credited because of the mistake by the bank. The error in A’s order did not relieve the
bank of its liability. The bank was ordered to pay damages to A.
KKO:1994:80. A’s intention was to remit a payment to B, for which purpose A used an
automatic system for payment traffic maintained by a bank. The name of the payee was
correct but the bank account number was incorrect. The computer system used for payment
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121 Values like liberty will not come from the absence of a state or from the absence of state
regulation. Quite the contrary, liberty comes from a state of some kind preserving and
regulating values. See Lessig 1999, 5.
122 Such traditional delivery channels are often constructed vertically, with producer, channel,
and consumer differentiated clearly as units in their own right. See Tennenhouse - Lampson -
Gillett - Klein 1995, Virtual Infrastructure
 http://www.tns.lcs.mit.edu/publications/VI/abstract.html
123 The social institutions that form pert of the architecture may also be described as overlapping
surfaces. On the bottom there is the deepest level, which is the area of the subjective
consciousness. The next level is that of views of certain diverse groups that function as a
collective public. The top surface is the concrete one and it is defined as the level of
individual subjects. See Hänninen 1981, 158 - 159.
124 This structural pattern may sometimes also be described as a social infrastructure or
infostructure; it is basically founded on data and the rights included by it. Data as a part of
the infostructure is defined through its ownership and is often also seen as an item of the
public infrastructure, such as roads, power, or utilities. See Cho 1998, 36.
125 See Lessig 1999, 5. In this sense, law and justice are defined as a process. Jurisprudence and
legal practice are both founded on the continuous use of sources of law but at the same time
they themselves operate as such sources. They both operate as actors and practices in the
legal processes. See Tolonen, H. 2003, 5.
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traffic lacked a complete check-system, whereby the account with the given account
number but the wrong recipient was credited. According to the principles of contract
relations, a bank as a institution maintaining payment traffic was responsible to the payee
for carrying out the order. A’s order with a mistake did not relieve the bank of its liability
and the bank was ordered to pay damages to B.
These values of the infrastructure illustrate the aims that are set to become the basic
structural building blocks of the overall architecture.121 The network architecture is thus
made up of certain hardware and software components and, further, their planned interaction
or mutual cooperation. Accordingly, the architectural tools are either structural or substantial.
Hardware components are the structural ones and they are characteristically physical. As
such they constitute the technical part of the architecture, which is often created for
delivering commodities.122 The most important architectural elements of the physical
structure are made up of technical choices, such as communication protocols or equipment
compatibility.
Network architecture is also described functionally, with this architecture being
constituted of certain societal institutions.123 These institutions are crucial for the whole society
and are basically built up of certain forms of ownership, organizational constructions, and
legal relationships.124 Thus, the functional elements of an architecture may be legal ones,
which are aimed at preserving substantial values.125 Legal architectural elements are closely
linked to legal concepts and legal principles as guiding forces. In this way, physical and legal
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126 See Lessig 1999, 5.
127 See Westman 1998, 33.
128 This may often also be referred to as the legal culture where the legal practices and legal
norms are used in continuous interplay. Legal norms have a direct influence in society and
on the other hand also preserve legal traditions and values. Culture defines the societal
framework and at the same time sets the limits of societal operations. See Paasilehto 2003,
34.
129 The infrastructure is often considered to distribute societal resources. See Kajser 1994, 15.
130 The infrasystem may be defined only as one societal system, such as power distribution
networks. Infrastructure is then defined as the totality of these various systems. See Kajser
1994, 15 - 16.
131 Convergence and infrastructure are closely connected to each other. The traditional
infrastructure is modernized through technological development and completely new ones
are created. For example, the www environment is often considered a modern communication
infrastructure. See NOU 1999:26, 26 - 27.
132 See Kajser 1994, 65. An illustrative example is money in its modern form and its development
as exchange instrument. Economic systems overall are generally the core of functional
architectural structures. See Tolonen 1992, 1 - 22.
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elements together construct the architecture.126 As systemic elements, both affect the
functionality and effectiveness of the overall network architecture, with the legal order at
the same time actually employed as a managerial tool. As such it is used for architectural
management and governance and, crucially, as a tool for affecting the development of the
architecture.127 The most definitive point in the functional architecture is  the societal
significance of a certain functionality.128 This functionality is considered important especially
when it constitutes an essential part of the architecture.
The architectural structure is always employed for carrying out certain societal tasks,
or it is at least a minimum prerequisite for the capability to realize a certain societal role.129
The functional architecture is often described as infrastructure; it may sooner be described
as an infrasystem that includes, beside technical and physical structures, all the essential
functional prerequisites. The infrasystem includes the technical structure, but it also includes
services, actors and the commodities to be delivered.130 The architecture as a functional
structure is constituted of societal institutions. As elements of the architectural structure,
these institutions constitute, for their part, a network that is actually rather similar to the
technical elements of the architecture. These institutions may be examined as an interactive
whole constituted by the interplay of technology and society.131
This kind of interactive functionality has an important influence on the development
of the constitutive elements themselves as well as on the framework where they are to be
employed.132 At the functional level, the main purpose of the architectural structure is to
provide a basis for distributing societal resources, where the interactivity actually constitutes
the core of functionality. At the same time, the architecture establishes the foundation and
the main prerequisites for the societal operations overall. On these grounds, the architecture
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133 According to this definition, the technological elements of architecture would be functional
as well. Their main task is to carry out certain tasks. This applies especially when we consider
an architecture as a traditional infrastructure. According to this, regulation may be seen in
terms of two effects, external and internal. See Westman 1998, 32 - 33.
134 As such these elements may even be considered as constituting a horizon for the cooperative
process of interaction in the Habermasian sense. See Habermas 1989, 120.
135 The systems of patent and copyright are simply too vague both alone to handle such
innovations. The classic line of demarcation has become increasingly blurred. See Reichman
1994, 2500.
136 An interesting view on databases and the protection of them is the World Wide Web. An
HTTP server actually acts as a traditional database that allows those with proper permission
to access, edit, or move Web files. See Major 1998, 84. It is even unclear what is actually
protected in databases. The possibilities include at least the information that a database
contains, its context, or its structure. See Seipel 1990, 33 - 34.
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is often conceived of the societal division of labor, inasmuch as it defines those who are
responsible for maintaining a certain architectural structure.133
1.3.2 Combining the variety of interests
The architecture is founded on communication. The architecture as a system of rights
governance should be based on two different but still overlapping prerequisites: the core
functions of the digital economy and its operational framework, seen as the reflective surface
beyond the overall functionality.134 These two phases overlap and thus need to be applied
together. The fundamental focus, in order to construct the essential baseline of the entire
architecture, is to ensure the cooperation between these two levels. In other words, the
function and the foundation need to be brought together.
The foundation consists crucially of certain interests that maintain the statics of the
system.  The characteristic statics of the traditional intellectual property rights are basically
due to their reliance on exclusivity. Creating a strong exclusive position requires the content
of the exclusivity needs to be defined relatively strictly. A strict definition of the context
is crucial to be able to define the exclusive position as a privilege to utilize the rights.
Exclusivity, however, as the sole definitive feature of the system of intellectual property rights
now seems to be breaking down. The most obvious breakdown will occur in the area of
disjunctive and exclusive categories for industrial and artistic property. The most gravely
threatened schemes are the ones of patent and copyright, with the danger arising from the
unpredictable behavior of several commercially valuable cutting-edge intellectual creations.135
One good example of these new creations is databases, which are now protected on a sui
generis basis.136 A database is actually not a stable or static creation but contains several
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137 These elements are arranged s layers that contain at least sources, producers, distribution,
and end-users. Each of these layers is moreover a complex structure. See Seipel 1990, 16 -
17.
138 This kind of vague line of demarcation is totally untenable from the viewpoint of the
traditional system of intellectual property rights. See Reichman 1994, 2501.
139 Legal hybrids refer here to unified forms of several traditional intellectual property rights,
for example databases. See Reichman 1994, 2502.
140 See Reichman 1994, 2502 - 2503.
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mutually operating elements.137 A database is thus characteristically a functional  invention
and as such a rather paradigmatic illustration of development today. The scope of interests
is no longer confined to pure exclusivity.
The scope of interests is becoming more blurred: what was a clear line of demarcation
of protectable creations has become more like a penetrable one. This makes it possible for
an intermediate zone of marginal inventions to exist.138  This is best illustrated through some clear
differences vis-à-vis the traditional system. First, the filed category of legal hybrids is becoming
wider inasmuch as this area has remarkably lower resistance to variances than the traditional
strict system. Accordingly, new innovations may more easily be produced under the vague
label of legal hybrids.139 Second, new innovations are not necessarily inventions in the traditional
sense. Namely, several fail the non-obviousness test and are likewise not capable of
delivering the kind of cutting-edge inventions, this being the traditional justification of legal
monopolies. Business method patents are examples of innovations that embrace both the
traditional line of demarcation and the non-obviousness of new inventions. Lastly, several
legal hybrids are not definable through the artistic prerequisites of copyright. Such innovations are
more likely to be introduced for economic use in the market. A good example is the source
code of a computer program, which closely resembles a literary work when represented
in two-dimensional form. If embodied in three-dimensional products, the hybrid regime
extends protection to the market, where applications are more likely to be industrial than
cultural.140
Pure exclusivity still has advantages and needs to be maintained at the level of
interests. The main advantage is that exclusive rights are usually defined against all external
parties, i.e., ultra partes. The protection is absolute and very strong. Here lies a dilemma as
well, however. The main problem of exclusivity as an absolutely protected position, and
along with this the privileging of this position, is that it freezes up all the functionality at
the core of this privileged position. In other words, the privileged position of a right-holder
is fundamentally constituted of total exclusivity. The privilege by itself is entirely too static to
be capable of encompassing the rights governance architecture as a whole. Nevertheless,
this kind of statics in intellectual property rights is still rather useful. Namely, it makes it
possible to design the scope of protected and privileged use, which is very much needed
for consolidating the functional architectural design. The rights governance architecture thus
should still be solidly anchored to something. This is why privilege as the core of statics is
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one of the most essential elements when building up the rights governance architecture.
In this task it is not even close to sufficient, however.
On the other hand, dynamics constitutes the kernel of the digital economy. Dynamics
has, however, been changing and varying slightly both in definition and in content. The starting
point in constituting the architecture of rights governance lies in the traditional view of
dynamics, according to which the core lies in the ability to transfer rights and to become
legally protected when carrying out those transactions. The main focus is on balancing
exchangeability and its smooth operation. This actually has made the interests of the market
the most central focus. On the other hand, this is precisely where functional dynamics differ
from traditional dynamics. Development in the world of business is actually mainly due
to the new business models that make it possible to shift the focus away from the customary
view. Therefore, it is not necessarily exchange in its traditional sense that constitutes the
core of dynamics anymore. Rather, dynamics are based on pure functionality; in accordance
with the dynamic aspect of the rights governance architecture, dynamics are founded
precisely on this functionality. In other words, the power to affect legal relations is not
necessarily anymore only the power to transfer rights but also, and even more fundamentally, the
power to participate in the relevant operation. Dynamics thus bring a relational approach into the
picture.
The rights governance architecture is needed for combining privilege and power - statics
and dynamics. Neither privilege nor power alone is adequate for constructing the whole.
In order to achieve the complete picture there is a need to complement static content with
dynamic functionality. This complementation further requires that both static privilege and
dynamic power are employed in parallel and harmoniously. On the other hand, the functional
combination of rights is best defined by concentrating on different actors that are then
further connected to either the privileged or the empowered position. These elements are
generally called the personal aspect of legal protection. An illustrative example of combined
privilege and power is found in the area of commons. The sphere of commons is actually
viewed from two different angles. On the one hand, the core of the static element of
commons consists of the privileged position and it is essentially devoted to rights to be
governed as static elements. For example, digitized content and its use is privileged when
the right to use is reserved to the right-holders themselves only. They are able to control the
access of others. Further, they are able to shape the behavioral patterns of all third parties
and may decide on the price of the content. This is the core of the static aspect of commons.
Continuing with the area of commons as an example, the dynamic element, for its
part, is based on the power to change the legal status of someone. Traditionally this is carried
out by granting a right to transfer rights. However, the definition of dynamics in the
modernized governance architecture of the digital economy, and likewise in the area of
commons, is formulated in terms of relationship that concern only certain parties. It is
relational in the sense that it is focused on only one party or actor at a time. The dynamics
of the modernized architecture of rights governance may not, however, be built on the
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141 Modern innovation networks thus have to include technological knowhow but at the same
time there is always a need for knowing those branches where the sophisticated new
technology is to be used. The needs of the end-user are actually rather definitive for the
success of an innovation. See Tervo 2004, 126.
142 Social transformation and along with it social innovativeness aim at greater participation
and democratization. See Holtgrewe - Werle 2001, 44.
143 Decentralization influences the communication system in at least two ways. First, decentral-
ized systems usually produce different information than concentrated systems and often
the views that they reflect are the ones of their owners. Second, concentrated commercial
systems are often bound to the prevailing distribution of power in society and this distribution
model is often translated into the distribution of power to express ideas and participate public
discourse. See Benkler 2002, 296 - 297.
144 An illustrative example of this is a peer-to-peer network, which is based on a distributed structure.
In other words, there does not exists any single central service provider; rather, all the
networking computers operate equally as clients and service providers in the network. See
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transferral of rights. Here, commons is an extremely good example, the reason for a novel
interpretation of dynamics being obvious. In the case of commons, the rights are actually
property of the community and there exist no external parties. Therefore, the dynamics and their
focus shift from being exchange-oriented towards being more function-oriented. The dynamics
of commons are still relational and concern only the particular parties involved in operations.
1.3.3 Decentralizing the innovation structure
Innovativeness as a communicative function constitutes an innovation network. The
architecture of the innovation network comprises several different elements. The network
is generally constituted of social cooperation, and social cooperation is based on the socially
transforming logic of innovation, in which social movements constitute the kernel.141 In
this sense, the core of social cooperativeness is found in the creativity of action based on
mutuality and sharing. The creativity of action further constitutes the foundation of creative
communities, which promote social transformation and social innovation.142 All of these
structural elements have a direct and concurrent effect on innovativeness. This is mainly
carried out through the capability to control the overall architectural structure. On the other
hand, the one who controls the architecture is often able to control the general behavior
of all the others. This is basically achieved through the choices that are made when building
the foundations of the architecture.
A decentralized network is directly focused on a lack of control.143 Decentralization
has one great advantage, which is associated directly with information being delivered
through the network. In a decentralized and freely operating environment, information is
put into practice without any controlling provider. In other words, there is no network server
that could interfere with the use of the network itself or with those who operate on a
computer network.144 This may have disadvantages, one of which is connected to network
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Kallioniemi 2001, 497.
145 The increase in the rate of innovativeness is not the only consequence of better possibilities
to communicate. Equally important is the increased efficiency of the market. Each of these
consequences contributes in its own way to increasing welfare. See Benkler 2002, 296.
146 The Internet is characteristically based on the end-to-end principle, given that it is based
on the TCP/IP -protocol (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol). This protocol allows
everyone to connect to the Internet. See Lessig 2002a, 148.
147 For example, in order to use the Internet for telephone calls one only needs to develop the
relevant application and get the users to adopt it. The application can be written and sent
to the person on the other end of the network. When both have installed the application,
it is ready for use. See Lessig 2002a, 37.
148 At the moment there exists a great difference in upstream and the downstream speeds that
causes an imbalance. This imbalance has been corrected in present use but it is a threat for
the expected decentralized use of cyberspace. For example, in the prevailing broadcasting
environment it is hard for p2p structures to evolve because of the need of  equal broadband
width. Future broadband technologies will be faster downstream than upstream, which means
that most of the broadband technologies will broadcast more quickly than they receive. See
Lessig 2002a, 158 - 159.
149 Neutrality actually only enables sending data across the network without regulating its content.
In other words, the network architecture only regulates how the data is to be divided and
how the resulting packets are to be shipped. The content and its use are   unnecessary
elements for structural applications. See Lessig 2002a, 149.
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security. In order to ensure and increase the security of operations, the threats to it have
to be eliminated as effectively as possible. For example, the Supreme Court of Finland in case
KKO:2003:36 (R2001/678) considered even an attempt to hack into the information
infrastructure of an enterprise a punishable offence.
KKO:2003:36. A used a computer program for scanning all the Internet addresses connected
to a cooperative association by an open network in order to find open service providers
for transmission. The scanning was thwarted by a firewall in the information system of
the cooperative association. A’s hacking was deemed punishable even as an attempt.
On the other hand, decentralization truly improves and supports universal societal
communication and at the same time the improved possibilities for communication generally
increase the rate of innovativeness.145 One sustainable tool for providing a network
architecture that is as neutral as possible is to strive to maintain the end-to-end principle. This
requires that all intelligence be located at the edge of the network.146 The decentralization
of the network architecture has some further consequences. The most significant implication
of decentralization is that the applications on computers are placed at the edge of the network.147
This will naturally directly affect the overall structure of the network.148 Using the
end-to-end principle closely resembles operating on a peer-to-peer network as a decentralized
network where the neutrality of the network architecture is reflected precisely in the universal
communicativity of the network architecture.149 This has a direct effect on the structure of
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150 Peer-to-peer architecture takes advantage of existing desktop computing power and network
connectivity. See Elkin-Koren 2002, 88.
151 This was so traditionally, when broadband speeds were low and computers sent and received
data at equal rates. See Lessig 2002a, 158 - 159.
152 Peer-to-peer technologies may actually be considered business methods and as such they
are rather challenging for the existing business methods in the content market. The most
famous of these to date is Napster. See Elkin-Koren 2002, 88 - 89.
153 See Lessig 2002a, 156.
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a network and especially the degree of centralization. The degree of centralization is best
manifested at the operational level. Namely, the traditional network, especially open
networks, are based on centralized power. This is where the emergence of equally
constructed peer-to-peer technologies has its effect. Peer-to-peer communication is carried
out among computers and it is based on a sharing of computer resources and services by direct
exchange between computer systems. It is thus characteristically decentralized and in fact
could not be created in a centralized manner. The decentralized character of a peer-to-peer
architecture makes it  possible to eliminate the need for centralized services and thus to
exploit the network resources effectively.150 As a decentralized communication architecture,
peer-to-peer technologies further presume the computers are equal and that they may operate
in rather similar ways and at similar speeds.151 Therefore, peer-to-peer technologies do not
require central management or control, the control in their case being rather diffused.152
The power of neutrality comes directly from the network’s inability to control the
context or any of the operations of the actors. This power is reinforced through the simplicity
of the network. This combination of neutrality and simplicity in the network architecture further
implies that the network cannot discriminate against content and applications. This increases
innovativeness in making it possible for all innovations and creations to emerge in the
network.153 In the digital economy it is significant to promote this kind of innovativeness,
for innovativeness is best carried out in circumstances where there is no decisive power. For
this reason, the communication network architecture ought to be kept completely
decentralized.
1.3.4 Innovating in ownership
As a crucial component of the rights governance architecture decentralization has various
consequences. These in turn have a great influence on choosing the architectural design
of the network on the axis of owned versus free. Decentralization in producing information
may indeed affect innovativeness in two fundamental ways. On the one hand, concentration
in the production of information may affect the quality of information. More specifically,
centralized systems tend to produce different information than decentralized systems;
decentralized information is more versatile and more flexible, especially in the utilization
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154 See Benkler 2002, 297.
155 The traditional character of the Internet as the common open network is based on its
freedom, openness and ungovernability. In addition, Internet is impossible to censor or
commercialize, and it is decentralized. See Vaidhyanathan 2001, 181.
156 See Lessig 2002a, 160.
157 In TN 2002:17 Web pages did not, however, reach the level of protectability required for
database protection. See TN 2002:17, 10 - 11.
158 Customer satisfaction has even been considered one element of a business strategy. See
Ahlfors 2005, 105.
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of innovativeness. On the other hand, concentrated commercial systems are generally based
on controlling the power to express. These institutions often translate the distribution of
economic power in society into a comparable distribution of power to express ideas and
engage in public discourse.154 Thereby, even the controlling power is divided, and neutralized,
in a decentralized architecture. This constitutes an enormous advantage for any decentralized
system.
Both the quality of information and the concentration of power need to be
reconsidered in the emerging digital economy. The digital economy offers substantial
opportunities for concentrating the controlling power in the hands of right-holders in favor
of free and high-quality information. This development may even be used against consumers
to the advantage of the owners of the network.155 In this sense, the existing communication
network has some disadvantages at the level of design. First, consumers live in a closed system
that may be based on discrimination of contents. This means that consumers actually have
no real possibility to choose or even to know what information is actually used as the basis
of their decisions.156 When it occurs as a continuous developing line of innovativeness, this
kind of concentration truly affects the quality of information. On the other hand, the
construction of the network environment is supposed to be based on the free flow of
information, one illustrative example of which is the ownerless status of Web pages.
According to the Copyright Council of Finland in case TN 2002:17 a Web page may be protected
as a database.157
Secondly, the business models mostly utilized in the digital framework are based on
owning customers rather than offering information or guaranteeing any access to them.158 This
kind of system cannot, however, afford any increasing number of options to its “owned
customers”. In other words, the number of those options needs to be restricted and their
content has to be diminished. This again necessarily affects the quality of information and
the structure of control. Thirdly, and especially when speaking about innovation, the
controlled platform may lower the willingness to innovate. Innovativeness is essentially based
on a free and  creative, or creative and free, environment. This freedom cum creativity will be
destroyed if the environment falls under the control of a private owner who gets the power
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159 See Lessig 2002a, 160.
160 In practice, it is precisely the Internet protocol that physically routes information on the
network. It does not  process or deliver certain kinds of data better than others. This freedom
of communication enables the network to adapt applications not originally foreseen by its
designers. See Lessig 2002a, 37.
161 See Lessig 2002a, 37.
162 See Reichman 1994, 2504.
163 Many recent business method patents are basically consist of an old method that is only
implemented in a new way in cyberspace. See Chandra 2002, 546.
164 One explanation for how power neutralized by collaborative rights are the basis of
innovativeness is the innovators dilemma. It may answer the question why open resources
are more valuable than closed ones. The dilemma describes a perfectly understandable series
of decisions that lead well-managed companies to miss the opportunities in disruptive
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to direct the innovativeness.159 On the other hand, lack of any centralized owner makes
it possible to emphasize either the view of the end-user or the view of the equipment-
embedded framework. Not being dedicated to one optimized application opens up the
network to innovation.160
1.3.5 Neutralizing the collaborative relations
An innovative network may be decentralized and ownerless and this ought to constitute the
core of the rights governance architecture. Openness implies further a third characteristic -
the neutrality of the network. Neutrality prevents discrimination on the network, as it is one
of the basic functions of the architecture. This freedom from discrimination derives from
the inability of a neutral network to make any choices. This further implies that the network
cannot discriminate against some information while favoring other. As such the network
cannot discriminate against any new innovator’s designs.161
Neutralization of collaborating rights may be carried out by endeavoring to construct
a unifying system at the level of intellectual property rights. The incoherence of the present
system is a threat to the balance of power that is based on interconnected rights. For
example, a legally protected name (a trademark) and the right to communicate on an open
network as a position (a domain name) collide and come to constitute a powerful
combination of rights. The power is further manifested through granting exclusive rights,
which is actually an attempt to overpower the competition.162 Moreover, granting exclusive rights
in a systemically unstable situation may lead to distortions in the overall communicative
structure. Here, an illustrative example is again the business method patent, where patents
as exclusive rights have been granted even for traditional and old inventions that have now
only been employed in a new way on a digital network.163
A showpiece of the power of neutralized rights in innovativeness is the model of
disruptive technologies, which causes what is known as innovator’s dilemma.164 In this dilemma,
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technological change. See Lessig 2002a, 89.
165 Companies often have difficulties recognizing technologies or business models that have
the potential to replace their existing technologies. Not only do companies lack the knowledge
and capabilities for these technologies or business models, but their existing capabilities and
knowledge function as a filter effectively prohibiting them from recognizing the value of
technologies or business models. See Keil 2000, 146.
166 Innovations are actually created by newcomers rather than by traditional players.
Innovativeness is clearly based on emerging new social operation models and rules created
by innovating newcomers. It is closely linked to the social structure. See Houtsonen 2000,
244.
167 This is actually the essence of the creative destruction identified and referred to by Joseph
A. Schumpeter. See Schumpeter 1965, 84 - 85. This kind of development is driven by a robust
development process in which the operating parties actively create new applications. See
Tervo 2004, 106.
168 It is in fact unexpected situations that offer some of the most innovative opportunities. The
other potential factors are incompatibilities, process needs, changes in a certain niche or
market, demography, observational change, and new discoveries. These factors are often
flexible and overlapping. See Korpelainen - Lampikoski 1998, 139.
169 If a company is focused on continuing processes, if it ignores new markets, and if it misses
the disruptive technologies that in fact produce radical new industries, then there is a good
reason to keep at least some critical resources for innovation open and within the commons.
A neutral platform and the e2e principle are essential tools for guaranteeing this. See Lessig
2002a, 90 - 91.
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the leading companies within a particular market will outperform others in perfecting the
technology that defines the existing market.165 Instead of identifying and developing
disruptive technologies, the development is highly concentrated on superior products to
continue existing product lines. This is why concentrated control will not produce disruptive
technologies.166 In order to prevent such concentration, it is reasonable to attempt to create
some collaboration of rights. On the other hand, innovator’s dilemma also reveals some
connections to the decentralization of  the network architecture. Decentralization may cause
some disruption in the traditional course of development. This is often referred as creative
destruction, where worse or less effective innovations are simply superseded by better ones.167
Thus, the basic question in innovator’s dilemma, as in versatile innovativeness overall, is
one of the opportunities offered to competitors. The distortion here, however, is  mainly
due to the traditional close dependency of enterprises on their own core capabilities.168 This
makes it hard to adapt totally different technologies or business models in the existing,
traditional organization process.169
1.4 Summary
In this section, the main purpose was to compare and contrast the elements and prerequisites
of both inventions and innovations. This is basically done in order to reveal the confusion
behind the changed prerequisites of both contract law and property law, as well as the
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development of the field of intellectual property. This confusion is due to the significance
of the digital economy and also the importance of intellectual property in it. The main
concepts and legal institutions basically still apply but their use is confusing. A good example
of this is the use of contracts when speaking about intellectual property. Attempts have
been made to bring the essential dynamics into the system by constructing contractual
arrangements in intellectual property and this has then been considered dynamics.
However, the property view requires more than changing only the balance of statics.
This essentially also corresponds to the difference between invention and innovation. An
invention is static and as such it may easily be understood as property, or an object that
can be owned. In these cases we speak often about patents or other intellectual property
rights. An innovation is somehow more complicated. The most significant difference is
that an innovation is more than a sole object. It is more likely to be described as a fluent
course of ideas. As such it can seldom be patented. Another problem here is that an innovation
is seldom stagnated. Therefore, the protective forms focused on the strict prerequisites of
intellectual property rights do not necessarily always fit in the real life of the present day.
Problems brought up by the interconnected examination of invention and innovation may
roughly be classified into three categories. These may be approached through
decentralization, the ownerless nature of a communication network, and neutrality. All these
elements create a part of the flow of innovativeness. On the other hand, all these problems
question the stability of the traditional system of intellectual property law. The bases seem
to remain but their interplay is somehow differently balanced. This is why there is a need
for a new interpretation.
The traditional schema of property law is based theoretically on the Hohfeldian
conceptual frame and its applications. The Hohfeldian frame is employed here also as the
core of the rights governance architecture. The foundations of the theory are explained
through the traditional use of the theory but the changes in the structure of the economy
continuously affect the application of the theory. The fundamental legal relationships are
still rather stable; it is only their mutual cooperation that is unstable. This changing balance
is the focal issue examined here.
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170 Hohfeld has used his concepts also for describing and examining the relation of common
law and equity. The Hohfeldian conceptual frame is fundamentally structured on the basis
of common law in United States. See Hohfeld 1913, 553. W. N. Hohfeld’s writings consist
entirely of articles in legal periodicals whereof the most significant are the three articles:
the two upon Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and the one upon
The Relations between Equity and Law.  The previous two articles are included by the printing
referred in this study. See Hohfeld 1964, 4.
171 See Zitting 1951: Omistajanvaihdoksesta silmällä pitäen erityisesti lainhuudatuksen
vaikutuksia.
172 Subjective rights are each only a set of different legal relationships.  Basically this means
that a right in rem is not a right against a thing. See Niemi 1996, 34 - 35.
173 This may often hinder the examination of the most complex legal interests. See Hohfeld
1964, 35.
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2 HOHFELDIAN FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS AND THE
CONCEPTUAL FRAME
2.1 The core and the significance of the conceptual frame
The interplay of inventiveness and innovativeness is a transitional process. The explanation
for  the transition from invention towards innovation needs to be drawn from a classificatory
and descriptive schema. The descriptive schema here is the Hohfeldian conceptual frame,
which was originally introduced to bringing out the alteration in the dynamics of legal
relationships.170 The focus was originally on the change of ownership.171 In the present
examination the central focus is on a different way to see dynamics in the digital economy and
especially in the area of intellectual property. This is also where the principal difference vis-à-
vis the traditional application of the Hohfeldian schema is found. Basically, as it is here
argued, the dynamics of intellectuality differ markedly from the dynamics of the traditional,
object-oriented “static age”.
The starting point of the theoretical examination is a clear definition of a legal
relationship. These relationships are relations between persons and they may be based solely
on the communication between them.172 This is also where the significance of a legal
relationship lies, even when the existence of a legal relationship as a basic concept of a legal
position is questioned. The basis is constituted by the traditional legal relationships, which
are seen as founded on the categories of rights and duties. In particular this means that all
legal relations are reduced to “rights” and “duties”.173 As such the whole structure of the
field of legal relationships tends to remain rather simple and stable. The legal relations are,
however, of the sui generis type, which clearly restricts the formal categorization. If any
categorization is needed it may well be realized, according to the Hohfeldian frame, by
classifying the correlative and oppositional conceptual pairs. In order to construct a more
varied and flexible view of legal relations, these correlative and oppositional pairs may then
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174 See Hohfeld 1964, 36.
175 This distinctive task of the Hohfeldian analysis was clearly and illustratively employed in
examining change of ownership. The essential ambition was to break down ownership, which
until then was understood only as an extensive subjective right. The Hohfeldian conceptual
analysis was used to examine ownership as legal relationships and as rights and duties of
the parties. See Zitting 1951, 47 - 51.
176 See Hohfeld, 1964, 35 - 36.
177 On the other hand, it is equally significant to differentiate personal legal relationships in
order to operate on more precise terms. See Helin 1988, 415 - 418.
178 See Hohfeld, 1964, 36.
179 According to W. N. Hohfeld: “A duty or a legal obligation is that which one ought or ought
not to do. ‘Duty’ and ‘right’ are correlative terms. When a right is invaded, a duty is violated.”
See Hohfeld 1964, 38.
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be used when examining the focal legal fields.174 Further, it is the single legal relationship
that constitutes the starting point for resolving the positions based on rights and duties.175
This implies that one conceptual pair in the Hohfeldian conceptual frame always represents
only a single type of legal relation. As such the conceptual pairs remain rather formal and
open. On the other hand, because of the formality and openness of the pairs each legal
relationship requires more accurate definition, this clarification being carried out by defining
the conceptual pairs in terms of their mutual interconnection. The conceptual pairs
correlating with or opposite to each other are accordingly specifications of each other. This
is used as a means to make visible the different included, and often also hidden, elements
and legal relations.176
The very foundation of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame, and the clear starting point
for the examination, is the distinction between right and duty.177 This fundamental distinction
then provides the basis of the conceptual frame, which is divided into the positions of the
entitled and the obliged. Further, both the level of rights and the level of duties are divided
into four distinct elements such that each legal element at the level of rights corresponds
to each legal element at the level of duties. A right as a complete concept thus fundamentally
consists of four elements that manifest the different overlapping aspects of the right. These
elements are right, privilege, power, and immunity. The correlating elements at the level
of duty are duty, no-right, liability, and disability.178
The Hohfeldian conceptual frame is  based on the classification of rights. In this
categorization a right remains the major concept and as such it is essentially definitive of
the whole category of rights. Along with rights this category includes privileges, powers,
and immunities. A right is thus not referred in its proper sense; rather, the use of the term
“right” is relatively broad and, in the Hohfeldian frame, it may be replaced by a more
accurate term. This is clearly carried out through examining the correlative of “right”, which
is “duty”.179 The interrelation of right and duty may be illustrated through an example. If
X has a right with respect to Y that he or she shall not copy the music created by X, the
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180 In light of this example, there might be a need to seek a synonym for the term “right” in
its broad meaning; following Hohfeld, this term would be “claim”. See Hohfeld 1964, 38.
181 See Hohfeld 1964, 36 - 38.
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correlative is that Y is under a duty toward X not to copy.180 Similarly, if X has a patent
granted for his or her invention and he or she has a right against Y that Y shall not exploit
X’s patented invention, the right is correlated by Y’s duty toward X not to exploit that
invention. In this way the interrelation of right and duty constitutes the most significant
foundation of all legal relationships.
Further, the conceptual pairs correlate with each other according to a certain
formalism. The jural correlatives are right - duty, privilege - no-right, power - liability,
and immunity - disability. These relations are called jural correlatives. In this schema the
correlative relationships refer to conceptual pairs that, on the one hand, particularize the
rights of the entitled party and, on the other, the duties of the obliged party. In the overall
descriptive schema of legal relationships these correlating pairs are employed as explanatory
concepts. All legal relationships may be classified by using these conceptual pairs. These
legal correlative pairs construct the foundation of all legal relationships. Further, all the rights
and duties may be broken down further and defined as personal relationships by using these
correlative pairs. On these grounds, the conceptual pairs of the Hohfeldian frame may
additionally be constructed as opposite pairs. These are defined as jural opposites which are
right - no-right, privilege - duty, power - disability, and immunity - liability.181 In the
following diagram the correlative relations are indicated by a solid line and the opposite
relations by a dashed line.
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182 More on these norms, see Aarnio 1982, 76 - 77.
183 See Niemi 1996, 19.
184 The content of copyright is simple and consists roughly of two elements. The core of these
elements is the variety of rights associated with a certain work. The most important of these
rights are the right to manufacture and the right to distribute. See Govaere 1996, 14. These
rights have also been described as exploitation rights. See more Bruun 2001, 42 - 44.
185 This two-leveled nature of norms related to subjective rights is the very basis of the division
between static and dynamic rights in the Hohfeldian conceptual frame. See Niemi 1996,
19.
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The Hohfeldian conceptual frame has a clear practical significance in that it may be used
for examining legal relations in either their static or dynamic sense. Further examinations
of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame reveal the salient meaning of the distinction between
the static and dynamic aspects. These examinations may consist of classifying the very
foundations of the conceptual pairs in order to reveal the elementary difference between
statics and dynamics. The examination is begun by classifying the conceptual pairs as
behavioral norms and competence norms.182 This is actually also the foundation for the
difference between statics and dynamics in the Hohfeldian analysis. The interrelationship
of the two different kinds of norms derives from the traditional character of the subjective
right. On the one hand, there is the class of factual use-rights, which are expressed in the form
of regulative norms. The objective of the regulation is a certain behavior.183 In the law of
intellectual property this is often associated with using intellectual property for one’s own
good. Thereby, for example, the privilege to exploit one’s own literary work is based on
a regulative norm. In Finland this is carried out in Copyright Act 2 §. Regulation, then,
concerns the owner’s behavior, which is parallel to the behavior of the external parties.184
The norm categories of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame also include certain
competence norms. These norms are based on granting legal power, i.e., competence, to
the right-holder. Legal power  concerns competence, which is described as the power or ability
to dispose of property. In such cases it is precisely this ability that is expressed by competence
norms.185 The disposal concerns the transference of rights and is carried out on the basis
of someone’s competence. Legal disposal is, for example, licensing a right to a copyrighted
computer program or selling a well-known trademark. This classification explains also the
division of static and dynamic aspects within the conceptual frame itself. This division is
carried out by examining both sides of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame as separate
components. Namely, both aspects include two parallel pairs. The correlating pairs of the
static aspect are right - duty and privilege - no-right. These two conceptual pairs are further
defined as behavioral norms.
Clearly, according to their very description, behavioral norms are contextually defined.
In other words, these conceptual pairs are closely linked to the content of the legal
relationship. By using this particular conceptual duplex it is further possible to examine
the content of the right-holder’s right. This right is contextually defined, on the one hand,
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as the right-holder’s freedom to behave as he or she wishes and, on the other hand, as his
or her right to forbid external parties to behave in a certain way. At the level of duty, external
parties have a no-right to interfere in the right-holder’s use and accordingly they have a duty
to tolerate certain behavior.186 For example, the copyright-holder (-owner) has a privilege
to produce copies of his or her work while correspondingly having the right to forbid another
person to do so. The external parties have accordingly a no-right to interfere in copying,
and they have a duty to let the copyright-holder produce those copies.
The dynamic aspect of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame is constructed internally
in an entirely similar manner, with two correlating conceptual pairs. These are power -
liability and immunity - disability and may further be defined as competence norms. The
content of the dynamic aspect consists of the power of the right-holder to decide about
the transference of the right and control over it, or use it to his or her own advantage. The
empowered position then correlates with the liability of the other party. Due to his or her
liability, that party has to tolerate the behavior of the other party. An illustrative example
of power as competence is found in the area of names and especially domain names. A
domain name is a name and as such it carries only a right to use. On the other hand, a
domain name gives its holder the competence to get connected to the network. Thereby,
a domain name always contains some internal power.
Additionally, in the dynamic aspect the content of dynamics is made complete by
immunity, which basically implies integrity. Immunity correlates with disability of the other
party.187 This immunity/disability position is best illustrated in the position of the disabled
party and the field of compulsory license. Compulsory license  corresponds to the legal
permission that is ensured by a court of law. It is granted to a person other than the patent-
holder and its purpose is to make the patented invention available to society. Compulsory
license puts the right-holder in a disabled position, which means that he or she is not immune
anymore. On the contrary, when one has a patent, one’s position is actually one of immunity.
2.2 Static and dynamic legal relations
2.2.1 The static aspect
The Hohfeldian conceptual frame is fundamentally composed of basic concepts of the static
aspect. Those basic concepts are right and privilege and they are generally described with their
correlating counterparts, duty and no-right. The totality of the static aspect is then constituted
of these correlating pairs. The definition may be augmented by describing the opposite pairs,
which are right - no-right and privilege - duty. Further, the static aspect is constituted of
Hohfeldian fundamental legal concepts and the conceptual frame
188 The owner thus has a freedom to behave as he or she wishes. In this respect the freedom
to use is a sort of normative void. The personal relations may easily be examined and resolved
through the concept of freedom of use, whereas the content of ownership may not be
determined through this concept. See Zitting 1984, 648.
189 Petrusson defines these three elements of utilization as the individual control over
information. See Petrusson 1999, 136.
190 See Niemi 1996, 19 - 21.
191 See Hohfeld 1964, 37 - 38.
192 See Benkler 1999, 363.
193 See Hohfeld 1964, 39. The Hohfeldian example is modified to fit in intellectual property
rights.
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both rights and duties, the rights being those of the right-holder and the duties those of
the external parties. The static aspect thus includes two different kinds of elements. The
right-holder is entitled to certain behavior and at the same time has a right to forbid external
parties to behave in a certain way.188 When speaking about inventions and the information
included in them, the right-holder has a privilege to access information and a privilege to utilize
information. Additionally, he or she has  the right to forbid the external parties to access
information.189 The essential focus here is that the right holder has an exclusive right to behave
in a certain way. This means that he or she  has both a privilege and right to behave in this
way.190
The static aspect may be described by defining the correlating relation of right and duty.
A duty, in other words a legal obligation, concerns what the obliged must do, is forced to
do, or must not do. On the other hand, a right is violated when the correlating duty is not
obeyed.191 If someone (X) has a right against someone else (Y) to the effect that Y shall
not exploit X’s patent, the correlating concept is that Y is under a duty toward X to refrain
from exploiting the patent. Likewise, if an enterprise owns a trademark, and has a right
against someone (Y) that Y will not use a similar mark in the same market area, then Y has
a duty to avoid using this mark. This example may be applied directly to defining the
borderline between the public domain and the enclosed domain, where the communication
of information describes an expectation about how the particular use of information is to
be legally organized. The core difference between the public domain and the enclosed
domain is that anyone is privileged to use information in ways that are in the public
domain.192
The static aspect is completed by another correlative relation, which is privilege -
no-right. This may also be described through examples, the previous one applying here in
a slightly varied form. Whereas X has a right or claim that Y should not exploit X’s patent,
X, on the other hand, has the privilege of exploiting this patent. In terms of opposing
concepts, X has no duty to not to exploit it.193 Thereby, the inner substance of privilege
is found in the counterparts of both right and privilege. A duty is a correlative in the legal
relation where the counterpart is a right. This is also where the further difference between
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194 The interrelation of right (as claim) and privilege is clearly illustrated in the following example
cited by Hohfeld: “The eating of shrimp salad is an interest of mine, and, if I can pay for
it, the law will protect that interest, and it is a right of mine to eat shrimp salad which I have
paid for, although I know that shrimp salad always gives me cholic.” See Hohfeld 1964, 41.
195 See Hohfeld 1964, 39 - 41.
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a right and a privilege can be found.194 This difference is significant indeed. Namely, the
correlative of X’s right that Y shall not exploit X’s patent is Y’s duty not to exploit. Further,
the correlative of X’s privilege to exploit it is clearly Y’s no-right that X shall not exploit
it. This example implies two different classes of relations. Accordingly, the different
manifestations of privilege, on the one hand, and right, on the other, are clearly illustrated.
The group of primary relations is then actually a party’s respective privilege against the third
parties in relation to exploiting the patent. The secondary ones are a party’s respective rights
against the third parties that they should not interfere in the act of exploiting the patent.
This is to say that the third parties have a duty not to interfere the right-holder’s
exploitation.195
This applies, for example, to keeping trade secrets. A trade secret constitutes to its
holder a privileged position to access secret information, with the correlating no-right of
a third party stating that he or she is not allowed to access that secret information. A trade
secret is protected through a right-holder’s right to forbid the external parties to behave
by inappropriate measures when the external party has a correlating duty not to behave like
this. (See, in Finland: Laki sopimattomasta menettelystä elinkeinotoiminnassa 4 §.) Right
and duty as correlatives constitute in this manner the core of the static aspect, which is
principally constructed of correlating conceptual relations. The analysis may be completed
through the opposite relations. The position of the opposite relations is slightly different
when compared to the correlative ones. Opposite relations namely define plainly the position
of either the entitled or the obliged. They do not  illustrate any mutual interaction between
the parties to a legal relationship. Therefore they may be used only in examining the legal
positions of either the entitled party or the obliged one.
The significance of the opposite relations is that they make it possible to examine
legal relationships and their internal importance. In other words, they define the legal
relationships only and focus on those. At the same time, the relationships indirectly also
define the legal position of any third party. In this analysis of opposite concepts, a right
is opposed to a no-right whereas a privilege is opposed to a duty. The position of the obliged
may be defined accordingly. A duty is opposed to a privilege and when the right-holder
has a duty to act in a certain way he or she has no privilege. Accordingly, a no-right is
opposed to a duty.196
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197 Legal relationships may be changed for two reasons. On the one hand, this may occur because
of a fact or a list of facts that cannot be included in the intention of a human being. On the
other hand, the change may be caused by facts that are included in human intention. When
intention has a definitive significance in changing the legal relationships, the person in
question is considered to have legal power. The legal power is, further, focused in affecting
certain changes in legal relations. See Hohfeld 1964, 50 - 51.
198 This means that legal power has to be distinguished from mental or physical power. See
Hohfeld 1964, 50.
199 See Niemi 1996, 39 - 42.
200 Operative facts are these that are essential for creating or establishing the legal relationship.
The fundamental concern is to distinguish legal power and physical power from each other.
Operative facts are, for example, the abandonment of an object, or acceptance of an offer.
In order to examine the scope of power and liability it is important to distinguish clearly
the operative facts and the legal facts. Operative facts play an important role in creating the
legal relations, whereby the physical facts operate always on the background. See Hohfeld
1964, 58.
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2.2.2 The dynamic aspect
Real legal relations are not fixed only to static relationships. Equally significant is the ability
to change legal positions, which is defined as the dynamics of legal relations. This ability to
change legal relationships is based on legal power, which is further defined as the core of
the dynamic aspect of Hohfeldian conceptual frame.197 This core is constituted of power
and liability as correlative counterparts. In this schema, legal power is associated with the
rights of the entitled person and at the conceptual level it clearly corresponds to the concepts
of right and privilege in the static aspect. Power is a concept on the level of rights and at
the level of obligations it correlates with liability. At the same time, it operates as the opposite
of legal disability.198 The power - liability relationship can be seen to constitute the kernel
of the dynamic aspect in the Hohfeldian conceptual frame.
This kernel may be described by defining the opposing relations for the dynamic
aspect. This clearly corresponds to the defining process of the opposing concepts of the
static aspect. Opposing relations particularize the legal positions of either the entitled or
the obliged. Power implies that the right-holder is not under disability. On the contrary,
he or she has the power to cause a change in the legal relationships. On the other hand,
the liability of the obliged party is opposed to immunity and that party is then under liability.
In other words, he or she lacks immunity against the power of the entitled.199 The
oppositional relationships thus may clearly be used as additional definitions when describing
the contextual relationships of the dynamic aspect. Further, as the content of the dynamic
aspect this relation of power and liability denotes the controlling power that the parties to
the legal relationship have. It also implies the legal liability in this controlling power.200
Thereby, the inner purpose of further using the legal power is to effect a change in a legal
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relationship. The change is carried out by disposing over the set of rights. As a consequence
of this act those legal rights are transferred from one person to another.
Transference of rights also affects the power itself, however. Therefore, through the
use of competence, the acquirer of a right receives an analogous legal position and power
to dispose.201 This is best illustrated through examples. The owner has the legal power to
extinguish his or her own legal interest by abandoning the object. When abandoned, the
object has no owner and no one has any power positions over it. This also apples to the
other positions defined through the Hohfeldian conceptual schema, i.e., right, privilege,
and immunity. Indeed, abandonment implies a power position over the abandoned object:
the power to acquire title to the object by appropriating it.202
In the field of intellectual property rights a compelling example of acquiring a power
position by appropriating may be found in geographic information. Geographic information
gives consumers information about the origins of goods. In this respect, geographic
information is a part of the public domain and as such is ownerless; it cannot be transferred
freely in order to preserve the accuracy of this connection.203 This ownerless status may,
however, be questioned by appropriating pieces of this kind of information. This actually
applies to all public domain information that is free to be appropriated.204 Another illustrative
example of the creation of a power position is found in open source software, where the creation
of an empowered position is even slightly stronger and may even be described as active
empowering. Active empowering is carried out through creating software and correspondingly
receiving copyright to it.205 Copyright is then further transferred to the use of the whole
community, the so-called open source community, where everyone is free to copy and modify
a computer program on the basis of transferred copyright. Copyright is then called copyleft.206
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Nevertheless, the empowered position is granted to the whole community. As a communal
right it becomes slightly stronger than it is normally.
The character of legal power ought to be examined even further to be able to reveal
its character in more detail. This is best carried out in the field of contracts. A mails a letter
to B and offers to license his or her patented invention to B. The letter is duly received.
These operative facts, i.e., mailing the letter and receiving it, create power as regards B and
a correlative liability as regards A. Further, B, by dropping a letter of acceptance in the mail
box, has the power to impose a potential or inchoate contractual obligation on A and himself.
This series of acts establishes further the power - liability relationship between A and B.207
This recalls the situation with shrink-wrap contracts and the  structural similarity between
shrink-wrap and click-wrap operations is clear. By clicking the button of acceptance, surfers
on the network actually place themselves under the power of the service provider. The
problem is of course that they may have done this even without knowing it. Nevertheless,
the power - liability relationship is established in a wholly corresponding manner in the
network environment.
The Hohfeldian conceptual frame is completed through the fourth and last correlative
pair, which is immunity and disability. Immunity is the correlative of disability and the
opposite of liability. Indeed, this fourth correlative pair completes the dynamic aspect of
analysis. The character of the correlating duplex is, again, best revealed by examining the
mutual relationship of the two parallel concepts of the dynamic aspect: power and immunity.
This mutual relationship resembles closely the one of right and privilege in the static aspect
of the analysis. There a right is one’s affirmative claim against another, and a privilege is
one’s freedom from the right of claim by another. The right is a presupposition of certain
behavior, with the privilege accordingly freedom from this. Likewise, here in the dynamic
aspect, power equalizes control in the legal relationship and immunity is freedom from this
control.208
A ready illustration of this is found in the area of licenses. Licensor X has the power
to license his or her patented invention to Y or to any other ordinary party. In this
relationship X possesses an empowered position. Further, the empowered position is
strengthened through the immunity of the owner, i.e., X as licensor. Immunity applies to
both the licensee and third parties. On the other hand, the licensee is under disability until
the license is transferred to him or her, and cannot dispose over the licensed invention that
is to be transferred. Disability applies until the license agreement is completed.209 A similar
situation occurs in copyright when a composer as copyright-holder has the power to
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manufacture and distribute copies of his or her composition. To really be entitled to this,
the copyright-holder is immune against any infringement by the external parties. Copyright
is, again, even strengthened through the copyright-holder’s immunity. The immunity is
further strengthened through the disability to copy of, for example, those who are listening
to the particular music, or composition.
2.3 Some applications of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame
2.3.1 Analyzing the transference of ownership
In Finnish jurisprudence, the application of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame has become
even classic. This status was introduced by Simo Zitting in his doctoral thesis in the 1950s
in which he examines the transference of ownership by concentrating on legal relationships.
The Hohfeldian conceptual frame plays a central role in the thesis and the overall
transference of ownership and divergence of legal relationships was analyzed using the frame.
This short section is mainly based on Zitting’s thesis. Zitting’s work is considered as a part
of analytical jurisprudence and its derivation, analytical civil law.210 The central aim of
analytical jurisprudence is to remove all of the unnecessary and disadvantageous elements
from the language of jurisprudence. The main argument is that instead of focusing on what
something is, one should focus on how something occurs. On the other hand, the aim is to create
a jurisprudential conceptual frame that would be sufficiently exact.211 These were, according
to Zitting, the most central means to characterize the transference of ownership in a totally
fresh way and accordingly reshape and take advantage of the different aspects of the owner
and the overall concept of ownership. His aim was to reshape the concept of subjective
right to correspond to reality.212
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213 The theory of subjective right as a connecting concept between legal facts and legal
consequences was researched by Per Olof Ekelöf, who came to the conclusion that the concept
of subjective right consists of two elements and includes both facts and consequences. On
the one hand, the concept refers to a group of legal facts and, on the other, to a group of
legal consequences. See Ekelöf 1946, 310 - 311. In this respect the concept becomes twofold
and could be defined to describe either legal facts or legal consequences, with the facts and
the consequences both bound together by the concept of subjective right so that  the concept
itself becomes equivocal. See Ekelöf 1945, 246 - 247. This view was questioned by Ivar Strahl,
who took the view that the concept of subjective right cannot be used as a concept including
several meanings. Strahl argued instead that the content and meaning of a subjective right
have to be the same as regards both the legal facts and the legal consequences. It cannot
be equivocal. This means, in other words, that the concept of subjective right (a claim, for
example) has to contain the same meaning in all premises and the concept of subjective right
was thereby only an illustrative concept referring to a group of legal facts. See Strahl 1946,
206 - 208.
214 In this respect, ownership consists of a complex of different norms, either behavioral norms
or competence norms. See Zitting 1953, 596. Ross defines this to be a simple example of
logical systematics, with the consequences derived from the set of legal facts. See Ross 1951,
476 - 477.
215 The new way to view a subjective right like ownership made it also possible to distinguish
elements within the concept that had been impossible to distinguish before. One major
change was the transition from the static position to the dynamic one. The need for this kind
of change was due to several factors at the same time, the principal ones being increasing
exchange, the change in the social structure generally and the incompatibility of the legal
instruments in the changed reality. See Zitting 1952a , 387 - 391.
216 See Zitting 1952a, 387 - 391.
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A subjective right like ownership is founded on a large number of legal facts and
legal consequences which are then connected by the concept of ownership. More precisely
we can say that the concept of ownership is built up of a cumulative set of legal
consequences. Legal facts alone do not build up any cumulative whole.213 They are mere
facts which could also constitute a disjunctive whole. These simple legal facts are then
connected to a set of legal consequences by the concept of ownership.214 Ownership was
no longer necessarily considered a substance of rights deriving from different legal facts
or consequences. Rather, it could be defined as a term describing the totality of elements
forming the complexity of legal positions.215 The emphasis moved towards different
elements, which further form the basis of ownership. Ownership is the common concept
for these positions. It can also be said that ownership was no longer a substantive concept
but, rather, a functional one. It could also be described as a dynamic dimension.216 This
was essential for societal development.
Ownership  illustrates clearly the overall social circumstances. Thereby, any transference
or development in those circumstances necessarily affects the scope of ownership. The level
of engagement of the owner and any change concerning it is evidently one manifestation
of the development in those social circumstances. Another is the evolution in the position
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of individual owner as the possessor of private property.217 The social circumstances were
traditionally more fixed to using the property for one’s own benefit rather than transferring
it or using it as collateral security. In those circumstances it was sufficient to consider
ownership as a static concept, where the main focus was on drawing a clear borderline between
ownership itself and the limited law of property.218 Expanding exchange, however, changed
this static and steady status of ownership, and dynamic ownership came into the limelight.
Dynamics simply rose over statics when examining the scope of ownership. This likewise
brought the change of subject and especially the different phases of this transferring process
into the focus of research.219
The legal status of the owner comprises three different components, which are the
primary right of the owner as a right of possession, competence, and a certain level of
dynamic protection, i.e., protection against creditors or other parties directing claims at the
assignor.220 Transference of ownership may further be examined by considering all these
three components. This diverse basis  makes it possible to define ownership in both static
and dynamic terms. This makes ownership clearly twofold.  Further, the legal positions found
in ownership are built up on the basis of either the static aspect or the dynamic aspect. These
aspects then further reveal the different characteristics of those aspects and make it possible
to focus on their most salient qualities. In the static aspect there is the right-holder’s right
or privilege to use his or her right, whereas in the dynamic aspect the most characteristic
element is the right-holder’s power to decide on his or her right.221
The difference is significant when the transference of ownership is examined as
different phases that form a process, and especially when the different elements of the
owner’s legal position are examined. This significance is made more visible as it has become
possible to differentiate the right to use the object oneself and, on the other hand, the power
to transfer ownership of it to someone else.222 The static aspect is then constituted of the
owner’s right to possess, i.e., his or her primary right. The context of this right is the freedom
to use the object. Freedom of use an object further includes two main factors, namely, how
it can be used and the certainty of the right to use. These two factors are, in other words, content
and protection.223 The most central element of the dynamic aspect is nevertheless the owner’s
competence, which entails the owner’s capability to affect the object’s transference from
one sphere of ownership to another. In other words, competence implies deciding about
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the primary right of the object.224 Additionally, the dynamic aspect includes a special form
of protection, which is called dynamic protection. Dynamic protection is carried out when
two rights collide. The collision refers to a situation where two rights collide and cannot
both be realized at the same time. One has to be extinguished.225 The clear divergence of
the static and dynamic aspects is likewise manifested in the mutual completeness of content
and its protection in the legal relationship. The protection that is to be given in the static
aspect is called static protection and it is essentially the protection that is given to the right-
holder in relations ultra partes. Dynamic protection is then only carried out where certain
severally and personally defined relationships are concerned. It is essentially carried out
only in certain personal relationships. In this sense, it concerns only a certain special personal
relationship and it concerns only a certain legal relationship, i.e., inter partes. Dynamic
protection is characteristically rather relative.226
This is where the Hohfeldian conceptual frame is exploited by Zitting. The Hohfeldian
frame is used for constructing the solid basis for differentiating varied personal relations
in the transference of ownership. The Hohfeldian correlative pairs construct, on the one
hand, the static aspect of the transference of ownership and, on the other, its dynamic aspect.
Further, the conceptual duplexes are more accurately defined in such a way that the legal
concepts of the static aspect are privilege - no-right and right - duty. This classification is
the additional basis for the definition of the owner’s protected freedom to use. This protected
freedom to use is constituted of the owner’s privilege to use the object and, on the other
hand, his or her statically protected right to claim protection if this use has been disturbed.227
The conceptual correlative pairs of the dynamic aspect are then the remaining ones, i.e.,
power - liability and immunity - disability.228 The analysis gives us the necessary instruments
for examining the variation of personal relations while transferring ownership. The most
crucial element is the correlating pair of power and liability, which is the essence of the
owner’s competence. Bearing in mind the fundamental description of competence as the
capability to transfer an object from one sphere of rights to another, the significance of
competence in the transference of ownership is most understandable. Competence is clearly
aimed at causing some kind of change in the relations involved in ownership. In other words,
when using his or her competence, a right-holder tends to decide about the primary right
that is the essence of ownership overall as a right.229
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The dynamic aspect is at least as interesting. The correlating pair immunity - disability
is defined as dynamic protection when examining the transference of ownership.230 The
protection is crucially carried out when two rights collide and both may not be carried out
simultaneously. Both right-holders derive their right from a correspondingly valid cause
but those rights may not be carried out simultaneously. One has to be extinguished. The
collision occurs when the assignment is invalid in such a way that the assignee may claim
his right in certain, but not all legal relations.231 In these cases dynamic protection implies
the stability, or the validity, of the legal relationship. This validity is the basis of the
assessment of the collision and the crucial focus is placed on those relationships which are
to be sustained, i.e., which are to be protected.232 When one gets a dynamically protected
position, one is in fact released from liability. This liability is further caused by the
incompleteness in the legal relationship between the assignor and the assignee. Accordingly,
getting a dynamically protected legal position implies that the assignee becomes immune
against the creditors of the assignor or other parties directing claims at him or her.233
2.3.2 Analyzing the legal position of a creditor
In Finnish jurisprudence the most well-known application of the Hohfeldian conceptual
frame is the analysis of transference of ownership, where the core of analysis lies in the
division of transference into different phases. Accordingly, property law has become the
key branch in which to employ the Hohfeldian conceptual frame. It is not impossible to
apply the frame in other branches of law, however. One illustrative example of the use of
the Hohfeldian conceptual frame in the law of obligations is the analysis carried out by Matti
Ilmari Niemi, whose analysis focuses on obligations, more specifically the analysis of the
debt relationship.234 The examination focused on a claim to a right. The very beginning of
the examination defines the content of a claim to a right. This further requires that the
mutual coexistence of the Hohfeldian conceptual duplexes ought to be characterized. These
conceptual pairs reflect the central essences of the subjective right, with those elements
described from two different personal views. Debt is defined as a relationship between two
individuals in which one acts as an assign and the other as an external party. The position
of the assign is primary and it constitutes the kernel of the overall examination. On the other
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hand, a claim necessarily requires a debtor, and from the debtor’s viewpoint the relationship
is debt. Through this short analysis we have constructed the basic relationship of a claim
to a right. This is based on the relationship between creditor and debtor, and it further
constructs the correlating relationship of claim and debt.235
The examination of a claim to a right may be started by looking at the static aspect.
The examination is then based on the main concepts of the static aspect, privilege and right,
which here may be defined as a claim.236 The claim corresponds to the debt and accordingly
the creditor’s claim to payment. On the other hand, parallel to the payment itself is the
creditor’s freedom from pecuniary obligation, given that the debt is only unilateral. The
creditor’s legal position is then constituted, on the one hand, of the claim to a right and,
on the other hand, of his or her freedom from pecuniary obligation. Further, the creditor’s
claim to the payment correlates with the debtor’s obligation of payment. On the other hand,
the creditor’s freedom from pecuniary obligation correlates with the external party’s no-right
to payment.237 Furthermore, in the static aspect the creditor’s legal position includes the
right and privilege to possess a promissory note. If the promissory note is a negotiable
promissory note, the creditor’s position is essentially constituted of possession of the note.
This constitutes the privileged position for the holder of the right. This further implies that
the holder of the right may behave in a certain way and at the same time he or she has the
right to forbid external parties to behave similarly. The privilege is actually an excludable
right. It correlates with the debtor’s duty to refrain from possession of the promissory note
and accordingly his or her no-right to possession. The debtor has no right to a claim of
payment; he or she has freedom from this.238
The examination of the dynamic aspect is first focused on the origins of debt. Debt
is often originally based on the assignment of the debtor; i.e., debtors use their power to
oblige themselves. At the same time, the position of the creditor has been converted into
one of power, with the debtor entering a position of liability. The debtor’s pecuniary
obligation includes the power to gain possession of the promissory note. Payment, on the
one hand, and assignment of the promissory note, on the other, then extinguish the right
of the creditor. In addition to the claim of a right, the creditor has the competence to assign
the debt, i.e., transfer it to another person. Competence describes the creditor’s power. This
power correlates with an assignee’s liability. The new creditor may then, as assignee and
as possessor of debt, receive immunity, with the debtor correspondingly being bound to
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disability. This is due to the legal protection of the assignee. This is the case, for example,
when a creditor acts in good faith when receiving the possession of a bearer bond.239
The most fundamental, even paradigmatic, difference between Zitting’s transference
of ownership and Niemi’s analysis of the legal position of creditor is found in the
construction of the static aspect. This difference actually gives even some further tools for
examining the conceptual frame and the possibilities to apply the Hohfeldian conceptual
frame to intellectual property rights and the phenomena of the digital economy. The
difference is clear. In Niemi’s analysis, unlike Zitting’s, the static correlating duplex right -
duty does not imply legal protection.240 Zitting constructs legal protection as a central and
concrete part of the conceptual frame and its applicability.241 The strong significance of
legal protection as a part of the analytical examination actually causes some additional
substantive problems in illustrating the mutual coexistence of certain elements in the complex
of legal relationships. Legal protection as a central part of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame
further implies that the concepts of right and duty would no longer have any accurate
substantive significance or context. These concepts would thereby only illustrate the legal
protection of privilege, not anything else.
A good alternative to this interpretation is to consider both correlating duplexes of
the static aspect as substantial and contextual. Thereby, a claim-right as a right to forbid
third parties to interfere with the right of a right-holder may actually be defined
independently from the overall design of the conceptual frame. Thus, the Hohfeldian
concepts may be defined as illustrating only allowed and not-allowed acts but not legal
protection at all. In other words, the concepts of the correlating duplex of right and duty
are actually interpreted as two different sides of the same legal relationship and further they are
treated as correlating concepts, i.e as a duplex of right and duty.242
The chief similarities in Niemi’s and Zitting’s analyses are found in the dynamic aspect
and are manifested in two different ways. First, the dynamics in legal relationships are
essentially based on the power to change legal relationships that are implemented between
different personal relations. This is carried out by transferring an object or a debt to another
person and, accordingly, leads to a change of subject. For Zitting the competence clearly
corresponds to the capability to transfer the object from one sphere of ownership to
another.243 Niemi’s view fundamentally corresponds to this, with the power position of the
creditor in his analysis essentially constituted of the creditor’s power to assign the debt, in
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addition, of course, to his or her power to demand payment.244 Thereby, the most essential
significance of the dynamic aspect seems to be to create changes in personal relations.
Changes in personal relations actually turns the focus on another similarity in the
two analyses: dynamic protection, or the legal protection in the dynamic aspect. For Zitting,
dynamic protection represents a special form of legal protection, one clearly diverging from
the static protection.245 This is due mainly to its very essence as a certain guideline for solving
collisions of rights. Further, it relates essentially to substantive law and dynamic protection
and is not in fact procedural legal protection. This is actually the state of affairs when
speaking about static protection.246 The similarity of these two applications of the Hohfeldian
conceptual frame is best revealed when examining dynamic protection. The fundamental
derivations of dynamic protection are substantially and contextually similar. Dynamic
protection is defined as a sustaining subjective right of the present right-holder and immunity
is a crucial part of that subjective right and its context.247
2.3.3 The evolutionary contract
The analysis of a debt relationship may clearly be considered as an analysis of a general
contractual relationship involving a promissory note although there does not exist a clear
line of development such as that seen in the two previous paradigmatic examples. The
Hohfeldian conceptual frame may nevertheless be applied also to contracts. In these cases
the applicability of the Hohfeldian frame is clearly found in the usefulness of the tools that
it offers for examining the legal relationships. This is simply carried out by reshaping the
context of the contract and then reducing its main elements to basic factors. In this
examination a contract is considered as both a regulative tool and a cooperative tool.248 The
most reasonable argument requires that different contractual elements be clearly
distinguished and their mutual relationships be further examined. The focus is placed on
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the significance of a contractual norm as a regulative tool for the parties’ cooperation. On
the other hand, this normative regulation may be carried out by the legislator, with the norm-
setting actually carried out at a slightly more general level.249 As a cooperative instrument,
a contract is based on several discretionary norms. Contextually these norms set a further
pattern for certain desired behavior and they further define the content of this behavior.
These foundational elements describe the extent of the validity of a contract, which is defined
in terms of three different aspects: temporally, contextually, and personally.250
As such a contract is a constellation of different relationships and further it may be
considered as a continuous process.251 Contractual relationships may be considered as
networks of legal relationships, where the inter partes relation may be complemented by
relations to totally external parties.252 On the other hand, contractual rights and duties have
traditionally been inter partes.253 The Hohfeldian conceptual frame actually would face some
counterarguments here. This is the case when some of the conceptual duplexes are
considered as definitions of legal protection, i.e., as instruments for solving legal collisions.
In the law of contracts the ultra partes relations are not particularly significant.254 The
solution to this lies in the Niemi’s analysis of the legal position of the creditor, which
suggests that the Hohfeldian conceptual duplexes may be interpreted only substantively
and contextually and that none of the correlating pairs describes legal protection.255
From this basis the evolution in contractual concepts clearly diverges in two
development lines. These lines are, however, rather close to each other. The one is the view
of Juha Pöyhönen/Karhu and its most essential context is to examine the contract as a
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262 Here the examination and distinctions may be carried out by examining the subjective position
in different legal relations, in particular interest, proceedings, and disposition. See Ross 1974,
183.
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continuous process.256 Considering the contract as a process is a clear consequence of
dividing the undifferentiated concept of contract into its constructive parts. This division
has actually made it possible to consider a contract as a large assortment of behavioral rules
set for the contracting, and cooperating, parties.257 Likewise, a contract can now be seen
as a chain or network of several successive phases. The character of a contract is changed
from a single entity towards continuous change and maturation.258 Further, considering the
contract as a process changes the overall view of contracts. This is especially the case in
assessing contractual liability, which may now be carried out also phase by phase. In other
words, liability no longer begins at a certain time and is extinguished at some other time
but may exist continuously. Full contractual liability does not begin at a certain time nor
does it remain similar all the time.259
The Hohfeldian conceptual frame and the process view of contracts are most readily
influenced by each other through the three aspects of the contractual process. These aspects
construct the maturation of contract, with the contextual dimension defining the liabilities.
The temporal dimension, for its part, defines the period of validity, and the personal
dimension defines the extending of contractual liability to external parties in addition to
the contracting parties.260 These aspects then constitute the mutual instrument for arranging
the cooperation of the contracting parties. This instrument overall may be then called a
behavioral norm.261 By these means the Hohfeldian conceptual frame has been suggested
as an instrument for characterizing  the developing view of a contract as cooperation among
parties. The most characteristic demand for changing perspectives is a reaction to the
traditional way to see legal concepts as undivided entities. The most crucial problem was
the failure to see behind the broad, undivided general conceptions. The concept of a contract
is traditionally considered as a subjective right and as such it is a legal fiction. However,
by using the Hohfeldian analysis it is possible to abandon the concept of a contract as an
undivided entity. The relationship can be seen as a personal relationship, instead.262
Viewing a contract as a personal relationship makes it possible to define it further
by describing it in terms of certain legal positions. These positions are complex and at the
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same time contextually variable. Here the legal positions actually describe a complexity of
legal facts having a certain legal consequence. One suggestion for extrapolation is offered
by Simo Zitting as a continuation of his studies of transference of ownership. This view is
parallel to the view of a contract as a continuous process and is most essentially based on
a contract as a regulative instrument and as such a crucial instrument for cooperation. A
contract is studied by concentrating on the process of contextual constitution, which includes
defining the behavioral pattern through rules of behavior. This pattern is then completed
by defining the validity of contract in trams of temporal, contextual, and personal
dimensions.263 Personal relations in cooperation on rule-setting describe who sets the norm,
the one to whom the norm is addressed to, and the subject of interest. The contracting party
acts in all these roles by turns.264 For example in licensing, the licensor acts as the one who
sets the behavioral rule when he or she has placed him- or herself under a duty to be bound
by a licensing agreement. The licensee then acts as the subject of interest. When the obliged
position of a licensor is based on the commitment made by him or her, he or she acts
accordingly as the one who sets the norm. Where payment of the contract price is concerned,
the licensee acts as the one to whom the norm is addressed. Actually, at the same time the
licensee also acts as the one who sets the norm, with the licensor acting as the subject of
interest.265
As can be seen from this example, defining the behavioral pattern is rather significant
in contractual relationships, given that they are considered as cooperation between two
parties. Defining the particular behavioral pattern actually justifies the rule of behavior by
creating some reasonable content for it. On the other hand, setting and validating the rule
of behavior also requires that the behavioral pattern can be further defined. Definition
actually converts mere exemplary behavior into a demand that the other party behave in
the contractual relationship in a certain way.266 This analytic view makes it possible to rethink
contractual relationships; it makes it possible to see both regulation and cooperation as
collaborating elements of contract. As such they are used as complementary elements, which
makes it possible to consider the common behavioral norm as a part of cooperation.
The most significant element here is nevertheless the personal relationship, examined
as the relation between the one whom the norm is aimed at and the subject of interest. The
one who is bound by the rule of behavior has to behave in a certain way, which is described
by the rule. He or she is then under a duty, with the subject of interest having certain
expectations based on the rule of behavior. The subject of interest does not, however, have
any substantive right, like a right to a claim, but does have the power to liberate the one
who is under the rule of behavior. The power actually creates competence to transform
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268 Connecting both of the contractual elements, i.e., regulation and cooperation, would be one
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normative and conceptual viewpoints are carried out mutually. Both regulation and
cooperation would constitute the basic elements of the contractual relationship. At the same
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269 See Niemi 1996, 35.
270 The rationale for this movement is that a larger group of programmers not concerned with
proprietary ownership or financial gain will produce a more useful and bug-free product
for everyone to use. In other words, they will make source code available and then set rules
governing its use. See Rosenberg D. 2000, 97.
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the status of behavior. In other words, behavior that ran contrary to the behavioral norm
is now completely permitted.267 The most crucial Hohfeldian conceptual duplex here is the
one of power and liability. This actually places some further questions for the Hohfeldian
conceptual frame in the law of contracts. Namely, establishing competence as the most
crucial element of the contractual relationship balances the overall contractual concept in
a new way. Competence as a principal element of a contract sets the focus on the regulative
aspect of the contract, with legislation only a supporting element.268
2.4 A reinterpretation of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame
2.4.1 The interrelation of right and privilege
Rights governance is based on an interrelated communication of interests. The foundations
of the rights governance architecture are constituted essentially on the Hohfeldian conceptual
frame. The Hohfeldian frame, however, needs some reinterpretation because of the changed
environmental prerequisites; the cooperating interests ought to be reconciled and rebalanced.
Nevertheless, in all cases, the Hohfeldian conceptual frame draws a clear distinction between
its two basic concepts, the concept of right and the concept of privilege. These concurrent concepts
constitute the kernel of the overall Hohfeldian conceptual frame. As such they likewise
constitute the most fundamental starting point for the further applications of the Hohfeldian
conceptual frame in this study.
On the other hand, the distinction between these two concepts is even slightly
emphasized through the further examination. These two concepts are namely by no means
included in each other; i.e., the combination of these two concepts does not imply any
exclusivity as such. Indeed, it is rather normal that someone has a right to forbid others
but does not have the privilege to do the thing in question.269 A good example of this is
found in the area of computer code and more precisely in open source. Open source software
is essentially based on free access to source code.270 However, at the same time as everyone
is free to read, redistribute and modify the source code, it has to be maintained free of
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charge.271 Thereby, anyone is allowed to forbid others to violate the rights of the open source
community (that includes everyone of us, actually) but no one, not even the one who is
forbidding, is allowed to violate those rights.272 The right-holder’s right nevertheless also
includes some exclusivity. The exclusive right of a right-holder is clearly different from the
above-mentioned the right to forbid without any necessary privilege.
Exclusivity has some clear background as the combination of the two concepts of right
and privilege. First of all, exclusivity requires that  the right-holder have both a right and
a privilege.273 In other words, in order to be able to exclude someone it is not enough that
the right-holder has only a right to forbid the external parties from interfering in his or her
use. In practice the scope of an exclusive right is generally explicitly defined. In Finland
a computer program is protected through copyright (Copyright Act 1§ and special provisions
Copyright Act 25j§ and 25k§). Directly pursuant to this right the right-holders have the
privilege to use the computer program that they have created and, further, they have right
to forbid others to use it. This defines exclusivity as such and it constitutes the traditional
scope of all exclusive rights.
On the other hand, there also exists a distinction between right and privilege.
Distinctiveness is evidently expressed in the two opposing elements of liberty, with liberty here
considered a fundamental concept. Liberty describes the basis of the overall combination
of right and privilege and it is divided into two elements. These two foundational elements
may actually be defined as the positive aspect and negative aspect of liberty. The negative
aspect is best described when the concept of privilege is examined alone. This implies
precisely the no-right of third parties; for example, a composer has the privilege to distribute
his or her composition, whereas the third parties have no-right to do this. Through his or
her privilege the right-holder has this right alone. By definition the negative aspect of liberty
sets out precisely that no one is able to forbid the one who has privilege to do something.274
For example, every author is free to modify his or her own text. The negative aspect of liberty
actually describes the extent and scope of behavior of the privileged person (here, the author).
On the other hand, a right in its narrow Hohfeldian sense is clearly different from this. A
Hohfeldian right implies exactly the right-holder’s right to forbid, which is one of the positive
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aspects of liberty.275 To go on with the previous example, every author may forbid others to
modify his or her writing under the original author’s name.
The static aspect of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame connects these two aspects
of liberty. This is precisely the context of traditional exclusive right, like in the previous
example. Likewise, the combination of right and privilege actually completes the static aspect
of the overall Hohfeldian conceptual frame. In order to draw the complete picture we need,
once again, to define the mutual communicative relationship of right and privilege.276 This
implies that in order to be able to connect these two different aspects there is a crucial need
to justify them as parallel concepts. It is nevertheless the static aspect that is to be utilized as
the starting point for interpreting the overall Hohfeldian conceptual frame. This is basically
due to the contextual character of the static aspect, which is rather foundational because
of its primary nature. This primary nature indeed implies that all the powers and
competencies that follow from the dynamic aspect are mainly derived from the level of
primary rights, i.e., from the static aspect of rights. The dynamic elements round out the
overall examination in that those powers and competencies are really secondary to rights
and privileges.277
The static aspect is first defined contextually. At the contextual level it includes the right-
holder’s entitlement (which actually is privilege) to behave in a certain way. At the same
time he or she accordingly has a broad right to forbid external parties to behave in the same
way.278 A right, in its broad definition, describes not only freedom from injunctions, but
also the right to require or forbid.279 Thereby, the position of a right-holder usually describes
an exclusive right to liberty. No one has the right to forbid and the right-holder is allowed to
act as he or she wishes.280 Further, privilege may be defined as primary in its relation to right.
Privilege is not, however, fundamentally derived from the fact that external parties have
been forbidden to utilize a right. Instead, privilege derives from the fact that the right-holder
has not been forbidden. This description of liberty has sometimes been considered even a natural
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aspect. In other words, external parties are ordered not to interfere in the behavior of right-
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283 Legal protection is carried out when legal is posed against illegal. Further, this illustrates
the inner character of static protection and it is explicitly granted to a right-holder when
his or her interests and those of the external parties are opposite. Overlapping interests cannot
be carried out at the same time. See Zitting 1951, 47 - 51.
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state, which would then mean that the right-holder is not subject to any particular behavioral
rules.281 However, to be able to describe both of concepts, right and privilege, there exists
a crucial need to add a regulative element to this pattern. It is a fact that rights have been
created even fundamentally through legislation. This applies to intellectual property rights
as well. Therefore, the author’s privilege to modify his or her creation and his or her right
to exclude the external parties is created by law. However, there still exists some degree
of liberty, even if it is regulated. The natural state in this sense does not imply that there
is no regulation at all.282
In the further definition of the static aspect exclusivity has one great advantage. This
advantage is the nature of exclusivity as related to its overall framework. Exclusivity is
usually defined against all the third parties (ultra partes). It concerns everyone. This has a
clear implication for the further use of exclusivity as a definitive element of the static aspect
in that exclusivity operates as one of the components of the scope of protection. Protection
actually includes two different, but still overlapping scopes. On the one hand, there is the
scope that stays within one's right, which includes the overall definition of contextual exclusivity.
This corresponds to the scope that is to be included in the right-holder’s right. On the other
hand, there is the scope of exclusion. This includes the parties that ought to be excluded from
the right. This definitive distinction between included and excluded actually implies that
protection is defined as static, with the scope of statics implying that the protection is clearly
based on drawing a strong boundary between included and excluded, i.e., right versus wrong.283
This in fact explains the general character of static protection.
The rights governance architecture described here is constituted partly on the static
aspect of the Hohfeldian schema. Thereby, in the further design of this architecture it is
significant to define the statics in this way. Static protection in this sense makes it possible
to construct the static aspect of this overall architectural design. Most fundamentally this
means designing the sphere of privileged and protected utilization of rights. On the other
hand, without any sphere of protection and exclusion, the right to use would remain only
a possibility, not a proper right. Therefore, both of the correlating pairs of the Hohfeldian
static aspect are equally essential when constituting the rights governance architecture. The
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conceptual pair of privilege - no-right and the pair right - duty, are both alone too static to
illustrate even the statics of any exclusive right sufficiently enough.
2.4.2 The combination of privilege and power as a legal position
The Hohfeldian conceptual frame is constituted on two main presuppositions. One of these
is that the static aspect of the conceptual frame further constructs the contextual part of
the legal relationship. Legal relationships are fundamentally based on privilege and right
as the two main elements of the static aspect. In other words, the whole structure of the
conceptual frame is fundamentally based on the static aspect. The nature of the Hohfeldian
conceptual frame is fundamentally derived from the static aspect. Further, the second of
the main presuppositions is that, as there is the static aspect describing the content of a right
position, there is always also the dynamic aspect, which is based on transference of  legal
right; i.e., it characterizes some change in legal relationships.284
These presuppositions set some further requirements for the overall constitution
of a legal relationship. The traditional constitution of that relationship is mainly based on
the sharp difference between statics and dynamics. This is, however, questioned by the
emerging digital economy, for statics alone are by no means sufficient for illustrating the
versatility and diversity of the dynamic digital economy. Rather, the overall construction is now
more likely based on continuous functionality. This is well described, for example, by
examining hypertext. Hypertext is essentially interactive, and its context is accordingly variable.
Some parts of the text may even be created by the reader, rather than the author, if the
concepts of reader and author are understood in a traditional way. Hypertext is functional
and as such does not necessarily fit into the traditional model of the static context.285 Another
illustrative example is hypertext links.286
Functionality is defined as one of the core elements of the digital economy. It is not,
however, constituted only of mere single functions; rather, these single functions are further
complemented by the overall operational frame. This is the reason why the perspective
cannot remain only static but crucially needs to be complemented through dynamics.
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Dynamics are also needed for elaborating the operational frame.287 The operational frame
is further constituted of operations and operational rules that make it possible to add
functionality directly to the functional core. In terms of Hohfeldian concepts, this is carried
out by applying power to the static context, i.e., by empowering the context as such. For example,
empowerment is carried out by granting a right-holder the power to restrict someone’s access
to written text. Empowerment is mainly carried out by keeping privilege as the main element
of the static aspect but introducing power as the definitive element instead of a right. This
combination of privilege and power is then used as a reflective surface that operates beyond
the overall functionality. These two overlapping phases are applied together to form a
baseline of the complete architecture of the digital economy. Functions and foundations
are brought into mutual interaction in order to become dynamic functionality.
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Dynamic functionality, as it is described above, challenges the traditional intellectual property
rights. Intellectual property rights are traditionally based on the sharp difference between
the static and dynamic aspects, which derives from their definition as property rights. These
rights are usually governed through exclusivity. The author, or the inventor, gets a right
to exploit his or her literary creation or invention although this right is granted with the
external parties given some slight exceptions to exploit the creation to a certain degree. The
statics of intellectual property rights are in this way based on their connection to exclusivity.
This, however, easily leads to rights being frozen, especially in the digital framework. Frozenness
is rather opposite to functionality and it eventually undermines the real functionality of rights.
Frozenness is found, for example, in the protection of databases. A database often contains
only certain strictly defined content that determines the scope of its protection. This,
however, easily freezes the whole, the very dynamic collection of information, in a certain concise,
static form. This is precisely defined in the requirement that the substantial part be the core
of the object of protection. This promotes functionality as related to the actors involved
and further research and development.288
The strong connection to exclusivity has some further implications, e.g., that creating
a strong exclusive position means that the content of exclusivity needs to be defined strictly.
Thus, strength in content likewise requires strictness in definitions. Database protection,
described above, again offers an illustrative example. On the other hand, to be able to define
the content strictly is actually the main prerequisite for exclusivity. On these grounds, content
is accordingly defined as privilege to use. The right-holder has an exclusive right to access and
use the fruit of his or her creativity by forbidding the access of third parties. In Hohfeldian
terms this privilege may then be defined through the correlating duplex of privilege - no-
right. Privilege includes the right-holder’s privilege to exploit the right and it also implies
that third parties have correlatively no-right to this. In this sense dynamics slightly modify
the overall scope of exclusivity as the core of the right-holder’s legal position. In the scope
of dynamics, exclusivity remains only as the definitive element of the static aspect; i.e.,
exclusivity only strengthens and defines a privilege as the right-holder’s freedom to behave
in the way he or she desires. This is not a very dynamic but an essentially static excluded
right to use. Dynamics require that there be more functionality in the pattern. This is then
the starting point for defining the content of a legal relationship as a combination of privilege
and power.
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Dynamics are the very core of digital economy. Traditionally, dynamics in property
rights have been defined as the right-holder’s power to transfer rights and further, as this
dynamic position is protected, also imply the right-holder’s ability to get legal protection
in those transactions. This certainly still applies in the operations of the digital economy
and the transactions are still naturally considered the kernel of the economy. Accordingly,
for example, the ability to license and transfer one’s patent is a valuable right for any right-
holder. However, in the development of the digital economy there has occurred some parallel
gradual development. However, this development has not taken place in the area of
exchange, although it has had a great influence on the dynamics of property rights. Namely,
the very definition and the content of dynamics have been changing gradually while the
traditional focus of the balance and especially the focus of the examination of this balance
have been on exchangeability and the smoothness of exchange. This is exactly where
functional dynamics diverge from traditional dynamics, with this changing scope then
affecting the balance of the overall legal relationship.
The change is carried out contextually. The traditional balance of dynamics centers
on smooth exchange, whereas the new scope of dynamics concentrates more on governing
the overall communicational process of those relationships. Dynamics, when illustrated from the
viewpoint of the digital economy, are then based sooner on functionality and on the
governance of this functionality. The emphasis overall is no longer on exchange but rather
on cooperation and communication. Accordingly, the power to affect legal relationships,
or change them, is not necessarily any longer defined only as the power to transfer rights,
but as the power to participate in the relevant operation. An explanatory example of this changing
balance is found in the difference between utilizing trademarks and domain names. Both
are defined as names and both are further used for communicative purposes. A trademark
makes it possible to communicate with consumers in the market, while a domain name
makes it possible to access the network. There exists, however, one great difference. The
express purpose of a trademark is to increase trade and it is in this way closely connected
to exchange. A domain name, on the other hand, has to do with access to the relevant
communicational environment, where the dynamics are clearly different. They are no longer
based on exchange only.
Another illustrative example comes from the field of contracts - the licensing of
intellectual property. Licensing gives the licensee a right to exploit the information that is
licensed and transferred. Licensing, however, differs slightly from transferring  tangible right,
because when licensing the right is not totally transferred from one sphere to another in
the traditional sense. Rather, rights are made available to two parties at the same time. This is
fundamentally due to the nature of information as an incompletely excludable resource.
In other words, information remains in the use of the one party even when it is transferred
to the use of the other. It may even seem that traditional property law remains totally helpless
in cases like this. This is closely analogous to the relationship of humankind and nature,
with nature viewed as property. Nature or the pure environment is used by people, but at
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the same time it is also used commonly as pure nature and environment.289 In this sense
nature, as well as information, are characteristically included in the sphere of commons.
It is necessary to examine these elements in the combination of power and privilege
as interrelated to each other. None of the Hohfeldian correlating pairs alone, not even power-
liability, is sufficient for constructing the dynamic and communicative aspects of a legal
position in their entirety the digital economy. The correlating duplex of privilege and no-right
is also too static for the purpose but is nevertheless useful for describing the core of the
static aspect. In other words, both of these duplexes are needed. The whole picture requires
the complementation of static content with dynamic functionality. Statics and dynamics must be
combined and connected, which requires the harmonious use of static privilege and dynamic
power. This causes some variations inside the Hohfeldian conceptual frame although these
are only interpretative ones. On the other hand, the examination of those variations is most
reasonably carried out by changing only the balance of reading. In this examination the most
significant focus is obviously set on the overall combination of privilege and power and
their mutual interaction.
The combination of privilege and power shapes the scope of empowered privilege or,
on the other hand, the scope of privileged power. These concepts overlap, but also in some
respect diverge. The overlapping and diverging character of those concepts is best examined
as an overall and complete combination. This is precisely what is to be done when privilege
is complemented by power and accordingly power is complemented by privilege. This is
how the combination is conceived of at the theoretical level. This combination at the same
time affects the content of the overall examination of legal positions. The change is
nevertheless pertains more to the balance, with the empowered privilege extending the mere
right to use towards a more dynamic view. This implies that the privilege is carried out
together with power in such way that the two work together. Further, in the construction
of empowered privilege the concept of privilege is complemented by power. This has some
consequences for the legal position of a right-holder. First of all, the right to use is slightly
altered by the structural reformulation of empowered privilege. Traditionally this legal status
is characteristically rather static. In other words, the right to use is linked exclusively to statics
when it really is only defined as a right to use, or rather as a privilege to use, in Hohfeldian
terms. The  creator of a computer program has the right to use his or her creation in the
same way as the author of a book has the right to use his or her writing. The statics here
imply the traditional statics of rights, meaning that rights are not transferred or changed
but are kept in the possession of the owner.
Here is in fact the main focus of the variation of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame.
The change lies in the area of privilege to use, where the empowered privilege is manifested.
Empowered privilege alters the right to use in the direction of the real functionality of rights.
In other words, the power to affect legal relationships is brought directly into, or at least
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close to, the right to use. More concretely, this closely resembles the alteration of the form
of an analog creation, e.g., text, music, or photographs. The digitization of such content
changes the status so greatly that some new possibilities are necessarily introduced, e.g.,
easy copying, constant quality, or modified authorship. These possibilities may easily entail
some additional power. A good example is music files, where the easy copying of music
makes it increasingly possible even to bypass the possession of the right-holder, as seen
in a case heard by the Supreme Court of Sweden NJA:2000:48 (B413-00): the court decided
that linking mp3-files was not creation of new copies of those files.290
NJA:2000:48. A is charged with an offence for breaking the Copyright Act by copying
music files from CD discs and distributing them in mp3 format. Distribution has been
carried out through A’s Internet page by providing links to the music files on the page.
Linking was not considered creation of new copies.
This is exactly where the scope of empowered privilege is found. The focus of the scope
of empowered privilege is set squarely on privilege. In other words, it is privilege that is
the starting point of the examination of the scope of empowered privilege. The view is
somewhat static in essence and dynamics are brought in by connecting privilege and power
together. It is then privilege that constitute the most fundamental element.
The view illustrated here is not, however, complete. Namely, the combination of
privilege and power is characteristically bidirectional. This bidirectional nature is actually again
a direct implication of the digital economy being an essentially dynamic operational frame.
The dynamics  require the cooperation of both privilege and power, with the combination
of the two aspects then requiring that there be a certain degree of two-sided influence. The
structure should thus be interpreted also from the viewpoint of privileging power. Indeed,
in this way, the content and the interpretation of a legal position is defined also as the
privileging of power. This actually means that the variation of content is carried out from two
opposite but still overlapping directions; i.e., it is genuinely bidirectional. Structurally,
privileging power corresponds exactly to giving power to privilege. The only difference is
the direction of interpretation. When power is privileged, statics are complemented by the
dynamic aspect, and when the privilege is empowered, the dynamic aspect is complemented
by statics. The interpretative model itself is the same in both cases.
The most central element where the privileging of power has an effect is the balance
between statics and dynamics in legal relationships. Indeed, privileging power moves the dynamics
towards the right to use. In other words, the right to use is dynamized. At the same time
dynamics are complemented through usability. This then impacts privilege to power and
in this way the overall combination of power and privilege or privilege and power is
completed. This completion has some further consequences. The most essential one is the
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ability to create excludable positions in dynamics. Depending on how dynamics are described this
enables exclusivity of exchange, or at least exclusivity of dynamics. The empowered position
is greatly strengthened by privileging it. This kind of privileged power is rather strong and
its strength is due exactly to the strength of the privileged power. The privilege first creates
an exclusive position, which essentially includes a right to exclude the external parties in
favor of the right-holder. For example, authors have an exclusive right to publish their texts.
This privileged position is then strengthened by adding power to it. Authors may become
able to remove access to their writings, making the exclusive position extremely strong and
powerful. This is the reason why this kind of privileged power rather easily leads to
monopoly in exchange. A dominating market position and its further implications constitute
a good example of this. A dominating market position is actually only a powerful position
in the market. Privilege is not included until the first in the market gets a dominating
position. In other words, the one who first notifies and accordingly exploits the resource
actually gets a powerful market position. This constitutes a relative market domination. This
position may then be privileged by protecting the dominating market position, for example,
though a trademark or domain name, which then privilege the power.
The combination of privilege and power may also be examined through the
Hohfeldian conceptual frame. This is carried out by first examining the interpretation of
the overall frame. The interpretation ought to be in accordance with the new interpretative
design, whose core, however, is still the combination of privilege and power. The correlative
duplexes themselves remain totally untouched and the only thing that changes is the balance
between the static and the dynamic aspect. The content is then interpreted by asserting the
correlative duplex of privilege - no-right as the most definitive element of the static aspect
of the combination. This also corresponds completely to the interpretation of privileged
power. On the other hand, the other aspect of the combination is constructed rather in
accordance with the construction of privileged power. The only thing that differs from the
constitution of privileged power is the Hohfeldian conceptual duplex that is posed as the
core of the interpretative model. This is, instead of privilege - no-right, the correlating pair
of power and liability. This duplex constructs the dynamic side of the same combination
that the duplex of privilege - no-right constructs on the static side. These two correlating
duplexes then constitute the overall kernel of the revised  interpretation of the Hohfeldian
conceptual frame.
2.4.3  Legal protection in the Hohfeldian conceptual frame
Legal protection constitutes a crucial part of legal relationships; it comprises a number of
essential elements. Legal protection is likewise closely bound to the Hohfeldian conceptual
frame. Even the basic distinction of legal protection as static and dynamic protection
corresponds to the Hohfeldian frame, which is generally defined in terms of a static and
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a dynamic aspect. Accordingly, the traditional starting point is the division into two
fundamentally different classes of legal protection, absolute and relative protection. This
classification derives fundamentally from the clear divergence of two closely related branches
of law, namely the property law and the law of obligations.291
First of all, legal protection is constituted of de facto legal protection, which is the essential
core of that protection. Legal protection is defined also as general legal protection that is
given against all the third parties (ultra partes). General legal protection like this is often called
absolute legal protection.292 Absolute legal protection is always carried out against a non-definable
group of people although it is by definition carried out also in every single legal
relationship.293 Absolute legal protection is also often characterized as static protection
because of its nature as a protection against any illicit disturbance by external parties. This
corresponds to the protection that is given when a right is used. The most essential element
here is that the protection is given against all the external parties, not only certain persons.
The protection is also considered absolute protection. On the other hand, absolute protection
is further defined as static. It refers to protection that is carried out when wrong is against
right, i.e., wrong versus right. This, on the other hand, explains the general nature of static
protection. When wrong operates against right it is actually unimportant which are the
personal relations or what they are like.294 This brings the fundamental reasoning behind
those forms of protection onto the same level.
Absolute legal protection is further complemented through relative legal protection which
unlike absolute protection, is always given against a definite party (inter partes).295 Relative
legal protection is carried out in exchange and is bound to the relationships involved in
transactions. Relative legal protection thus differs from absolute in character, because it
is realized only in certain personal relations.296 Dynamic protection occurs when two equal,
and equally valid, rights collide. The collision is precisely a consequence of the validity of
both of those rights, given that both cannot be carried out concurrently. However, dynamic
protection is not the only form of protection in the dynamic aspect in the Hohfeldian
conceptual frame. The dynamic aspect also includes the elements from the static protection,
i.e., the protection that is carried out in the collision of wrong and right. Both forms of
protection are equally usable, but it is precisely the dynamic aspect where the collisions of
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two equal rights are to be found. Proper dynamic protection is directly connected to different
protectable personal relations. Namely, the collision is resolved on the basis of the mutual
personal legal relationships, which reflects precisely the relativity of dynamic protection.297
The reinterpretation of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame is accomplished by
implementing legal protection as a part of its entirety. The reinterpretation corresponds to
the traditional implementation of legal protection in the Hohfeldian frame. Legal protection
is implemented in the Hohfeldian conceptual frame directly as a part of the conceptual
duplexes. These correlating duplexes are then further interpreted in such a way that two
duplexes, one of the static aspect and one duplex of the dynamic aspect, are defined as
including legal protection instead of simply the content of a legal position. Therefore, legal
protection and the content of a legal position are clearly differentiated as early as the level
of conceptual definitions. On the other hand, the breakdown of legal protection into two
clearly different aspects implies the division of legal protection itself into either the static
protection or dynamic protection. In Hohfeldian terms, static protection is further manifested
through the correlating duplex of right - duty. Dynamic protection is then similarly described
through two correlating concepts, immunity and disability.298
The core of the static aspect is the right-holder’s legal position. The static aspect is
mainly based on privileged position, that is, in Hohfeldian terms the correlative duplex of
privilege - no-right. Conceptually, static protection is the protection of a static right to use.
On the other hand, content is defined by defining legal protection first, with legal protection
employed as an instrument of the contextual aspect. The content and its extent are in fact
defined by examining the difference of right versus wrong. This may likewise be used as
the kernel of the overall architectural design of rights governance. In other words, static protection
as such defines the limits of the governance architecture. Thereby, the static aspect has its origin
in both contextual rights governance and legal protection in its static sense. Static protection
is, in other words, absolute; i.e., static protection is protection against all the external parties.
Absoluteness of protection strengthens the statics of the rights governance and makes the
governance architecture even more closely connected to certain limits. Strict limits on the
governance architecture are crucial for being able to construct the content, even though
the content in the dynamic framework often remains/becomes rather blurred. The blurred
nature does not, however, make the right governance impossible as long as the limits of the
variation are defined. This is precisely why the limits at this level ought to be drawn through
statics.
Nevertheless, dynamics still constitute the essence of the digital economy and thus
likewise constitute the essence of the rights governance architecture. This aspect is also
examined through the Hohfeldian conceptual frame. The dynamic element in its traditional
sense is based on the power to cause some kind of change in legal relationships. Dynamic
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protection diverges slightly from static. In the traditional interpretation, dynamic protection
is called protection against creditors or other parties directing claims at the assignor and
is closely linked to the collision of rights.299 A good example of this is the trade of the same
object to two different persons. The right that remains permanent is said to receive dynamic
protection. In the area of intellectual property rights there is, however, one rather crucial
problem concerning the interpretation of the dynamic aspect and especially dynamic
protection. The dynamic aspect is more likely and more often interpreted from completely
procedural premises. On the one hand, this is due to the emphasis on exchange as the basis
of the dynamic aspect. On the other hand, the procedural focus is due to the nature of
dynamic protection as the rule of priority in collision of  concurrent rights. Dynamic protection is clearly
associated with the protection that is to be given to a third party in exchange when rights
are in collision.300
Further, both of these two factors are elements of the dynamic aspect of the
Hohfeldian conceptual frame and this  makes the overall interpretation of the dynamic aspect
of the frame likewise rather dynamic. On the other hand, this procedural  view of the
traditional interpretation of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame has been criticized. The
criticism has mainly been focused on the different nature of the legal protection and the
primary norms, i.e., permitted and non-permitted behavior. The norms are at two different
levels and as such they would not be parallel at all. Legal protection and legal remedies are,
according to this view, only secondary in relation to the actual subjective right. Further,
according to this criticism, the Hohfeldian correlative pairs would not illustrate legal
protection at all. The static correlative pairs, i.e., privilege - no-right and right - duty, would
 both be defined only materially and contextually.301
Another way to interpret the Hohfeldian conceptual frame is to consider both of
the correlating duplexes of the static aspect only as substantive and contextual. Thereby, a claim-
right as the right to forbid external parties to interfere with the right of the right-holder may
actually be defined equally independently from the overall design of the conceptual frame.
Accordingly, the Hohfeldian concepts may be defined as illustrating only allowed and not-
allowed acts, but not legal directly protection at all.302 These concepts of the correlating
duplex of right-duty can then be interpreted as two different sides of the same legal
relationship and further they are treated as correlating concepts, i.e., as a duplex of right
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and duty.303 This interpretation model actually suits better for intellectual property rights.
This means that, exactly like the static aspect, the dynamic one may be examined as only
material and contextual. In these cases dynamic protection may be defined as the immunity
of a right-holder and consequently as the disability of a third party. As such the protection
provided for in the dynamic aspect of the Hohfeldian analysis is interpreted as stability of
the subjective right. In this way immunity - disability as correlatives may be considered as
a part of the subjective right itself.304
The dynamic aspect is, analogously to the static one, divided essentially into content
and legal protection. The third argument for the uselessness of the procedural focus in the
dynamic aspect is found precisely in the nature of dynamic protection. Dynamic protection
is based precisely on protection against creditors or other parties directing claims at an
assignor, i.e., rules for solving collisions between two conflicting rights. In the Hohfeldian
analysis, legal protection is related directly to the correlating pairs and as such it becomes
a part of their mutual structure. Both static and dynamic aspects are further divided into
two elements, which are then defined to be the content and the protection of the aspect
concerned. This classification applies to both the static and dynamic aspects although it
is clearer when examining the static aspect. Because of the nature of the static aspect in
the Hohfeldian conceptual frame.
2.5 Summary
The main purpose of this section was to concretize the foundation of the traditional
Hohfeldian conceptual frame as it is applied in the illustration of legal relationships. The
traditional interpretation is based on a clear difference between the static and dynamic aspect
as two basic elements of the frame. The conceptual correlatives of privilege - no-right and
right - duty constitute the static aspect. Further, the right-holder’s competence is based on
power - liability with the utilization of this competence ultimately protected through
immunity - disability.
For the purposes of the digital economy and its fuzzy legal phenomena the Hohfeldian
conceptual frame has been slightly modified and reinterpreted, however. The reinterpretation
is realized by moving the balance of the conceptual frame slightly towards dynamics. This
is carried out in keeping with the development of the digital economy. The digital economy
is characteristically dynamic meaning that completely static interpretation of any property
right is no longer a sufficient description of its legal positions. The reinterpretation is realized
through sketching the content of the right-holder’s legal position in terms of both the static
and dynamic aspects of the Hohfeldian conceptual schema. The core of this legal position
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is founded on privilege - no-right as statics, and power - liability as dynamics. In this sense
the content of the legal position is based on statics and dynamics, both being definitive for
the content.
The interpretation is completed through defining the limits of dynamics. Conceptually
static protection is  the protection of a static right to use. The content and its extent are
in fact defined by examining the divergence of right versus wrong. This may actually be
used likewise as the kernel of the overall architectural design of rights governance. In other
words, static protection as such defines the limits of the governance architecture. The static
aspect has its origin in both the contextual rights governance and the legal protection in
its static sense. The strong limitation of the governance architecture is crucial for being able
to construct the content, even though the content in the dynamic framework often is
relatively blurred. The blurred nature does not, however, make rights governance impossible
as long as the limits of the variation are defined. This is precisely why the limits at this level
ought to be drawn through statics.
On the other hand, dynamics still constitute the essence of the digital economy and
thus likewise constitute the essence of the rights governance architecture. The dynamic
element in its traditional sense is based on the power to cause some kind of change in legal
relationships. In this respect dynamic protection differs slightly from static. Dynamic
protection may thus be defined as the immunity of a right-holder and consequently as the
disability of a third party. As such the protection provided for in the dynamic aspect of the
Hohfeldian analysis is interpreted as stability of the subjective right. In this way
immunity - disability as correlatives may be considered as a part of the subjective right itself.
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3 A RIGHTS GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE IN LIGHT OF THE
HOHFELDIAN CONCEPTUAL FRAME
3.1 Background
The fundamental basis of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame is twofold. It is, on the one
hand, fundamentally based on the relation between control and access. This further defines
the content of a legal position, whose contextual basis is founded on the privilege of a right-
holder and his or her power. On the other hand, a legal position is based on rights governance.
Rights governance is further based on defining personal relationships as legal relations. This
is carried out on the axis of included and excluded, and the axis of the interrelation of
different personal relations. This twofold construction then links two different classes of
powers included in private property. Private property always includes two kinds of powers,
private and public. The classification of property as a combination of powers is derived from
a certain view of property as sovereignty. Sovereignty is in fact the foundation of property
as a combination of powers.305
The private nature of power comes into focus when property relations are to be
presented as a relationship between a right-holder and a duty-bearer. Property rights are
considered single relationships and are likewise defined as an individual relation between two
parties. Public power is manifested when property rights are examined as a class of similar
rights held by an individual and used against an indefinite number of persons. Those rights
are exercised as a set of rights.306 The distinction between private and public power actually
connects the Hohfeldian conceptual frame and the rights governance architecture. This
is carried out by first examining the two areas of legal protection in the Hohfeldian
conceptual frame, namely, static protection and dynamic protection. These two different
areas of legal protection reveal some of the most essential elements of a legal position.
First, it is possible to classify personal relations by considering the difference between
private and public power. Private power is defined as the scope of inclusion, i.e., the included
context defines the sphere of private power to be exercised. Here, the scope of public power,
for its part, actually corresponds to the static protection, which is protection against all the
third parties. Public power also illustrates the owner’s legal position from the outside, when
someone is interfering with the owner’s right to use. Accordingly, public power is also
absolute in nature; it is carried out against all the third parties. Thus, in the Hohfeldian
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interpretation, public power actually describes the scope of included and excluded. This
illustrates the scope of control and access on the axis of included and excluded. This part of
the Hohfeldian interpretation constitutes the static aspect of examination. On the other
hand, private power well illustrates the legal position contextually. The content of the legal
position is described in relative terms when the legal relations are examined as personal
relationships, such as contractual relations or other legal rules that constitute interpersonal
relations. This is then the scope of relative protection, which is further carried out as
interpersonal legal relations. Further, it is rather essential to be able to describe the
interrelation of  different persons, as this constitutes the very scope of the rights governance
architecture. The rights governance architecture overall is thus constructed of the static
aspect, which is based on control and access, and of the dynamic aspect, which is founded
on cooperation through different personal relations.
The evolving overall design of the digital economy changes the prerequisites of the
legal architecture. This is exactly where the Hohfeldian conceptual frame is to be employed.
In the physical world the barriers to the rights governance architecture are mainly based
on the functions of the construction itself and in this scope the physical constraints constitute
additional boundaries for the rights governance architecture. This applies to the architecture
in its physical sense. For example, goods are governed through transferring the possession
of a thing. In the physical world the governance architecture is reasonable and easy to build
on physicality. Easiness is founded on the real boundaries of tangibles, which then further
restrict, or ease, their use and transference. Tangibility might also make the construction
of the governance architecture easier, as it is mainly based on the clear visible boundaries
of physical things.307 Therefore, the physicality of governed objects is one reason for deriving
the overall rights governance architecture precisely from physicality. Physicality has clear
advantages in the traditional legal framework. The traditional rights governance architecture
is mainly based on governing the rights that are derived from physical things. This is in
fact the foundational paradigm of property law. This is where the digital economy mainly
has an impact: all the natural restrictions of physical space have been pushed aside by the
digital economy. It is this collapse of pure physicality that has brought about the most
significant paradigmatic change.
This change is has occurred due to digitization together with the network effect and
it directly affects the core of the rights governance architecture. The most fundamental
change is seen at the level of physicality or intellectuality of governable objects. Rights to
be governed constitute at the same time the boundaries of “things”, i.e., the governed objects.
Objects in the digital economy are mere artificial constructions and the boundaries are
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consequently drawn by legislation.308 These altered conditions change the way of looking
at the main foundations of the rights governance architecture. This has been carried out
to the extent that there no longer exist any actual boundaries for the objects that are to
governed, or at least the existing boundaries are not very clear. Therefore, even the barriers
in the digital economy are radically different from the barriers of physical space: these are
functions of the design of the system itself, which then further affects the rights governance
architecture.
The framework of the digital economy has in fact no natural character but is as it
is built to be. This actually sets some further requirements for the rights governance
architecture in the digital economy, the primary one being closely linked to the central role
of computer code in the digital economy. Computer code  constitutes the kernel of the overall
operativeness in that it is the kernel of digital “products”. This gives a powerful position to the
one who  is able to decide on the construction of the rights governance architecture. This
sets some further requirements in the digital economy. The relative aspect of rights
governance, i.e., the dynamic aspect of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame, is focused on this
reinterpretation of the frame and these new requirements exactly.
The other requirement of the rights governance architecture is to be able to support
and refresh innovativeness. The rights governance architecture plays a central role in shaping
innovativeness, which is one of the main focuses of digital economy. Innovativeness is also
one of the central creators of the digital economy as it is greatly based on rapid innovations.
Those rapid innovations are, again, based on creating new improvements as fast as possible.
In this way, the digital economy actually binds both innovativeness and technological
development closely together. Rapid innovativeness requires correspondingly rapid
technological inventions. This is where inventiveness and innovativeness are connected
together. The close linkage of inventiveness and innovativeness has some further influences.
These influences are clearly seen in the further development of the cooperation and
communication of inventiveness and innovativeness. In fact, this communication is rather
essential for converting the mere static inventions into the creative dynamic innovations.
As a consequence new products generate new markets and new models of distribution,
mainly because of the altered elements of physicality.
3.2 Innovation as governance relations
Ideas in business are based on mutually communicative innovations, which constitute a crucial
force. This force is based on the difference between invention and innovation which requires
that there always exist a need to bring ideas to and utilize ideas in the market in order to
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modify them to become innovations. Unless ideas are brought into effective use, they remain
mere inventions. Business ideas are thus always innovations as they are employed strategically
in business. On the other hand, a business idea itself may be examined as an invention. For
the purpose of this examination, a business idea is divided into certain component elements.
A business idea is made up of three main elements, which are further divided into minor
internal elements. These main elements are name, idea and money. In the further examination
of business idea and its components, it will be necessary to keep the main examination lines
clear. Accordingly, it is rather crucial to note that the elements of a business idea are in
continuous interconnected communication (mutual communication).
The interconnection of internal communicativeness as the kernel of a business idea
means that none of three main elements alone is able to represent the idea. They are all
needed and even necessary elements for illustrating the complete picture of the
communication between different interests inside the business idea. Their mutual relationship
and interconnected effect on each other is based on constant communication, which is the
only way in which the structural elements may illustrate the whole process of the business
idea. A business idea is not a status that remains exactly the same all the time. Instead, it is
more like a developing process all of whose elements are present and evolve together. Secondly,
none of elements, nor the business idea as a combination of these, is complete. A business
idea is constituted of networking, which implies some serious demands for the cooperation
and communication of those elements. On these grounds, as the core of networking, the
elements affect and are supported by each other. Finally, it is crucial to note that at the same
time each of the elements needs the other two.
The mutual communication and the continuous incompleteness imply a need for
further elaboration and reinterpretation of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame. On the grounds
of the recent development, illustrated above, an alternative interpretative model may be
constructed on the combination of privileged power or empowered privilege. This constitutes the
contextual part of the combination of relationships as the core of a legal position.
Communicativeness mixed with incompleteness constitutes the very core of this content.
On the one hand, communication is based on privileged operative positions. The most essential thing
here is communicativeness and this privileged position is more than only a static privilege
protected against interference by external parties. A privileged position is rather more like
a necessary and essential but not sufficient element of the business idea as a process, or
as a combination of operations. The other crucial element of innovation as a process is based
on empowered positions. Increasing the power of content that is further constituted on privileged
positions it is carried out through the dynamics of digital economy. Rather than being
constituted on a mere static status, the combination of privilege and power is more likely
to be based on dynamics and functionality.
Being founded on dynamics, those positions become accordingly extremely powerful.
The importance of the privileged positions is more likely to be based on power as the
complementary element of the combination. In other words, privilege does not remain static,
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as in the cases when it is only a protected right to use, but it is made more dynamic through
empowering it. Empowerment increases in this way the power of privilege. In a more
practical example, adding power to the privileged position is like recharging a car battery.
The battery is as such a useful and potentially significant source of energy but the real power
is implemented in it through recharging. In this way recharging increases the operational
power of the battery. This is exactly what happens to privilege when it is given power.
3.3 Domain names as functional governance relations
A business idea overall consists of interconnected aspects of a name, ideas and money. It
is divided into certain components for purposes of further examination. The name is one of
the crucial elements of this configuration. In the functional rights governance architecture
it is essential to consider the name as one of the main organic elements. A name is even
crucially significant as a communicational instrument. It is a name that makes the
communication overall even possible; on the other hand, communicativeness constitutes
one of the most important purposes of a name.309 A name may be utilized as an interface,
with a name having a dual task in communication. A name operates as a means of recognizing
the communicating parties and, on the other hand, names make it possible to direct the content
of a message to someone.
A name is an expedient for directing rights and duties in societal communication
and as such it may be used as an instrument of rights governance.310 The usability of a name
is  twofold. First, in order to be able to direct rights, and accordingly duties, there has to
be someone whom those are directed to. On the other hand, this someone has to be recognized
and by these means the directive force of legal duties is actually built into the name directly.
A name thus includes a part of the governance architecture, as it is used to bind together the
elements of personality. Second, a name is used as a means of identifying of those who act in
society, with a name becoming a privilege of its holder. Thereby, a name actually constitutes
a privileged communication position. In this way, a name as a communicative tool includes
some power in it but at the same time includes also some privilege. This is the basis for
examining a name as a combination of privilege and power. Communicativeness makes
a name powerful, but at the same time its privileged character means that it is treated like
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property, i.e., a name becomes excludable. This is then further the basis for examining a
name as a combination of different kinds of legal relationships as the core of a legal position.
The rights governance architecture is also founded on functionality. Functionality
derives from the combination of privilege and power, which then establishes functionality
as a whole as the kernel of the governance architecture. This is further carried out through
connecting the crucial incompleteness and operations of the digital economy together. Both
of these factors require networking and the rights governance ought to be effective and
reasonable.
3.3.1 The content of the domain name as a combination of rights
3.3.1.1 The domain name as a communicator
The significance of a name as a communicator is fundamental. In communication, names
above all increase the reliability of communication, the reliability being built directly into
the essence of names. In the communicative environment, names are used as a tool of
identification, which actually makes the identification function as one of the most important
tasks of a name.311 Reliable identification is crucial for smooth communication.312 On the
other hand, identification has a close connection to the operational framework, where the
significance of identification increases with distance. This is best illustrated in distant
communication, where there do not exist any real instruments other than names for identifying
the communicators. This is precisely the situation on open networks, where domain names
are to be utilized. Therefore, as an identification tool, a name has actually less meaning in
face to face communication than in long-distance communication. On the other hand, long-
distance communication is impersonal, which increases the meaning of a name as a means
of identification. This is exactly where the development of the communicational framework
of open networks has an impact.
Names are employed as a means of directing speech; i.e., a name has a certain directive
task. This task is best described when the vertical construction of a name is examined.
Verticality is illustrated through the rights embedded in a name, where they are arranged
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as an overlapping structure. Thereby, in this structure some elements are fixed to names and
some other elements are fixed to the rights underlying it. An illustrative example of this
is the institution of names overall. Everyone has an obligation to have a name, which makes
a name actually an obligation at the same time as it is an instrument of identification in societal
communication and participation. In this sense, a name is required of everyone and in
societal communication a name is essential.
On the other hand, without a name no one is able to become part of the functional
society, i.e., to operate as a member of society. Functionality together with the essentiality
of a name has been recently clearly stated by the Supreme Court of Finland in the case
KKO:2004:51 (R2003/362),  which basically concerned a falsifying a signature. Forgery,
however, undermines the trustworthiness of certain documents in business and exchange.
Most of all, falsifying a signature infringes a person’s right to his or her own name, according to
the reasoning of the Supreme Court. Societal operations thus seem to be closely linked to
the confidence implied by the authentication using names and, on the other hand, at the
same time to the integrity of names.
KKO:2004:51. A had placed a mail order using regular customers’ client cards, wherein
A had forged the signatures of those customers. According to the Supreme Court of
Finland, the essential purpose of preventing forgeries is to ensure the public reliability
of pieces of evidence, i.e., the public interest in the reliability of certain pieces of evidence
in legal and economic life. Forging another person’s signature also infringes his or her right
to his or her own name.
The reasons for treating a name as a communicator are rather fundamental and clear. First
of all, a name establishes a societal position. As a socially operational position, a name likewise
creates a functional position for its holder. Further, related to a name, personal rights and
duties in general are governed through the name itself. This is carried out through the societal
order of which human beings constitute a crucial part. A name also establishes an obligation.
A name is a useful means to accumulate the rights belonging to a certain subject. As such,
a name is really essential for everyone. These positions created by a name are basically also
the ones that are to be protected. A name accordingly establishes a protected position,  given
that the right to a name is uninfringible. On the other hand, the protection of names ensures
societal communication. This is the basis of the cooperation of all of the positions that are
based on names. Communication in society, or life overall, would be impossible without
having any usable and protected names.
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313 Society overall is based on communication, the two most fundamental factors being the
communicating parties and the communicational environment. See Dommering 1996, 15
314 The communication environment has changed with the emergence of electronic administra-
tion and electronic transactions. See Government Proposal HE 194/2001 vp., 25 - 26.
315 Here the development is actually carried out through electronic identification, which is
technically realized by connecting the name and personality of a human being. In the
electronic communication environment, this is carried out even more effectively than by
using only specific person identification numbers, although the identification number
constitutes the kernel of the process. The fundamental purpose of electronic communication
is to improve the access to, and quality of, certain administrative services, as well as the
customer orientation in government. Effectiveness is also one of the crucial aims of the
government. See also Korhonen 2003, 350 - 351.
376
3.3.1.2 The domain name as an identifier
A name has a certain value as an identification tool in varying frameworks and is actually
defined in different ways. Those definitions are further rather dependent on the environment
where a name is to be used. Thereby, a name employed in the real physical world is rather
easily distinguishable from a name employed in an intangible environment. Intangibility as
the framework of names is one essential implication of digitization, together with networking.313
Further, these two factors change the whole communication infrastructure and the
significance of names in it. Names likewise have their special formulations designed
especially for the digital world. A name in the physical world has its counterpart in the digital
environment in the form of a domain name. On the other hand, there are not, however,
very many differences between these two different forms of names. Even an ordinary
“physical” name is often used as a domain name; in fact a domain name actually includes
precisely the same features as a physical name. Therefore, the most fundamental character
of a name itself is not altered much from the traditional use of names.
The greatest difference comes  with the altered communication framework .314
Communication is namely no longer only the interaction of two parties but is often carried
out in an undefined network. In other words, communication is not fixed anymore only
to pure interaction; there is always a need for a certain identifying element in domain names.315
It is actually a consequence of the communicational environment that has made names and
the digital environment closely linked. It is precisely the identification task of a name that
has been changed along with the change of the communicational environment. This makes
the domain name a prototype of the name in the digital world. Digitization has some other
consequences where names are concerned. A name in the digital environment is more than
a mere means of identification. Parallel with its task as an instrument of identification, a
domain name is used to define and make recognized the position where information is to
be found.
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316 Autonomy is thus a relative concept. Autonomy may also be considered to have value for
people who come to and live in a world. Moreover, autonomy is considered to be part of
the relationships both between individuals’ actions and their preferences. See Benkler 2001,
33 - 34.
317 A domain name may be called an electronic address. See Koktvedgaard - Levin 2004, 354.
318 A domain name usually tells where on the Internet one has been, where one is now, who
one is dealing with and how one can find the same content or position again. See Gulliksen
2001, 57.
319 The domain name system has been compared to the 1-800 telephone numbers that can be
dialed as mnemonics. Domain names thus serve as vanity telephone numbers for companies
that want a number that is both easy to remember and to guess. See Gulliksen 1999, 24.
320 This has several visible manifestations. Communication on open networks is based on technical
protocols (on the Internet the TCP/IP protocol) where a message is sent digitally to its receiver
and the protocol operates as an enabling framework. Technicality is manifested even when
a message is concretely sent in that the message is split into several separate fragments and all the
fragments are generally sent to a receiver through different transmission channels. In this
way, the protocol regulates how the data is to be divided and how the resulting packets will
be shipped. See Lessig 2002a, 149.
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The identification task of a name is one of a name’s essential elements. A domain
name is further clearly considered as an identification tool, precisely like a proper name
in the physical world. A name thus grants some autonomy to its bearer. In this respect,
autonomy is considered as both a capacity and a condition of which people can have more
or less.316 As such, a domain name has one feature in addition to its identification task: it
may  be an address that expresses where the domain name holder can be found.317 Thereby,
a domain name is not only an instrument of identification but also an expression of position.
In other words, a domain name generally tells certain facts about the location and possession
of the relevant domain name and its holder.318 As such, domain names rather closely
resembles geographic names or some other geographic information that contains street
addresses, postal codes and  information about a country.319
3.3.1.3 The domain name as a connector
A name in the digital environment corresponds essentially to that in the physical framework.
There exists, however, some elements that make the name in the digital environment
somewhat different from a usual name. First, the character of communication differs clearly from
the communication being carried out in the physical environment. The characteristic change
is due to the digitized design of information when information is communicated in digital
networks and represented in digital form. This kind of information is more clearly bound
to its technical form. The technicality of digital information is best illustrated in its close
relationship to the communication framework itself.320 Technicality as a formal representation
of communicated information therefore affects the fundamental design of a digital name.
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321 An IP address consists of numbers and it is significant to other computers for their mutual
communication. In order to be able to participate in this communication a computer (=a
user) must have a unique IP address. See Grewlich 1999, 387.
322 See Rahnasto 2002, 19.
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Communication derives directly from the technical structure of names and the digital
communicational framework.
Digitization changes the fundamental elements of names as communicative
instruments. In this way information as the foundation of a domain name and the name
itself are connected. This is precisely how a name is used as a connector. In the digital
communication network, it is the domain name that operates more like an address of a certain
Web page or an attribute of an actor than a real  name. This is due to the construction of
Web pages, where a concrete name is only a visible illustration represented in textual form.
A name in the digital environment is used for navigating in this environment; for the equipment
the numerical IP addresses would be more suitable, as computers actually recognize each
other by those numbers.321 However, in human communication the domain name is usually
expressed as a human-understandable name or symbol.322 A name in the digital world is
thus more than a name in the common sense. Digital names or domain names make the
communication more dynamic, with a name being used for describing both a name and
a position at the same time.
Having a certain position on the communication network is significant  in another
sense as well. The location where the information is to be found takes on extreme importance
in digital communication. In physical communication it is significant to be able to get
recognized by one’s name. This is not, however, enough in digital communication, where
the ability to be found by computers, i.e., search agents, is important for overall
communication. At the same time, the name and position being pointed at by the name
are connected together. This is exactly where the third dimension of the domain name is
found. A name in digital form has some economic value that is included in the name as
a connector precisely in the digital environment. The value is created by connecting a name
and the information that is included in that certain name. A domain name takes on great
economic value and as such closely resembles a trademark. A trademark even often includes
a domain name and vice versa. The reason for this is clear: a trademark may be protected
as property whereas a domain name may easily remain only a right to use.
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323 Domain names are regulated in Finland by the Finnish Communications Regulatory Office
(FICORA).
324 The other way to govern the field of domain names is the market. These two lines are the
main areas in the governance of domain names. See Rahnasto 2002, 31 - 32.
325 The content of private ownership is basically defined through three core elements: 1) the
completeness of the right, meaning that the owner, and only the owner, has complete power
over a thing, 2) exclusivity and indivisibility, meaning that there can be only one complete right
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3.3.1.4 The empowered privilege of the domain name
The communicative structure of the digital economy is fundamentally based on names. A
name is the attribute that is used for recognizing actors. This is clearly manifested in the
combined roles of a name. In the overall communicative structure, a name plays at least
three different but closely overlapping roles at the same time. First, a name is both a central
means of communication and an essential tool of identification; i.e., it has a communication
and identification function. These two factors then create the third one, which is the connective
task of a name. A name is thus a rather central communicative tool in the digital
environment. This then prompts the examination of the content of a legal position as a
relationship of privilege and power in the case of a name.
The empowered privilege of name is fundamentally based on two essential factors.
The first of these is the special exclusivity of a name. In this view a domain name is sui generis.
On the other hand, for the domain name the status of sui generis is created through the
foundations of the rights governance architecture due to the different roles of a name and
its foundations. Basically, the privileged position of a domain name is created through state
governance with rights governance based on the registration of domain names.323 State
governance is further based on strict restrictions concerning the use and granting of domain
names.324 This constitutes the basic foundation of the governance architecture of domain
names. When governed by the state, a domain name is basically founded on a right to use.
In the system of state governance, domain names are not actually owned by their possessors.
In this system a domain name resembles an ordinary name: the possession of a domain name
is more based on the exploitation of a right.
A domain name as such is not owned, and the protection of domain names is not
proprietary either. A domain name is mainly governed through state governance and as such
a domain name may also be defined as non-proprietary. On the other hand, due to the lack
of ownership and the non-proprietary character of a domain name, it is not sustainable to
define the content of a legal position only through a right to forbid. Granting the right-holder
a right to forbid the external parties is precisely how ordinary property rights are constructed.
The owner has a strong right to restrict the acts of external parties and a right to restrict
is, further, due to the absoluteness and exclusivity of ownership.325 Ownership is thus stable
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attached to the thing, and 3) the limited scope of right, meaning that the object of the right has
to be limited and demarcated. See Tolonen, H. 2004, 205.
326 Exclusivity is based on both the state governance of domain names and the mutual
relationship of domain names and trademarks. This is exactly where the second level domain
names come into play. See Rahnasto 2002, 60 - 61.
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and through this stability ownership actually gives a similar stability to the rights to be
owned. On the other hand, the stability of ownership is established through the right to
forbid others to interfere in the use of the right-holder’s right. This is where domain names
differ from other general property rights.
Domain names are incompletely excludable.326 In this sense they do not belong to anyone
as property. The incomplete exclusivity of domain names therefore requires that the content
of a right-holder’s legal position is defined differently from the traditional definition, that
is, as being fundamentally based on excludability. The content is now more likely to be
defined as a certain relationship rather than as a mere position. As relations this includes
the domain name as privilege and, on the other hand, the domain name as competence. The
domain name creates a privilege through its de facto exclusivity. As it at the same time operates
as a communicative connector, the privileged position is also characteristically functional.
In the communication network, the domain name creates at the same time an empowered
position for its holder. This is due to the character of a domain name as precisely a domain,
or as an address where the relevant information can be found. Thereby, a domain name
is equally a name and a position. A domain name is recognized by the name, but utilized through
the information it includes.
The combination of name and position is the very kernel of a domain name. It creates
a position that may be called an empowered privilege. This requires that there exist in a
domain name some elements from both spheres: the sphere of power and the sphere of
privilege. The empowerment of a privileged domain name is carried out through the
dynamics of the privileged position of the name. This is based on the insufficiency of statics
alone in accounting for the dynamic and functional entity of a domain name. When the
static definition of privilege is not enough, there emerges a crucial need to draw the basic
borderlines dynamically. Dynamics is brought into the model well by combining the
Hohfeldian power and the Hohfeldian privilege as elementary parts in the overall definition
of the content of a legal position. This is then the fundamental factor that changes the pure
statically protected privilege the status of empowered privilege. The empowerment of a name
may be illustrated through an example where empowerment is carried out through a
combination of domain and name. This is actually a direct consequence of the strong status
of a name in the communication on open networks.
The strong status is linked directly to the communicativeness of a name, i.e., a name
is used as both an instrument of identification and a denominator of position. This alone
already creates a rather strong empowered position. A further example comes from the field
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327 Value is often acquired through having creations experienced; i.e., inventors generally want
people to experience their works. See Marks - Turnbull 2000, 199.
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of brands. Even communicativeness itself may be empowered, which is clearly manifested
when a name is expanded to become a brand. A brand illustrates rather clearly the
empowerment of a name or even a domain name. A brand often increases the value of a
name or a trademark. At the same time, the marketing force of the brand is increased and
the name becomes empowered. The empowerment of names is not, however, a new
invention, given that a name as a privilege has been accorded power even earlier. This has
been carried out through the possibility to transfer a right to a name, i.e., selling a trademark
or a domain name. Empowerment has then been carried out in the traditional sense of property
rights, with transferability forming the very core of dynamics. Property rights have been
considered to be dynamic and have been brought into the sphere of exchange. This kind
of empowerment is, however, slightly different from the dynamics in the sense of dynamic
functionality.
Transference, and its related dynamics, are based only on transferring rights; the real
functional aspect of dynamics has been excluded. In other words, objects, such as trademarks
may have been transferred, but this is basically all that the traditional dynamics has included.
Empowerment in the sense of functional dynamics is more than this. Domain names and
trademarks are actually included in a special class of names because proper names as such
cannot be transferred at all. They belong squarely to the sphere of commons. An illustrative
example of the common scope of a domain name is the possession of a domain name that
is exclusive. A domain name may belong to only one possessor at a time. This sharply
differentiates a domain name from an ordinary proper name, as ordinary names may be
possessed by any number of people and all at the same time. This is exactly where the
communicational environment mostly affects names. Personal communication may easily
be carried out even if none of the names involved is exclusive, but the communication in
open networks changes the significance of names as communicative instruments. The whole
communicational system becomes functional and the functionality of the system further
requires, on the one hand, the exclusivity of domain names and, on the other, a clear rights
governance architecture.
The dynamic functionality of names in the communicational framework is manifested
even  in the evolving utilization of names. The inability to transfer proper names is manly
due to the valueless character of names; i.e., names do not have any exchange value.327 The
inability to be transferred is characteristic of names but dynamics are not. A name is still
a powerful instrument of communication and this gives a name also extreme significance.
However, in the case of domain names, the scope of dynamics has been altered even from
the free transferability of exchangeable names. This is again further carried out through
the change in the means of communication and the significance of a name in it. A right
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328 For a human being, a name is both a right and a duty. A name is actually essential for anyone
to become a member of society and to be able to communicate with others in the society.
See Kangas 1991, 33 - 34.
329 Domain names and the access granted through them is essential for actors to be able to
transmit and receive information. The main task for the domain names in the network
environment is to ensure access to information resources. This involves both the transmitter and
the receiver of the information. In order to guarantee equal access, domain names are granted
and governed by state and generally on a non-profit basis. See Government Proposal HE
96/2002 vp., 8 - 9.
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to a domain name is transferable despite its ownerless nature, but dynamics are nevertheless
realized alongside this through communicational empowerment.
3.3.1.5 The privileged power of the domain name
Power may also become a dominating element in the legal position of a right-holder. The
kernel is founded on an empowered privilege as described earlier. As such the content of
a legal position is described one-sidedly from the viewpoint of statics. The content, however,
generally needs to be defined also from the viewpoint of dynamics, i.e., from the viewpoint
of the power position. This definition does not much alter the content itself, which remains
essentially the same as in the case of empowered privilege. The only factor that changes
is the structure and the overall view of the content. The structure becomes precisely the
opposite to empowered privilege, in which the content is described from the viewpoint of
privilege. When examined as privileged power, the statics of privilege are further complemented
by power as an extra element. This is precisely where the opposite interpretation is to be carried
out and the content is examined from the viewpoint of dynamics and further complemented
through privilege. Stability must be added to the overall functionally dynamic architecture.
Empowered privilege in names is likewise linked closely to communication, as
explained above. A name is actually an essential element in communication, which makes
it very dynamic in nature. On the other hand, the right to name is also a privilege that is
stated already in the law.328 A name is used as an instrument to identify and control people.
This is exactly where the combination of privilege and power with regard to names further
creates a strong power position in the basic communicational architecture. The strength
is implied by a name being protected property, with the strength then increased with some
power bound to the overall communicative pattern. A name is in the possession of its holder,
but at the same time it is used for getting access to the communication network.329 On these
grounds, this position might even be defined as the core of communicativeness overall on
the open networks.
A name constitutes the core of communication. Therefore, the crucial role of a name
as the kernel of the communication architecture is also the core of the privileging of power.
This is basically due to the twofold foundation of the communicational circumstances, where
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330 This is often referred as access to network and it is further pursued to be controlled. See
Bishop 200
331 Copy protection refers to techniques used to prevent the unauthorized copying of software.
Copy protection is mainly realized through protecting software by issuing registration
numbers with each package. When one installs the software, one must enter the registration
number. This does not prevent all piracy, but it limits it. In addition, users cannot get updates
for a product unless they own the original diskettes and documentation.
See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/c/copy_protection.html
332 Rights management systems are often connected with copyright managing information.
Copyright management systems are basically databases that contain information about content,
author and other current right-holders. This information is also needed to support the process
of authorizing the use of works by others. Rights management systems often include ancillary
modules for payment or accounts receivable. See Gervais 2000, 78.
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a name is used as connector. A domain name is used as a means to direct communicational
speech. On the one hand, the power of this privileged position is due to the participation
right that is attached directly to the name. A name as a privilege creates the basis of
communication. Further, the close link to communication also creates a strong foundation
for the empowerment of this privilege. For example, a name is essential in the market even
as a prerequisite for identification. Goods are marketed through trademarks and, on the
other hand, a trademark is used later as a means of identification by consumers. This actually,
at the same time, creates an empowered position for a name, with empowerment occurring
by making a name a means of communication. This position is further strengthened when
a certain product comes to dominate the market.
The empowerment of privilege is also due to the access right that is also attached
to a name. The access right further ensures the functionality of the overall communicational
structure. The totality, i.e., the content of the whole communicative structure, is based on
everyone’s access to networks. In this structure a name takes on great significance indeed.
In this way, the significance of a name constitutes another foundational argument for the
privileged status of power in the communicational architecture and for the significance of
domain names in it. This is best described through an example. Access to networks does
not mean only the simple ability to log on but entails real accessability. This means that there
ought to be ensured access to the information that is available on the network.330 This is
the core of communication. In order to be really smooth, communication requires that there
exist a real possibility to get information and give it. Accordingly, access to network is
generally described as a privilege. This is supported in the strongest way through copy
protection.331 On the other hand, access is restricted by empowering privilege through the
rights management system. Rights management grants access only to a restricted sphere
of actors, with access further defined precisely through the rights management system.332
This is often realized through registration.
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3.3.2 Included versus excluded concerning names
A functional business idea contains always a static element that is parallel to its essential
dynamics. The statics of a business idea is founded on the requirement of defining the sphere
of those who are included contextually as right-holders. Accordingly, it is crucial to draw
the borderline along the axis of included/excluded. Inclusion and exclusion are the only stable
instruments to define the sphere of those who are entitled to get the legal position of a right-
holder. This is also where the demarcation of access and control is to be carried out. The
difference between inclusion and exclusion makes the definitional structure necessarily rather
static, however. Statics are an unnecessary but at the same time characteristic consequence
of this definition as the determination between included and excluded is based on a certain
absoluteness. The demarcation is comparable to exclusivity, as exclusivity and absoluteness
constitute the basic elements of ownership in its static sense. Statics are in fact in this way
bound to the way in which they are defined: when defining the difference between inclusion
and exclusion, the boundaries need to be drawn strictly and in a stable way. On the other
hand, despite the overall dynamics in the rights governance architecture for names, it is
essential to define the static context of the position of a right-holder.
A name is crucial in communication. A name has at least one extremely significant
attribute that makes it a rather special communicative instrument: its exclusive character. A
name is always a kind of privilege and as such it always contains a certain exclusivity. The
privileged position of a name is derived from its private character. A name is even
characteristically included in the private sphere of a human being. Thus, even when a name
is not legally protected, it still includes a number of personal elements. These elements give
a name some additional privilege. Thus, the exclusivity of a name is not necessarily a legally
protected exclusivity, i.e., not legally protected in the sense of property rights. In other words,
although a name is possessed by its carrier, no one is able to have any real ownership of a proper
name. This concerns especially the names of human beings. These names are not owned
but distinguished or appropriated from the general sphere of commons. It is precisely by
distinguishing or appropriating that names are made exclusive.
Neither defining strict boundaries nor creating exclusivity is necessary before the
system is able to become functional. Functionality itself creates the need and the foundations
for drawing any boundaries. If there is no functionality, there is no need to draw boundaries.
On the other hand, drawing strict boundaries beforehand leads to statics in the whole system
when the system is based on traditional intellectual property rights. Thereby, drawing
boundaries basically constitutes the starting point of the traditional system of intellectual
property rights. This is one of the points of divergence between the traditional system of
intellectual property rights and that of the digital age, and one that places new demands
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333 Networking constitutes an online working method where people get connected to open
communication networks and establish two-way links. See Marks - Turnbull 2000,199.
334 Digital rights management protects the copyrights on data by enabling secure distribution
and/or disabling illegal distribution of the data. Typically, a DRM system protects intellectual
property by either encrypting the data so that it can only be accessed by authorized users or
marking the content with a digital watermark or similar method so that the content can not
be freely distributed.
See Webopedia http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/D/DRM.html
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on the system. One good example of these new operations is networking.333 Networking
requires functionality to a significant degree. Functionality is in fact the core of networking
overall. Operativeness and the capability to behave operatively is the core of the coherence
of the whole system. Thereby, there actually exists no need for drawing any borderlines
beforehand. Functionality itself creates the boundaries if there happens to be any need for
them. This is, however, basically where the strict rights management systems, for example,
a system of digital rights management go wrong. Those systems bind intellectual property
too closely to statics. Digital rights management allows access and also ensures it, or then
access is denied.334 The whole construction is built on the static on/off pattern and provides
no room for any variety or flexibility.
The static aspect of the rights governance architecture operates as the basis of
exclusion/inclusion axis. This aspect is ultimately based on two main elements. One is the
empowerment of privilege that truly changes the character of statics. In the traditional system of property
rights the privilege constitutes the core of the static aspect of the Hohfeldian schema, and
as such it is assumed to remain static. Privilege is linked to rights in their static sense, e.g
when the rights are not transferred and they are not involved in any dynamics. This occurs
for example, when a patent is exploited by the patent-holder in his or her industrial
production. In the evolving framework of the digital economy, privilege in its traditional
sense is one of the core elements to which the impacts of the digital economy are targeted.
This is where dynamics are brought into close coexistence with privilege by the
empowerment of privilege. The other main element of the rights governance architecture
is the need to define access rights by excluding those who are not entitled to access. Exclusion is
focused on the privilege and as such is principally defined solely as a complement of the
static aspect. In the new dynamic interpretation of the Hohfeldian schema, exclusion is
realized after empowering the privilege when actually it is precisely the empowered privilege that
is defined through exclusion. In this way exclusion takes on even more significance given that
privilege itself is further strengthened through empowerment.
Exclusion itself further creates a privileged position. Privilege is created precisely
through the possibility to exclude others. A privileged position does not necessarily have to be
defined through property rights or the ability to protect those rights legally. Privilege may
also be established by including certain elements while excluding others. For example, a
name is often considered a privilege in that it basically determines some certain individual
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information of its bearer. This personal information is included in the name. In other words,
a name and the information included in it are closely related and welded together. On the
other hand, certain information is always related to a certain name and this is where these
elements together enhance the sphere of privilege. The exclusivity of names does not,
however, correspond to the exclusivity of property rights. First of all, the exclusivity of a
name is not necessarily based on legal exclusivity. Further, there do not exist any official
rules for using names. The use of names is based on everyone’s right and duty to have a
name. This differs slightly if a name is legally protected, i.e., a trademark or business name.
In Hohfeldian terms, the right and duty to have a name would actually be the privilege of
having a name and the duty to have it as its opposite. In a certain sense this is totally
congruent.
The problem, however, arises when names are generally examined in the Hohfeldian
conceptual frame. It seems that the privilege of having a name is matched by the external
party’s no-right to have one. For trademarks this is the case, but all the other classes of
names, i.e., names without any legal status or protection, would be excluded from this
definition. Names seem to belong to the scope of incomplete excludability. Incomplete
excludability implies that the use of names is not clearly defined by excluding the external
parties. This is a direct consequence of incomplete excludability and the unprotected nature
that is characteristic of a name.
The sphere of privilege needs to be outlined in some different way. Here the core
is exactly the strong position of the empowered privilege, which is especially significant
for names. The significance is due to the exclusion from empowered privilege, which further
creates a strong position for the one who is included, i.e., the one who has the privilege.
This is due to the common nature of names, which further implies that names are basically
reserved for the common use. Names are common for the entire society. The other important
factor here is the significance of a name in communication. Both the incompleteness of excludability
and the significance of names in communication further reflect the common and general
character of names. It would actually be rather exceptional for a name to be excluded from
the sphere of commons. A good example of exclusion is a trademark, where the exclusion
is carried out through legislation.  Exclusion is defined by comparing two or more
trademarks to each other in order to find out the similarity between the two. An illustrative
example comes form Supreme Court of Finland in case KKO:2004:49 (S2001/710) where two
closely similar names of closely similar products were compared to each other.
KKO:2004:49. A health food store sold a special food product under the name “Renichew”.
According to the Supreme Court of Finland the name was confusingly similar to the
trademark “Rennie” belonging to a medicament sold in a drugstore and available without
a prescription.
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335 The domain name system has actually been developed for the governance of cyberspace.
See Grewlich 1999, 194.
336 See Grewlich 1999, 194.
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A name here is used as a distinctive instrument in the market and in this way it maintains
the proper and smooth communication of the market and consumers. The protection of
a trademark as a name, however, also includes protection of the value of the name in the
market, in which respect it closely resembles a domain name. A domain name is both a tool
of identification and a position of communication. This division is also one consequence
of the dynamics of the digital economy.
3.3.3 The relative governance of the right to a name
Communication on open networks is basically carried out through domain names.
Communication requires some degree of ability to contact another terminal on the network.
For this it is necessary to have the address of the terminal that one wishes to contact.335
This address, as well as the information concerning the control of the relevant domain name,
is included in the domain name itself. This is exactly why a domain name constitutes an
essential instrument for communicating through the open networks. Additionally, such
communication requires proper rights governance for the overall construction of domain
names. Rights governance in this sense and the way in which it is carried out is actually
becoming the highest commercial and strategic interest.336
Another key issue is governing the global information networks which, again, are
based more or less on the proper distribution of powers. The distribution of powers also
constitutes the foundation of the governance architecture of domain names. In this way
rights governance has a close connection to the functionality of the digital economy. This
is further carried out through the dynamics of both rights governance and the functionality
of the digital economy. Dynamics further implies that there are several different
communicational, and at the same time operational, relationships involved in that
functionality. These relationships construct the fundamental basis of dynamics. For instance,
network delivery of digital content constitutes a network of several cooperating actors, e.g.,
content providers, service providers, licensees, and end-users. There actually would be no
dynamics without these functional and cooperative relationships in the sense of digital
operativeness. Functionality is based on involving relationships as the basis of operations.
The functionality of domain names is basically founded on their dynamic content, with
dynamics in this sense constituting the fundamental reason for the need to govern domain
names. Domain names have several essential tasks that add some degree of dynamics to
the overall rights governance architecture. As such, domain names serve to identify the
destination in communication. This is the identification function of domain names and it
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is associated with the character of the name as an address of certain information.
Accordingly, the rights governance architecture of names needs to be based, at least partly,
on governing the identification rights, i.e., the identification of relevant information. This
is carried out by governing names, which constitute the main connecting link between the
information and its position. Domain names allow for higher accessibility to information.337
On the other hand, accessibility like this requires that the communicational structure be
approached from within the information itself. Accessibility has a close connection to the
communicational structure itself, exactly like domain name as a means of identification.
Basically, in communication through the open networks the capability to get oneself
identified is as important as getting access to information. A domain name has additionally
a few economic functions for which an effective rights governance architecture is needed.
These functions are connected with names as used in the market. Nevertheless, the economic
function of a domain name is rather different from the traditional economic function of
names in the market. The difference stems from the altered framework, i.e., an open network
as the main communicational environment. On open networks domain names may even
strengthen the organizational identity of an enterprise. On the other hand, domain names
may get some economic value of their own, exactly like trademarks.338 Further, the economic
function of a name as a communicator is the third dimension that requires a proper rights
governance architecture. In this sense, rights governance closely resembles rights
management as a more economic construction.
The dynamic aspect of rights governance architecture is based on the distribution
of powers, making the architecture essentially functional. Further, the distribution of powers
characteristically implies that the governance architecture can no longer be based on
including something and excluding something else. On these grounds of inclusion and
exclusion, the overall legal position of a right-holder remains too static. The
exclusion/inclusion distinction is not very dynamic despite the essential significance of the
distinction for the whole rights governance architecture. Therefore, this dualistic
differentiation is used only for defining the absolute boundaries of rights and the static
position of the right-holder, whereas the relative rights governance is more based on governing
cooperative relationships.
The other focal factor in the rights governance architecture is the relativity of the
governance architecture itself. The relativity of governance, as well as the significance of
functionality, affects the dynamics of the overall architecture. This is best illustrated in the
interplay of rights, which implies that the operational network is more and more based on
several colliding rights; i.e., there are various parallel rights that should all be carried out. This
resembles closely the collision of rights in the traditional dynamics of exchange, where there
are several competing rights and only one may really be realized at a time. Communication
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on open networks and networking overall, however, differ from the pure classification of
priority in their synchronousness. There is no longer only one right that should be sustained
but rather several cooperating and communicating rights which are each  equally essential for
the functionality. Networking is, in other words, based on synchronous rights that operate
simultaneously. In this way networking is not based on the logic of exclusivity.
The need for relative rights governance is thus basically due to the operational
environment becoming more dynamic. Dynamics require functionality, which is carried out only
by combining a set of different rights. The core of rights governance in its relative sense
is defined in terms of immune positions of right-holders. In this way governance in its
dynamic aspect is actually based on immunity and, on the other hand, the third party’s
disability to affect the right-holder’s legal position. These dynamically protected positions
then derive from privileged power as the basis of the dynamic aspect, it being exactly the
privileged power that is protected through the immunity of a party and the disability of the
third party. Convergence is one of the central factors that directly and clearly affect the
requirements of the relative rights governance. Convergence is carried out at least in two
areas that are also closely linked to names. One is the interconnection of the market and cyberspace.
Cyberspace is more and more becoming the area of commerce to be sold and marketed
effectively.
On the other hand, the operations in the market generally, and in the market in
cyberspace in particular, are converging. Accordingly, it is becoming more complicated to
maintain the fiction of a connection between a trademark and its immediate environment
where the trademark would be bound to the environment where it is to be used. In other
words, two similar trademarks would not collide if used in totally different markets. The
convergence of the market and cyberspace, however, changes this slightly. Now, cyberspace
is not a competing marketing environment but a parallel one. This is basically “relative
exclusivity” in the respect of the positions involved in operations. Thereby, operating on open
networks only complements the existing market and in this way it is only additional to it.
This may, however, lead to collision between a trademark and a domain name when these
are similar but do not belong to the same enterprise or another holder.
Further, the overall governance architectures for trademarks, on the one hand, and
domain names, on the other, differ somewhat from each other. A trademark is fundamentally
classified as property and is based on ownership. The control of a trademark is based on
the right-holder’s domination on the grounds of ownership. Accordingly, at the same time
its governance is carried out statically by excluding external parties from the right-holder’s
use and dynamically through the right-holder’s competence to transfer a right to trademark.
Rights associated with a trademark are governed through property rights when the
governance does not maintain pure dynamics in the sense of digital networking. On the
other hand, the governance of domain names is not based on ownership at all but is more
like granting the rights to use for a certain time period. A domain name is still all the time
owned by the state, like a phone number. As such it is also like an address that cannot be owned
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either. A good example is the Finnish shopping mall Aleksi 13, whose name refers to the
address of the mall, Aleksanterinkatu 13. The name belongs to the shopping mall whereas
the address is merely the address where this mall can be found.
The other implication of convergence is identity and name. This is the sphere of the
domain name, which includes both an identification segment and a domain segment. Both
converge to become a domain name. The convergence of name and identity is an outcome
of the development of the communicational framework, where it is necessary to identify
oneself. On the other hand, the amount of information on open communication networks
is so enormous that there also exists a need to get some visibility in one way or another.
This is exactly where the altered operational framework changes the significance of names
in communication. This implies, however, at the same time the parallel governance of both
identity and name and that governance cannot be carried out through absolute exclusion.
There is thus a need for relative rights governance when both of the regulative values are
to be set in place. Further, convergence has one additional implication where names are
concerned. It explicitly increases the value of a name. This is due to three factors: the importance
of communication, the significance of names in it, and the emergence of the market and
the influence of market forces in the communicational framework. Basically, all these three
elements are firmly linked to the domain name, which becomes a structured combination
of these three factors all together.
3.4 Business ideas as functional governance relations
Rights governance in the altered framework may be approached through ideas as well. Good
ideas constitute the basis of innovativeness and rapid innovations are the basis of the digital
economy. This is true especially in the case of business ideas as one of the most important
implications of the digital economy. The digital economy itself and its wealth-increasing
power are both based on business ideas and business methods as digital innovations. Where
a name constitutes an essential means of communication, the business idea is the other of
the core elements of modern business.
3.4.1 The content of the business idea as a combination of rights
Innovation and names have at least one connecting link. Innovations are communication,
exactly like names. The communicational structure of an innovation is, however, constituted
somewhat differently from that of names. In this comparison a name is surely a
communicational feature, even when it is used alone. Innovation is thus constituted
differently from a name in that it must be bound to more functional content. Innovation always
has to include some significance in content. On the other hand, the functionality of content
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is the most elementary factor in dynamizing the digital economy. Innovations are constituted
on communication between innovations and the framework where those innovations are
to be utilized.339 This is the basis for viewing the content of innovativeness as the
combination of rights as the legal position of a right-holder.
3.4.1.1 The business idea as information
Communicativeness is the kernel of the functionality of a name. Likewise it is the core of
functionality of innovativeness. The communicative structure of innovation is, however,
interrelated with its framework. This connection of content and its framework is actually
the overall basis of functional dynamics as innovativeness. Naturally, a name also includes
this element, but the communicativeness of a name is more likely to be based on its strict
relation to the personality of its bearer. The functionality here is rather vertical, whereas
for business ideas functionality is more horizontal. Operations are to be carried out in an
interrelated manner and in parallel, whereas names always have the vertical relationship
defining the content of name. Horizontality thus correlates closely to innovation networks.
The statics of protection have some further serious consequences. Information
embedded in a business idea is usually closed to exploitation by third parties.340 This is carried
out by patenting an invention, for example a business method, when this closed nature easily
affects the business idea overall. On the other hand, the need to close ideas is also based
on communication, more accurately on the communicational capacity of an idea. Business ideas,
like ideas overall, are communicative and as such have a great capability of bearing and
transmitting certain information concerning the invention itself. In this sense, in order to
create statements about the world individuals need access to information.341 Basically, an
idea is actually built up of information, as this information constitutes the very core of the
business idea itself. In this way a business idea is actually nothing more than information. This
is actually why the capability to contain and bear information constitutes the core to get
inventions closed through patenting them. Information is revealed to the others in the form
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of an invention whether it is protected through intellectual property rights or not.342
Moreover, the tendency towards protecting ideas by closing them is due to the value of
information or even the ideas themselves. Information is valuable, with the value depending
on whether the information is revealed to someone or not.343 Ideas are often based on their
potential to include value and information. This potential actually forms the foundation
of innovativeness as well. However, the potential to include information together with its
value affects the stability and endurance of a patent as the protection method of business
methods as inventions.
The informative character of ideas is accordingly based on the dualistic use of an idea.
An idea may at the same time be used by two or even more persons, and even then it is
not overused or exhausted. In other words, ideas might easily be used by many people at the
same time. However, communicativeness is not necessarily characteristic of ideas and there
is moreover a tendency to enclose ideas even when there would otherwise be a free flow
of them. The aim of acquiring wealth and of increasing the economic profit from ideas
requires that even business ideas be closed and protected. On the other hand, business ideas
include a lot of information. This can be seen when ideas are revealed and exploited by several
users as well as when ideas are kept secret and exploited by only one user. In both cases,
business ideas affect the framework where they are used. Business ideas are always instruments
for informing the surroundings. This actually means that a business idea is used well as a medium
for communicating an idea and its framework. In this way a business idea is used for
constructing cooperation and networking.
A business idea as information is thus also fundamentally a central form of
communication in the digital economy. Business ideas, however, also constitute the foundation
of innovativeness itself. This is due to the tacitness of ideas.344 Ideas are basically embedded
in the actions of human beings and they are rarely revealed visibly.345 This is also the power
of innovativeness and the renewing force of ideas.346 Ideas may be combined freely and
in this way a new idea may always make an existing one obsolete. Further, ideas basically
constitute the foundation of innovativeness, an example being the informative character
of business ideas. A business idea as information needs rights governance, with the
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of change of the needs of customers as a consequence of the digital economy; secondly,
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pace of business activities in digital economy, the essential role of informatization and the
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governance architecture to be implemented along with both innovativeness and its
framework.
3.4.1.2 The business idea as communication
In the network economy digitally manifested business ideas constitute the core of the economy
and the market.347 Because of the digital character of the economy, business ideas are often
represented in digital form, e.g., as computer code, as computer programs, or as software.
Digital representation has become the principal way to illustrate business ideas in the digital
economy. This is at least partly due to the possibility to protect digitally manifested business
methods. The digital representation form operates even as the core of open networks.
Accordingly, this makes computer code the foundation of the open networks; that is, the digital
operational frame is constituted of computer code. In other words, it is precisely computer
code that makes the operations functional. At the same time the code is used for constructing
the central functional framework as the foundation of communication.
On the other hand, business methods are often embedded in computer code, at least
in the digital environment. This is basically due to the need to create some value for a business
idea by attempting to patent methods of doing business and, on the other hand, due to the
fact that the traditional system of intellectual property rights that does not offer many options
for protecting ideas in business. The value-creation and the communicational status of
business ideas result in an obvious collusion, however. A business idea is used for trading
profitably while, at the same time, constituting the main operational framework of the digital
economy. Business ideas that are represented in digital form have thus become a fundamental
part of the communicational framework, with this fundamental character affecting the whole
communication structure implemented in the digital framework. In this way, the fundamental
character of business ideas, when represented digitally, makes communication bound to ideas
and their governance architecture.
Business ideas get several interfaces with communication. Basically, even business ideas
themselves are communication. An idea is never born or lives on its own, but its wealth
and brilliance is always a result of communication. In business communication is carried
out between the market and ideas, and so it is with business ideas. Business ideas thus get their
existence from the market in communicational interaction. On the other hand, there would
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be no ideas or innovation without smooth communication. Further, the communicativeness
of a business idea ensures the free circulation of information, which is the core of overall
communication. Allowing the free flow of information and keeping communication
unrestricted has some further consequences. One of them is the evolving innovativeness
that makes it possible to develop business ideas towards innovations. Innovativeness requires
free communication due to the nature of information and ideas and their fundamental character
in the digital economy. Business ideas actually communicate with improvements and
accordingly steer development and innovativeness. In other words, communication is
essential for inventions to reach a higher level of inventiveness. The acceptance of the market
is always essential for inventions to become innovations.
Finally, business ideas make up part of society. As such business ideas are solidifying
factors, even though they are fundamentally dynamic in character. Solidification thus does
not  require any statics. As such even business ideas may operate as a solidifying factor.
This is carried out through innovativeness and the communicativeness bound to
innovativeness. An idea is never the same but is always flexible and elastic. A business
method patent, however, links ideas and innovativeness to the architectural construction
of rights. This occurs through the communicativeness of a business method patent. A patent
actually connects the right to use, i.e., the right to forbid third parties, and the right to access,
i.e., the right to change the legal position or legal relationships. This applies to business
ideas especially as they essentially include rights on both levels. The communicativeness
of ideas becomes apparent also in the changing balance of business ideas.
In its traditional sense, business is commerce and is fundamentally based on
transactions. This is true also in the digital economy but the digital economy is more than
only transactions. The significance of transactions in the digital economy also affects the
changing balance of operations. A change in the significance of transactions or in their
essence is exactly due to the changing balance of operations. Even though it is commerce
that makes money, the logics of the digital economy are constructed differently. The digital
economy is based on operations being carried out through networking, which is precisely
the most essential element. This challenges also communicativeness. At the same time it
makes communication of ideas the most central way to achieve functionality. Communicating
through business ideas, however, changes the way to see the scope of protection. First of
all, a business idea cannot be kept secret, for secrecy actually closes communication. Secrecy
closes communicativeness and this does not work in the digital economy. The main reason
for this is the significance of the free flow of information as the basis of innovativeness.
On the other hand, the business idea as a central means of communication, and the business
method as its visible application, affects the way a business method patent is viewed. A patent
is an effective way to govern rights but at the same time it has its disadvantages. A patent
closes ideas although at the same time it may be used for informing others about the implications
of ideas. Nevertheless, a patent is a means to control the use of information and as such
governance through patents remains rather static. In the communicative and innovative
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digital economy such strong and freezing governance easily closes even communicative
networking.
3.4.1.3 The business idea as a connector
In business, a name is axiomatically employed as a connector. Usually a name is used also
as a sign of identification of certain business and the products of certain producer.348 A good
example is trademarks and today also domain names. Identification here is not, however,
not necessarily bound to mere goods or market actors as such but may even be carried out
at the level of the operational framework. Identification at this level is based on innovativeness
as the core of functionality and as such also as a central part of societal behavior. This is
based on the rapid and fluent innovativeness of the digital economy. As the economy
constitutes a central element of society, it is important to be able to identify oneself even inside
the economical structures. This may be carried out through a name and its definitive expression
but identification may also be carried out somewhat more directly. This is realized through
the capability to innovate. This is a direct outcome of the scope of innovations as the basis
of societal operations and it becomes extremely significant in the digital economy. By these
means innovativeness closely resembles the domain character of the domain name as it
determines how to define the position of an actor.
Innovation constitutes a domain character for the innovator. The domain character
has some further consequences in the overall innovative framework. Business ideas may
be used as innovative units. Each of them constitutes the elements of the overall framework.
As innovative units, business ideas may be examined as connectors in that they connect
ideas to the overall structure of digital economy. Further, when connected to the operational
framework business ideas shape the very structure of the framework. In sum, business ideas,
especially the ones that are structured digitally, are the main structural elements in
constructing the digital economy and its functional framework.
Business ideas as connectors are, on the other hand, a means to create identifications.
Identification in this sense is closely linked to the structure of the operational environment,
i.e., the economy where business ideas are to be employed. Business ideas in a way shape
the environment and it is rather essential to be able to take part in this construction task.
In other words, to be part of the economy and communicate in it, it is essential to participate
in its overall structure. In this way business ideas may easily be considered as both
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participation and identification. As such they ought to be considered as more than simply a way
to make profits.
3.4.1.4 The empowered privilege of the business idea
The significance of ideas in the networking digital economy appears at two levels. At the one
level, there is the static privileged character of ideas as protected and thus excluded property.
In the digital economy this is precisely related to business ideas because of their essence.
The focus of this level is on statics. Accordingly, at this level it is important to be able to
define contextually the legal position of a right-holder. The position is now manifested in
its static sense. On the other hand, defining the legal position in its static sense is crucial
in order to be able to set certain limits on the right to use. This is the core of the static aspect
when defining the content of the position as a combination of rights. However, mere statics
is not enough for constituting the overall basis of rights governance architecture; there always
exists a need for a certain degree of dynamics. On the other level, there are dynamics that
are introduced by the right to access. Right to access is closely linked to the external party’s right
to access when a right-holder is able to directly affect the legal positions of other actors.349
These parallel levels constitute the scope of the networking of ideas.
Further, these two levels are based on a clear but partly overlapping distinction that
has to do with cooperation and communication. The static aspect is mainly based on a certain
degree of inventiveness, whereas the dynamic is more or less based on innovativeness. For
example, the utilization of certain information is based on the right-holder’s patent, with
he or she having a right to open the access of the public to it in order to increase
innovativeness. Sometimes this information may even include ideas. The combination of
these two levels is further employed as the core of a business idea; a business idea as a certain
form of innovativeness includes both of these levels. The core of a business idea is
constituted on the coexistence of statics and dynamics with this core becoming even deeper
through this structure. The core is actually constituted of a static privilege to utilize the
invention and a dynamic power to open access to it.
Depth is achieved by connecting these two levels. In this way they actually are not
merely parallel but also in a continuous communicational relationship. This is in fact what the
dynamics are based on. The communication between these two levels then makes the whole
combination of rights dynamic, or at least functional as to its most fundamental character.
In other words, both the static right to use and the dynamic right to open access need to
coexist. This coexistence is then used in constructing the integrity of the contents of the
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legal position, which further constitute the combination of empowered privilege and the
combination of the privileged power of ideas.
The combination of empowered privilege plus privileged power is first constructed
from the static viewpoint. The proper functionality of the system of intellectual property
rights requires that one define the sphere of those who are entitled to certain rights and
those who are not. This is, again, carried out through excluding the external parties by
creating the privilege for a right-holder as an included one. In other words, the privileged
position actually includes a privilege to utilize the idea and it correlates with the external
parties’ no-right to do this.350 The right to use certain information as a privilege is actually
the most central content when making use of a patented business method. At the same time,
it may as well be defined as the scope of an invention as a static creation. This actually
constitutes the core of the static aspect in the sense of the traditional position of the right-
holder. Traditionally, content in its static sense would be complemented by the right to forbid
third parties to behave in a certain way, i.e., to interfere with the right-holder’s right to utilize
his or her invention. This actually constitutes the core of statics as a protected legal position
of a right-holder.
The overall content of the right-holder’s legal position is, however, based on a
combination of both privilege and power, exactly like the content of the corresponding
position concerning names. The empowerment is increased in the privilege. Thus privilege
as a patent for a business method is actually empowered by the market and networking when
the overall business idea may be privileged through patenting a method. Networking is
precisely the social element in the scope of a business idea. This is where there emerges a need
for a new interpretation of legal status. Basically it seems that in the scope of the digital
economy the traditional view remains fundamentally too static, exactly like the examination
of domain names presented previously. In the scope of a business idea there likewise exists
a crucial need for dynamics in this interpretation. The structure needs to be complemented
with some degree of dynamics when the content of more dynamic business ideas is
constructed of power to open access to the public in addition to privilege to use. The crucial
need to combine these two positions - privilege and power - is again one of the essential
consequences of the digital economy. In the context of the digital economy it is insufficient
to interpret the content of legal position only through the static aspect. Statics are a necessary
but no longer a sufficient building block in the overall structure. Namely, there ought to
be some reconciliation of statics and dynamics in order to highlight the social aspect of business
ideas. Dynamics and the social aspect are introduced by networking and reciprocal
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communication, with the dynamic element of content introduced by the power to open
access.
Privilege is further complemented through empowerment, which is then further
founded on public access to ideas. In this scope ideas are excluded from the public domain,
for example, through patenting the application underlying an idea or keeping simply ideas
secret. A right to open access to an idea adds some power to a legal position that is first
described through privilege. Empowerment is here carried out precisely through opening
the access to an idea in order to innovate and cooperate. The access to an idea as
empowerment is based directly on the need for innovativeness and networking in the digital
economy. In this context empowerment is carried out for several reasons. The first is directly
connected to innovativeness as networking. Modern innovations can no longer (if they ever
could!) be based on closed exploitation of merely the innovator’s own ideas. Innovations
need to be developed in social communication and, further, ought to become accepted by
the market. Innovativeness is very much communication.
Communication in the area of innovations is carried out between the market and
innovations but at the same time also in the whole operational networking environment.
However, it is exactly this approval that gives invention some special strength. This is then
the basis of the overall empowering force of patent. However, when protected through a
patent the opened access to applied ideas is doubly strengthened. First, the strengthening
is carried out by creating a privileged position by excluding the external parties through
the patent. Second, it is carried out through market approval itself. By these means protection
also becomes twofold, but the communication is carried out in two separate relations. The
first of these is determining, taking the form of the right-holder’s right to his or her
invention, while the second is more functional, taking the form of innovativeness as
networking. This structure is nonetheless the core of empowerment.
Parallel to this task there is, however, the aspect of technical development that always needs
to be taken into consideration in the case of patents. This applies also to business method
patents. Despite their essential social connections, business methods are usually patented
as technological applications, thus connecting the patents closely to technological
development. The privileging of this power is carried out through an  excluded access, which
actually makes the invention a part of overall technological development. Each business
method patent thus becomes a part of the group of existing inventions. This constitutes
the basis for why patenting these inventions creates a position of empowered privilege. In
this way, both business and technology are linked together, which is the core of business
methods.
A business method as an invention becomes a part of inventiveness and functional
networking. This is also why an invention as a privilege of the right-holder is empowered
by its engagement with continuous technological development. As a combination of two
parallel and overlapping areas, a business method patent may practically be considered a
prototype of the empowerment of privilege. A business method  fundamentally contains all the crucial
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elements of empowered privilege. First, privilege is created by patenting. Patenting implies
exclusion of all the external parties from the utilization of an invention and accordingly
implies a privilege for the right-holder to utilize the invention. This applies to patents in
general; business methods, however, constitute a special category because of their close
connection to the market and the economy. This engagement is complemented by
empowering this privilege, which is carried out through the acceptance of market.
3.4.1.5 The privileged power of the business idea
A business method constitutes one of the core elements of the digital economy, especially
when examined in a slightly larger sense as a business idea. Even at the structural level,
business ideas include both privilege and power. They also operate as the foundation of
privileging power. Further, the concept of privileged power itself is actually carried out by
concentrating on the very same aspects as in the concept of empowered privilege. The
combination of power and privilege is then constructed equally in both of the cases, i.e.,
that of privileged power and of empowered privilege. It is only the prescriptive approach
taken in interpretation that is to be changed. Thus, the empowerment of privilege and
privileging of power are basically interconnected counterforces in the sense that they are
similarly created, only from opposite standpoints.
First of all, power is privileged through granting the right-holder exclusive access to an
invention. Exclusivity of access to and utilization of an invention operates as a powerful
position in an innovative framework, with the privileging of this position imparting some
strength into this combination. Empowerment is carried out precisely through the mutual
communication and internal functionality of the patented business method and the market as
an operational frame. Market acceptance gives the business method patent such a vitality
that the whole patent is strengthened, i.e., empowered through it. Usually this kind of strong
market acceptance grants the right-holder a controlling position in the market, especially
when market acceptance is aimed at a protected and, for this reason, excludable object. In
this way a possibility to reach a controlling position in the market creates a powerful position
for the business method. This is also why market acceptance creates empowerment for a
patent, with a patent defined as a privilege.
On the other hand, empowered privilege is linked to an exclusive position that is
further empowered by market acceptance. In this sense market acceptance is reached in
the course of time. The better and more powerful a business method is, or the better it
becomes in the market, the more it gets value that is increased for the company. This actually
means that the controlling position in the market is privileged through patenting a business method.
For business methods this kind of privileging is likely because of their significance in the
market. Business methods are exploited directly in the market, their being precisely designed
for market purposes only. Moreover, a successful business method increases its value and
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strength. A good example is the lock-in effect, which is precisely a means of getting and
exploiting one’s controlling force in the market.351 On the other hand, market operations
are constituted basically of market-accepted business methods. Thereby, any business method
patent becomes rather promising in the market, even if not yet accepted by the market.
3.4.2 Exclusion as an essential part of the business idea
A business method patent is constituted on excludability, with the core of a protectable
business method as the core of an idea being defined through its entitlement to the right-
holder’s right to utilize the invention and access to it. The core is defined through a patent
as the main protection instrument of business methods. This, however, requires that a
business method needs to be expressed and manifested clearly in order to exclude others
from the utilization of the method or in order to include someone in it. This constitutes
the static aspect of the content of the legal position. At the same time, this exclusion creates
a privilege for the included one, i.e., the right-holder. On the other hand, the privilege
contains exclusion from ideas in the sense of being able to forbid external parties to interfere
in using the right-holder’s privilege. Accordingly, each of the external parties has a no-right
to interfere in the use-right of a right-holder. A business method may be utilized only by
the right-holder.
In this way, exclusion delimits the privilege in its static sense. On the other hand,
the privilege associated with a business method is created through patenting. Patenting may
be considered a means to constitute a sustainable exclusive right to a business method. At
the same time, exclusivity sets limits on a business method as an invention. These are exactly
the boundaries that are needed for creating the exclusive position. In this way, boundaries
define a privilege as a right to utilize the information included in a business method. This
is basically how the content of the position of a right-holder for a business method is
constituted in its static sense.
Exclusion is static. This is mainly due to its strict boundaries, which are basically
nevertheless structured communicatively. Communication is carried out as related to society
in the form of existing inventions. This is a direct implication of a business method as an invention
and the requirement that it be useful, novel, inventive, and properly disclosed when a patent
is granted. These prerequisites are clear but at the same time they are static. Statics are then
further implied in the overall system of intellectual property rights, in this case through
patent. Communicativeness is derived from the sphere of existing technological development,
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meaning that the basis is constituted of existing patented inventions. This is exactly why
the exclusion is rather static and its boundaries are not very flexible. In this respect the existing
mass of inventions as the basis of technological development implies the statics of
inventiveness. In this sense, it is precisely inventiveness that constitutes the kernel of
exclusion in its static sense. At the same time, the static exclusivity in business methods
for its part makes up the static part of the rights governance architecture. Thus the
boundaries of exclusion are drawn through the communicative relationship of an invention
and its framework. In this respect inventiveness, even in its static sense, is fundamentally
no more than communication.
The scope of exclusivity, on the other hand, is defined from the viewpoint of drawing
those boundaries.  The exclusivity of patented business methods is precisely legal exclusivity.
There do not exist any features that would naturally exclude ideas from common use and the
boundaries ought to be defined through law. This is also why these boundaries are artificial
and exclusion, i.e., the right to utilize an invention, is likewise clarified artificially. The
demarcation is carried out against the sphere of commons. Here, exclusivity from ideas
for making business may be examined also from the viewpoint of how crucial the information
is from which the external parties are to be excluded. This is based on the view that there
simply exist some resources upon which many people depend. Inventing new technology
is not enough: there always exists a need for a “killer” application that actually inspires
people to learn how to use the new development. Business methods are described as one such
inventions.352 This again illustrates the social aspect of business ideas. Information that is
excluded by patenting a business method actually seems to be rather essential when it is
used to construct “killer“ applications. Such business methods are used precisely for inspiring
new technological development.
3.4.3 The relative governance of rights in business ideas
The rights governance architecture would remain static if founded on exclusivity as its only
element. The static exclusive element of the rights governance architecture ultimately needs
to be complemented through a dynamic view. This is best illustrated by going on in the
examination of the rights governance architecture of the most essential societal resources. At the
same time the balance of the overall rights governance architecture moves to a somewhat
more abstract and more dynamic level. Governance is thus aimed at governing abstract
objects. On the other hand, when those abstract objects, or even rights, come to be governed,
access to socially crucial resources may give rise to some problems. These are handled by
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adding to the resource-dependent relationship a formal and legally constituted person-
dependent relationship. An example will shed some light on this: A farmer, in order to plant
crops, is dependent upon having seeds to plant. This is called an object-dependent
relationship, because of the crucial nature of the object. If these seeds are now the subject
of a patent, the farmer is dependent upon the permission of the owner of the abstract object
for access to those seeds. A person-dependent relationship has  been added to the object-
oriented relationship.353 This would easily be considered a business method.
The close interconnection of object and subject in the core of rights governance is
actually the reason why there exists a need to examine both the static and dynamic aspects;
i.e., there is a need to define the dynamic aspect parallel to the static aspect of rights. The
core of this examination lies in the person-dependent relationship as described above. It
is precisely in the empowerment of a static excludable object-dependent position that the
need arises for relative rights governance in the rights governance architecture. This is in
fact the scope of the dynamics that have been added. Therefore, as statics are needed for
defining the sphere of excluded and included, dynamics are necessary for defining the rights carried
out in mutual networking. Networking is a rather direct consequence of the person-dependent
construction of artificial resources. Several rights may be involved in networking; it is in
fact possible that there may exist several competing rights.
The main difference between statics and dynamics in constructing the rights
governance architecture may be found directly in the character of both aspects. Static
exclusion of rights is carried out for an invention, as an invention is characteristically static.
The statics are exactly definitive statics, which are suitable in this delineation. When defining
the boundaries whether something constitutes an invention or not, there is not yet very much
need to examine the rights in their later interaction. This is exactly the focus of the difference
between statics and dynamics. On the other hand, dynamics need to be defined slightly
differently given that dynamics are generally used for combining inventiveness and
innovativeness, i.e., combining the static aspect and the dynamic aspect. In this context it
is then precisely innovativeness that connects the business method and dynamics in the
overall rights governance architecture.
The dynamic element is further brought in precisely by the empowerment of privilege.
For business methods this is generally carried out through market acceptance. Market
acceptance actually closely connects the crucial role of “killer” applications in technological
development in employing the crucial information in its social context and the person-
dependent relation of those socially crucial resources. Both the importance of “killer”
applications and the person-dependence of intellectual property rights increase the power
of inventions, which constitute their own background. Those “killer“applications are based
on excluded privilege as the core of invention, as object-dependence is based on excluded
privilege. Here, the object-oriented view of relationships illustrates statics even more clearly
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be physical. Therefore, information needs to be commodified and made more “thing-like”.
See Rosenblatt - Trippe - Mooney 2002, 19.
355 The basic purchase of goods on open networks, however, occurs exactly in the most
traditional way. One goes to the Web site, fills in some information, gives one’s credit card
number, and gets a file that contains some content in encrypted form. One then downloads
a client application that decrypts the content and plays or shows it, or passes it to another
application to do this. Traditional trade is based on this kind of activity on the network as
well as in the physical world. This is based on encryption technology, and it provides
scrambling of information. This is called cryptographic key management system and
protection is carried on in such a way that it can be decoded only by authorized users.
Decoding can be done only by using a certain key or code The encryption technology ensures
that some digital transactions are secure. See Samuels 2000,  112.
356 One and the most original of these business models is paid download. Paid download is the
closest equivalent of selling and purchasing physical goods because of the simple model
of buying, selling, and then getting what one has bought. This system is simple, and it is
mainly based on digital rights management. See Rosenblatt - Trippe - Mooney 2002, 20.
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when the object constitutes the core of the whole construction. The relative connection
to the market in fact changes the privileged position directly into empowered privilege.
In addition to market acceptance innovativeness requires rights governance.
Inventiveness is carried out through the static element and it is founded on the requirements
of usefulness, novelty, and inventiveness. These prerequisites are essential in order to define
the business method patent as a privilege. Innovativeness itself may, however, be carried
out only when there are several parties involved. Innovativeness is like an ongoing process
or a continuous procedure, which consists of cooperating actors. This kind of process is
rather complicated to fit into the traditional systematics of intellectual property rights. The
process is constituted of communication, which is basically carried out between technological
development and (co)operating innovators. Strict adherence to traditions would freeze up
the system. A good example of dynamic functions shrinking back towards static ones is
the system of digital rights management. From the viewpoint of intellectual dynamics the
main aim of the traditional systems of digital rights management is to make the online world
more like the offline.354 This actually means that nearly all business models exploiting digital
rights management systems are somehow based on or located somewhere in the supply
management chain, where there still exists some commodified information.355  This is why
the paid download models are not a revolutionary reform for business; they are totally fixed
to statics.356 It is only the form in which the content is downloaded that has really changed.
The business framework as such has remained unchanged, and it seems that there is no
need to remove the traditional business pattern from the framework.
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3.5 Venture governance as functional governance relations
Venture capital is based on pure communication. Communication inside venture capital
is carried out through money and capital. Capital is the most essential structural kernel of venture
capital. Capital constitutes the central accumulating element, to which all the structural parts
of the overall venture are then linked. In order to remain functional, this core requires
unrestricted communication inside it. On the other hand, capital is squarely based on money
and the relativeness of capital is directly affected by money. Accordingly, communicativeness
as the kernel of venture capital constitutes the foundation for its further examination. This
is in fact the definitive element that makes venture capital in a structural sense partly static
and partly dynamic.
The coexistence of statics and dynamics requires communication in order to be
functional enough. It is precisely the interplay of statics and dynamics that constitutes one
of the most foundational communicative consequences in venture capital. Statics are implied
through a certain part of the structure of the venture. This structure is constituted of some
elements of capital that have been described as its privileged elements. These privileged
elements further constitute the content of the legal position of a right-holder in its static
sense. In what follows, the constitution of this legal position is actually used as to posit
capital as the element linking statics and dynamics.
3.5.1 The content of venture capital as a combination of rights
3.5.1.1 Functional capital
The functionality of capital is clearly manifested in its ability to constitute relationships. In this
sense capital is generally considered rather strong, with this strength basically founded on
communication. This is the very core of the functionality of capital. The communication
here is, however, rather relative: it is constituted always differently depending on the parties
participating in it.357 The communicative pattern is constructed relatively, which actually
corresponds closely to communication being the kernel of capital. The structure here is
as highly dependent on the overall design of the cluster of relevant relationships. On the
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other hand, this cluster constitutes the communicative part of the overall construction, where
functionality is employed somehow differently depending on the purpose of different
relationships and on their significance in the overall governance architecture.
The capital involved is either real tangible capital, such as physical assets, or
intellectual capital. This is exactly where money enters the picture. Namely, these different
classes of capital are rather incommensurable unless translated into the language of money.
Money is an essential tool for interrelating the diverse elements and relationships of capital as the
kernel of functionality. In this task money is actually made to imitate this overall
functionality. This then affects relationships that are based directly on money. Those relations
are often described as two-party relationships. As such they are likewise defined as two-way
relations, with this two-way character making the functionality rather determined.
Functionality is namely fixed to the mutual connection of the two cooperating and
communicating parties. In a two-way relationship money is defined as a sort of contextual
feature of this connective relationship. In other words, there would be no relationships without
money, which is employed in these two-way relations in the form of credit. Money actually
has two tasks when it operates as the core of functional capital: it communicates social relations
and operates as an intermediary between them.
Money is used as a commensurable measurement of the amount and the value of
capital.358 This twofold communicativeness of money is rather manifest in the networking
relationship, where there exist several cooperating actors. An illustrative example is venture
capital and the governance architectures of venture capital relationships. Such relationships
are even more complicated than simple two-party relationships. The task of money is to
define the mutual relations of the actors and their relative values. This is precisely the basis
of the rights governance architecture of money: this basis has to be founded on economic
commensurability. Economic commensurability seems to be the basis of the overall rights
governance architecture in that it is founded precisely on money. In this respect money has,
however, again a dual meaning. It is both an asset and a position. Money operates namely as
an illustration of economic value while it is precisely economic value that constitutes the
significance of money as an asset. On the other hand, the ability to constitute and govern
relationships is a manifestation of the capacity of money to constitute positions. These two
indicators are closely and solidly bound together in the essence of money.
The functionality of capital is constructed on the cooperation of the static function
of money as an object and the dynamic function of money as a position. These two functions
are carried out in parallel and their realization is at least partly mutually interdependent. In other
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 words, the value that is given to the capital may be any value whatsoever, but the capital
as such is always a part of the rights governance architecture of cooperating relationships.
The object-orientation  becomes a crucial part of those governed relations. Concurrently, the
position that is constituted through money may be defined differently depending on the
operating parties and their mutual relationships, but the capital has always some value that
has to be further defined through money. Here, the position-orientation, for its part, is
implied directly in the governance architecture. This dualistic task of money also constitutes
the functionality of money and is precisely carried out by the combination of the static and
dynamic dimensions of capital.
Moreover, money characteristically includes a hazardous dimension, with this
hazardousness of money as a venture illustrating communicativeness as well. Money as
a venture is the factor that applies precisely to the functional dimension of capital. This
is basically because of the necessary uncertainty and hazardousness involved in a venture.
Capital as a venture includes several different acting patterns as the basis of getting rewarded.
These patterns are further described either as risks or as opportunities as they are bound directly
to the very essence of a venture. In other words, a venture gets its most central content as
the unity of different acting patterns and operative possibilities. In this context relationships
constitute the core of functionality.
3.5.1.2 Structural capital
Concurrently with its functional dimension money has also some other significant tasks,
one important one being bound to the structural dimension of capital. The structural
dimension of capital is precisely based on money, exactly like the functionality of money.
Here, the functional dimension is complemented by the structural one. On the other hand,
the structural element differs slightly from the functional one. The variation is manifested
mainly in their application. The most essential function of the structural element of money
lies in its constructive potential.359 Money is thus used, for example, as an intermediating
instrument for vested investments. Investments are vested and, by these means, embedded,
into innovations. Innovations often may even govern money flows, whereby money at the
same time operates as a governing instrument for innovations.
Money operates as a constructive instrument and as such it is used for governing
rights and responsibilities. In this way money constitutes the basis of the rights governance
architecture. It is exactly here where the divergence of the functionality of money is
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illustrated. The starting point for both is nevertheless the foundational network of
relationships, but where the structural pattern is based on adaptation of both static and
dynamic elements at the same time, the functional one is more likely associated with
dynamics.
However, capital has some conflicting elements here, compared to ideas, or names. Both
a name and an idea may be protected through intellectual property rights - a name through
trademark, an expression of an idea in the form of invention through a patent. Accordingly,
they get protection that is directly based on the privilege and right of the right-holder to
exclude external parties from his or her utilization of a right. In this way an idea and name
both rather closely approach the traditional sphere of intellectual property rights. This is
precisely where capital is very different. There is no way to construct any protected privileged
position with regard to capital that is similar to the traditional privileged position that can
be constructed on intellectual property rights. In the case of money these positions are thus
more likely to be focused on governing investments vested in innovations. This is precisely
where the structural examination of capital needs to be focused. The first task is to construct
the core area of rights by defining privilege within it.
The privileged position of a right-holder is derived directly from money as the core
object of capital. Money that is committed to venture capital is usually used in an operative
network; networking for its part constituting the most usual operative form of venture
capital. On the other hand, in an operative network the privileged position is for this reason
essentially based on money. This means that money is the definitive element in these
relationships and especially in constituting the privilege of the right-holder. Functionally,
this totally equalizes the two-party credit relationship as a prototype of legal relationships.
The owner of money thus has a privileged position in venture capital in its structural sense.
3.5.1.3 Identificational capital
In addition to functional and structural dimensions, money has at least one more important
task. Money is also used as a tool for identifying the actors who are participating in networking.
In this sense venture capital is paradigmatic as a construction of several different cooperating
actors. The identifying task of capital is slightly different from both its functional and
structural ones. As an identification tool capital namely defines precisely the roles of different
actors.360 This is integral especially in venture capital, where the whole structure of capital
is built on a mutually collaborating network. Further, those roles are the basis of constructing
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any privileged positions with regard to capital. In these cases the investor receives the
privilege on the grounds of his or her investment. Privilege is, in other words, based directly
on the position of the investor. On the other hand, such a position is directly  derived from
the amount of his or her investment. This is also why his or her privilege is derived directly
from money as an identifier.
The identificational function of money is manifested also in another way. Venture
capital is founded on the operative abilities of cooperating parties. In other words, the capability
to participate in operations and the ability to influence them constitutes actually another
viewpoint on the identificational function of money. This is most clearly illustrated in the
ability of venture capital actors to acquire essential business information and employ it.
In the risky network of venture capital, access to business information is a rather important
feature of privilege. On the other hand, here it is again precisely money, exploited through
the investment, that opens up this access and forms the basis of the privilege. The risky
nature of venture capital also requires a clear definition of privileges and identification of
actors operating under those privileges. The hazardousness of venture capital is one
important factor when constituting the rights governance architecture through money. In
this architecture the identification of actors is indeed one of the most essential elements.
Identification like this is then further carried out through money as an intermediary
instrument, granting the investors privileged positions through their investments. This is
also the main feature that is used in identifying their positions.
3.5.1.4 The empowered privilege in capital
The core of the legal position of a right-holder is based on his or her privilege and the
correlating no-right of a duty-bearer. This constitutes the static kernel of the right-holder’s
legal position from the viewpoint of venture capital. The privileged position is thus created
in venture capital on at least three different grounds. One of them is the essence of money, with
money used as an intermediating tool in the venture capital structure. The essence of money
has a  close connection to the essence of investment in venture capital. Investment creates
a strong operative position for the investor. Money is precisely the factor that creates a
privileged position for the investor. In this sense the investor acts as the owner of this
invested money and accordingly gets a privileged position through his or her monetary
investment.
The privileged position of a right-holder is founded on the significance of information.
This position is precisely based on the privileged position as a right to access. On the other
hand, privilege as access is based precisely on the essential nature of information in those
relationships. Access to information creates a strong privilege for those with access. They
get access to required information and at the same time get a strong position because of
that. Access to information does not, however, as such yet impart any empowered
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functionality to the information itself. Access is still only access without any precise dynamic
power in it. It is further basically the employment of privilege and access together that makes up
the empowerment of this privileged position.
The third of the fundamental grounds of privileged position in venture capital is
networking. In fact, networking is partly connected to both access to information and money
as an investment. Both constitute, each for its part, the privileged position in venture capital.
Further, both privileged positions - access to information and money as investment -
constitute in part the network structure and the operative positions inside it. Networking
may basically be considered as a prototype of a rights governance architecture. This is precisely due
to its communicative character and the significance of social relations in it. By these means
communication within networking as a whole is basically founded on rights governance.
Moreover, networking as the overall communicative construction is still an effective
instrument to bring some power to the privileged position.
These arguments are all closely bound to investment, which through money constitutes
a privilege for the investor. This privilege is basically constituted similarly to the credit
relationship, which implies considerable statics in the position. The legal position of a right-
holder in the credit relationship thus becomes generally rather static. Nevertheless, the simple
credit relationship between a debtor and creditor may well be considered as the prototype
of legal relationships when those are based on money. Accordingly the credit relationship
may be defined as an exemplar of the privileged position of the right-holder in financial
relations. The credit relationship is useful in another sense as well. Namely, the two-party
credit relationship as the basic financial relationship places capital in the center of the privileged
position. Actually, it is precisely the private and static character of this relationship that
creates the privilege for the right-holder. At the same time the position of the right-holder
is defined as a privileged one. This is indeed why the relationships that are based on capital
or money are often primarily examined and defined exactly through the statics of the basic
relationship.
On the other hand, statics are not unfavorable for the rights governance architecture
where money is concerned. The statics of the basic credit relationship provide the venture
governance with some constancy. This is clearly manifested in the impending realization of
a credit relationship, that is, if there occur some problems in paying back the loan and
enforcement is needed. This constancy of the credit relationship appears in the arrangements
for the impending realization, which may be termed a sort of risk governance. Money in the
sense of an obligation of the debtor to the creditor is employed here exactly as a tool of
governance. Nevertheless, the statics of this relationship make the governance structure
static as well. On the other hand, we may examine the illustration of rights governance as
governing risks. This is the reverse side of the kernel of rights governance in venture capital.
However, the statics of risk governance in the credit relationship are manifested in another
way through the amount of risk and the allocation of it. In the static basic credit relationship
there is no way to allocate either the amount of obligation or the bearer of the risk of failure.
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It is always the debtor who has to bear the risk of failure and this is naturally a rather heavy
burden for a small start-up enterprise.
The Hohfeldian pattern is clear in the credit relationship, which as such is constituted
of the correlating privilege of a right-holder and no-right of an external party. In a simple
two-party relationship the correlative relationship of privilege and no-right is rather clear.
This also applies to relationships in venture capital, where it is the monetary investment
that creates the privilege for an investor. Venture capital is, however, rather more dynamic.
For this reason venture capital emphasizes even more the privileged position of only one
actor, i.e., the investor. On the other hand, the significance of the privileged position of
the investor is further mainly manifested in the cooperativeness of venture capital. Further,
this is exactly where the empowerment of privilege is carried out. Empowered privilege
is based on the elements introduced above and it is mainly created through the position that
the investor gets when he or she receives the power of decision in the financed company. This is true
especially in the case of venture capitalists, who aim at maximal profits; i.e., they invest for
maximal profit and aim to exit right when the maximal profit is reached. Therefore, the
decision-making power, as well as the privilege that is to be empowered, is more focused
on governing and increasing the forthcoming profit.
On the other hand, capital venture may be examined from the viewpoint of risk
management, exactly like risk governance in the credit relationship. Risk management is
actually the other of the main indicators of a capital venture, together with profit for exit.
It is true that risks in capital venture are based partly on the expected profit, but they are
also based on powdering the hazards of cooperating parties. The risks are borne by a larger
number of operating parties, whereby the amount of risk often remains lower. On the other
hand, the realization of a risk is not such a big calamity for the debtor. The most threatening
risk a small early-stage enterprise is naturally that it will not be viable. From the viewpoint
of an investor this means that he or she might lose his or her investment. Basically, however,
risk management is just like risk governance. This is due to the mutual relation of risk and
the actors in a venture capital arrangement. In this classification risk is more likely to be
connected to the possible profit or damage and risk management gets its definition from
the situation itself. Risk management is based precisely on the risk and its management,
whereas risk governance is somewhat opposite to this. It is likely based on governing
relations of people and the functional coexistence of the relations among them. Risk
governance is  more relationship-oriented and it is also characteristically more functional.
The functionality of risk governance places some demands on the overall system.
Most of all, the governance structure requires some concretization. This may be realized in the
form of money and by means of creating empowered privilege on the basis of governance.
Money, once again, is a useful feature for concretizing a risk and communicating it to others.
This again illustrates the commensurability of money, which makes possible its use as the
basis of right governance. The governed relationships need to be defined through the
positions that they constitute in the overall functionality. This is then exactly again the place
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where privilege as position and money as a concretizing feature are brought together. On
the other hand, the significance of money as risk governance is clearly manifested in the
market. The market is clearly based on money, with the social relationships in the market
based on exchange and trading possibilities.361 The commensurability of money also gets
its manifestation here. The significance of money is closely linked to the value of goods,
with the value further employed as the societal task of a good. Therefore, when goods are
exchanged they fulfill at the same time their societal task and ensure societal communication.
This is the most fundamental reason to base the rights governance architecture on objects:
the rights governance architecture is based on exchange and on the value of a thing as a
constructive instrument of governance. In this respect exchange operates as a parallel
instrument to rights governance. Risk governance is realized at the same time as exchange
and is at least partly bound to exchange and the value of things. Risk governance thus
follows the possession of a thing, with the one having possession often also bearing the
risk.
3.5.1.5 The privileged power in capital
Money is communication. When speaking about capital, it is precisely money that constitutes
the foundation of communication. Money operates as the fundamental factor in constituting
the overall communicative structure of capital ventures. This is carried out through the
communicativeness of money as such. Capital, being founded on money, is already functional and
it gets its entire content from different relationships and their coexistence. It is basically
money that gives capital its functionality. On the other hand, the power of money derives directly
from its functionality. The very ability to communicate is power, especially in the networking
framework. Money may as such be used as a communicational tool and the one who has
the control of money in a certain operational framework also has the power to control the use of
that money, for example, in the form of innovations as vested investments. Through this
power he or she further gets the power to control and direct all the other operations that
are to be carried out by the controller. Innovativeness is often carried out through this. As
such money takes on a significant role as a controlling device. This also applies even to
venture capital.
Rights governance, as well as risk governance in venture capital, are both based on
the privileged position of the right-holder that is created through money. An investor invests
in an enterprise and its potential success. The investment is carried out in the form of money,
but at the same time money creates a privilege for the investor. This privilege then creates
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the power for the investor to influence the executive decisions inside the enterprise, given
that the investments are vested in its crucial operations. Money is here employed as a
connecting factor between the privilege and the investor. On the other hand, the bond of
privilege and investor operates as the foundation of the privileged power of money. For this
purpose the privilege that is created through money is simply strengthened through
empowering that position.
This requires that privilege and power be overtly connected. On the other hand,
empowerment is carried out by the competence of the investor which is still a privileged
position. The competence is, again, linked to the power of the right-holder, i.e., the investor,
to make decisions regarding the business operations. Further, money as the manifestation
of privilege in these operations converts the whole position into an empowered one. This
is the core of privileged power. Thus privileged power is fundamentally based on the active
role of the investor. The activity derives directly from the role of the investor as a shareholder
rather than as a mere actor granting an ordinary loan. The role as a shareholder converts
the passive and static role of the financier into an active role as a part of the executive body
of the enterprise. On the other hand, the role of an investor is a privilege based on the
investment, and the activity of the shareholder is definitively described as privileged power.
3.5.2 Exclusivity as the demarcation of venture capital
The content of the legal position of a right-holder may not be considered complete without
any real right to exclude third parties. Exclusion basically operates as a complementary
element of the static aspect of money and it is fundamentally constituted as the privileged
position of a right-holder. The right to exclude constitutes the complementary element to
the right-holder’s privilege to utilize the object. In the terms of the Hohfeldian conceptual
frame the right-holder’s privilege to use correlates with the external party’s no-right to use
and accordingly the right-holder’s right to forbid correlates with the external party’s duty
to not interfere in the use. The special character of venture capital is clearly manifested in
the exclusivity of the privileged position of investor.
Here, contrary to exclusive rights generally, the rights of venture capital are particularly
restricted exclusive rights. In other words, exclusivity does not mean a ceaseless or unchangeable
right but only a limited one. Limitations are imposed through both the time to use and the
way to use. In all cases both include the exclusivity of venture capital inside the boundaries
of the static aspect. On the other hand, exclusivity that is restricted to a certain limited time
period sets the position of the venture capitalist inside a defined future duration. The
A rights governance architecture in light of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame
362 On the other hand, the financial structure of venture capital is often based on so called exit
strategies where the arrangements are founded through contracts that allow an investor to
exit when he or she has the strongest power in a company.  See Lauriala 2001, 59.
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financing that is carried out in the form of venture capital is always defined in duration.362
On the other hand the defined duration is a means to introduce exclusivity by limiting the
time period. In other words, a time limitation defines the extent of exclusion. Basically this applies
clearly to the exclusion of those who are entitled to utilize the right. The difference is
introduced by constituting exclusivity in a slightly varied way. Exclusion is carried out in
a rather more functional way than by defining it only through different personal relationships.
Further, the restricted liquidity of private equities is the manifestation of exclusion
in the relations of those who are bound to the venture capital enterprise. This is clearly
carried out in the form of a restriction of transferability of the equities. In other words, the
exclusion is based directly on the equities themselves and the exclusivity becomes defined
as the attributes of those equities. On the other hand, the investor is bound to the enterprise
by the exclusive nature of private equities.
3.5.3 The relative governance of rights in venture capital
Venture capital operates in a characteristically functional way. Functionality is basically due
to two overlapping elements, which function mutually constructive parts of the venture
capital structure overall. Networking brings functionality to the operations of venture capital
and functionality itself is at the same time increased by these means. On the other hand,
the significance of information sets some prerequisites for functionality. Information needs to
be accessible to everyone in the correct form. Thus, networking as the core of operativeness
and the essential nature of information both imply some further prerequisites for carrying
out rights governance. The third element of functionality here is the nature of innovativeness.
Innovations are thus based on vested investments and in this way closely bound to money.
These prerequisites are precisely the ones aimed at the relative collaboration of rights in
cooperative relationships. Rights governance in its relative sense is fixed to prerequisites
set directly for information and cooperation. These prerequisites then link networking closely
to venture capital and information itself as one of the essential elements of it. The core of
relative rights governance is based on communication. In this respect the rights governance
architecture as a relative construction is based on collaboration and cooperation. The
problem in venture capital is that there are several colliding or competing rights and in fact
no means to exclude anyone. Rights governance therefore has to be constituted on real
collaboration and the coexistence of cooperative relations. In this way networking becomes
part of the core of the rights governance architecture.
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Venture capital is characteristically founded on networking and is therefore founded
on a coexistent consortium of several operators. On the other hand, the operative force
of these actors has to be reconciled. In other words, the networking structure cannot be
operated as an unbalanced process; proper governability is crucial for its functionality.  The
rights of an investor and the rights of the other stakeholders have to be taken into
consideration. Networking can only be carried out by restricting the power of the deciding
party through the corresponding immunity of the other actors. This is exactly where the
balancing of cooperating relationships is to be realized. On the other hand, rights governance
in this sense is closely fixed to risk governance; these two forms of governance are rather
similar. Risk governance illustrates even more clearly the immunity position of some
cooperating actors. On the other hand, rights governance is precisely the connecting factor
between networking and information as the core of venture capital.  In this respect,
networking is basically carried out on the basis of business information. Information must
be governed effectively.
Information governance is characteristically relative as well. This is basically due to
the  nature of information itself, which is relative. Information is possessed relatively and
some actors may possess more information than the others. In this sense information is
not free but rather a means to use power: information always tends to remain asymmetric.363
Thus, information asymmetry is rather usual or even a general and typical element of a the
decision-making process in cooperative networking processes.364 Information governance
is in fact rather parallel to the rights governance of cooperating network relationships. In
this sense, information also makes up the overall kernel of venture capital as a relative
process of rights governance.
On the other hand, with information governance constituting the core of the whole
rights governance architecture, the governance as a relative construction is generally founded
on communication. It is thus precisely communication that is to be governed. Further, both
networking and the informational background of networking are both closely related to
communication. Networking is even realized as communication and information may be
processed to become more and more symmetric through the proper interrelated
communication of the cooperating parties. By these means governing communication is
a kind of second degree governance and it operates as the basis of governing both constructive
elements, networking and information.
A rights governance architecture in light of the Hohfeldian conceptual frame
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3.6 Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to outline the rights governance architecture as based on
the Hohfeldian conceptual frame. The main observation was the drastic change in the
balance of statics and dynamics as the constructive elements of the cooperative processes
of the digital economy. It seems that it is precisely the digital economy that has had the most
greatest influence on the rebalancing of statics and dynamics. The traditional legal
relationships are static and as such they are fundamentally based on the right-holder’s
privilege to utilize his or her right and forbid the external parties to interfere in that
utilization. Correspondingly those external parties have a no-right to use this right and they
have a duty not to interfere in another right-holder’s right to use. In the scope of the digital
economy this static structure seems to remain too static, however. This is basically due to
the cooperation of certain privileges and powers, these privileges and powers existing even
inside the same legal position. In other words, privilege is no longer only a feature of the
mere right to use. Use is more and more defined as dynamic utilization, such as a
participation right or active communication.
Through its development the digital economy affects the mutual existence of statics
and dynamics, whose core elements are privilege and power. Privilege alone is too static
to illustrate the utilization right as it is used in the operations of the digital economy. On
the other hand, power no longer entails only the competence to transfer rights. This is
basically due to the dynamic character of digital operations. They are based on both the
right-holder’s privilege to utilize his or her rights and correspondingly his or her right to
affect the legal position of the other actors participating in the operations. This is exactly
where the most paradigmatic economic change is to be carried out. This is also precisely
where the empowerment of privilege, as well as the privileging of power, is to be realized.
Empowerment of privilege is best described as increasing the strength of the privileged
position. Empowerment affects privilege directly by increasing its internal power. The
privileging of power takes place accordingly, although it is only carried out from the
viewpoint of power. The position of a right-holder is again strong as it includes the power
or competence to affect the legal position of others. This empowered position is then further
strengthened through its privileging. The empowerment of privilege and the privileging
of power in this sense are precisely due to the digital economy and its operations as dynamic
processes rather than point-like objects of protection. The operations are significantly
dynamic but the dynamics do not derive only from the right-holder’s right to transfer those
rights. They are dynamics rather in the sense of being entitled to affect the positions of all
the other actors in these operations.
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The empowerment of privilege and privileging of power are extremely well manifested
in some central operations of the digital economy, such as domain names, business ideas
or venture capital. Each of these operations is based on both privilege as the core of statics
and dynamics as the manifestation of power. On the other hand, all of these operations
may further be considered the core elements of the operative digital economy as they
constitute some of its most crucial foundations. This is indeed why the developing digital
economy affects those operations. Domain names, business ideas and venture capital operate
to a significant extent dynamically, with the rise of the digital economy strengthening the
dynamics of those operations. On the other hand, all of these operations additionally include
a privileged aspect as this part is protected in one way or another. This is further precisely
where the privileging of power or empowerment of privilege have their impact.
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365 See Suarez-Villa 2001, 9.
366 In this sense a brand is a communicative relationship. See Petrusson 2004, 127.
367 The static intellectual property rights are used for invoking unauthorized usage of the
property whereby it originates from the right to use one’s own property without disturbance.
Defining static intellectual property rights is used for evaluating to which structures one
should be loyal and which structures one should reject in the business arena. See Petrusson
2004, 118 - 119.
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CHAPTER FOUR. SUMMARY. CONCLUDING REMARKS
1 BUSINESS IDEAS AS COMMUNICATION
Business ideas are communication. A business idea is founded on innovativeness, with
innovativeness itself consisting of some new interpretations of traditional elements of business
life. The most crucial of these elements are names, ideas and money, these features defining
the overall operativeness of business. In traditional business these elements are utilized as
simple names, ideas or money, but in the digital economy they are defined somewhat more
dynamically. Names, ideas and money become essential operations and they cannot merely remain
protectable objects. They participate themselves in the operations of the digital economy
and further constitute some of its core components. Innovativeness, for its part, should
be based on the circulation of information, given that this constitutes the kernel of
innovativeness. The circulation of information constitutes the crucial basis for the
communication of innovativeness, inasmuch as communication is carried out on the basis
of the free circulation of information.365
Communication ought to be carried out on the basis of diverse interests, which then
together constitute the basis of the business idea. For example, a brand or a trademark may
be considered as a cooperative unit connecting at least the interests of the enterprise, the
stakeholders and the customer.366 In this respect, a business idea as a reflection of several
overlapping interests is continuously dynamic. Therefore, dynamics here clearly illustrate the
communication of stakeholders in those interests, with the stakeholders well classifiable
as the major actors in society. Communication is carried out between three different interests,
those of the state, the market, and society. These are the stakeholders participating in the
construction of the modernizing scope of intellectual property rights. This threefold
communicative pattern is also the basis of the operativeness underlying business ideas, as
business ideas are likewise constituted of those interests. In the traditional system of
intellectual property rights it is the interest of the state that has been emphasized, with the
other two stakeholders neglected in this regard. On the other hand, all of these interests
have been emphasized differently depending on the focal operational frame and the
functionality of the stakeholders in it. The state-oriented view has led to statics.367
Summary. Concluding remarks
368 In this context dynamic intellectual property rights are based on a set of tools used to utilize
the property in different structures. This is then further used for making a prognosis of the
validity of their usage. See Petrusson 2004, 119.
369 A good example is customer relationships. In the cooperative digital economy, it is significant
to know one’s customers and collect some consumer information. See Shapiro - Varian 1999,
33 - 34.
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On the other hand, the statics of a state orientation are best illustrated when examining
the interest of the market. Namely, the market strives to be as dynamic as possible. In this
sense dynamics constitute the core of the overall functionality of the market. This is also
where the alteration of statics and dynamics is best seen, the interest of the market being
solidly fixed on dynamics. However, both of these stakeholders need to be cooperative and
mutually communicative and neither the state nor the market can be neglected. In the
traditional economy this is carried out by building up contractual constructions to realize
the dynamics, i.e., licensing or some other tools to utilize the property.368 Licensing makes
it possible to transfer rights and it is considered dynamic. The digital economy has
nevertheless caused these interests and the stakeholders to become more dynamic, even in content.369
This is exactly where cooperation and communication as the basic elements are linked. It
is thus no longer sufficient to be able to constitute dynamics that are fundamentally still
based on statics. Neither is it possible to constitute statics that have only slight connections
to dynamics. One additional feature here is the scope of commons, which illustrates the
interests of the society as the third major stakeholder.
Commons may be used as a safety valve when striving to collaborate communication
between all these stakeholders and their interests. On the other hand, the scope of commons
best supports the free flow of information as the core of innovativeness. Thus, from the
viewpoint of innovativeness it is precisely information that ought to be kept free. In this
sense information constitutes the overall foundation of innovativeness and, further, free
information operates as one of the most fundamental elements of the overall digital
economy. Innovativeness is thus communication and as a communicative function it forms
an innovation network. The architecture of the innovation network as social cooperation
is constituted of several different elements. Openness, flexibility and decentralization
constitute here the most central elements. Moreover, social cooperation is based on a socially
transforming logic of innovation whose core lies in social movements. In this sense, the
core of the social cooperativeness is the creativity of action as based on mutuality and
sharing.
Summary. Concluding remarks
370 Along with the emergence of digital economy the information and communication technology
have begun to play a major role. On the other hand, developing information and communica-
tion technology enables new operative forms. See Weill - Broadbent 1998, 6.
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2 COMMONS AS AN AREA OF INNOVATION
The scope of commons is crucially based on communication. Communication is used for
ensuring the free flow of information as the core of innovativeness. As such innovativeness may
generally be described as a crucially common interest: to a certain degree innovativeness
is even impossible without collaboration and communicative cooperation. On the other
hand, the sphere of commons may be described as a governance structure where no one
has the right to exclude others from access to commons. In this sense the sphere of
commons is controlled by no one, which correspondingly makes this resource free for all
to use. One particular element of the commons is its collective character. In order to realize
and even increase innovativeness those ideas and information need to be communicated
with the rest of the society. In this sense free resources are also crucial for innovation and
creativity.
Information as a free resource constitutes the essence of ideas, with free circulation
further the basis of the commons. Commons is, in other words, the freest area of innovation.
This is where the collapse of the traditional system of intellectual property rights is first
to be seen. The traditional system is fundamentally based on the right-holder’s ability to
control resources, namely ideas and information. On the other hand, ideas and information
operate as appropriate controlling instruments in that they are characteristically genuinely
fundamental. This is best described in the foundations of the system of intellectual property
rights. First, defining the boundaries of intellectual property operates exclusively in law,
with law actually fixing and building up the internal meaning of intellectual property rights.
Without law and its definitions there would be no patents, copyrights, or any other
intellectual property rights. Intellectual property and likewise intellectual property rights
are thus always fictions that are created by law. Second, the control of commons is generally
reflected as the need to be able to define the boundaries of certain protectable inventions.
Accordingly, intellectual property rights need to be defined strictly and fixedly.
An efficient way to operate in the creative digital economy is to endeavor to exploit
information given that the digital economy is closely bound to innovativeness and the
circulation of knowhow.370 Innovativeness is closely bound to creativity and dynamics as the
core of creativity. Dynamics thus constitute one of the most important factors of competitive
business. Accordingly, creative capital operates as the core of the functionality of an
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371 This is often also referred to as Creative Commons. See Lessig 2004, 282.
372 The way to control information flows thus affects how culture develops. See Lessig 2004,
120 - 121.
373 Dynamic functions do not even occur without the static ones, but the static infrastructure
has to be in place for the dynamic functions to occur. See Suarez-Villa 2001, 10.
374 This certainly affects the concept and context of property as well. Property is now more
likely seen as an interaction between technology and markets. The power of technology
supplements the law’s control and the power of the concentrated market weakens the
opportunity of property rights to operate as the basis of new development. See Lessig 2004,
168 - 169.
375 Digital technologies mostly affect acquiring and sharing content. Acquiring and sharing are
the main operational lines for human being to live in society; it is only that capturing and
sharing are both modified through digital technology. See Lessig 2004, 184.
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enterprise.371 Creativity thus has a great influence on the overall cultural environment as
the operational framework.372 Innovativeness is thus best carried out in an environment
where there exist no restrictions on the supply of information. The free circulation of
information and the sphere of commons constitute the most effective generator of
innovativeness, the non-restricted environment supporting the readiness of innovativeness.
Unhindered innovativeness thus requires real access to information, which again emphasizes
the sphere of commons.
3 THE DYNAMICS OF INNOVATIVENESS
Innovativeness is often considered a linear process in that it describes an invention as merely
a static creation. Parallel to this, the statics of inventiveness are likewise due to the core
of the concept of invention itself.373 The concept of invention requires that the included
attributes of the invention be defined and accordingly the rest excluded. The requirements,
however, render the core of inventiveness explicitly linear in relation to the content. In other
words, the easier the core of the content is to interpret, the easier it is to define the distinction
between included and excluded attributes. This constitutes the foundation for stable access
to an invention in order to constitute an architecture that supports inventions. The distinction
is decisive for the concept of an invention and it has to be drawn, although at the same
time it causes inventiveness to remain static.
The statics of inventiveness are, however, called into question by the digital nature
of modern inventions. These inventions are mainly represented in the digital environment,
which is fundamentally based on networking.374 It often becomes impossible to constitute
those creations in the form of a simple invention; rather, the inventions are more likely to
be described as being based on information as a flow of ideas.375 These freely flowing ideas constitute
the fundamental core of a digital invention. In all cases, however, defining information
strictly is complicated and it is accordingly equally difficult to force information into a certain
Summary. Concluding remarks
376 Invention is often described and examined as phases. During these development phases
knowhow is refined and commercialized, and the parties merely operate together as
independent participants. See Chesbrough - Teece 1998, 29 - 30.
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pattern. The static pattern of inventiveness may here even prevent sufficiently strong
protection. Information overall seems to be a complicated thing either to define or to
stabilize. The problem of demarcation has two main reasons. There is the lack of both a
real protection object and a sufficient amount of subjectivity given that information is not
defined to be knowledge, which is actually only someone’s subjective experience. Information
seems to be very difficult indeed to force into the pattern of invention. Creations of the
digital economy are characteristically versatile. However, in the age of traditional intellectual
property rights, an invention was often described as frozen in such a way that it was easy
to fit into the pattern of subjective right.
The innovation process is often described by traditional instruments. This seems
to be the fundamental distortion inside its description. However, in order to be able to reveal
the most essential dynamics of the innovation process, there is a crucial need for some dynamic
examination tools. Innovation is a dynamic process; it may not be described as a mere
development in single phases.376 The innovation process is more and more likely to be
described as a communicational process where the different cooperating parties are closely
interconnected. For this reason a suitable dynamic approach to development from static
inventiveness towards dynamic innovativeness is generally found in the utilization of
completely new resources. The emergence of new resources and research on them is one
factor changing the balance clearly from statics towards more dynamic operativeness.
Basically, innovativeness  generally cooperates with a dramatic change and is thus closely
linked to new and explorative development. A close link to new resources and the ability
to reveal changing foundations is thus characteristic of innovativeness. Innovativeness is,
on the other hand, described as doing something in a totally new way. Innovation  often
refers to new products, processes, or systems being introduced on a large scale. Here,
innovativeness is based on certain foundational requirements and is primarily based on the ability
to reasonably identify different elements. This is often realized in order to create something new
by bringing together something that has not been brought together before, i.e., by innovating.
This is carried out, for example, by forming new associations.
Innovativeness is in this way based on making use of new resources or using existing
ones in an innovative way. For this reason invention and innovation together constitute
a single entity. As an entity the bounds of inventiveness and innovativeness constitute a
complete illustration of the core of ideas in business. Ideas are founded on a congruent
adaptation of inventiveness and innovativeness, both together. Distinctiveness is brought
into the coexistence through some supportive additional features needed for completing
the bond. Thus, the most fundamental resources of an enterprise are generally communicative, whereby
there exists a crucial need for communication between the internal view of the enterprise
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and its external environmental frame. Inventions are relatively fixed to existing resources
and the knowledge embedded in an enterprise. The basic approach to introduce these
resources overall is purely to take advantage of them as completely as possible, with such
exploiting affecting the communication architecture and, through this, innovativeness
directly. In this way inventions are to be dynamized by balancing them towards innovativeness.
Innovativeness is thus based on continuous utilization of resources and is defined as a
dynamic and functional whole. In any case, on these grounds innovativeness requires
unbroken communication; in order to capitalize resources maximally communication cannot
be dispersed or fragmentary in any way.
4 THE ARCHITECTURAL BASIS OF INNOVATIVENESS
The combination of inventiveness and innovativeness constitutes the core of the architectural
structure of innovativeness. This combination is characteristically compact, but at the same
varying. The variation is found in the character of the overall process of communication
as the core of the architectural design. Even the divergence of the process of inventiveness
and innovativeness is based on a continuous process. This process, together with the
additional architectural constructions, is in fact precisely the factor that establishes a clear
distinction between invention and innovation. It keeps both areas as phases of their own
in the core of functionality given that both have different functions to perform.
Innovativeness is linked to individual creativity, which articulates both inventiveness
and innovativeness. These elements are bound together through communicative elements,
created through the connective designs or structures, and included by the legal architecture.
The digital economy includes the fundamental basis for this kind of design; innovativeness
in the digital economy is mainly carried out though open networks, which further are
generally based on a certain designed structure. This elementary structure is generally referred
to as a legal architecture and it has a certain internal elementary pattern. The architecture
constitutes the basis of all the general preconditions that societal cooperation considers to
be necessities. The architecture constitutes the basis of the overall communication and societal
cooperation. This makes the architecture rather essential for functionality, whereby the
architecture ought to be an essential requirement for universal functionality. As such the
architecture implements a certain functional design.
The architecture is dynamic and is founded on communication. As a system of rights
governance it is based on two divergent but still overlapping requirements: the core functions
of the digital economy and its operational framework as the reflective surface underlying
functionality overall. The starting point in constituting the architecture of rights governance
is found in the traditional view of dynamics, where the core lies in the ability to transfer
rights and to become legally protected when those transactions occur. The main focus in
the traditional system lies on balancing exchangeability and its smoothness, which actually
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has placed the focus on the interests of the market. This is precisely where functional
dynamics diverge from traditional dynamics and the basis upon which the rights governance
architecture is to be built. Dynamics have been changing both definitively and contextually.
Dynamics are thus sooner based on pure functionality and are founded precisely on this functionality.
The power to affect legal relations is not necessarily anymore only the power to transfer
rights but also, and even most fundamentally, the power to participate in the relevant
operation.
Free participation is ensured by decentralizing the network, with the network becoming
directly focused on the lack of control. Decentralization has thus one great advantage, which
is linked directly to information being delivered through a network. The power of neutrality
comes directly from the network’s inability to control the content or any of the operations
of the actors. This is further stabilized through the simplicity of the network, the combination
of neutrality and simplicity in the network architecture meaning precisely the inability of
a network to discriminate against content and applications. In this way innovativeness is
increased given that it becomes possible for all the innovations and creations to emerge
in a network. This affects both the quality of information and the power to express one’s ideas.
In this way an innovative network may be decentralized and ownerless and is even better
as such.
5 EMPOWERING PRIVILEGE - PRIVILEGING POWER
Functionality constitutes one of the core elements of the digital economy. Functionality
is, however, not constituted only on single functions; rather, these functions are complemented by
the operational frame overall. The description cannot remain only static but must crucially be
complemented through dynamics, with dynamics needed for elaborating the operational
frame. The operational frame is constituted of operations and operational rules that make
it possible to impart functionality directly to the functional core. Using the Hohfeldian
concepts, this is carried out by applying power to the static content, i.e., by empowering
the content exclusively. Empowerment is mainly carried out by keeping privilege as the
main element of the static aspect but introducing power as a definitive element instead of
right.
This combination of privilege and power is then used as a reflective surface that underlies
functionality overall. These two overlapping phases are applied together as a baseline of the
complete architecture of the digital economy. Functions and foundations are brought into
mutual  interaction in order to create dynamic functionality. On the other hand, the central
element where the privileging of power has an influence lies in the balance between statics
and dynamics in legal relationships. Indeed, privileging power moves the dynamics towards
the right to use: the right to use is dynamized, with dynamics complemented through usability
at the same time. This accordingly adds privilege to power and in this way the overall
Summary. Concluding remarks
377 On the other hand, property rights are often primarily developed within the framework of
the material value chain. See Petrusson 2004, 52 - 53.
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combination of power and privilege or privilege and power is complemented. In this way
the combination of privilege and power shapes the scope of empowered privilege or, on
the other hand, the scope of privileged power.
The rights governance architecture thus lies in the combination of privilege and power -
statics and the dynamics. Neither of these alone is adequate for constructing the complete
view of rights governance in the digital framework; in order to get the complete picture
there is a need to complement the static content with dynamic functionality. This
complementation further requires that both static privilege and dynamic power are employed
in parallel and harmoniously. On the other hand, the functional combination of rights is best
defined through concentrating on different actors that are then further connected to either
the privileged or the empowered position.
A prototype of combined privilege and power is found in the scope of commons,
where commons are viewed from two different angles. On the one hand, the core of the
static element of commons is constituted of the privileged position and it is essentially
devoted to the static rights to be governed. On the other hand, the dynamic element in the
scope of commons is based on the power to change the legal status of some other actor.
Traditionally this is carried out by granting a right to transfer rights. However, the definition
of dynamics in the modernized governance architecture of the digital economy, and likewise
in the scope of commons here, is formulated in terms of a relationship that concerns only
particular parties. It is relative in the sense that it is focused on only one party or actor at
a time.
The dynamics of the modernized architecture of rights governance may not, however,
be built on transferring rights. Here, the scope of commons is exemplary, the reason for
a novel interpretation of dynamics being obvious. Still considering the commons as a
prototypical example, the rights inside the sphere of commons are actually property of the
community and in this respect there do not exist any external parties. Therefore, dynamics
and particularly the focus of dynamics shift from an exchange orientation towards more of a
function orientation. In this way the dynamics of commons is still relative and concerns
only the particular parties involved in operations.
6 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SYSTEM OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
The system of intellectual property rights is based on inventiveness as a static point-like
occurrence. This makes the overall system static due to the core of the concept of invention.377
The concept requires that all the attributes of an invention are defined and accordingly the
rest are to be excluded. Those prerequisites, however, fix the core of inventiveness explicitly
Summary. Concluding remarks
378 In this respect, intellectual property does not have any existence in itself. See Petrusson 2004,
53.
379 Th is the basis of the concept of subjective right. It is defined through three basic axioms:
1) subjective right stands for being in legal relationships, 2) legal relationships can prevail only
between persons and 3) a subjective right does not prevail only inter partes but also ultra partes.
See Niemi 1999, 291a.
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linearly to the content itself: the core of content is interpreted and defined through the
distinction between included and excluded. This, at the same time, however, causes
inventiveness to remain static and stable. Sometimes it is even the content as such of an invention
that makes the distinction of invention and innovation complicated. An example of this
is an idea and its protection, given that an invention is always based on an idea. However,
when embedded in an invention, an idea is still slightly more dynamic than the invention.
Ideas constitute the core of innovativeness and they are characteristically dynamic. The major
problem of the statics of an invention is thus caused by the dynamic idea in the core of
a proprietary characteristic of a static invention. This is precisely due to the significance
of information as the kernel of invention. Problems in the digital economy are thus mainly
related to ideas and their fundamental character in inventions.
Digital inventions are based on information as a flow of ideas, with this dynamic
process constituting the core of a digital invention.378 Defining information precisely is rather
complicated, however, and it is accordingly equally complex to force it into a certain pattern,
i.e., the one of invention. Thereby, the static pattern of inventiveness may here prevent
sufficiently strong protection. Information overall thus seems to be difficult either to define
or to stabilize. The problem has two main reasons. There is namely a lack of both a real
protection object and of a sufficient amount of subjectivity. The sharp difference here calls into
question the cruciality of a subjective right as one element of invention. The fact that all
rights must have a subject is generally rather definitive for constructing any property right.
A subjective right, such as property rights, is thus based on certain prerequisites. It is possible
to constitute only when three basic prerequisites are fulfilled. At the minimum, there ought
to be a clearly defined object, someone who bears the right, and a legal relationship between
these two.379 A digital invention does not, however, necessarily include any of these, whereby
the digital environment does not directly rely on the construction of subjective rights.
However, in the age of traditional intellectual property rights, an invention was often stable
in that it was easy to fit into the pattern of a subjective right.
The statics of an invention are crucial when defining its possession, as possession
constitutes the foundation of property. For this reason in order to come into someone’s
possession, an invention needs to be stabilized and fenced. Stabilization defines the
fundamental relationship between possessor and invention, i.e., who possesses what. This
commitment, however, at the same time actually runs counter to the elasticity of modern
legal relationships. It is precisely this commitment that stabilizes and freezes the whole
traditional pattern of legal relationships. An invention is similarly fixed through the
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possessors’ engagement with it. Stabilization refers to the assets of the traditional legal
system. Those assets are usually best capitalized when they are associated with a strict and
well-protected position, i.e., property rights. Stabilization through defining something as
an invention does not mean that the asset would cease evolving, although the level of
inventiveness is still the minimum prerequisite for any new invention. This, with the
continuous development, is basically the main problem with the protection of business
method patents through any traditional property right. Business methods are highly
innovative but they are still forced to fit into the definition of invention. However, this kind
of stabilization prevents the further innovative use of patented business methods. Thereby,
the traditional protection of inventions may well be considered as freezing up the whole
system.
The dynamized view of intellectual assets is best described by changing the
perspective: it is no longer an invention in its static sense that is the focus but rather the
connection between the invention and the environment where the enterprise operates. The background
is found in the statics, with the utilization of inventions traditionally considered static and
the static view biding inventiveness tightly to the proprietary horizon. A change in the
balance makes the perspective functional, whereby the viewpoint is adjusted and made more
functional and dynamic. In this way, dynamics drive frequent change in order to reproduce
new and revised knowledge.380 At the same time, the environment is likewise to be taken
into consideration when the whole inventive pattern is dynamized and functionalized. This
is exactly why this perspective is justifiably considered a communicative one. The view
namely makes communication the essential focus of the overall pattern.
Dynamization of the overall innovative pattern has at least one drastic consequence,
namely the change in the balance of right and power. In other words, the right to use loses its
traditional definitive task as the core element of right as a privilege. This is a direct
consequence of dynamization, the mere right to use remaining too static for describing
functionality. Instead, dynamization ought fundamentally to be based on power as the ability
to affect the legal relationships of the parties involved in operations. At the same time, the
empowered position makes the functionality overall dynamic. Further, none of these
operations can be examined totally detached from the framework but they remain rather
closely linked to it. This is a direct implication of the includability of the dynamic aspect
and in this way the framework actually becomes a part of operations. This then constitutes
the intersection of privilege and power as well as the essence of the digital economy.
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YHTEENVETO TEOKSEN KESKEISISTÄ AJATUKSISTA
INNOVAATIOT KOMMUNIKAATIOPROSESSEINA.
OIKEUDELLINEN ARKKITEHTUURI IDEOIDEN HALLINNOIMISEKSI
LIIKETOIMINNASSA
1 LIIKEIDEA KOMMUNIKAATIONA
Liikeidea on kommunikaatiota. Kommunikaationa liikeidea määrittyy toiminnallisista
lähtökohdista ja perustuu innovatiivisuuteen. Innovatiivisuus itsessään syntyy tässä
yhteydessä usein siten, että liike-elämän perinteisiä käsitteitä ja määreitä hahmotetaan uudella,
innovatiivisella tavalla. Tämän tutkimuksen näkökulmasta keskeisimpiä näistä uudelleen
määriteltäviksi tulevista toiminnallisista käsitteistä ovat nimet, ideat ja raha. Nämä
elementit rakentavat liike-elämän toiminnallisuutta kaiken kaikkiaankin. Perinteisessä
liiketoiminnassa näitä elementtejä käytetään yksinkertaisesti nimien, ideoiden tai rahan
muodossa, mutta digitaalisessa taloudessa ne usein pyritään määrittämään myös hieman
dynaamisemmin. Nimi, idea ja raha muodostavat nimittäin eräitä keskeisiä digitaalitalouden
toimintoja, eivätkä ne siten voi enää määrittyä pelkästään suojattavina objekteina. Toisaalta
nämä elementit itsekin muodostavat toiminnan solmukohtia digitaalisen talouden
toimintoihin ja ovat osia sen peruskomponenteista. Peruskomponentit muodostavat
osaltaan innovatiivista toimintakehystä. Toisaalta innovatiivisuus vaatii pohjakseen ideoita
ja informaatioita. Siksi innovatiivisuus olisi pyrittävä rakentamaan informaation vapaalle
liikkuvuudelle: vapaasti virtaava informaatio ja esteettömästi käytettävissä olevat ideat
nimittäin muodostavat innovatiivisuuden ytimen. Informaation vapaa liikkuvuus on siten
innovaatioiden kommunikaation olennainen pohja. Toisin sanoen innovatiivinen
kommunikaatio voi toteutua ainoastaan informaation vapaan liikkuvuuden muodossa.
Kommunikatiivinen liikeidea sisältää erilaisia intressejä. Tästä syystä kommunikaa-
tio toteutuu parhaiten siten, että intressit muodostavat yhdessä liikeidean perustan.
Esimerkiksi, brandia tai tavaramerkkiä voidaan perustellusti pitää yhteistoiminnallisena
yksikkönä, joka yhdistää ainakin liiketoiminnan itsensä, sen omistajien ja asiakkaiden
intressit. Tässä mielessä liikeidea on useiden erilaatuisten ja erimääräisten toisiinsa
limittyvien intressien yhtymäkohtana pysyvästi dynaaminen. Dynamiikka viittaa tässä niihin
intresseihin ja intressitahoihin, jotka voidaan määrittää yhteiskunnallisessakin mittakaa-
vassa suurimmiksi toimijoiksi. Näitä ovat tämän tutkimuksen valossa valtio, markkinat ja
yhteiskunta, joilla siis kaikilla on liikeideaan liittyviä omia intressejään. Tämä kolmikantai-
nen kommunikaatiorakenne muodostaa perustan liikeidean toiminnallisuudelle, jossa
liikeidea rakentuu näiden intressien yhteistoiminnasta. Samalla nämä intressitahot
osallistuvat myös immateriaalioikeuksien järjestelmän uudistamiseen. Perinteisessä
immateriaalioikeuksien järjestelmässä valtion intressit painottuvat usein voimakkaimmin,
markkinoiden ja yhteiskunnallisten intressien jäädessä taka-alalle. Toisaalta kaikkia näitä
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intressejä ja intressitahojen keskinäisiä suhteita on painotettu eri tavalla riippuen
kulloisestakin toimintaympäristöstä ja intressitahojen toiminnallisesta osuudesta
vastaavassa toimintaympäristössä. Valtiopainotteinen lähestymistapa on kuitenkin
johtanut näkökulman staattisuuteen.
Toisaalta valtiopainotteisuuden staattisuus tulee parhaiten esiin tarkasteltaessa
markkinoita ja markkinoiden intressejä. Markkinat nimittäin pyritään järjestämään niin
dynaamisesti kuin mahdollista. Toisaalta markkinat kyllä pyrkivät dynaamisuuteen jo
oman määritelmänsäkin kautta. Dynamiikka muodostaa siten markkinoiden ytimen. Ydin
kuitenkin kokoaa digitaalisen talouden muutoksen itseensä; tässä ytimessä nimittäin myös
statiikan ja dynamiikan keskinäinen vuorovaikutus näkyy selvimmin. Näin on juuri
markkinoiden luontaisen dynamiikan vuoksi. Molempien intressitahojen, siis valtion ja
markkinoiden, on kuitenkin toimittava yhteistyössä; niiden on kommunikoitava
keskenään, mutta kummankaan intressit eivät toisaalta saa painottua liian voimakkaasti.
Perinteisessä taloudessa yhteistoiminnallinen kommunikaatio on pyritty järjestämään
rakentamalla niin kutusuttuja dynamisoivia instrumentteja. Hyvä esimerkki tästä löytyy
lisensoinnista ja muista omaisuuden käyttöön pyrkivistä vastaavista järjestelyistä.
Lisensointi mahdollistaa oikeuksien siirron ja on siis siten perinteisessä mielessä
dynaaminen instrumentti. Digitaalitalous kuitenkin vaikuttaa myös itse dynamiikkaan:
intressitkin ovat dynamisoituneet. Tämä on juuri se ydin, johon peruselementtien keskinäinen
yhteistoiminta kiinnittyy. Enää ei olekaan riittävää rakentaa dynamiikkaa, joka pohjimmil-
taan kuitenkin edelleen perustuu statiikalle. Toisaalta ei ole myöskään riittävää, eikä
järkevää, rakentaa statiikkaa, jolla on ainoastaan vähän varsinaisia dynaamisia liittymiä.
Riittävässä määrin dynaamisen kuvan luomiseksi eri intressien keskinäisestä kom-
munikaatiosta on kolmannen intressitahon huomioiminen välttämätöntä. Kolmas
intressitaho rakentuu yhteiskunnallisille ja sellaisena vielä tarkemmin yhteisöllisille
intresseille (commons), ja ne toimivat intressin kokonaiskuvan välittävänä linkkinä.
Yhteisölliset intressit muodostavat yhteiskäyttöisiä hyödykkeitä eli toimivat yhteiskäyttöis-
ten hyödykkeiden taustana.
Yhteisölliset intressit muodostavat eräänlaisen varaventtiilin rakennettaessa
kommunikatiivista, kaikki kolme intressiä huomioivaa yhteistoimintaa. Yhteisöllisten
intressien alue on siinä mielessä keskeinen innovaatiota tarkasteltaessa, että se tukee edellä
mainituista intressitahoista parhaiten vapaata informaation virtaa innovatiivisuuden
ydinelementtinä. Innovatiivisuuden näkökulmasta informaatio määrittyykin juuri tästä
syystä keskeiseksi tekijäksi, joka on syytä säilyttää vapaana. Tässä mielessä informaatio
muodostaa myös innovatiivisuuden keskeisen perustan. Samalla informaation vapaus on
yksi digitaalisen talouden rakennekomponenteista. Innovatiivisuus on siten kommunikaa-
tiota, ja kommunikatiivisena toimintana se muodostaa innovaatioverkostoja. Näillä
innovaatioverkostoilla on oma, yhteisöllisiä toimintoja ja intressejä tukeva arkkitehtuurin-
sa, jonka keskeiset rakenneosat ovat avoimuus, joustavuus ja hajauttaminen. Nämä  ovat
siis avoimen innovaatioarkkitehtuurin keskeisimmät rakenne-elementit. Lisäksi yhteistoiminta
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perustuu innovaatioiden ja toimintojen yhteisöllisyyteen, jonka ydin löytyy toiminnallisesta
luovuudesta. Luovuus näyttäytyy usein juuri ideoiden ja informaation vapauttamisena
yhteisön käyttöön.
2 YHTEISÖLLISYYS INNOVAATIOVARANTONA
Yhteisölliset intressit ovat kommunikaatiota. Kommunikaatio varmistaa erityisesti
informaation vapaan käytön ja muodostaa siten innovatiivisuuden ytimen. Toimivalla
kommunikaatiolla toisin sanoen varmistetaan ja edistetään innovatiivisuutta. Näistä lähtökoh-
dista innovatiivisuus kuvautuu aika luontevasti yhteisöllisenä intressinä. Tietyssä mielessä
innovaatiot ovat jopa mahdottomia, elleivät ne ainakin jossain määrin perustu kom-
munikaatioon ja yhteistoimintaan. Toisaalta yhteisölliset intressit määrittyvät myös
hallinnointirakenteena (governance structure), jossa kenelläkään ei ole oikeutta sulkea muita
ulkopuolelle. Yhteiskäyttöisten hyödykkeiden alueelle on siten jokaisella vapaa pääsy, eikä
niiden toimintaa tai käyttöä kontrolloi kukaan yksin. Eräs yhteisöllisten intressien
keskeisistä elementeistä onkin juuri nimenomaan niiden yhteisöllisyys. Innovatiivisuuden
toteuttamiseksi ja jossain määrin jopa sen kasvattamiseksi ideoiden kehittelemisen tulisi
tapahtua tiiviissä yhteiskunnallisessa vuorovaikutuksessa. Tässäkin mielessä vapaat
resurssit ovat eräs innovatiivisuuden ja luovuuden olennainen osa.
Informaatio vapaana resurssina muodostaa ideoiden ytimen. Ideoiden vapaa
kommunikaatio puolestaan muodostaa yhteisöllisten intressien perustan, jolloin
yhteisöllisyys muodostaa innovatiivisuuden vapaimman mahdollisen alueen. Tällä alueella
tapahtuu myös voimakkain perinteisen immateriaalioikeuksien järjestelmän murtuminen.
Perinteinen järjestelmähän rakentuu olennaisesti oikeudenhaltijan oikeudelle kontrolloida
käytettäviä resursseja, digitaalitaloudessa erityisesti ideoita ja informaatiota. Toisaalta ideat
ja informaatio toimivat sopivina kontrollivälineninä perustavanlaatuisuutensa vuoksi.
Kontrollivoima näkyy parhaiten immateriaalioikeuksien järjestelmän perusteissa.
Ensinnäkin immateriaalioikeuksien rajanvedot ovat aina juridisia, ja niiden rajat
määritellään ainoastaan laissa. Tällöin lainsäädäntö oikeastaan toimii yksinomaisena
välineenä rajattaessa immateriaalioikeuksien sisältöä. Ilman laissa tapahtuvaa määrittelyä
ei olisi myöskään patenttia tai tekijänoikeutta, tai muitakaan immateriaalioikeuksia.
Immateriaalinen, aineeton omaisuus, samoin kuin immateriaalioikeudet ovat siten aina
laissa luotuja fiktioita. Ne ovat suunnittelijansa vallan mukaisia, ja siten eräs tehokas
kontrollin väline. Toiseksi yhteisöllisten intressien alue ja laajuus peilautuvat vastakoh-
tiensa kautta. Yhteisöllisyys näyttäytyy siis vastakohtana tarpeelle kyetä määrittämään
suojattavien, ja siten yhteisöllisestä käytöstä poissuljettavien inventioiden rajat. Tästä
syystä immateriaalioikeuksien järjestelmästä kuitenkin muodostuu helposti staattinen ja
jähmeä.
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Digitaalitalous saa voimansa luovuudesta, jolloin vasta informaation ja ideoiden järkevä
hyväksikäyttö muuttaa digitaalisen talouden perustoiminnot tehokkaiksi. Siksi digitaalita-
lous perustuu pääasiassa juuri innovatiivisuuteen, mikä usein määrittyy myös tietotaidon
vaihdoksi. Innovatiivisuus on siten kiinteästi sidoksissa luovuuteen ja dynaamisuuteen
luovuuden ytimenä, jolloin dynamiikka määrittyy erääksi kilpailukykyisen liiketoiminnan
tärkeimmistä tekijöistä. Vastaavasti luovuuteen perustuva pääoma toimii usein
innovatiivisen yrityksen funktionaalisuuden keskiönä. Luovuudella on toisaalta myös oma
vaikutuksensa ympäröivään kulttuuriin, jolloin luovuus ja sen vaikutus kulttuuriseen
kehitykseen samalla muotoaa toimintaympäristöä. Innovatiivisuus toteutuu siten parhaiten
ympäristössä, jossa ei ole, tai on mahdollisimman vähän, esteitä informaation välittämisel-
le, kommunikaatiolle ja jakelulle. Informaation vapaa kulku ja yhteisöllisyys muodostavat
tällä tavoin tehokkaimman innovaatiomoottorin, ja toimintaympäristön rajoittamattomuus
tukee vielä omasta puolestaan innovaatiovalmiutta. Esteetön innovatiivisuus vaatii siten
todellista pääsyä informaatioon, mikä taas puolestaan edelleenkin korostaa yhteisöllisten
intressien keskeisyyttä innovatiivisuuden ytimessä.
3 INNOVATIIVISUUDEN DYNAMIIKKA
Innovatiivisuus on kommunikaatiota. Kommunikatiivisuudestaan huolimatta innovaatiot
nähdään usein lineaarisena prosessina siten, että niiden näkyvä tulos, inventio (invention),
määrittyy pelkästään staattiseksi. Invention staattisuus vastaavasti palautuu itsensä
käsitteen ytimeen, joka määrittyy samoin staattiseksi. Staattisuutensa vuoksi inventio
käsitteenä edellyttää, että sen sisältämät elementit on määriteltävä, ja vastaavasti sen
ulkopuolelle jäävät elementit on suljettava määritelmän ulkopuolelle. Määritelmälliset
lähtökohdat kuitenkin samalla vaikuttavat suoraan invention ytimeen; inventiosta tulee
eksplisiittisesti lineaarinen suhteessa sisältöönsä. Toisin sanoen mitä helpompi sisältö on
määritellä, sitä helpompi on myös vastaavasti määrittää sisältöön kuuluvan ja siitä
poissuljetuin keskinäinen suhde. Sisältöön kuuluvan ja siitä poissuljetun välinen rajapinta
muodostaa edelleen perustan pysyvälle pääsylle inventioon, jolloin pääsyn turvaamisesta syntyy
perusta perinteiselle oikeuksienhallinta-arkkitehtuurille. Tässä mielessä perinteinen
arkkitehtuuri tukee inventiota; inventioon kuuluvan ja siitä poissuljetun välinen rajanveto
on eräs perinteisen järjestelmän olennaisimmista elementeistä, vaikkakin se samalla tekee
järjestelmästä staattisen. Perinteisessä järjestelmässä vastaavasti myös inventio jää
määritelmällisesti staattiseksi.
Invention staattisuus kyseenalaistuu voimakkaasti uuden talouden inventioiden
digitaalisuuden vuoksi. Nämä inventiot tuotetaan pääasiassa digitaalisin välinen ja
digitaalisiksi sisällöiksi, ja siksi ne myös pääasiallisesti esiintyvät digitaalisessa toimintaym-
päristössä. Tämän tyyppisiä inventioita on usein mahdotonta kuvata tai edes luoda
yksinkertaisen invention muodossa; ne perustuvat mieluummin muuttuvaan informaati-
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oon ideoiden vapaana kulkuna. Tästä syystä ideoiden ja informaation sisältöä on hankala
määritellä tarkasti, tai edes niiden pakottaminen tiettyyn muottiin on vaikeaa. Vapaat ideat
muodostavat siten digitaalisten inventioiden perusytimen. Toisaalta muuttuvassa
muodossa olevien ideoiden pakottaminen invention staattiseen muotoon saattaa jopa
rajoittaa tai estää riittävän vahvan suojan saavuttamista. Tässä mielessä informaatio siis
näyttää olevan hankala sekä määrittää että stabiloida. Määrittelyn vaikeus johtuu
pääasiassa puutteista kahdessa suhteessa: informaatiolta puuttuu sekä konkreettinen
suojakohde että riittävä subjektiivisuus silloin, kun informaatio ei määrity tiedoksi, joka
jo onkin subjektiivista. Siten informaatio vaikuttaa olevan suhteellisen hankalasti
pakotettavissa invention muotoon: digitaalisen talouden luomukset ovat luonnostaan
muuttuvia ja kehittyviä. Tässä näyttäytyy siten jälleen eräs perinteisen immateriaalioikeuk-
sien järjestelmän ja digitaaliajan tuomien muutospaineiden rajapinta. Perinteisessä
järjestelmässä inventio oli/on yleensä mahdollista määrittää “jähmettyneessä muodossa”
ja samalla siten, että se oli/on sovitettavissa subjektiivisten oikeuksien järjestelmään.
Innovaatio (innovation) on inventiota selkeästi dynaamisempi käsite. Siitä huolimatta
innovaatiot, samoin kuin  innovaatioprosessit nykyisin usein kuitenkin määritellään
perinteisin instrumentein. Tämä näyttää muodostavan perustavanlaatuisen vääristymän
innovaatiokäsitteen sisälle. Innovaatioprosessien keskeisen dynamiikan esiin saaminen
nimittäin välttämättä vaatii dynaamisia tutkimusvälineitä. Innovatiivisuus on dynaaminen
prosessi, eikä sitä siten inventiosta poiketen voida kuvata pelkästään yksittäisistä vaiheista
koostuvana kehityksenä. Siksi innovaatioprosessit yhä enenevässä määrin kuvataankin
kommunikatiivisina prosesseina, joissa erilaiset, keskenään yhdessä toimivat tahot
muodostavat tiiviin kokonaisuuden. Tästä syystä sopivan dynaaminen lähestymistapa
siirryttäessä staattisesta inventiosta kohti dynaamista innovaatiota näyttääkin yleensä
helposti löytyvän tavoista hyödyntää uusia resursseja. Uudet resurssit ja niiden tutkiminen
voi siten toimia eräänä tekijänä siirrettäessä tasapainoa statiikasta kohti dynaamista
toiminnallisuutta. Innovatiivisuus korreloi yleensä dramaattista muutosta ja liittyy siksi
läheisesti uuteen ja kokeelliseen kehitykseen. Toisaalta tiivis liittymä uusiin resursseihin,
samoin kuin kyky löytää muuttuvia perusteita on innovatiivisuudelle jopa luonteenomais-
ta. Innovatiivisuus siis voidaan kuvata tavaksi tehdä jotakin täysin uudella tavalla,
vaikkakin innovatiivisuus usein myös viittaa uusiin tuotteisiin, prosesseihin tai järjestel-
miin. Tällöin innovatiivisuus usein myös linkittyy kyykyyn jäsentää ja identifioida erilaisia
elementtejä. Juuri tämä näyttäytyy yleensä uuden luomisena; yhdistetään ja tuodaan esiin
jotakin, jota ei ole esitetty yhdessä koskaan aiemmin. Tätä kutsutaan innovoimiseksi, ja eräs
sen malliesimerkki löytyy juuri uusien yhdistelmien muotoilemisesta.
Innovatiivisuus perustuu tällä tavoin uusien resurssien hyödyntämiseen tai
vanhojen, jo olemassa olevien käyttämiseen uusin, innovatiivisin tavoin. Siten inventio ja
innovaatio yhdessä muodostavat yhtenäisen kokonaisuuden, jossa niiden liittymät
muodostavat täydennetyn kuvan ideoista liiketoiminnassa. Ideat perustuvat jatkuvalle
invention ja innovaation yhteistoiminnalle. Molemmat on siis otettava huomioon,
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vaikkakaan kumpikaan ei yksin kykene muodostamaan vastaavanlaista täydentynyttä
kuvaa ideoiden rakenteesta. Tällaisena invention ja innovaation sidos kuvaa myös
yrityksen perusresursseja. Perusresurssit ovat siis yleensä kommunikatiivisia, ja siksi yrityksen
sisäisten resurssien ja sen ulkoisen toimintaympäristön täytyy kyetä keskinäiseen
kommunikaatioon. Inventiot itsessään ovat suhteellisen tiukasti kiinni jo olemassa
olevissa resursseissa ja yritykseen sulautuneessa piilevässä tiedossa. Nämäkin resurssit
tulisi pyrkiä hyödyntämään niin kattavasti kuin mahdollista. Resurssien hyödyntäminen
tällä tavoin kuitenkin samalla vaikuttaa koko kommunikaatioarkkitehtuuriin ja sen kautta
suoraan innovatiivisuuteenkin. Inventiotkin dynamisoituvat, jolloin ne jo painottuvat edellä
kuvatuin tavoin innovatiivisuuden suuntaan. Tällä tavoin innovatiivisuus perustuu
jatkuvaan resurssien hyödyntämiseen ja määrittyy siten dynaamiseksi ja funktionaaliseksi
kokonaisuudeksi. Joka tapauksessa innovatiivisuus vaatii onnistuakseen jatkuvaa,
fragmentoitumatonta kommunikaatioketjua.
4 INNOVATIIVISUUDEN ARKKITEHTUURINEN PERUSTA
Invention ja innovaation sidos on kommunikaatiota. Tämä sidos muodostaa innovaatio-
arkkitehtuurin ytimen ja on luonteeltaan kompakti, mutta samalla muuntuva. Muuntuvuus
perustuu arkkitehtuurisen mallin pohjana olevaan kommunikaatioprosessiin. Tällöin jopa
inventio- ja innovaatioprosessien väliset eroavaisuudet perustuvat nekin viime kädessä
jatkuvaan prosessiin. Toisaalta tämä prosessi yhdessä arkkitehtuuristen lisärakenteiden
kanssa määrittää myös invention ja innovaation välistä eroa. Molempien prosessien
toiminta nimittäin perustuu omajärjestelmäiselle vaiheisuudelle, jolloin kummallakin on
myös omia, kokonaisprosessin kannalta olennaisia tavoitteita toteutettavana.
Innovatiivisuus linkittyy toisaalta yksilölliseen luovuuteen, mikä puolestaan rakentaa
sekä jo inventioita että myös kehittyneempiä innovaatioprosesseja. Juuri tästä syystä
näiden elementtien saattaminen keskinäiseen kommunikaatioon on olennaista. Toisaalta
kommunikatiivinen sidos muodostetaan yhdistävien ja kokoavien rakenteiden kautta ja
sisällytetään oikeudelliseen arkkitehtuuriin (legal architecture). Digitaalitaloudessa tällaiselle
rakenteelle on olemassa kehys jo toimintaympäristössä itsessään; digitaalisen talouden
innovatiivisuus tapahtuu pääasiassa avoimissa tietoverkoissa, jotka taas puolestaan
yleensä perustuvat tietyille olemassa oleville, usein keinotekoisille rakenteille. Tästä
pohjarakenteesta voidaan puhua myös oikeudellisena arkkitehtuurina, ja sillä on tietty
oma sisäinen kaavansa. Toisaalta arkkitehtuuri muodostaa perustan kaikille yleisille
toimintaedellytyksille, joita yhteisöllinen toiminta pitää välttämättöminä. Siten arkkiteh-
tuuri muodostaa perustan kaikelle kommunikaatiolle ja yhteiskunnalliselle yhteistoiminnalle.
Arkkitehtuuri määrittyy siten yhteiskunnallisen toiminnallisuuden ytimeksi, toisin sanoen
tietyksi toiminnalliseksi rakennekehykseksi.
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Arkkitehtuuri on dynaaminen, kommunikatiivinen kehys. Oikeuksien hallinnointi-
järjestelmänä se rakentuu kahdelle erilliselle, mutta samalla kuitenkin toisiinsa limittyville
edellytyksille, nimittäin digitaalitalouden perustoiminnoille ja koko toiminnan heijastus-
pintana näyttäytyvälle toimintaympäristölle. Lähtökohta oikeuksienhallinta-arkkitehtuuria
rakennettaessa löytyy perinteisestä dynamiikasta, jonka ydinajatus on kyetä siirtämään
oikeuksia ja saada oikeudellista suojaa silloin, kun oikeuksien siirto on tapahtunut lain
edellytysten mukaisesti. Perinteisen järjestelmän pääpaino on vaihdannan tasapainottami-
sessa ja joustavoittamisessa. Siksi perinteinen järjestelmä on myös painottunut hieman
voimakkaammin markkinoiden intressien suuntaan. Tämä on toisaalta juuri se leikkaus-
piste, jossa funktionaalinen dynamiikka eroaa perinteisestä dynamiikasta ja toisaalta se
ydin, jolle oikeuksienhallinta-arkkitehtuuri rakentaa lähtökohtansa. Funktionaalistuessaan
dynamiikka muuttuu sekä määritelmällisesti että sisällöllisesti. Funktionaalinen dynamiikka
perustuu siten ennemmin puhtaalle toiminnallisuudelle yhteistoimintana, kuin staattisuuteen
pohjaavalle oikeuksien siirtelylle etupiiristä toiseen. Valta vaikuttaa oikeussuhteisiin ei
siten välttämättä määritykään enää vallaksi siirtää oikeuksia. Paremminkin se määrittyy
oikeuksien siirtomahdollisuuden lisäksi myös vallaksi osallistua relevanttiin toimintaan ja
vaikuttaa muiden siihen osallistuvien tahojen toimiin.
Oikeudellisessa arkkitehtuurissa vapaa osallistumismahdollisuus turvataan
rakentamalla toimintaverkosta hajautettu, jolloin siitä samalla muodostuu kontrolloimaton.
Eräs hajautetun verkon eduista liittyykin juuri siihen tapaan, jolla informaatiota välitetään
ja jaetaan verkossa. Hajautettuun tiedonsiirtoon viitataan usein myös verkon neutraalisuu-
tena. Neutraalisuuden voima saadaan erityisesti juuri verkon kyvyttömyydestä kontrolloida
informaation sisältöä tai verkon toimijoita ja näiden toimia. Neutraalisuus stabiloituu
edelleen toimintaverkon yksinkertaisuuden kautta, jolloin neutraalisuuden ja yksinkertaisuu-
den arkkitehtuurinen yhdistelmä vi ittaa erityisesti juuri verkon kyvyttömyyteen
kontrolloida välitettäviä sisältöjä tai kommunikaatiosovellutuksia. Innovaatiot ovat
vapaita syntymään ja kehittymään tämänkaltaisessa avoimessa verkossa. Vapaus
puolestaan on omiaan lisäämään innovatiivisuutta. Lisäksi kuvatunlainen verkko vaikuttaa
sekä informaation laatuun että valtaan ilmaista ideoita. Siksi innovaatioverkon tulisi rakentua
edellä mainituille elementeille, erityisesti neutraalisuudelle ja yksinkertaisuudelle. Lisäksi
sen tulisi muodostua hajautetuksi.
5 VALTAKYLLÄSTETTY YKSINOIKEUS - YKSINOIKEUTETTU VALTA
Digitaalitalous on kommunikaatioita. Eräs sen keskeisistä rakenne-elementeistä on juuri
toiminnallisuus. Toiminnallisuus ei siten perustu ainoastaan yksittäisille toiminnoille, vaan nämä
toiminnot täydentyvät niiden heijastuspintana näyttäytyvällä toimintaympäristöllä. Tämä
toimintojen ja ympäristön vuorovaikutus muodostaa erään niistä rajapinnoista, joilla
digitaalitalouden kommunikatiivisuus tulee esiin. Toimintojen ja toimintaympäristön
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kokonaisuutta ei siksi voi kuvata pelkästään staattisena, vaan sitä on välttämättä
täydennettävä dynaamisilla komponenteilla. Dynamiikkaa tarvitaan erityisesti rakennetta-
essa toimintaympäristöä. Toimintaympäristö rakentuu siten toiminnoista ja niiden
toteuttamiseksi tehdyistä säännöistä, jolloin toiminnallisuus on mahdollista ulottaa
suoraan toimintaympäristön ytimeen. Hohfeldin käsittein (tässä vapaasti suomennettuna):
valta sitoutetaan staattiseen sisältöön, toisin sanoen yksinoikeuteen perustuva oikeuden
sisältö valtakyllästetään. Vallan kyllästäminen tapahtuu karkeasti kuvaten siten, että
oikeudenhaltijan yksinoikeus (privilege) säilytetään staattisen aspektin pääkäsitteenä
muodostaen samalla vallasta (power) yksinoikeutta määrittävä elementti perinteisen
(vaade)oikeuden sijaan.
Yksinoikeuden ja vallan yhdistelmä toimii funktionaalisuuden heijastuspintana. Nämä
kaksi toisiinsa limittyvää elementtiä muodostavat yhdessä digitaalisen talouden
oikeudellisen arkkitehtuurin perustan. Toiminnot ja perusteet saatetaan keskinäiseen
vuorovaikutukseen, jotta kyettäisiin kuvaamaan dynaamista toiminnallisuutta riittävän
selkeästi. Toisaalta keskeisin elementti, johon vallan yksinomaistamisella on vaikutuksen-
sa, löytyy statiikan ja dynamiikan keskinäisestä tasapainosta oikeussuhteissa. Vallan
yksinomaistaminen siirtää nimittäin dynamiikkaa kohti käyttöoikeutta: käyttöoikeus
dynamisoidaan, mutta samalla dynamiikkakin täydentyy oikeuden käytettävyydellä. Tämä
siis yksinomaistaa vallan, ja tällä tavoin koko vallan ja yksinoikeuden - tai yksinoikeuden
ja vallan - yhdistelmä täydentyy. Tällä tavoin konstruoitu yhdistelmä muotoaa valtakylläs-
tetyn yksinoikeuden - tai yksinoikeutetun vallan - keskeistä alaa.
Oikeuksienhallinta-arkkitehtuuri lepää siten yksinoikeuden ja vallan yhdistelmän varassa,
siis statiikan ja dynamiikan varassa. Näistä kumpikaan ei yksin ole täysin adekvaatti
muodostamaan tai edes kuvaamaan digitaalisen toimintaympäristön oikeuksienhallinta-
arkkitehtuuria. Täydellisen kuvan saamiseksi tarvitaan sekä statiikkaa että dynamiikkaa,
jolloin staattinen, sisältöä määrittävä puoli täydennetään dynaamisella, toimintaa
määrittävällä aspektilla. Toisaalta tällaisen arkkitehtuurin lopullinen malli edellyttää, että
molemmat, sekä staattinen yksinoikeus, että dynaaminen valta saadaan toimimaan
harmonisesti ja rinnakkain. Toisaalta oikeuksien funktionaalinen yhdistelmä määrittyy
parhaiten ottamalla huomioon myös erilaiset toiminnassa mukanaolevat tahot, jotka
liittyvät sitten joko yksinoikeutettuun tai valtakyllästettyyn oikeusasemaan.
Yksinoikeuden ja vallan yhdistelmän prototyyppi löytyy yhteisöllisten intressien
alueelta, jossa yhteiskäyttöisiä hyödykkeitä voidaan tarkastella kahdesta erilaisesta
näkökulmasta. Ensinnäkin yhteiskäyttöisten hyödykkeiden staattisen elementin ydin
koostuu yksinoikeuteen pohjautuvasta oikeusasemasta, ja se on rakennettu staattisessa
tilassa olevien oikeuksien hallinnointia varten. Toiseksi yhteisöllisten hyödykkeiden
dynaaminen elementti perustuu valtaan vaikuttaa toisen toimijan oikeusasemaan.
Perinteisesti tämä on toteutettu siirtämällä oikeuksia, mutta dynamiikan määrittely
uudistuneessa digitaalitalouden arkkitehtuurissa, esimerkiksi yhteiskäyttöisten hyödykkei-
den kohdalla, tapahtuukin käyttämällä hyväksi suhteita, jotka koskevat vain joitakin
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toimintaan osallistuvia tahoja kerrallaan. Tässä mielessä oikeuksienhallinta on relatiivista.
Tällä tavoin käyttö ja toiminta eli valtakyllästetty yksinoikeus ja yksinoikeutettu valta
muodostavat yhteiskäyttöisten hyödykkeiden hallinnoinnin ytimen.
Uudella tavalla rakennettu ja tulkittu oikeuksienhallinta-arkkitehtuuri ei siis
rakennu pelkästään sen varaan, että oikeuksia kyettäisiin siirtämään etupiiristä toiseen.
Juuri tässä suhteessa yhteiskäyttöiset hyödykkeet tarjoavat malliesimerkin. Yhteisöllisten
intressien muodostama alue ei nimittäin edes toimi ilman että dynamiikka määritellään
perinteisestä poikkeavalla tavalla; uuden tulkinnan tarve on ilmeinen. Yhteiskäyttöiset
hyödykkeet nimittäin kuuluvat oikeastaan yhteisölle, ei yksilölle. Nämä hyödykkeet ovat
siis yhteisön omaisuutta, ja tässä mielessä niiden käyttö ei erottele henkilötahoja siten, että
osa määrittyisi sisä- ja osa ulkopuolisiksi. Juuri tästä syystä dynamiikka ja erityisesti
dynamiikan ydin siirtyy yhteisöllisten intressien osalta vaihdantaan painottuneesta
dynamiikasta toimintaan painottuvan dynamiikan suuntaan. Tällä tavoin yhteiskäyttöisten
hyödykkeiden käytön dynamiikka silti säilyy relatiivisena ja koskee ainoastaan toimintaan
osallisia.
6 VAIKUTUS IMMATERIAALIOIKEUKSIEN JÄRJESTELMÄÄN
Immateriaalioikeudet ovat kommunikaatiota. Kommunikatiivisuus asettuu kuitenkin
kyseenalaiseen valoon perinteisessä immateriaalioikeuksien järjestelmässä. Perinteinen
järjestelmä perustuu inventioille staattisina pistemäisinä tapahtumina. Samalla koko
järjestelmästä muodostuu staattinen. Staattisuus johtuu välttämättä invention käsitteestä
ja sen staattisuudesta. Käsite nimittäin itsessään edellyttää, että kaikille siihen sisältyville
elementeille on löydettävä tiukat määritelmät, jolloin käsitteen ulkopuolelle jäävät
elementit kyetään rajaamaan pois. Invention määreet tulevat siten suoraan osaksi sen
sisältöä, jolloin sisältö muodostuu lineaariseksi. Käsitteen ydin siis määritellään kahtiajaon
sisällytetty/poissuljettu nojalla. Samalla tämä kuitenkin tekee inventiosta staattisen ja stabiilin.
Inventiosta muodostuu siten perinteisen järjestelmän prototyyppi. Invention staattisista
lähtökohdista on kuitenkin hankala tarkastella digitaaliajan innovaatioita - ja inventioita-
kin. Siten toisinaan jo pelkästään invention määritelmä ja sen sisältö tekee invention ja
innovaation keskinäisten erojen näkemisen hankalaksi tai jopa mahdottomaksi. Hyvänä
esimerkkinä on idea ja sen suojaaminen. Inventio nimittäin perustuu aina ideaan.
Kuitenkin tultuaan osaksi inventiota idea jää aina ytimeltään inventiota itseään
dynaamisemmaksi. Ideat taas puolestaan muodostavat innovatiivisuuden perustan ja ovat
siis siksikin luonteeltaan olennaisesti dynaamisia. Sen vuoksi suurin ongelma invention
staattisuudessa syntyy juuri idean dynaamisuudesta suhteessa invention omistukselliseen,
staattiseen luonteeseen. Ideat ja informaatio digitaaliajan invention ytimenä aiheuttavat
perinteiselle järjestelmälle siten suurimmat muutospaineet. Digitaalitalouden tuomat
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muutospaineet kiinnittyvätkin erityisesti juuri ideoihin ja niiden keskeiseen rooliin
inventioiden synnyssä.
Digitaaliset inventiot perustuvat informaation vapaaseen saatavuuteen ja ideoiden
vapaaseen kulkuun. Tämä prosessi on keskeisesti dynaaminen ja se muodostaa
digitaalisten inventioiden ytimen. Informaatio on kuitenkin suhteellisen hankala määritellä
tiukoin edellytyksin, samoin kuin sitä on vaikea pakottaa tiettyyn valmiiseen muottiin, siis
perinteisellä tavalla määritellyksi inventioksi. Siksi invention staattinen malli saattaa
osaltaan jopa rajoittaa riittävän vahvaa suojaa. Informaatio siis kaiken kaikkiaan näyttäisi
olevan hankala sekä määrittää että stabiloida. Ongelma jakautuu kahdelle perusteelle:
harkittaessa informaatiolle sopivaa suojamuotoa kuviosta puuttuu usein varsinainen suojan
kohde. Toisaalta informaation suojaamisessa puutteita esiintyy myös riittävässä subjektiivisuudes-
sa. Tällainen eroavuus kyseenalaistaa subjektiivisen oikeuden keskeisyyden invention
eräänä keskeiselementtinä. Vaade kaikilla oikeuksilla olevasta subjektista muodostaa erään
varallisuusoikeuden kantavista rakenteista. Subjektiivinen oikeus, kuten juuri esimerkiksi
jokin varallisuusoikeus, rakentuu tietyille perusedellytyksille. Toisaalta subjektiivinen
oikeus on konstruoitavissa ainoastaan silloin, kun nämä edellytykset täyttyvät. Vähintään
on siis täytyttävä vaatimus tarkasti määrätystä oikeusobjektista. Lisäksi on oltava joku,
jolle oikeudet voidaan kohdistaa eli oikeussubjekti, ja kolmanneksi on oltava näitä
yhdistävä side, oikeussuhde. Digitaalinen inventio ei kuitenkaan välttämättä täytä näitä
kaikkia kolmea vaadetta, eikä se siten välttämättä myöskään voi aina palautua subjektiivi-
sen oikeuden konstruktioon. Vastakohtana digitaaliselle inventiolle toimii siis perinteinen
inventio, joka on/oli usein tarkasti määritelty kaikissa edelle kuvatuissa suhteissa ja
täyttää/täytti siten myös subjektiivisen oikeuden edellytykset.
Invention staattisuus muodostaa olennaisen tekijän silloin, kun määritellään,
kenellä on invention hallinta. Hallinta on toisaalta omistuksen ydin. Myös tästä syystä,
ollakseen jonkun hallinnassa, invention tulee olla stabiloitu, määritelty ja rajattu.
Stabilointi määrittää siten sen perussuhteen, jonka varassa tehdään arvio hallinnanhaltijan
ja invention keskinäissuhteesta, siis kuka hallitsee mitä. Tämä määritelmä ja sidos kuitenkin
samanaikaisesti heikentää oikeussuhteiden elastisuutta. Tämä sidos juuri stabiloi ja
jähmettää koko perinteisen oikeussuhteiden järjestelmän. Näistä lähtökohdista inventio
siis määritellään hallinnanhaltijan sidonnaisuutena suhteessa inventioon. Siksi stabilointi
viittaakin juuri perinteiseen oikeusjärjestelmään, missä varallisuus usein kapitalisoituu
parhaiten silloin, kun se asettuu tiukan ja hyvin suojatun hallinnan piiriin. Jonkin
määrittäminen inventioksi, ja sen stabiloiminen tällä tavoin ei kuitenkaan perinteisessä-
kään järjestelmässä tarkoita sitä, että kohde itsessään lakkasi kehittymästä, vaikkakin sen
on saavutettava riittävä taso, jotta voidaan ylipäätään puhua inventiosta. Uusien
inventioiden asettaminen tähän tarkasti määrättyyn kehykseen yhdessä inventoiden
jatkuvan kehityksen kanssa onkin pääasiallisin ongelma esimerkiksi liiketoimintamallien
patentoinnissa. Liiketoimintamallit ovat erittäin innovatiivisia, ja sellaisena vahvasti
dynaamisia, mutta siitä huolimatta nekin pyritään sovittamaan invention staattiseen
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määritelmään. Stabilointi tässä mielessä ja tässä yhteydessä kuitenkin estää patentoitujen
liiketoimintamallien myöhemmän innovatiivisen käytön. Siten voidaan perinteisen suojan
sanoa jäädyttävän koko järjestelmän.
Dynamisoitu näkökulma immateriaaliseen varallisuuteen kuvautuu parhaiten
näkökulmaa vaihtamalla: polttopisteessä ei siten enää olekaan inventio staattisessa
mielessä, vaan ennemminkin invention ja sitä määrittävän ympäristön välinen suhde.  Tausta
löytyy statiikasta; inventioiden käyttöä pidetään perinteisesti staattisena, jolloin staattinen
näkökulma sitoo inventiot tiukasti varallisuuteen ja edellytyksiin sen käytöstä. Statiikan
perustavanlaatuisuutta horjuttaa kuitenkin muutos statiikan itsensä ja dynamiikan
välisessä tasapainossa, jolloin koko näkökulmasta muodostuu funktionaalinen. Samalla
itse näkökulmaakin uudistetaan ja dynamisoidaan. Tällä tavoin juuri dynamiikka toimii
tässä jatkuvan muutoksen moottorina. Vastaavasti invention dynamisoinnissa ja
funktionalisoinnissa on huomioitava se toimintaympäristö, jossa inventioita tuotetaan ja
käytetään; myös toimintaympäristö hahmotetaan tällöin dynaamisena. Juuri tästä syystä
tätä uuteen selitystapaan pyrkivää näkökulmaa voidaan kutsua kommunikatiiviseksi
vuorovaikutuksen muodostaessa näkökulman keskeisimmän osan.
Invention dynamisoitunut malli voidaan nähdä jo innovaationa. Koko innovaa-
tiomallin dynamisoinnilla on ainakin yksi vakava seuraus; se nimittäin muuttaa välttämättä
oikeuden ja vallan välistä keskinäissuhdetta. Käyttöoikeus perinteisesti käsitettynä yksinoikeu-
tena toisin sanoen menettää sille kuuluneen keskeisen aseman. Tämä on järjestelmän
dynamisoinnin suora vaikutus silloin, kun pelkkä käyttöoikeus jää välttämättä liian
staattiseksi, jotta sen avulla voitaisiin kuvata dynaamisia oikeusilmiöitä. Staattisuuden
sijaan järjestelmä tulisikin perustaa dynamiikalle, jolloin keskeisimmäksi käsitteeksi
nousee käyttöoikeuden sijasta valta kykynä vaikuttaa toiminnassa aktiivisina näyttäytyvien
tahojen toiminnallisiin positioihin. Samalla tällainen valtakyllästetty asema muuttaa koko
toiminnan dynaamiseksi. Edelleen, yhtäkään toiminnallisista kokonaisuuksista ei voida
tarkastella kokonaan irrallaan ympäristöstään, vaan ne toimivat tiiviissä yhteistyössä
ympäristönsä kanssa. Toimintaympäristön tuleminen osaksi toimintojen kokonaisuutta on
siten suora seuraus dynaamisen aspektin nostamisesta keskeiseen asemaan. Samalla myös
siis toimintaympäristöstä tulee yksi arkkitehtuurin toiminnallisista osista. Vastaavasti
toiminnassa aktiivisena näyttäytyviä tahoja tarkastellaan toimintaympäristön muodosta-
maa kehikkoa vasten, jolloin siis kyetään kuvaavasti tuomaan esiin yksinoikeuden ja
vallan keskinäinen leikkauskohta, samoin kuin digitaalisen talouden keskeiselementit.
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